



**Midlands State
University**



**ABEL MUZOREWA'S SECURITY FORCE AUXILIARIES (SFAs) DURING
AND AFTER THE WAR OF LIBERATION IN HURUNGWE DISTRICT,
ZIMBABWE**

Being a thesis submitted to the Department of History, Midlands State University, Gweru,
Zimbabwe in fulfilment of the requirements of a **Doctor of Philosophy**

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DEDICATION

To my teacher and mentor Never Kapungu and the late Michael Chakawa for encouraging me to specialize in History.

Abstract

The Security Force Auxiliaries (SFAs) who actively fought for Bishop Abel Muzorewa in Zimbabwe's war of liberation and their experiences remain a grey area in Zimbabwean historical studies. Their voices in the history of the armed struggle are conspicuously absent. Where they appear, they are simply castigated as those of sellouts, imperialist stooges, and traitors who are better ignored. Rhodesian writings which largely celebrate counter-insurgency also ignore the role of the Security Force Auxiliaries. What exist are 'namings' and 'otherings' such as 'dzakutsaku', 'huruyadzo' and 'Pfumo Revanhu' that are dependent on the enunciator's ideological position. This thesis therefore fills an important gap in Zimbabwean political history through a focus on a neglected historical subject—that of SFAs in particular, and the manufacturing of political identities in general. At the centre of this thesis are such pertinent questions such as whom these SFAs were, why and how they were created and the role they played in the war. A case study of Hurungwe district is used because it was one of those complex theatres of war in which ZIPRA, ZANLA, Selous Scouts, Security Force Auxiliaries and regular Rhodesian colonial forces operated and competed for the 'hearts and minds' of the people. What is emerging from this thesis is that SFAs were generally recruited by force from mujibhas, hastily trained and often deployed to their areas of origin to fight against guerrillas while at the same time bringing back and defending colonial civil administration that was targeted by guerrillas for sabotage. One of the findings of this thesis, that will certainly disturb those who have accepted the idea of a popular anti-colonial liberation war, is the positive perception of auxiliaries as a force that indeed protected the people. This explains why, in part, there was no widespread violence against them in Hurungwe after 1980 and why at the end of the war SFAs were fully integrated into their families. This finding, however, does not discount the political challenges met by SFAs as their wartime role and identities continued to haunt them in post-war Zimbabwe. Thus, the thesis ends with an analysis of the postindependence national reconciliation and military integration which largely ignored SFAs. The exclusion of SFAs is part and parcel of the construction of political identities into insiders and outsiders as well as patriots and sellouts. Through this research, the SFAs' version of Zimbabwe's bush war is unveiled in order to fill an academic lacuna on blacks who fought against ZAPU and ZANU during the liberation war. The thesis deconstructs the role of such people as sellouts who were determined to block Zimbabwe's independence. This is a historical study that draws its data from oral interviews with former SFAs and wartime civilians, archival as well as published and unpublished sources.

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LIST OF ACRONYMS

ANC	African National Congress
ANC-Z	African National Congress- Zimbabwe
BSAP	British South Africa Police
CCJP	Catholic Commission for Justice and Peace
CID	Criminal Investigation Department
CIO	Central Intelligence Organization
DA	District Assistant
DC	District Commissioner
DSA	District Security Assistant
FM	Field Manual
FROLIZI	Front for the Liberation of Zimbabwe
MHS	Matebele Home Society
MOS	Monomotapa Offspring Society
NDP	National Democratic Party
PF- ZAPU	Patriotic Front- Zimbabwe African People's Union
PVs	Protected Villages
RENAMO	Resistencia Nacional Mocambicana- An acronym derived from the first two letters of each word in the name. It is used interchangeably with MNR.
RLI	Rhodesian Light Infantry
RPA	Rwanda Patriotic Army
RSF	Rhodesian Security Forces
SB	Special Branch
SFAs	Security Force Auxiliaries
SS	Selous Scouts
UANC	United African National Council
UNITA	National Union for the Total Independence of Angola
ZANLA	Zimbabwe African National Liberation Army (armed wing of ZANU)
ZANU	Zimbabwe African National Union
ZANU-PF	Zimbabwe African National Union- Patriotic Front

ZAPU	Zimbabwe African People's Union
PF-ZAPU	Patriotic Front- Zimbabwe African People's Union
ZDP	Zimbabwe Democratic Party
ZIPRA	Zimbabwe People's Revolutionary Army (armed wing of ZAPU)
ZUPO	Zimbabwe United People's Organization

CHAPTER 1

INTRODUCTION

This thesis is a study of the role of Security Force Auxiliaries (SFAs) in Zimbabwe's war of liberation and their post-war experiences. The role played by the Security Force Auxiliaries was determined by various identities they were given and those which they attributed to themselves. As such, identity is interwoven with the role which SFAs played. Although numerous researches have been done on historically and culturally determined identities such as ethnicity and the market-determined identities such as class, the subject of constructing political identities within the context of a protracted liberation war in which African nationalist leaders competed for power has not been thoroughly researched on. Such political identities as counter-revolutionary, quisling, Tshombe, sell-out, patriot, puppet, collaborator, freedom fighters, and many others emerged within the context of the prosecution of the nationalist liberation struggle.

The Security Force Auxiliaries was a term used to denote the armed wings of Abel Muzorewa and Ndabaningi Sithole's military and political formations that were internally based in Rhodesia (now Zimbabwe). These forces have been portrayed in popular Zimbabwe African National Liberation Army (ZANLA), Zimbabwe People's Revolutionary Army (ZIPRA) and academic histories as mercenaries and sellouts who betrayed the nationalist and liberation war cause.¹ Muzorewa himself is also perceived as a later-day turncoat politician who hijacked the African revolution in the 1970s on account that he was simply power hungry.² The thesis deals with the complicated question of the making of political identities and interrogates the political assertions that sustained political labeling as part of excluding contending nationalist actors and their supporters. This is done through detailed empirical research based on oral interviews with former auxiliaries and those whom they interacted with during the liberation war in Zimbabwe. Partly

¹D Cauter, *Under the Skin: The Death of White Rhodesia*, London, Northwestern University Press, 1983, p. 270, J Nkomo, *The Story of My Life*, SAPES Trust, 2001, p. 212, J McLaughlin, *On the Frontline: Catholic Missions in Zimbabwe's Liberation War*, Harare, Boabab Books, 1996, p. 36 and J Alexander, J McGregor and T Ranger, *One Hundred Years in the Dark Forests of Matebeleland*, Harare, Weaver Press, 2000, pp 151-157.

²R S Maposa, Bishop Muzorewa's Theology and the Struggle for Zimbabwe, 1965-1980: A Re-Consideration, *International Journal of Developing Societies*, Volume 2, No 1, 2013, p. 22.

the thesis establishes the SFAs' place in Zimbabwe's counter insurgency history, nationalist and Rhodesian politics. It also analyses various ways in which the use of SFAs impacted on the intensification of wartime violence in Hurungwe district where ZIPRA guerrillas operated until the end of the war.

Hurungwe was a highly contested theatre of war with various armed forces competing to garner support from the peasants. The thesis therefore extends the frontiers of knowledge in Zimbabwean political historiography beyond Masipula Sithole and Norma Kriger's conceptions of 'struggles within a struggle' that did not deal with the pertinent question of the construction of political identities. To articulate the thesis of 'struggles within the struggle' simply in terms of ethnicity and generational variations is part of the nationalist struggle's complications, but there is need to unpack and understand how political identities were constructed, their fluidities, and instrumentality in a liberation struggle where questions of power loomed large.

SFAs were created during the height of Zimbabwe's liberation war at the beginning of 1978, officially after the March 3 Agreement between Internal Settlement leaders and Ian Smith, which created a transitional government. This research explores the logic of creating SFAs who were aligned to one of the Internal Settlement leaders, namely Bishop Abel Muzorewa. It evaluates whether the force served any purpose other than safeguarding the status quo, that is, the perpetuation of the Rhodesian minority rule. Under the strategy of counter-insurgency, the central focus of the Rhodesian colonial white settler government was to win the hearts and minds or support and confidence of the colonized people by claiming to be protecting civilians in zones of conflict from guerrilla violence.³ By winning hearts and minds, it simply meant winning over people's confidence. As advanced by Evans, hearts and minds war meant applying timely principles of political participation and reform to counterinsurgency efforts.⁴ The research interrogates the implications of the counter-insurgency strategy, particularly how it culminated in the formation of SFAs during the closing phases of Zimbabwe's liberation war. Although there were many armed forces in Zimbabwe's liberation war, concentrating on a single force through a case study method will enable a better understanding of one force which was an integral

³ J. K Cilliers, *Counter-Insurgency in Rhodesia*, London, Croom-Helm, 1985, p. 202.

⁴ M Evans, The Wretched of the Empire: Politics, Ideology and Counterinsurgency in Rhodesia, 1965-1980, *Small Wars and Insurgencies*, Volume 18, Number 2, June 2007.p. 175.

component of the protracted war.

The central idea of this research is to elaborate how, through SFA (on behalf of the Internal Settlement and later the Zimbabwe- Rhodesia regime), Bishop Abel Muzorewa battled to win the 'hearts and minds' of rural people against guerrilla insurgencies who were fighting on behalf of their political party, namely ZAPU. This is brought to light by closely examining the development of the auxiliary concept, their recruitment, training, deployment, operations and how they interacted with civilians during the war. To this will be added post- war experiences of former SFAs with special attention being given to how they were received back by their own communities and how they were ultimately re-socialized.

Aims and Objectives

The general aim of the research is to establish the role of SFAs in Zimbabwe's war of liberation, their war against nationalist guerrillas, and how this ultimately shaped their identity in independent Zimbabwe. There are a number of objectives to be met in this research. The thesis examines the reasons why boys and youngmen joined SFAs as explained by those who were participants. It seeks to explain how they were recruited, trained and deployed taking into account the role they were going to play. Furthermore, the thesis locates the place of SFAs in the struggle, as nationalist parties fought for legitimacy during Zimbabwe's long war. It also analyses the role of SFAs in the violence that gripped Hurungwe district during the struggle for independence between 1978 and 1980. In addition, the research examines how the SFA type of counter insurgency warfare hinged on attempts to win 'hearts and minds' of the people. It highlights what they did in the successive governments between 1978 and 1980 as understood by people whose hearts the forces had wanted to win. In addition, the work illustrates their experiences after their disbandment and subsequently their re-integration and re-socialization process at the end of the war. Lastly, the research analyses the post-war experiences of former SFAs with reference to how those who knew or heard about them, for example, peasants, former ZIPRA guerrillas, Rhodesian soldiers and so on regard them.

Statement of the Problem

For many years, liberation war history was always presented from the point of view of the dominant and not the subaltern side. The defeated or those who were opposed to the cause of popular liberation wars and tried unsuccessfully to bring about an alternative vision of independence or their own mode of liberation were generally not allowed by the repressive atmosphere to add their voices. History was a chronicle of the victors' words and deeds. The lives and views of common people (especially military and non-military *collaborators* with minority regimes) were considered non important.⁵ Those who had won the struggle saw people who presented alternative views or took a different course as enemies or counter-revolutionaries.⁶ Sidelining former enemies is part of identity politics which is dependent on the rhetoric of blame, the illocutionary effects which are designed to chastise the target for being unjust, prejudiced, inhuman, oppressive and /or violent.⁷ This thesis is therefore influenced by the need to depart from a history which relied on the story of great men and the broad national story to one narrated from the standpoint of a historically neglected former armed force. Currently one finds romanticism and triumphalism on the part of those who won.

During the early years of independence when ZANU-PF support was almost widespread (except for Matebeleland and parts of the Midlands provinces), former combatants who were deemed to have identified with the minority regime during Zimbabwe's liberation war feared to air their views even in private. In fact, SFAs were not even regarded as combatants and as such they were not made to fit in the category of ex-combatants. Therefore, until such components of society are given the platform to speak, the history of Zimbabwe's war of liberation will remain incomplete. To date, enough time has lapsed for the alleged military *collaborators* (SFAs) to freely discuss their wartime and post-war experiences. In his study of the 1896-7 Chimurenga War, Beach argued that collaboration or neutrality were not neat categories into which different groups could

⁵M Bourdillon and P Gundani, 'Rural Christians and Zimbabwe's Liberation War', in, C Hallercreutz and A Moyo, *Church and State in Zimbabwe*, Gweru, Mambo Press, 1988, p.147.

⁶C Saunders, 'Issues of Writing on Liberation Struggles in Southern Africa', in C Saunders (ed), *Documenting Liberation Struggles in Southern Africa: Select Papers from the Nordic Africa Documentation Project Workshop*, 26-27 November 2009, South Africa, Uppsala, Nordid Africa Institute, p.98.

⁷K J Gregen, 'Social Construction and the Transformation of Social Identities', F Newman and L Holzman (eds), *A New Development Way of Learning*, New York, Routledge, 1999, p. 3.

be slotted. Chiefdoms often shifted from one group to the other and back again depending on the politics of the day.⁸ Beach went on to argue that the issue of collaboration has remained a sensitive issue among the Shona since the First Chimurenga. For years, the Nhowe used to spit when a Budya passed by and in 1973, a Shona student at the University of Rhodesia suggested that a study in the ethnic origins of these Budya collaborators should be carried out so as to determine if they are really Shona or not in order to understand why they fought on the side of the BSA Company.⁹ Such sentiments were found to be strong against former SFAs in times of political instability such as election where constant reference is made to the war of liberation by those vying for power. The major difference between the First and Second Chimurenga is that in the latter chiefs, spirit mediums and other traditional leaders did not feature prominently in the decisions by youths to join or not to join SFAs. Chiefs did not command the war in Hurungwe and at times they were at the mercy of armed combatants. In the works of Beach, the decision to join the war, collaborate or stay neutral was taken at leadership level. In the case of SFAs, it was found that neither the traditional leaders nor the parents had a major say in the recruitment of young men into auxiliary forces.

Those who co-operated with the minority colonial regimes have earned such names as collaborators. If such were the sentiments, then it means that indeed it is noble to get those who fought for an alternative Zimbabwe to speak and tell their own version of how and why they came to differently prosecute the war of liberation. They need to be rescued from silence because they have not been given a chance to add their narratives in the making of the nation. Doing so would set the ball rolling for studies into the Guard Force, DSAs, farmers' militia and even various households who decided to take an alternative route. The thesis is not intended to put SFAs at par with organizations fighting the brutalities of colonialism but is bent on giving an alternative way of examining Zimbabwe's road to independence. It is also intended to demonstrate that those who joined SFAs might have done so out of rational calculations. Interestingly therefore, the study found many willing respondents especially from among former SFAs who were ready to share their experiences.

⁸D N Beach, *War and Politics in Zimbabwe 1840-1900*, Gweru, Mambo Press, 1986, p. 69.

⁹*ibid*, p.145.

Robins has also commented about the lack of representation of other players of Zimbabwe's war of liberation. He decried that official accounts remain focused on the heroic narratives that culminated in ZANU's triumph. That kind of approach has deliberately excluded traces of memories of beatings, torture, death and disappearances of countless Ndebele speakers who were massacred in the 1980s in the Midlands and Matebeleland provinces.¹⁰ In the 1980s, researchers tended to be uncritical because they believed that criticism would bring the hard-won struggle to disrepute. By extension, the SFAs have been negatively portrayed in public histories, archives, museum exhibits, art, television documentaries, theatre and school textbooks. The assertion becomes clear if one reads a publication by J Frederikse.¹¹ In the end voices of such people as the SFAs have been gagged by the defensive Zimbabwean state. It is now the correct moment to resolve the problem by rescuing the silent voices through oral interviews.

The other problem is that those who have studied and written on the auxiliaries have done so without capturing voices from auxiliaries themselves, their wartime instructors or those responsible for their deployment.¹² No serious effort has been made to establish what the civilians of Hurungwe district or, for that matter, every other rural area, had to say about their relations with auxiliaries during the war and the way in which local communities received them back to normal civilian life. Professor Ranger decried that Zimbabweans are being frequently nauseated by endless propaganda about how freedom fighters were always winning battles against Rhodesian security forces and how helicopters were downed during such engagements.¹³ The war was quite complicated hence military confrontations between guerrillas and auxiliaries go a long way in addressing issues concerning the meaning of battlefield life for SFAs in addition to establishing their usefulness to the system which they were defending.

¹⁰ S. Robins, 'Heroes, Heretics and Historians of Zimbabwe's Revolution: A Review of Norma Kriger's Peasant Voice, in, *ZAMBEZIA XXIII*. 1(1996), p.74.

¹¹ J. Frederikse, *None But Ourselves: Masses Versus the Media in the Making of Zimbabwe*, Johannesburg, Ravan Press, 1982, p.257. Bob North of the Rhodesian Intelligence Corps referred to the auxiliaries as the ----- 'biggest rabble I have ever come across. Undisciplined political thugs as far as I am concerned----- so it turned out, those auxiliaries were nothing more than paid political thugs

¹² J K Cilliers, *Counterinsurgency in Rhodesia*, 1985. The author spends a whole chapter on Operation Favor without any input from auxiliaries themselves. H Ellert, *The Rhodesian Front War*, 1993 also does the same on a chapter dedicated to SFAs

¹³ www.britain-zimbabwe.org.uk/ZimbHistoriography 6 November 2011, p.16.

Justification of study

The research is vital because it initiates debate on a force which has been ignored or denigrated in Zimbabwe's liberation war history. Guerrillas and Rhodesian Security Forces have been extensively researched on while SFAs alongside other combatants of minority regimes such as District Security Assistants (DSAs) and Guard Forces have been eclipsed by guerrilla veterans. This is in spite of the fact that they were numerous. For example, SFAs numbered up to 19000 by ceasefire at the end of 1979.¹⁴ Of course, the issue of numbers is not generally agreed. Judith Todd estimates that the total number of auxiliaries belonging to Bishop Muzorewa was about 16000.¹⁵ Despite the disagreement, the sheer number of these combatants makes them a compelling and worthwhile subject of study. Further, the research considerably fills the knowledge gap identified by Professors Bhebe and Ranger when they lament that *'the whole subject of the Internal Settlement and of the auxiliaries badly needs to be researched.'* The two added that such a research would add to *'our understanding not only of the war on the ground but also of gender and generation issues and of witchcraft issues during the war.'*¹⁶ Many former members of the SFAs that I interviewed were of the opinion that they rescued civilians from brutal excesses of guerrilla violence. The strategic logic of such claims should be thoroughly investigated so that the matter is brought to light in order to establish whether the force had any popular support. In short, very little is yet understood about the black servicemen, especially their motives in joining the white-led security forces in ever increasing numbers.

Ndlovu-Gatsheni has indicated that the nationalist visions of such nationalist actors as Muzorewa and Sithole have remained languishing outside the mainstream liberation struggle history. The popular view is that they represented reactionary politics and were bent on compromising the ideals of the national liberation. He adds that a recovery of the side of the nationalist narrative of such ignored nationalist actors draws from their visions, the existence of autobiographies and their other writings which reveal the drama of the liberation struggle.¹⁷ Reluctantly at least, these

¹⁴J K Cilliers, *Counter Insurgency in Southern Rhodesia*, London, Croom Helm, 1985, p. 211.

¹⁵J G Todd, *Through the Darkness: A Life in Zimbabwe*, Cape Town, Zebra Press, 2007, p. 8.

¹⁶N Bhebe and T O Ranger, 'Introduction', *Society in Zimbabwe's Liberation War Volume II*, Harare, UZ Publications, 1995, p. 5.

¹⁷S J Ndlovu-Gatsheni, *Do Zimbabweans Exist: Trajectories of Nationalism and National Identity in a Post-*

‘failed’ nationalists have been given some attention especially by Rhodesian writers such as Peter Stiff, Ian Pingle, Richard Bourne, Paul Moorcraft, Peter McLaughlin, Ian Smith, Douglas Rogers and Ron Reid Dally. The situation becomes more pathetic if questions are raised on what became of their supporters and more importantly their combatants. There is relevance and logic in uncovering how they were affected by various forms of violence such as structural, systemic and symbolic. The way in which SFAs adjusted to civilian life goes a long way in informing and complementing the current efforts of Zimbabwe’s Organ for National Reconciliation, Healing and Integration (ONHRI). SFAs were ignored once they were disbanded but some did join the uniformed forces during the integration period making it a point to hide their previous identities.

Re-humanization of former combatants is a central element to study because it gives new life to them and enables their full acceptance in communities where they reside. Traditionally in some parts of Africa and Latin America, there was a tendency of warriors returning from the battlefield to go through transformative rituals which would cleanse them of the shame of having shed blood or any other crimes committed during the execution of the war. In war soldiers may kill, burn and rape because they have entered into an altered state which gives space to do that. According to Ehrenreich who studied ancient Latin America, returning warriors went through challenging rituals before they could celebrate victory or reenter the community. The ceremonies included covering their heads in apparent shame, vomiting repeatedly, abstaining from sex and so on.¹⁸ Among the ancient Maori, it is alleged that returning warriors could not participate in the victory celebration until they had gone through a *whaka-hoa* ritual designed to make them ‘common’ again. The hearts of slain enemies were roasted after which offerings were made to the war god Tu and the rest were eaten by priests who shouted spells to remove the ‘blood curse’ and enable the warriors to reenter their ordinary lives. Last, among the Taulipang Indians of South America, victorious warriors sat on ants, flogged one another with whips, and passed a cord covered with poisonous ants, through their mouths and noses.¹⁹ These painful and shocking post war rites are easily articulated because their performance was public knowledge to any victorious side especially before the spread of Western *civilization*. This is not withstanding

Colonial State, Berlin, Bern, 2009, page.126.

¹⁸ B Ehrenreich, *Blood Rites: The Origins and History of the Passions of War*, London, Granta Publications, 2011, p.12.

¹⁹ *ibid.*

exaggerations by Western writers such as Ereinreich whose intention was partly to justify European colonization. There is no doubt that the defeated too went through their rituals but hardly are such activities captured in the mainstream historical narratives. Taking the spirituality of the Zimbabwean society as a point of departure, the defeated former SFAs also went through their own rituals either individually or in groups when the war came to an end. It is precisely these processes which the research sought to investigate in order to establish whether they took place, in what form and how curative they were.

Tekere noted that when a son comes from war, there are ceremonies to be held, beer is brewed and thanksgiving made for the safe return of the warrior. He claims that his family did it for him when he came back from Zimbabwe's war of liberation. In Robert Mugabe's case, Tekere claims that the ceremony could not be held until him as a comrade-in-arms attended but in the end, the ceremony did not take place because Mugabe did not invite Tekere as the family wished.²⁰ That numerous such ceremonies did take place cannot be denied but their nature on SFA forces who had lost the war and were denigrated is a crucial space to be investigated because it is a representation of the other and darker side of history which many researchers have deliberately avoided. I should hasten to point out that this research is not intended to blind Zimbabweans from the noble, moral and ethical justifications of waging the liberation war, but it emanates from the need of a multiplicity of voices especially from those who had been negatively branded leading them to feel uneasy about sharing their wartime experiences with fellow Zimbabweans because they have been *otherized*. Such people could include victims of guerrilla violence who eventually sided with SFAs.

The research was conducted in Hurungwe District which is in the Mashonaland West Province to the North West of Zimbabwe where a large number of auxiliary forces fought and still reside. Apparently not many guerrillas were recruited from the district largely because of physical impediments associated with crossing the Zambezi valley and river on foot.²¹ The area in

²⁰ E Z Tekere, *A Lifetime of Struggle*, Harare, SAPES, 2007, p.146. The assertion by Tekere should be approached with caution because by the time he wrote the book, he had become enemies with Mugabe. Like any other biography, this was also a political statement.

²¹ J Chakawa, 'The Environment and Zipra Guerrilla Warfare 1972-1979', Dissertation Submitted to the Department of History and Development Studies in Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements for a Master of Arts Degree in African History, Midlands State University, Gweru, Zimbabwe, 2007.

question was a ZIPRA operational zone called Northern Front 1.²² Most of that area was heavily patrolled by Rhodesian and South African Defense Forces, hence making it difficult for insurgents to pass undetected. Therefore, the majority of armed participants in the war being mainly auxiliary forces, it was found logical to get the history of the struggle from their experiences and what the local populations still remember. More often, SFAs are today portrayed in patriotic history as having been poorly trained and seriously lacking in discipline; hence in the end they indiscriminately attacked civilians. It is therefore crucial that this research interrogates the claim especially as it constitutes an integral part of winning hearts and minds. I chose one district because I intended to argue that such sweeping generalizations about the SFAs' wartime relations with civilians and their training are not justified on a nationwide scale. The political geography of the conflict is relevant not only to understanding the dynamics of the war's prosecution but also to analyzing the postwar relations between civilians and SFAs.

This research will benefit historians firstly in Zimbabwe and secondly across the continent. It provides the nation with a history of how SFA *collaboration* with the minority regime impacted on Zimbabwe's revolutionary war. It therefore adds a new chapter to Zimbabwe's history so that many academics and politicians may reconsider their perceptions of this force alongside the whole politics of the Internal Settlement and ultimately, Zimbabwe-Rhodesia. The general reader will also benefit from an extensive coverage of this important period in the history of the country especially written with the input from former members of the SFAs. In general the data of oral interviews will add to the collections of Zimbabwe's oral history project.

Literature Review

Counter-insurgency (COIN) can be defined as comprehensive civilian and military efforts to simultaneously defeat and contain insurgencies.²³ On the other hand, insurgency can be defined as the organized use of subversion and violence to seize, nullify or challenge political control of a region.²⁴ It constitutes of manipulating, undermining, or disrupting government institutions so that local authorities are 'out administered.' Thus Rhodesian forces including SFAs were an

²²Interview with Dumiso Dabengwa, former ZPRC Chief of Intelligence, City Hall, Bulawayo. 4 October 2013.

²³ US Counterinsurgency Guide, January 2009, p.12. www.state.gov/documents/organization/, 6 November 2015.

²⁴ *Ibid*, p. 5.

integral part of counter-insurgency while the Zimbabwe African National Liberation Army (ZANLA) and Zimbabwe People's Revolutionary Army (ZIPRA) were insurgent forces. Counter-insurgency can use conventional or unconventional means such as psychological operations and assassinations. It makes use of population control, oil spots, monitoring, cordon (guarding or stopping people from entering or leaving an area) and search and so on. The British, French, American and Germans have different strategies of counter-insurgency. This research however, concentrates mainly on the use of irregular forces as seen in the SFAs modus operandi. It investigates the effectiveness of the 'quasi-regulars' outside the standard Rhodesian command structures (such as SFAs) which were generated from the Rhodesian military to win over civilians to the government of Bishop Muzorewa. Further, it is crucial to find out why the Rhodesian government could have chosen that mode of operation as a means to fighting guerrillas and attempting to win over support especially from rural dwellers where the guerrilla war was heavily concentrated.

Counter-insurgency in the History of Southern Africa

Most compromised paramilitary forces in Southern Africa were created by minority white governments during liberation wars in attempts to win the war against guerrillas. This idea of setting blacks against each other was used in Mozambique, South Africa, Namibia and Angola. In Namibia's war of independence, the force was known as Koevoet and was responsible for the deaths of many SWAPO members and guerrillas.²⁵ They operated alongside white officers and were effective in tracking guerrillas. In addition, they also spearheaded a campaign of terror among the Ovambo and the Okavango people where guerrillas had extensive support. They did a number of odd jobs such as distributing propaganda newspapers, showing propaganda films and training bodyguards for pro-apartheid South African chiefs and headmen.²⁶ In the case of Rhodesia, such forces were created for politically influential chiefs such as Ndiweni and Chirau by the minority government of the day but were not as widespread and militant as Muzorewa's auxiliaries.

Former members of the hated Koevoet confessed atrocities they committed during the war

²⁵D Herbstein and J Evenson, *The Devils Are Among Us: The War for Namibia*, London, Zed Books, 1989, p. 61-68.

²⁶*Ibid.* p. 67.

against Namibia's independence to the Truth and Reconciliation Commission in South Africa.²⁷ In 2000 the former members of Koevoet (nicknamed crowbar) which had operated in Namibia during its liberation war gathered near Cape Town to reminisce about their 'glorious' days and to help each other cope with being outcasts in independent South Africa. The former second in command of the Koevoet told AFP that since they were disbanded, some have had nervous breakdowns and others had committed suicide. A former member, Grobber, said that the members felt purposeless in life when everyone thought that such people as him had no reason to live after atrocities which they committed on behalf of the apartheid South African government.²⁸ The research sought to promote a platform for the voice of former SFAs not only to get them to speak, but to find how disbandment affected them, how they were regarded on returning home by the same communities to which they had directed their violence during the war though in a different way from South Africa. Normally the standard practice is for war veterans to express a sense of superiority over civilians, which includes the feeling that they deserve a better political right than civilians. Schaffer has given numerous examples to that effect. These range from the Kenyan askari in the King's African Rifles to the Senegalese conscripts in the French colonial army, Germany veterans in the 4 major wars and so on – the superiority feeling continues.²⁹ There was a feeling among the victorious forces that they should occupy a special position because they had fought for the British Empire. In Nigeria, chiefs and headmen had problems with African 'veterans' returning from World War 1 even though they had been fighting to preserve not their empire but that of the British.³⁰ Those who demanded such a special treatment and recognition were aligned with the minority ruling government of the day.

As for the SFAs, their candidate, Bishop Muzorewa, lost the 1980 general election hence condemning his former combatants to all sorts of insults in the process. They were not offered an opportunity to share their military experiences but rather made to feel ashamed for shunning

²⁷*ibid.*

²⁸www.dispatch.co.za/koevoet, 25 June 2011.

²⁹J Schaffer, *Soldiers at Peace: Veterans and Society After the Civil War in Mozambique*, New York, Palgrave Macmillan, 2008, pp. 152-154.

³⁰*Ibid.*

nationalists and accused of siding with imperialists. Up to date, they have not been allowed by government-controlled media to share their glories and frustrations of the struggle which justifies why this research is doing so. Writing about SFAs in the first decade of independence was not undertaken because it had the potential of inviting the wrath of the state. Furthermore, historians were more preoccupied with exploring how independence had come about and analyzing roles of ZANU and ZAPU alongside the contribution of their military wings. Disbanded enemy forces were therefore not a lucrative option for study.

Rogers has pointed that it is one thing to be white and on the losing side in a race war but to be black and to have served on the side of the white regime as tens of thousands of Rhodesians did is to carry a mark of shame in Zimbabwe – and little chance of promotion.³¹ He gave an example of his family's former gardener, Lawrence, who left in 1975 to join the Rhodesian police force. Twenty-five years later he had still not risen beyond the position of sergeant. While that may be true, at least those who were in the army and police retained their jobs hence they did not have an experience as nasty and hopeless as those who were disbanded. That gap is the reason for researching more into the disbanded SFAs.

A study by Sachikonye on political violence in Zimbabwe during the period 2000 and 2002 has proved that many of its victims are indeed traumatized. Current symptoms are only short-term and long-term effects are yet to unfold. The work was based on the experiences of farm workers during the land invasions. They had to witness the violence of land reform and sometimes they fought in defense of their white masters and, at other times, they were beaten or tortured. There was also psychological torture in which some farm workers witnessed torture of their fellow colleagues or they were compelled to fight each other. He concludes that the former and present farm worker population is therefore a traumatized social group of the Zimbabwean society.³² That realization is crucial to the appreciation of how violence leaves permanent scars on its victims. Farm workers within the Zimbabwean situation were brought to light because of the farm invasions especially in order to paint a bad picture of the whole program. Otherwise before that, they were a generally languishing group and their experiences were not of public interest.

³¹D Rogers, *The Last Resort: A Memoir from Zimbabwe*, New York, Crown Publishing House, 2009, p. 274.

³² L Sachikonye, *When a State Turns on its Citizens: 60 Years of Institutionalised Violence in Zimbabwe*, Auckland Park, Jacana Media, 2011, pp.36-37.

The research sought to establish the contribution of farm workers and white commercial farms to the recruitment and training of auxiliaries.

Similarly, in the struggle against independence in Mozambique, the Portuguese created local militia called Flechas to fight Frelimo guerrillas. They were platoon-sized units consisting of 'tribesmen' and guerrilla defectors who were specialized in tracking, reconnaissance and pseudo-'terrorist' operations. Sometimes they patrolled in captured uniforms and were rewarded in cash bounties for every guerrilla they captured or killed.³³ They were similarly recruited in Angola as part of a strategy to win the support of people. The above research by Schaffer does not go on to elaborate what attracted locals to join Flechas and what they felt in being one. This is the lacuna being filled by this thesis. My study emphasizes that defectors from either auxiliaries or guerrillas should be researched on so that reasons for their defections can be compared with opinions and popular views. It is important to do so in order to prevent having to judge their decisions by current standards. Politicians who broke up or defected to form ZANU in 1963 have been given a lot of attention but not those who defected to the enemy. Some of them such as Nyathi who sold out Nyadzonia camp were summarily executed.

Apparently, there is no book published focusing entirely on the SFAs and their role in the liberation struggle. Rather, the available literature has concentrated on ZANLA, ZIPRA, leading nationalists, peasants, spirit mediums, churches and frontline states respectively.³⁴ These works did not ignore SFAs totally but only gave attention to them in passing because they did not find the force as useful to the cause of the liberation. There were no archives as yet covering the last years of the liberation war. For Zimbabwean writers, it was not very safe to concentrate on exploits of a counterinsurgency force. The safest way out was therefore to demonise forces such

³³L Sachikonye, *When a State Turns on its Citizens: 60 Years of Institutionalised Violence in Zimbabwe*, Auckland Park, Jacana Media, 2011, pp.36-37.

³⁴D Martin and P Johnson, *The Struggle for Zimbabwe: The Chimurenga War*, Harare, ZPH, 1981, N Bhebe, *The Zapu and Zanu Guerrilla Warfare and the Evangelical Lutheran Church in Zimbabwe*, Gwer, Mambo Press, 1999, E M Sibanda, *The Zimbabwe African People's Union 1961-1987: A History of Insurgency in Southern Rhodesia*, Trenton, Weaver Press, 2005, T O Ranger, *Peasant Consciousness and Guerrilla Warfare*, Harare, ZPH, 1985, N Kriger, *Zimbabwe's Guerrilla War: Peasant Voices*, Harare, Boabab Books, 1995, *Guerrilla Veterans in Post-War Zimbabwe*, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 2003, J Alexander et al, *One Hundred Years in the Dark Forests of Matebeleland* and F Chung, *Re-Living The Second Chimurenga: Memories from Zimbabwe's Liberation War*, Harare Weaver Press, 2007.

as SFAs. It is vital to review the works of 'Rhodesians' before that of academic historians, political scientists and anthropologists noted above.

Perspectives of 'Rhodesians' on the war of liberation and Auxiliaries

For the purposes of this review the term Rhodesians was used for whites who served the minority Smith regime in various capacities and have continued to identify with the minority cause of the liberation war. Although there were blacks who supported the minority cause, these have not researched or written on the war either because they are ashamed of themselves, they lack the capacity to write or have since renounced their commitment to the minority regime. Rhodesian works critiqued here were written by those who, at one time, served in the security forces during the war as Reservists, journalists, PATU, Grey Scouts, the BSAP or Selous Scouts. Most of them had the chance to write about their experiences after they had already left Zimbabwe.

Immediately after independence, Stiff wrote on the role of the Selous Scouts (SS) in the recruitment of SFAs from 'tamed' guerrillas. These were captured guerrillas who were then convinced to start operating as pseudo guerrillas or to join SFAs and use their new position to strike havoc into real guerrilla camps.³⁵ The thrust of Stiff's work is to highlight the place of the SS in various theaters of the war. The role of SS in attacks on Mozambique, Zambia and Angola is emphasized. The same applies to many military engagements and assignments in Rhodesia. In the process however, he discusses the formation and operations of SS in many parts of the country. For this thesis, the most important part is his discussion of the deployment and operations of SS and SFAs in Hurungwe.³⁶ It was this section which made it possible to realize massive deployment of pseudo SFA, ZIPRA and ZANLA in Hurungwe. Therefore, atrocities allegedly committed by ZIPRA need to be treated with caution as the SS were out to smear ZIPRA in full force. The work is entirely elitist and fictional because it is based on what Stiff was told by Lt Ron Reid Daly who headed Selous Scouts for most of the wartime. Stiff neither interviewed rural civilians nor critiqued claims by Daly, thereby turning the utterances more into a story than a comprehensive history. That Stiff, a former member of the British South African

³⁵ P Stiff, *Selous Scouts: Top Secret War*, Alberton, Galago Publishing, 1983, pp. 313-318.

³⁶ *ibid*, pp.316-317.

Police (BSAP), does not question Daly is myopic given the complexity of the war to which he was a participant. All he wanted to prove was that the Rhodesian military was so efficient but was betrayed by its politicians who negotiated independence with the Patriotic Front.

Caute was a war time British journalist who used to travel extensively either armed or unarmed, with or without Rhodesian Forces and sometimes had a chance of interviewing guerrillas and SFAs in the front. He described how dangerous it was for Africans to be associated with adjacent white commercial farmers or to be found betraying the struggle in any way. Of special mention is his identification of various fiefdoms headed by auxiliaries. Maranda Communal Lands were under 'Cde' Lloyd, a guerrilla defector who had been trained in Uganda and was by 1979, loyal to Ndabanigi Sithole. Musana Reserve auxiliaries were commanded by 'Comrade Max' who claimed to have trained in Tanzania, Egypt, Moscow and the Ukraine but was now fully behind the UANC of Muzorewa.³⁷ Manyeni TTL was under a 21 year old 'Mick Jagger who headed a force of 300- 400 auxiliaries'.³⁸ It becomes important to investigate whether such young auxiliaries in Hurungwe district did not upset traditional structures of authority thereby leading to deteriorating relations which could frustrate the agenda of getting support and legitimacy from locals.

Caute despises all auxiliaries by likening them to gangsters³⁹ and this is the view which the research sets out to investigate through oral interviews and archival information so as to give them a place which is objectively and historically theirs. Caute gives a list of districts where auxiliaries were fully established. Among these were; Musana, Mhondoro, Hurungwe, Masembura, Chinamora, Chiduku and Marange for Muzorewa. On the other hand, Sithole's men were in Gokwe, Maranda, Copper Queen and parts of the Eastern border. There are a number of grey areas in Caute's work. To start with, he was simply describing all information he came across during his wartime career as a journalist in Rhodesia such that a reader has to surf through the whole book to get the scattered information on auxiliaries and various other important wartime stories. Worse still, despite being a journalist with unlimited access to auxiliaries, he

³⁷ D Caute, *Under the Skin: The Death of White Rhodesia*, p, 270.

³⁸ *Ibid.*

³⁹ *Ibid.*

made no effort to interview any of them during the war or thereafter and neither did he gather civilian perceptions of the force. Above all, the work is badly referenced making it impossible to establish his sources of information hence jeopardizing follow-ups to his study.

Ellert, who had been an officer in the police during the crucial years, 1964-1980, closes his book, *The Rhodesian Front War*, with a chapter on *Operation Favour*- an operation which was responsible exclusively for the recruitment, training and deployment of auxiliaries between 1978 and 1979. He locates the implementation of the operation to CIO and Special Branch officers alongside Selous Scouts. According to him, SFAs were deployed to areas which Muzorewa and Sithole claimed to be their strongholds. Owing to the animosity between the two internal leaders (which is part of the 'struggles within the struggle thesis'), these forces operated separately. The Sithole forces were initially trained at Spurwing farm near Enkeldorn (Chivhu) which is south of Harare while the Muzorewa forces were deployed in Musana and Masembura.⁴⁰ Ellert says that SFAs were also recruited from the ranks of the mujibhas⁴¹ in order to create confusion and deny guerrillas support. The scheme failed because guerrillas could not surrender in accordance with the thinking of the internal leaders but rather escalated violence. Of interest in Ellert's work is the identification of Hurungwe as SFA's success story. This was because ZIPRA guerrillas had been discredited for killing villagers in a bid to establish control of the local population. Chakawa⁴² also found that, although there is no evidence that ZIPRA activities increased support for auxiliaries. To the embarrassment of both ZIPRA and Rhodesian forces, the population swung to ZANU-PF in late 1979.⁴³ In the Matebeleland and Midlands Provinces, the program was a failure and had to be abandoned in most parts.⁴⁴ Still, it remains questionable why the people of Hurungwe district did not vote for Muzorewa's UANC if their hearts were with auxiliaries. It is therefore pivotal to establish the level of support for the SFAs in the district under study.

⁴⁰H Ellert, *Rhodesian Front War: Counter Insurgency and Guerrilla Warfare 1962-1980*, Gweru, Mambo Press, 1993, pp 180-182

⁴¹ These were boys and youngmen who disseminated intelligence information to guerrillas.

⁴²J Chakawa, 'The Environment and Zipra Guerrilla Warfare'.

⁴³H Ellert, *Rhodesian Front War: Counter Insurgency and Guerrilla Warfare 1962-1980*, Gweru, Mambo Press, 1993, p.188.

⁴⁴*Ibid*, p.193.

This research differs with that of Ellert in several ways. First, Ellert makes a survey of the whole country while this study is limited to Hurungwe in order to get detailed information as perceived by the people of that district. Secondly, his approach is elitist as he obtained most of his information largely from Rhodesian state officials. In contrast, this research derives data from those who have been silent for a long time including the SFAs and the people they interacted with. In this way, it is a history of the “povo”. This is a Portuguese word which was used by Frelimo to denote ‘the masses’ and borrowed by ZANLA to refer to civilians.⁴⁵ In addition, while most ZIPRA guerrillas hailed from Midlands and Matebeleland, surveys have indicated that Hurungwe auxiliaries were locals who could be difficult to sell out for fear by the local communities to invite reprisals to their own children.

In a later study, Ellert attributes the origins of Operation Favour to the Projects section, which was originally under the “terrorist” desk at Braeside in the capital city of Salisbury (now Harare). The section was founded by Detective Vic Opperman and was a place of rest for Rhodesian combatants from operational areas. As from 1978, the facilities were used to train auxiliaries.⁴⁶ Like Cauter, Ellert's information was not elicited from rural people who experienced the war. It does not explain where these trainees came from or how they were deployed and worse still, it does not capture their feelings. Through research on the war as remembered by civilians, it is possible to uncover whether SFAs had legitimacy or whether or not they executed witches, how far they were involved in domestic disputes or whether they used terror. This will help to answer questions associated with relationships they established in the district under study.

Cilliers dedicated a whole chapter to Security Force Auxiliaries. He first describes the doctrine of counter-insurgency as it was employed in Malaya before moving into the gestation of the idea of creating one such force within the Rhodesian Special Branch (SB). Counter insurgency was attempted through destroying contact between the insurgent and the civilians while at the same time destroying insurgent forces and strict population control including the last stage which can

⁴⁵P Moorcraft and P McLaughlin, *The Rhodesian War: A Military History*, Jonathan Ball Publishers, Johannesburg and Cape Town, 2011, p. 99.

⁴⁶H Ellert, 'The Rhodesian Security and Intelligence Community 1960-1980', in N Bhebe and T Ranger (eds) , *Soldiers in Zimbabwe's Liberation War Volume I*, Harare, UZ Publications, 1995, p. 95.

be supplemented by creating a militia.⁴⁷ This is where the SFA scheme fit in. He examined the first deployment of the force in Musana until it had covered most of the country and the challenges faced by the force in Matebeleland.⁴⁸ His work is quite informative but different from this thesis because it did not elicit information from the combatants themselves and civilians who saw them operating.

Moorcraft and McLaughlin presented a whole history of the Rhodesian war without any input from their African combatants or civilians sympathisers. Moorcraft was a journalist for the *Time* Magazine during the war, taught politics at the University of Rhodesia and later served in the Reserve of the BSAP/ZRP after December 1979. McLaughlin served in operational areas as a field reservist in the BSAP and taught modern political and economic history at the University of Rhodesia/Zimbabwe from 1977 to 1983.⁴⁹ They divide their book into 3 sections, namely; the period 1965 to early 1972 when the security forces were winning, the ‘no-win’ war from 1972-1976 and the intense period of 1976-1979 when Rhodesians were losing the war. The two agree that militarily the Rhodesians never lost a battle, which is not likely in a protracted war of this nature. All the same, they took their time to denigrate the role of the SFA in the liberation war just as has been done even by academic historians. To start with, the two argue that the intensification of the war led to a chronic weakness of Rhodesian forces. The following were identified as low caliber: Guard Force which was created in 1975 as the fourth army whose role was to guard Protected Villages, the Rhodesian Defense Regiment which was created in 1978, District Assistants (DA) and District Security Assistants (DSA) and the SFA which was also created the same year.⁵⁰ DSAs and DAs are described as generally low-caliber manpower and poorly trained. One white police officer who worked closely with the Internal Affairs responsible for their deployment noted that, ‘They died well and died en masse’. SFAs are described as merely an armed rabble.⁵¹ An investigation in to the role of the SFAs in the counterinsurgency warfare goes a long way in explaining their purpose in the war and their effectiveness. It is in fact ludicrous think that the Rhodesians could have created a force which just went to die in

⁴⁷ J K Cilliers, *Counter Insurgency in Rhodesia*, London, Croom Helm, 1985.

⁴⁸ *Ibid.*

⁴⁹ P Moorcraft and P McLaughlin, *The Rhodesian War: A Military History*, Johannesburg and Cape Town, Jonathan Ball Publishers, 2010, p.9.

⁵⁰ P Moorcraft and P McLaughlin, *The Rhodesian War*, p.58.

⁵¹ *Ibid*, page 59.

battle without giving any resistance or inflicting damage on insurgents. Rhodesian perceptions are dubious because if taken seriously, it means that white Rhodesians were bent on exterminating black combatants who were fighting on their side. That is less likely given the Rhodesian desperation for support. After all, tossing too many untrained soldiers into the field would obviously discredit Rhodesians in the eyes of the majority Africans.

Autobiographical and Academic Views on Zimbabwe's war of liberation and Auxiliaries

Abel Muzorewa himself wrote his own autobiography in which he detailed his political experiences from as early as 1958 when he went to study in the USA. He came to prominence during the Smith-Home constitutional proposals of 1971. According to him the church made its recommendations to Sir Douglas Home but these were completely ignored. He summed up that 'we felt used and abused.'⁵² It was him who had been chosen by nationalists to lead Africans to support the 'No' vote against the proposed constitution. Muzorewa agreed because 'there was no political party as a vehicle for the struggle and the old nationalist leaders were in prisons and detention camps. Neither ZANU nor ZAPU could provide a neutral leader of national stature.'⁵³ In 1974, Muzorewa formed a political party, ANC, to advance the struggle for independence. From then on, he did not look back. He began to negotiate with Smith on several fronts while at the same time trying to get control of ZIPRA and ZANLA guerrillas inside and outside Zimbabwe.

Muzorewa made every attempt to defend each political maneuver which he made. To him therefore, he was not a sell-out as other nationalists branded him. In fact, he thought that pro-settlement African groups which sprouted after the Pearce Commission were largely composed of Smith's stooges.⁵⁴ Little did he know that in future exactly the same allegations were to be leveled against him. It is not surprising that one ZANU speaker commented that, 'If Mr Smith and Muzorewa were put before me; I choose to shoot Muzorewa first before I shoot Ian Smith.'⁵⁵ Although Muzorewa continued to assure his supporters throughout his autobiography that he

⁵² A Muzorewa, *Rise Up and Walk: An Autobiography*, London, Sphere Books, 1979, p.93.

⁵³ *Ibid.*

⁵⁴ *Ibid*, p.121.

⁵⁵ *Ibid.*

would never be a sellout, his cohabitation with Smith lost him credibility in the eyes of leading nationalists especially those who were in exile, and in Smith's detention camps/prisons. To them, Smith was attempting to wrestle power from them especially by his later moves of transforming Muzorewa to a Commander-in-Chief of guerrilla forces. The branding of Muzorewa as a sell-out was part of the struggle to take away power given that it was becoming a trend that the majority would eventually rule on attainment of independence. His book ends in April 1978 thereby leaving out a lot of political developments which constitute the focus of this study. By the same year, he was boasting of his own army, the SFA, and in 1979 he became Prime Minister of the short-lived Zimbabwe- Rhodesia. It is crucial in this study to establish how this force thought of itself as it operated in zones of conflict, and whatever political allegiance it had either towards Muzorewa, Sithole or Smith and the Rhodesian Security Forces. This goes a long way in my attempts to establish their role in the liberation struggle against elite views from various acclaimed nationalists and populist historians.

Fay Chung, who was with the ZANU education department in Mozambique during the liberation war presents her war time experiences as an integral part of the history of Zimbabwe in her book. She moves to the present-day opposition politics in Zimbabwe and describes the different types of treatments which were given by the Rhodesian government to Sithole and Muzorewa's auxiliaries. Muzorewa was more trusted by Smith hence his forces grew tremendously unlike those of Sithole.⁵⁶ The wartime experiences by Chung are largely set in Mozambique and thus are peripheral in explaining the war at home, let alone the SFA type of counterinsurgency. Her presentation is that of a prominent politician whose perceptions differ from the way those in rural areas saw the war unfolding before them and how they reacted to antagonistic forces in their midst.

Tekere, who helped to found ZANU in 1963, also published his autobiography in 2007. He rose through party ranks during Zimbabwe's war of liberation to become ZANU-PF's last Secretary General from 1977 to 1981. He also served briefly as a Minister of Manpower Planning and Development and a member of parliament until October 1988. He is critical of Robert Mugabe but generally agrees with him on many issues especially on matters of the party's ideological

⁵⁶F Chung, *Re-Living the Second Chimurenga*.

thrust. Tekere took his time to lambast not only SFAs, but the personality of Muzorewa. He claims that during ZANU-PF's election campaigns on the eve of the 1980 election, security was a major concern. Threats did not only come from the Rhodesians, but also Muzorewa's murderous gang known as auxiliaries. He adds that these had been given the role of peacekeepers by the British, but they were obviously working for the Rhodesians.⁵⁷ Without an insight into the political orientation of the SFA during their military training, one is left wondering whether they were really bent on blocking the coming of independence. Disruptions of ZANU-PF meetings represented a normal struggle on the eve of independence. After all, opposition political rallies could not be held in ZANU-PF strongholds because of fear of ZANLA attacks. Similarly, ZAPU complained of complications associated with holding rallies in ZANU strongholds but at the same time forgetting that ZANU could hardly enter Matebeleland for the same reasons. As for Muzorewa, attempts to unify the parties that had started in 1963 failed the same year. Tekere claims that, "I began to realize that Muzorewa still maintained the old Zimbabwe-Rhodesia' mindset, nor did he regret the violence he had caused."⁵⁸ Similarly, Tekere failed to enter into a political marriage with Ndabaningi Sithole in the early 1990s. Though disgruntled by ZANU-PF, Tekere could not provide a successful alternative and towards the end of his life, he had drifted back to the party which he helped to found.

Judith Todd discusses the experiences of her family during the struggle for independence and thereafter. Throughout, they were interacting with nationalists as they were fighting for independence and thereafter when they regained independence. Her book is important in understanding the attitude of the government towards ZIPRA which was a guerrilla movement and its political party ZAPU. They had been enemies with ZANLA and ZANU in the war. Their differences persisted after independence leading to the Gukurahundi massacres. At least until the discovery of arms on ZAPU farms, government was positive about assisting former ZIPRA guerrillas to adjust to civilian life. Several cooperatives and farms had been set aside for them. The Zimbabwe Peace Project significantly helped them in these endeavours. Moreover, there were several instances in which individuals and organizations complained about bad treatment of

⁵⁷ E Z Tekere, *A Lifetime of Struggle*, p.125.

⁵⁸ *Ibid*, p.170.

these former guerrillas.⁵⁹ Preferential treatment was largely absent for those who had assisted Rhodesians. Completely ignored by the new government, the research sets out to establish how SFAs had to cope with the failure to defeat guerrillas and what they thought and felt about former guerrillas who were now in power.

In 1985, Ranger raised a number of issues from his fieldwork in Makoni. Firstly, oral informants told him that SFAs did not obey spirit mediums.⁶⁰ One opinion from his oral informants was that SFAs 'protected' people from guerrillas, they wanted schools to re-open, cattle to go to dip tanks and children to go to school. It is further claimed that in Gandanzara area of Makoni, SFAs freed people from guerrilla bondage and persecution. Another contribution to SFAs made by Ranger is his comparison of the SFAs and the Kikuyu Home Guards and that like SS, SFAs were part of a strategy of counter-terror operating from communal areas and bent on discrediting guerrillas.⁶¹ This thesis however, focuses mostly on Hurungwe which did not have as successful African farmers as those of Makoni. Hurungwe was just a young reserve created at the end of the Second World War by the white settler scheme. Ranger mainly relied on ruling party officials. Doing so had the disadvantage of failing to incorporate views of the defeated forces such as SFAs. It should not be forgotten that Ranger's work was also one of the praise-texts geared towards supporting ZANU-PF which was then in power. Under the political dispensation providing then, it was not safe to go into reserves and start targeting for interview those who were deemed to have fought against independence. Ethically, this was a subject many former combatants of the former regime were not quite comfortable to discuss. These factors militated against interviewing them. Circumstances have since changed and such people are now willing to respond.

There is evidence from David Martin and Phylis Johnson⁶² and P Stiff⁶³ that after independence, members of Muzorewa's SFAs joined other 'compromised forces' in leaving the country to join

⁵⁹J G Todd, *Through the Darkness: A Life in Zimbabwe*, Cape Town, Zebra Press, 2007.

⁶⁰T O Ranger, *Peasant Consciousness and Guerrilla Warfare*, Harare, ZPH, 1985, p. 212.

⁶¹*Ibid.*

⁶²D Martin and P Johnson, *Destuctive Engagement*, Harare, ZPH, 1985, p. 44.

⁶³P Stiff, *Warfare by Other Means: South Africa in the 1980s and 1990s*, Alberton, Galago Publishing, 2001, pp. 92-105.

the South African Defense Forces. Alongside former members of the Rhodesian Light Infantry (RLI), Special Air Services (SAS), Special Branch (SB), the Central Intelligence Organization (CIO), the Guard Force and District Security Assistants, some former SFAs joined the South African Defense Forces at independence. The scope of the research is not to seek information from all these but to get to know from former SFAs what happened to them and their colleagues with the coming of majority rule.

Kruger focused on the use of compulsion by ZANLA guerrillas in Mutoko district where, through the Methodist Church, Muzorewa had considerable support. The work suggests that had it not been for the use of force, ZANLA guerrillas would have hardly obtained any legitimacy. That way the findings ignore that even counter insurgent forces also applied force hence SFAs cannot be exonerated from violent behavior. As an extension to the above, the research investigates how effective auxiliaries were as campaigners for Muzorewa's political party, the United African National Congress (UANC). It also interrogates how violent-free were the methods they employed if they did campaign to win the hearts and minds in the way their adversaries in ZANLA did. In this case, again, the thrust will be on North Western Zimbabwe rather than the North East.

McLaughlin provided valuable information on the experiences of Catholic Missions in Zimbabwe's Struggle for independence.⁶⁴ She made a detailed study of St Albert's Mission (Mt Darwin), Avila Mission (Nyanga), St Paul's Mission in Musami and Mutero Mission in Gutu. She makes a summary of Catholic missionaries who were killed or deported between 3 December 1976 and February 1980. This adds up to 25 killed and 18 deported. Of those killed, one was a bishop, 11 priests, 4 brothers and 6 nuns.⁶⁵ Like other authors, she views Security Force Auxiliaries (SFAs) as having played a negative role in the war of liberation. She accuses them of unleashing a reign of terror in the countryside of which the Catholic Commission for Justice and Peace (CCJP) was the first to expose and condemn.⁶⁶ Further she describes SFAs as a cheap army equipped largely with captured weapons with little pay and minimal rations. The

⁶⁴J McLaughlin, *On The Frontline: Catholic Missions in Zimbabwe's Liberation War*, Hrare, Boabab Books, 1996.

⁶⁵*Ibid*, p. 288.

⁶⁶*Ibid*, p 36.

force, according to her, was responsible for rape, murder and violations of the ceasefire accord. Of interest to note are her findings in Murewa and Mutoko where some “mujibhas” became members of the SFA and began operating in the same area. This research sought to investigate the relationship between such type of auxiliaries and guerrillas. It intended to find out how youths such as Kasikai, Lancelot, Gringo and Knowell who had switched sides (from being mujibhas to SFAs) and operated in their communities fared in independent Zimbabwe.⁶⁷ Further, the circumstances surrounding such turn of events are the preoccupation of this study. However, it is pivotal to understand the author’s locus of enunciation. MacLaughlin had been with ZANU in Mozambique during the war of liberation. Therefore, she also became a willing scribe of the political party she had worked with by castigating counter forces.

Bhebe details various units of the Rhodesian security forces so as to bring out a military composition of the Rhodesian army during the liberation war. Basically, he identifies 5 units of the Rhodesian security forces, namely; the Army, Special Air Service, Selous Scouts, Grey Scouts and Rhodesian African Rifles. Units of the BSAP were the Police Support Unit, CID and the Special Branch. He also mentions the Guard Force which guarded Protected Villages.⁶⁸ Bhebe does not extensively dwell on the SFA yet it was a critical militia to the Rhodesian counter insurgency project because he was preoccupied with the study of ZAPU and ZANU and how these interacted with the Evangelical Lutheran Church during the war of liberation. The areas under ZIPRA operations explored in this study such as Vuti West and East and Magunje were swamped by the SFA who complicated the war effort through their attempts to win the hearts and the minds of civilians from guerrillas.

Alexander, McGregor and Ranger again denigrate militias such as DSAs and auxiliaries. They see them as neither prejudiced nor professional. They describe them as rougher, prone to looting, untrained people excited by carrying guns and a people who enjoyed eating free food and to be seen eating canned beef and baked beans.⁶⁹ All the same they, at least, provide information

⁶⁷ J McLaughlin, *On The Frontline: Catholic Missions in Zimbabwe's Liberation War*, Hrare, Boabab Books, 1996. page.36.

⁶⁸ N Bhebe, *The Zapu and Zanu Guerrilla Warfare and the Evangelical Lutheran Church in Zimbabwe*, Gweru, Mambo Press, pp. 111-113.

⁶⁹ J Alexander et al, *One Hundred Years in the Dark Forests of Matebeleland*, p. 151.

pertaining to the recruitment of both SFAs and DSAs⁷⁰ whom they equated to Kamuzu Banda's Young Pioneers. Since they were forcibly recruited, it comes as no surprise that some of them defected carrying with them not only vital information but also guns and radios. Therefore, auxiliary camps in Nkayi, Lupane and Silobela were used as recruiting grounds by ZIPRA until the whole Operation Favour scheme had to be abandoned.⁷¹ While Alexander focuses largely on Matebeleland, the thesis dwells on the North West which was ZIPRA's Operational Northern Front 1.⁷² Like in Matebeleland, it was ZIPRA which operated among the largely Korekore of Hurungwe. The question is whether the Korekore reacted just as the Ndebele and Kalanga speaking people of Matebeleland and the Midlands did. Furthermore, while recruitment and deployment of auxiliaries was abandoned in Matebeleland, it went on in Hurungwe to the end of the war. Circumstances around such a state of affairs might entice a conjecture that in the North West, auxiliaries won the hearts and minds of people and challenge the populist view of the force as *dzakudzaku*, Shona word meaning directionless and swaying about hopelessly.⁷³ Changing sides to join guerrillas might as well indicate that after all, they were not opposed to Zimbabwe's independence but may have been driven to join auxiliaries by other reasons which they had little control over. However, the original meaning of the term *dzakutsaku* as it was used in the late 1970s differs radically from the above assertion. According to Chinamasa who was mujibha during the war, the term denoted the popularity of UANC as a mass nationalist movement with too many followers. *Dzakutsaku* thus became a slogan whereupon the sloganeer would shout *dzakutsaku* and respondents would shout back *Huruyadzo*, meaning the greatest of all political parties.⁷⁴ Later, the name was used for UANC combatants and generally for anyone who belonged to Muzorewa's party.

Norma Kriger extensively analyses the disbanding of compromised forces and the demobilization and re-training of former guerrillas. She reviews parliamentary debates on the disbanding of the SFAs during the integration period and, like Cilliers, puts the total number of

⁷⁰J Alexander et al, *One Hundred Years in the Dark Forests of Matebeleland*, p.152.

⁷¹*Ibid*, p.156.

⁷²*Ibid*, p.xiv.

⁷³*Ibid*, p. 157.

⁷⁴Interview with Mr Chinamasa, Chinhoyi University of Technology, 20 December 2011.

SFAs to around 20 000.⁷⁵ The argument from ZANU-PF-led government was that compromised forces like the SFAs were ad hoc forces created for a specific purpose and never meant to be of permanent nature. Since the specific purpose had been completed, they could be disbanded as there was no longer need for them. They were particularly hated by the ZANU-PF government because some of them were ZANLA deserters.⁷⁶ Their disbandment is analyzed in as far as it prepared them for civilian life and reconciling them to those they had ‘plundered’ during the war.

The radio played a crucial role in winning the hearts and minds of targeted populations in Zimbabwe’s war of liberation. Tarugarira discussed the role of the Voice of Zimbabwe (VOZ) which was beamed from Mozambique by ZANU Information Department in order to counter the propaganda which was being churned from the Rhodesian Broadcasting Corporation (RBC). The Rhodesian government provided FM radios to chiefs so that, as government officials, the chiefs would continue to hear about Rhodesian victories. These cheap FM radios could not tune into VOZ.⁷⁷ ZAPU also ran the Zimbabwe People’s Revolutionary Voice which was beamed from Mozambique. Tarugarira however, emphasized the role of VOZ in shaping people’s perceptions about the liberation war. It would be important to establish the extent to which the lack of support for UANC and its auxiliaries in the 1980 elections had anything to do with the media. Furthermore, it was found from one interview by Tarugarira that Rugare Gumbo was still convinced that Rhodesian and auxiliary forces were hated by people because they flogged, robbed, harassed and intimidated people with impunity.⁷⁸ Such sweeping statements cannot go unchallenged as there were huge differences in the manner in which the war was fought in various theatres.

Marowa looked at ways in which the Musukwi River in the Hurungwe area under chief Dandawa’s jurisdiction marked an important landscape during the liberation war.⁷⁹ To the east is Chidamoyo mission hospital which from 1976 was protected by RSFs and to the west is Rengwe

⁷⁵N Kriger, *Guerrilla Veterans in Post War Zimbabwe*, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 2003.

⁷⁶P Stiff, *Warfare By Other Means: South Africa in the 1980s and 1990s*, p. 32.

⁷⁷G Tarugarira, ‘Voices From the Battlefield: The Role of the Radio in Mass Mobilisation during Zimbabwe’s war of Liberation’, 1975-1979’, *The Dyke*, Vol 6, Number 1, 2012, p. 162.

⁷⁸G Tarugarira, *Voices From the Battlefield*, p.168.

⁷⁹I Marowa, ‘Crossing the Boundary: Memories and Narratives of a River Valley Landscape during Zimbabwe’s war of liberation, 1976-1980’, *Landscape Research*, March 2014.

and Fuleche areas which were occupied by ZIPRA guerrillas. The west was nicknamed Zambia possibly to illustrate the fact that ZIPRA guerrillas were infiltrating from Zambia while the east was referred to as Rhodesia implying that RSFs had effective control.⁸⁰ Any civilian who crossed the boundary was assumed to have sold out. As such, victims could be punished by any of the forces. This implies that as competing combatants were fighting for supremacy, they were also able to manipulate the landscape to suit what they wanted. One who crossed Musukwi had the potential of disseminating information to either of the antagonistic forces. Safety therefore lay in prohibiting travelling beyond the river. On its own, the river was of no significance to the war effort. By 1979, RSFs had withdrawn from Chidamoyo and were replaced by SFAs. When they showed little respect of this boundary by crossing into Rengwe, a fierce battle ensued just after the bridge. Marowa's work is one of the first dedicated to experiences of the war in Hurungwe though his major focus is the landscape. It is nevertheless important as it provides an important glimpse into how the physical environment was manipulated in order to distinguish between patriots and sellouts. However, the work only analyses a very small part of Hurungwe while this thesis covers the whole district.

The literature reviewed has demonstrated that auxiliaries were denigrated by all the authors who wrote on the war of liberation. Even Rhodesians who operated with them also took a swipe at them. Appreciating how SFAs got such a label can be bettered by looking at the invention/construction of political identities. According to Zeleza, African identities just like African languages are inventions mutually constitutive, existential and epistemic constructions. He goes on to show that invention is a historical and a social process. The pages of history drip with blood over invented identities.⁸¹ Through a study of their recruitment, training, deployment, operations, disbandment and return to civilian life, an attempt is made to examine how auxiliaries had varying identities and establish the fluidity of different identities they had. Their role in the war is also important in understanding their identities.

Theoretical Framework

The study is informed by a triangulation of the population-centric counterinsurgency warfare

⁸⁰ I Marowa, 'Crossing the Boundary', p. 7-8.

⁸¹ P T Zeleza, *The Inventions of African Identities and Languages: The Discursive and Developmental Implications*, www.lingref.com, 10 September 2014, pp14-15

theory and the constructivist theory of identities. Under the population-centric counterinsurgency theory, war is fought for winning the hearts and minds to the counterinsurgent while under constructivism; identities are assumed to change over time. Given the way in which the war was fought in Hurungwe and the manner in which identities were constructed, destroyed and reconstructed, it is imperative that one should apply both theories to clearly understand the role of SFAs in the war and their experiences after 1980. For this thesis, the population-centric/centred theory of counterinsurgency is preoccupied with understanding how the idea of using civil defense forces or militias was mooted and implemented by Rhodesian military commanders and politicians. Identity politics uncovers how in the process of doing so, SFAs ended up getting varying identities, most of them negative labels which have haunted some of them to the present day. Therefore, because identity became a product of the war, it is important to look at the counterinsurgency theory first.

According to a French officer and scholar, Lieutenant Colonel D Galula, the battle for the population is a major characteristic of the revolutionary war.⁸² Winning the hearts of the population (for the insurgent) or keeping it submissive (for the counter-insurgent) is an art which is essentially of a political nature.⁸³ Therefore the strategy of creating a special militia, in this case SFA, is embedded in the spirit of strategically keeping the population submissive to the stronger and more effective of the deployed various forces. Blacks who joined SFAs were given the label militia or auxiliary. It carried racial overtones because it was not applied to whites who commanded or sometimes operated with them regardless of how poorly trained they may have been. The support of the population is a significant element in winning counterinsurgency wars. This has of late culminated in US counterinsurgency manuals such as the Field Manual 3-24 and the 2008 US Army Field Manual 3-0 Operations.⁸⁴ The authors of Field Manual (FM), of whom the most important is General David Petraeus, wrote: ‘Of the many books that were influential in the writing of FM 3-24, perhaps none was important as David Galula’s *Counterinsurgency Warfare: Theory and Practice*.’⁸⁵ All of them emphasize that wars are fought among people. In

⁸² T Rid, ‘The Nineteenth Century Origins of the Counterinsurgency Doctrine’, *Journal of Strategic Studies*, Volume .33, No. 5, October 2010, p. 727’

⁸³ D Galula, *Counter Insurgency: Theory and Practice*, 2006, p. 4.

⁸⁴ T Rid, The Nineteenth Century Origins of the Counterinsurgency Doctrine, *Journal of Strategic Studies*, Vol. 33, No. 5, October 2010, p. 727.

⁸⁵ A Marlowe, ‘David Galula: His life and intellectual context’, Strategic Studies Institute Monograph, August 2010,

simple terms, this means that while a government may have an efficient army, to win a counterinsurgency war, the military must cease to be apolitical and become fully political. David Galula (1919-67) who served 2 years in Algeria's mountainous Kabylia region as commander of the 45th Colonial Infantry Battalion during the Algerian War (1954-62) wrote that:

To confine soldiers to purely military functions while urgent and vital functions have to be done, and nobody else is available to undertake them would be senseless. The soldier must be prepared to become.....a social worker, a civil engineer, a schoolteacher, a nurse, a boy scout. But only as long as he cannot be replaced for it is better to entrust civilian tasks to civilians.⁸⁶

Winning the population was a major preoccupation of the French in Algeria throughout the 19th century. The major problem with the 19th century approach lay in the ruthless crushing of the civilian population whenever it was realized to be the pillar behind guerrilla insurgents. Unfortunately, in both Algeria and Madagascar, the French realized that as much as they could destroy insurgency, they were not capable of subduing the spirit of resistance. They were confronted by a state of permanent warfare.

There is need to differentiate between the ways in which wars were fought in Europe and in Africa. In Europe, winning over strategic towns, industries and mines could be decisive. Moreover, winning a few battles sometimes up to 5 would end the war. In Africa during the wars of conquest and then liberation wars, the picture was different. The Prussian Major General Carl von Decker came to Algeria in 1840 to observe the French campaign against Abd el Kader's insurrection. After several months in Algeria, he realized that there were no enemy positions that could be attacked, no fortifications, no operational relevant locations, no strategic deployments, no classical lines of communication, no decisive battles and no center of gravity.⁸⁷ Similarly, Rhodesia was a different kind of war terrain from Europe. The dilemma with the Rhodesian war in Hurungwe district was that counterinsurgent forces did not only need to win support of the civilian population, but also needed to hold territory to prevent ZIPRA guerrillas from reclaiming it by the night. As such, there was a further remodeling of the French approach through the deployment of militias to do both. In Madagascar, the experiment had worked when Gallien was

p. iii.

⁸⁶ T Rid, The Nineteenth Century Origins of the Counterinsurgency Doctrine, *Journal of Strategic Studies*, Vol. 33, No. 5, October 2010, p. 727.

⁸⁷ *Ibid.*

sent to subdue a resistance movement in 1896. He succeeded by replacing the disliked Merina nobility and then sent out his officers to supervise and empower local chiefs. By the end of the year, insurgents were losing legitimacy.⁸⁸ Still, he did not create a civil defense militia to achieve that end.

According to Jardine, the strategy of population-centric counterinsurgency maintains that the support and control of the local population must be the proper and primary objective of a counterinsurgency campaign.⁸⁹ Without easy access to the population, guerrillas find it hard to operate effectively. Therefore, it would be illogical for insurgencies to indiscriminately kill people who are supposed to protect them. The challenge in this study is that insurgent forces stood accused of atrocities. This now adds multiple dimensions to a counter-insurgent warfare. Among these include the use of pseudo operatives by the government, the deficiencies in the training of guerrillas and the effectiveness of civil defense militias in smearing the identities of insurgents.

Insurgency refers to a protracted and military activity towards completely or partially controlling a state through the use of irregular forces and *illegal* political organizations. Irregular military organizations use a variety of tactics such as guerrilla warfare, terrorism and political organizations to achieve their ends.⁹⁰ It is important to note that while the government delegitimizes insurgent forces and their political leaders, they in turn fight back by giving the same insulting names to the government which they accuse of being an illegal regime. Government reaction in containing or preventing insurgency from taking over the country militarily or politically is referred to as counter-insurgency. According to Thomas Rid, in counterinsurgency warfare, the population is the center of gravity.⁹¹ In the case of Hurungwe district, counter insurgency measures were intended to destroy ZIPRA support bases. It was at this stage that activities of the SFAs began to impact on the people of the district, thereby raising

⁸⁸ *Ibid.*, p. 750.

⁸⁹ E Jardine, Population-centric counterinsurgency and the movement of peoples, *Small Wars Insurgencies*, Vol 23, No 2, May 2012, p. 764.

⁹⁰ A A Malaquias, *Rebels and Robbers: Violence in Post Colonial Angola*, Stockholm, Nordiska Afrika Institutet, 2007, pp. 101-102.

⁹¹ T Rid, The Nineteenth Century Origins of the Counterinsurgency Doctrine, *Journal of Strategic Studies*, Vol. 33, No. 5, October 2010, p. 727.

questions on the effectiveness of fighting the war by civil defense forces means.

According to Cilliers, within the counter-insurgency doctrine, breaking the hold of insurgent forces and re-establishing control by the authorities has been attempted in two stages as follows:

1. Breaking the contact between people and the insurgent while at the same time destroying the insurgent organization
2. Population control through Protected Villages, curfews, martial law, food control, identity systems and related measures.⁹²

The second stage is completed by the creation of civil defense militias to hold territory and guard Protected Villages (PVs) and other strategic settlements and infrastructure. In order to attain support of the local population, militias are expected to successfully protect the population from insurgent *harassment* while at the same time being seen to be defeating insurgents. Moreover, where insurgents are using terror against the local population, to endear themselves, militias should not use the same control tool. This is where most problems arise. In a practical war situation, both insurgent and counter-insurgent forces make use of terror. For example, pseudo gangs or *bleus* terrorized civilians in the Algerian civil war⁹³, and were also used against the Mau Mau by Captain Frank Kitso in Kenya.⁹⁴ However, in a situation where civilians collaborate actively with insurgents, it is difficult for militias not to use terror. Generally, militias end up resorting to various methods of terror such as cordon and search operations, massive sweeps, collective punishments, torture, bombing 'rebel' villages, resettlement and even 'rehabilitation'.⁹⁵ The above are all counter-insurgent tactics whose ability to win the 'hearts and minds' of the people is under investigation in this research though only some were deployed by the SFAs.

Counter-insurgency succeeds when insurgents are unpopular as the case of failed insurgencies in the Philippines, Peru and Malaya. In the district of Hurungwe, it is important to re-appraise the level of support on the part of ZIPRA guerrillas against auxiliaries. While no attempt is being made to totally exonerate other counter-insurgent forces, more often, auxiliaries were deployed

⁹² J K Cilliers, *Counter Insurgency in Rhodesia*, pp. 202-203.

⁹³ A Horne, *A Savage War of Peace: Algeria 1954-1962*, London, McMillan, 1996, pp. 260-261.

⁹⁴ D M Anderson, *Histories of the Hanged: Britain's Dirty War in Kenya and the End of the Empire*, London, Weidenfield and Nicholson, 2005, pp. 284-286.

⁹⁵ M Shipway, *Decolonisation and its Impact: A Comparative Approach to the end of Empires*, Oxford, Blackwell Publishing, 2008, pp. 166-168.

in 'frozen zones' where other regular forces were not fully operational because they had been deliberately excluded by Rhodesian military strategists on the ground. Therefore, it was the irregulars who were in touch with civilians on a day to day basis more than the Rhodesian regular force. However, the civilian population is not as naïve as counterinsurgent theorists would have wanted peasants to believe. They may pretend to support an organization but in the end vote differently. Cohen has noted that public opinion is less malleable. Capturing what the entire population thinks even under the best of circumstances is not easy.⁹⁶ Cohen goes on to show that the human population provides information for a variety of reasons such as rewards, personal vendettas, ego, blackmail and so on. Even if a poll survey is to be undertaken, the average person may not be able to differentiate between pollsters and intelligence agencies sent to ferret out the insurgents' supporters.⁹⁷ This is what brings the counterinsurgency doctrine into question. Auxiliaries were satisfied that the population was behind them. ZIPRA guerrillas were similarly confident of massive support. In the end neither of the forces was victorious not only in the district but in the whole province.

Counter-insurgency in the case of Rhodesia Front Party point of view as from 1972 was based on the following ideologies:

- settler-status anxiety.
- Anglophobia.
- anti-communism.
- anti-nationalism.
- anti-liberalism⁹⁸

Strategies used by Rhodesians hinged on the thinking that Britain was letting go the empire basing on rapid decolonization of Africa between 1956 and 1965. Against this background and on the basis of resisting British colonial misrule, there was an increased thinking that a few resolute Rhodesians would assist Britain to withstand the tide of decolonization.

⁹⁶ R S Cohen, Just how important are the hearts and minds anyway? Counterinsurgency goes to the polls, *Journal of Strategic Studies* 2014, p. 2.

⁹⁷ In the 1980 election, the results for Mashonaland West were as follows - PF polled 37888 votes, UANC 28728 votes and ZANU-PF 203567 votes. The later had no visible guerrillas in almost the whole province. In the end both UANC and PF ZAPU had one seat each while ZANU-PF had 6.

⁹⁸ M Evans, 'The Wretched of the Empire: Politics, Ideology and Counterinsurgency in Rhodesia, 1965-80', *Small Wars and Insurgencies*, Volume 18, Number 2, 2007, p. 175.

Against this background, it should be noted that the British had many traditions and tactics of counterinsurgency. Some of these were to be borrowed by the Rhodesians into their bush war. The British tactic as used in Malaya included cordoning (surround completely) and raking (searching), oil spot strategy, recruiting local leaders, political organizations and militias. Oil spot strategy is a tactic in which a political or military organization secures an area to be used as a launch site for campaigns to other areas. SFAs had several bases in Hurungwe from which they could launch attacks on opponents and also control the population. However, the effectiveness of the program was patchy. In Chundu area of Hurungwe for example, ZIPRA strength remained unchallenged up to the end of the war.

According to Parsons, a guerrilla campaign cannot succeed unless it has the support of the majority of the people and it was with this in mind that the Rhodesians launched their campaigns of winning hearts and minds of the African population.⁹⁹ In the words of a member of the unit, the aim was to create such a feeling of terror that people would not dare to support guerrillas. It concentrated its efforts on schools since it is always from there that most recruits emanated. Groups toured schools offering rewards on children who reported on the activities of their village. Essay competitions were written on such topics as, *what I should do if my father fed a terrorist*.¹⁰⁰

Dead bodies were used to discourage children from crossing into Mozambique. Mutilated bodies were dragged on to school grounds behind a vehicle and then pulled around the compound by a piece of rope or by the hair. Another method was showing violently brutal films at school or in villages where the whole community including young children was forced to view it. A typical film included tracking a group of freedom fighters by security forces using a hyena. The hyena is let loose on the wounded body of one man and is seen ripping the body apart by eating it.¹⁰¹ Despite the use of such methods, guerrillas would always stealthily return at night with counter-propaganda. It was therefore with the realization that territory has to be held that SFAs were recruited from the same people who had been exposed to government propaganda. In many instances in the war, the battles and victories were psychological rather than military. For

⁹⁹MS 308/58/5, NAZ, B Parsons, Some Aspects of Psychological Warfare in Rhodesia.

¹⁰⁰ *Ibid.*

¹⁰¹ *Ibid.*

example, closing a school and failure of security forces to open it was a sign of victory on the side of guerrillas. The war was psychological because guerrillas moving into an area were trained in methods of conscientization. Winning hearts and minds was more effective on the part of guerrillas because they could make grand promises. Governments naturally cannot make such promises as its pledges must be seen to be carried out. SFAs as shown later struggled to make buses travel again, opening schools, clinics and rural shops or in short making the countryside 'governable' again. In 1977, Major General Andy Rawlins was appointed Director General of Psychological Warfare and this is what he said about the guerrilla, 'We want to undermine him...turn him in to an anti-terrorist.'¹⁰² Part of that was attempted by capturing and turning guerrillas.

There is need to explore the life experiences and ultimate creation of a militia (harkis) by Galula during his operation in Kabylia district of Algeria between 1956 and 1958 in order to understand its applicability to the district under study. The major challenge in Algeria was the absence of proper information on the whereabouts of guerrillas. Therefore it was hard to track and kill them. His 1956 solution to the absence of intelligence information was the training of a civil defense unit which he named Force Z.¹⁰³ Working outside regular military channels, Galula and his colleagues had recruited 200 Kabyles and trained them into a local defense unit. Soon after their training, they passed en bloc to the other side taking with them all the weapons and ammunition.¹⁰⁴ The theory that such a force would be used to lure the population to the government side had failed just as happened in one such experiment in the Midlands province during the war of liberation in which 200 newly trained SFAs joined ZIPRA with their guns, ammunition and radios.

Against this poor performance, Galula tried other mechanisms. For example, villagers could not leave the village for more than 24 hours without a pass, nobody could receive a stranger into the village without permission and villagers were discouraged to open doors at night. These were the sticks. The carrot was that dispensaries and schools were opened in some villages.¹⁰⁵ By 1957, he

¹⁰²*Sunday Mail*, General Plans to Fight with Psychology, 20 March 1977.

¹⁰³D Galula, *Pacification in Algeria, 1956-58*, Santa Monica, Rand Corporation, 2006, p.97.

¹⁰⁴*Ibid*, 2pp. 98-99.

¹⁰⁵*Ibid*, 2006, pp. 100-116.

had created self defense units in each village called *harkis* whose responsibilities included protecting children and teachers during classes, tracking and attacking guerrillas. In April 1957, Galula had a fulltime harkis which was paid, armed and clothed by the army.¹⁰⁶ The units were sent back to their own villages. They were effective in tracking guerrillas, spreading propaganda and operating as scouts.

It was with this in mind that Galula came up with his counterinsurgent theory where he recommended the use of local defense units or militias to win over support of the population. Galula himself remained unknown in France until the Americans came to know the importance of his theory. American counterinsurgency doctrine today emphasizes the value of the civilian population in order to win popular support. The Rhodesian and the Algerian approaches to counterinsurgency share a number of similarities. In both cases, the war itself was not winnable though at local level, there could have been successful battles. In both cases, militias were generally of known identity to the people though Rhodesians could add forces from without. Furthermore, they were armed, clothed and paid by the army and were in each case irregular. SFAs and harkis were both used for propaganda purposes against insurgents. There were also a number of contrasts. The army in Algeria continued to have a physical presence among the villagers while in Rhodesia, the army sometimes withdrew from *frozen* zones. These similarities make it important therefore to not only use Galula's theory but also other theories that place the population in the center of the conflict as important to win over. The issue of identity is pivotal in understanding the role of militias in such wars.

According to Tuly, identity politics concerns itself with struggles over appropriate forms of legal, political and constitutional recognition and accommodation of identities of individuals, immigrants, refugees..., nation states, indigenous peoples and so on. Quoting Fanon, he demonstrates two types of identities, those that were imposed by the colonizer and those that were imposed by the elite who succeeded the colonizer.¹⁰⁷ These are so defined because they exhibit identity related characteristics. In politics, identity is a vehicle for the oppressed and excluded groups to have a voice because speaking has the power to enable excluded groups to

¹⁰⁶ *Ibid*, pp. 133-171.

¹⁰⁷ J Tuly, Identity Politics, T Ball and R Bellamy (eds) *Cambridge History of Twentieth Century Political Thought*, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 2010.

talk. In this study, such people are the former SFAs. According to Dalglish, having a voice is key to providing a firsthand account of experience, typically of the injury caused to self-understandings by having been denied basic rights.¹⁰⁸ Therefore, identity politics is defined by exclusion as much as it is by inclusion. It also attempts to address the lacuna of political representation.

Identity is not fixed, it changes over time hence it is fluid. As such, one may have multiple identities over time and space or at the same time.¹⁰⁹ Such changes are partly explained by the fact that identity is constructed. Feron and Laitin have shown that social identities culminating in ethnic violence may be constructed by political elites who wish to further their own ends. They have done so using the constructivist theory of ethnic violence. They have argued that in each case violence has the effect intended by elites of constructing group identities in more antagonistic and rigid ways. From a constructivist point of view, differences between A and B are neither natural nor eternal. Differences are found in the mouths of politicians attempting to advance a course of action or by journalists reporting everyday primordial beliefs as historical facts.¹¹⁰ Politicians may intensify violence through the construction of social and political identities because they are better placed to calculate with precision the results of doing so. Identities whether political or social are produced and reproduced daily but it is important to note that they are always constructed. Gatsheni discusses these as highly politicized and explosive identities.¹¹¹ For example, the labels Hutu and Tutsi had a class character in pre-colonial Rwanda, but today these labels have taken an ethnic and political dimension.

In the same manner, the identity given in Zimbabwe to nationalists such as Muzorewa and their followers is a political construction and thus part and parcel of political engineering. The national identity has been constructed to advance the interests of those in power as opposed to those who failed. National identity denotes any given set of myths, stories and beliefs propagated

¹⁰⁸ B Dalglish, Problematising the Political Theory of Identity Politics: Towards an Antagonistic Freedom, *KRITIKE*, Volume 7 Number 1, June 2013, p. 72, www.kritike.org/journal/issue_12, 11 September, 2014.

¹⁰⁹ S J Ndlovu-Gatsheni and W Williams, 'Rethinking the Past in the Present: Changing Identities of Joshua Nkomo in Post-Colonial Zimbabwe', *African Identities*, Volume 8, Number 3, August 2010, pp 199-208.

¹¹⁰ J D Fearon, 'Violence and Social Construction of the Ethnic', *International Organization*, 54, 4, Autumn 2000, pp, 845-853.

¹¹¹ S J Ndlovu-Gatsheni, 'Is Nativism a National Question in Post-Colonial Africa?', S J Ndlovu-Gatsheni and F Ndlovu, *Nationalism and National Projects in Southern Africa*, Pretoria, AISA, 2013, p. 61.

to justify a dominant group and to maintain power. In the case of Zimbabwe, such generated myths and images are sectarian. Ravengai has shown that the version of history which appears in Zimbabwe's theater incriminates those who had a different view during the liberation struggle as sellouts.¹¹² ZANU-PF, the ruling party, is comfortable with plays which parrot its own version of history. Anything outside that is not part of national history. As a result, Asians, coloreds, whites, townspeople and a large chunk of the Ndebele are excluded. In the same manner, plays which include these categories are banned, censored or politically controlled. Those deemed to be working with former colonizers are denied space to tell their own version of history.¹¹³ The liberation discourse inscribes a nativist topology which re-inscribes the same binary oppositions it sought to fight during the war of liberation such as insider/outsider, indigene/alien, traditional /western and so on. A study of Zimbabwe's road to independence is important in demonstrating the construction of political identities which have created stereotypes which have become ingrained in some sections of Zimbabwe's population.

There are several arguments being advanced to clarify issues of political identities in relation to SFAs and their role in the war under study. To start with, political identities are so enduring that those labeled negatively find it hard to shrug them off. Secondly, where the given political identities carry negative connotations, the receivers cannot form themselves into an association or organization for fear of further victimization while those with a favorable identity are free to organize themselves. Thirdly, an insulting political identity is a mark of shame because its carrier is unable to air his views in public. Fourthly, constructed political identities work to the advantage of political elites to advance their cause such as retaining power for as long as possible. Any positive role those who are branded as bad may have played in a war is completely excluded as part of history or at most trivialized. In a war situation, militias may have multiple identities but usually one is enduring for as long as they are not given the opportunity to rule. In short, the way in which SFAs were understood during Zimbabwe's war of liberation and afterwards should be defined in terms of their role and the various political identities which they carried.

¹¹² S Ravengai, 'Political Theater, National Identity and Political Control: The Case of Zimbabwe', *African Identities*, Vol 8, Number 2, May 2010, p. 163.

¹¹³ S Ravengai, Political Theater, National Identity and Political Control: The Case of Zimbabwe, *African Identities*, Vol 8, Number 2, May 2010, pp. 163-165.

Methodology and Data Collection Methods

This research adopts a qualitative approach because it focuses on opinions about the Second Chimurenga which can be best expressed qualitatively. The qualitative approach made use of various data collection methods which included text studies, analysis of primary sources in Zimbabwean archives, interviews and audio recordings. Furthermore, the qualitative approach helped to foster an understanding of the meaning attached by the participants in the study of SFAs. The method of collecting data involved the presentation of oral verbal stimuli and reply in terms of oral verbal responses. I relied mostly on personal interviews. According to Khothari, personal interviews require a person *known* as the interviewer asking questions generally in a face to face contact to the other person or persons. At times, the interviewee may ask questions and the interviewer responds to these but usually the interviewer initiates the interview and collects information.¹¹⁴ According to Maxwell, meaning in qualitative research encompasses cognition, effect, intentions and everything else and anything else the researcher may refer to as the participants' perspectives.¹¹⁵ It was also chosen because it focused on situations and people rather than numbers.

Unstructured interviews were undertaken. Among the interviewees were former members of SFA from Hurungwe who operated within or outside their district, ex-ZIPRA guerrillas, government forces and civilians who were old enough to remember and were resident in Hurungwe during the war. The method of interviewing was chosen for its strength in deriving from the informants as much oral information as possible. Oral testimonies were also chosen because they were the richest though sometimes they lacked precision, particularly in terms of chronology. Quoting Walter Benjamin's thesis on the Philosophy of History, Taylor-Garcia illuminated that, 'to articulate the past historically does not mean to recognize it the way it really was. It means to seize hold of a memory as it flashes up in a moment of danger.'¹¹⁶ Such a state of

¹¹⁴C R Khothari, *Research Methodology: Methods and Techniques*, New Dehli, New Age International Limited Publishers, 2004, p.94.

¹¹⁵J A Maxwell, *Qualitative Research Design: An Interactive Approach*, London, Sage Publications 1996,p. 17.

¹¹⁶D V Taylor-Garcia, 'Decolonial Historiography: Thinking about Land and Race in a Transcolonial Context', in *Tensions Journal*, Issue 5 (Fall/Winter), 2011, p. 9.

affairs became the basis for eliciting a multiplicity of voices in order to have a clearer picture of SFAs' experiences both during the war of liberation and after. Getting several voices was also intended to deal with the challenge of memory lapses. Generally all informants were expected to be of a sound mind and over 47 years of age as from 2011. It was assumed that people of this description were able to provide more credible or reliable insights on the subject under investigation. To get this information the researcher had to travel extensively throughout the district and interview as many people as possible by snowball sampling- that is, obtaining respondents through referrals among people who share the same characteristics.¹¹⁷ Therefore, I benefitted greatly from funding provided by the university and great hospitality shown by respondents especially those in rural areas.

Information was obtained by interviews from male and female wartime residents of the district, ex-SFAs, former government soldiers, former-ZIPRA guerrillas and various categories of civil servants and all other people relevant in the rural area under study. Intensive use was made of information from the National Archives of Zimbabwe (NAZ), the ZANU-PF archive and files from the Karoi District Administrator. These primary sources added information on what it was like to live in the war-torn district then. In addition, use was also made of secondary sources such as published and unpublished works and research papers from both serious academics and Rhodesian writers. Electronic sources were used in a bid to get as much of on-going debates on the topic as possible and where available file tapes were also used. The most known and remembered commanders of SFAs were interviewed wherever/whenever they could be located.

Some of the most important informants were headman Mudzimu, the two surviving sons of wartime headman Chanetsa and chief Nyamhunga. All of them were interviewed in the comfort of their homes between 2012 and July 2014. Mudzimu was important because he was heavily beaten by auxiliaries during the war and almost sentenced to death by spirit mediums of Hurungwe. He is one of the disgruntled headmen who lost his chieftainship before his movement to Hurungwe. He was also one of ZIPRA's greatest supporters during the liberation war. The Chanetsas also lost their chieftainship. Most of the information obtained from them concerned

¹¹⁷A Bloch, 'Doing Surveys', in, C Seale (ed), *Researching Society and Culture*, London, Sage Publications, 2005, p.182.

their movement to Hurungwe. Chanetsa's younger son was however, an auxiliary during the war of liberation and was useful in explaining the experiences of SFAs around St Boniface Mission. Useful information on the connection of auxiliaries and spirit mediums was obtained from chief Nyamhunga whose area of jurisdiction was heavily contested in the war and this resulted in the death of the then incumbent chief Nyamhunga.

The response from former auxiliaries in particular was overwhelming. I had not anticipated such a positive response. They were willing to discuss their wartime experiences for nothing. Only at the end of our discussion was I sometimes able to get them some cigarettes for those who smoked. Besides former auxiliaries, women who had participated in the war especially as guerrilla helpers were happy to discuss the war. For example, I found Mrs Nyoni absent from her home when I came for the interview. When she returned in the evening, she followed me where I was camped for a discussion about her experiences with both ZIPRA and SFAs. Other respondents were found outside Hurungwe especially in Karoi and Chinhoyi.

The field was not without its problems. One chief refused to grant me an interview though I had all the documents necessary for authentication. Permission had been sought from the permanent secretary in the Ministry of Local Government, the Provincial Administrator and District Administrator. I had to fill the gap by interviewing other people in his area who shared what they knew about the death of chief Dendera in the war and the operations of auxiliaries. Only one former SFA refused to say anything about the war despite assurances from me. The local government offices in Karoi did not provide PER5 files for me arguing that these were running files and as such they were not available for research because information in them was sensitive. I had assumed that they had old files but these were not evident.

Scope and Limitations

The thesis focused on Muzorewa's SFAs and the people they interacted with during and after the war. It was confined largely to Hurungwe District of Zimbabwe where former SFAs are based, though some examples were taken from across Zimbabwe. Collection of information from oral informants was done in vernacular (Shona language) though sometimes it was also done in English especially where it involved former ZIPRA operatives in Bulawayo. It covered the

period 1978-2008 and was undertaken in Zimbabwe. Exploits of guerrillas or government forces which did not include SFAs were deliberately excluded even where it was extremely attractive. In the same spirit were all other experiences of civilians then in Hurungwe as long as such experiences had nothing to do with auxiliaries. Furthermore, the study was also limited in its scope by the unwillingness of possible worthwhile operatives in Muzorewa's auxiliaries to speak. Most of these were either senior office bearers in political parties or those not contended with the motive of the research.

Ethical Considerations

All interviewees and other informants were given assurances that their information was required for purposes of a thesis and were assured of their security and confidentiality. Where they chose to be anonymous, the researcher respected that. Even where they wanted their identity known but the information they provided was found to be sensitive, they were advised accordingly. Those who did not want to speak were not compelled to do so. The research interviews were made to fall within the correct schedules of people's routine. Thus interviewees were not disturbed from their daily chores to answer questions but were met when and where they were free to do so. In short, the research paid heed to confidentiality and maintained independence from possible attempts to manipulate the results during data collection and even after completion. Key issues and problems met during the research were communicated to the university via correct procedures. A letter of consent was produced to all parties who needed it and so was the research proposal.

Chapter Breakdown

The first chapter is introductory. It justifies the study of SFAs and reviews available literature on SFAs and the war of liberation. Such literature includes the use of militias in Sub-Saharan conflicts, works by Rhodesians as well as autobiographical and academic researches on the same topic. It also encompasses 2 theories which inform the study of SFAs.

Chapter 2 covers the history of Hurungwe. It is therefore about the political geography of the area under study. It traces the creation and peopling of the reserve, its natural environment and

the physical relationship with Zambia. It is also about how the various traditional leaders ended up in Hurungwe and the kind of relationship they had with the colonial governments. All the traditional leaders claim to have come from outside Hurungwe.

Chapter 3 provides the long history on the creation of the identity of traitor from the late 1950s. 1963 is considered a watershed year because the construction of identities became deeply entrenched as a result of the ZAPU split. When auxiliaries were formed, they got the negative label from both ZANLA and ZIPRA alongside their political parties. As such, that identity has continued to plague not only SFAs, but those who challenge the hegemony of ZANU-PF.

Chapter 4 accounts for the creation of SFAs and what the force was intended to achieve. For the Rhodesians, the reasons were political and military, but for Muzorewa, it was a strategic move. The same chapter discusses the militarization of the Ministry of Internal Affairs which in Hurungwe also housed SFAs. The Ministry of Internal Affairs was responsible for the deployment of SFAs in some districts.

Recruitment, training and deployment of auxiliaries are covered in chapter 5. As a result of the Rhodesian counterinsurgent motives, recruits came from boys and young men who were in the majority of cases trained on white commercial farms around Hurungwe and in exceptional cases elsewhere. The period of training varied from a minimum of 2 weeks to a maximum of 8 months. They were often deployed back to their home areas. In line with the counterinsurgency thinking, once they were deployed, they became preoccupied with winning hearts and minds of the people for Muzorewa. Chapter 6 assesses how SFAs are remembered generally. Voices elicited pointed to their rescue missions, relationships with the spiritual world, protecting civilians and how they sometimes went on the offensive against ZIPRA.

Chapter 7 is on the post-independence experiences of SFAs. The central issues in this chapter are reconciliation, healing and integration. As such a critical review of reconciliation is made. This is followed by a study of ways former SFAs adjusted under changing political circumstances.

While integration was smooth at family and community level, there were challenges at political and national level. The thesis is concluded in chapter 8 which summarizes the whole study and links it with the theoretical framework.


CHAPTER 2

HURUNGWE DISTRICT AND ITS PEOPLE

Introduction

The motive of this chapter is to enable the reader to understand the geography and the history of the district under study. Otherwise, it is intended to provide more information on the district and the people who populate it. Added to that, it also gives an important analysis of the way in which the district was carved out after it became an alternative for creating white commercial farms to benefit whites from Rhodesia who were fighting as soldiers on behalf of Britain during the Second World War. The white farmers settled there were augmented by chiefdoms moved from the Zambezi Valley as a result of the construction of Kariba Dam. Other chiefdoms from Gwelo and Lomagundi were for various reasons also moved there. As such, Hurungwe became a meeting point of various ethnic groups brought together by the colonial administration.

The District of Hurungwe (formerly Urungwe) is in Mashonaland West province which is to the extreme North West of Zimbabwe as shown on the map of the province below.



Source: Maphill 2011.

Hurungwe shares its borders with Makonde and Kariba districts. Generally the district is divided into Hurungwe East, West and North for purposes of political administration. Hurungwe West has four communal lands namely Rengwe, Hurungwe, Nyaodza and Piriviri while Hurungwe East has Chundu and Kazangarare Communal lands.¹ To the latter is also the small town of Karoi which serves the district under study. Up to 1944 when Hurungwe was created as a separate district, it was part of Lomagundi district.² Rutherford demonstrates that until the post-war ex-soldiers resettlement scheme was mooted by the colonial administration, the district was not of importance in the minds of government. Otherwise, it was only known for hunting expeditions and tsetse fly. The ex-soldiers' scheme transformed the district into a tobacco growing area for white commercial farms. When Hurungwe became a separate district in 1944, it

¹ *School Atlas for Zimbabwe*, Esselt Map Service, Stockholm, 1987, pp8-9

² B Rutherford, *Working on the Margins: Black Workers, White Farmers in Postcolonial Zimbabwe*, Harare, Weaver Press, 2000, page. 18.

had 10 European farmers and about 19000 Africans living in the reserve and 8000 on unassigned land.³ Available archives are more concerned with the removal of groups under specific traditional leaders and not those who were already in Urungwe before the forced removals.

Unlike other districts especially in Masvingo, Hurungwe provides a general picture of backwardness because it had no schools at all by the time of the settlement of ex-soldiers. The district has no mission boarding school up to the present day. Any mission schools that existed at any one time were controlled by either the Seventh Day Adventist Church or The Salvation Army. The Catholic Church at one time had St Martin Primary School in Chundu Communal lands but with the escalation of the war, it was also closed. St Boniface Mission belonging to the Jesuit Society, a religious order of the Catholic Church, closed its doors as the war intensified in 1978 after its only catechist was killed.⁴ The only secondary schools functional during the war were Charles Clark and Chikangwe because they were protected by RSFs since the former was close to a police camp and the latter was in the small town of Karoi. All other secondary schools were built after independence. Hurungwe did not have, and still does not have, a nurse-training institute or any other such tertiary college. Therefore, it is not surprising that for so long, the district was neglected. Its history could not be written partly because of lack of local initiatives and mainly as a result of underdevelopment caused by the absence of minerals and the ravages of the tsetsefly. Until the 1970s when the liberation war started, most areas were not accessible even by gravel roads. With the coming of independence, many primary, secondary and adult-literacy schools were opened. By 1980, the only academic of repute which Hurungwe had produced was the late Minister Ariston Chambati. Worse still, Hurungwe has not produced any prominent politician besides the one already identified.

Most educational and health institutions now remaining belong either to the council or the government. Kapfunde clinic in Chief Nematombo's area belonged to the Evangelical Church during the war years but now has been taken over by the Hurungwe District Council. Similarly Kapfunde primary school was taken from the church by the council. The Salvation Army has

³ *Ibid.*

⁴ S2929/2/9 Delineation Report, Urungwe District, February 1968.

also lost Mahwada Primary School to the council. The only growth point in Hurungwe is Magunje. During the War, Magunje was already a big service centre. Some of the service centres in Hurungwe which were a hive of activity during the war were Sengwe, Zvipani, Mashuma, Mudzimu, Mahwada, Kapfunde, Zvarai, Chimusimbe, Chidamoyo and Chitiki. Chidamoyo had a mission hospital which survived the war and is still functional to date. The hospital belongs to the Church of Christ and is the only mission hospital in the whole district.

Hurungwe is generally a country of the Korekore people, though the Karanga and other ethnic groups also constitute a sizeable number. According to the researcher's observations, Korekore traditional rituals have survived despite challenges from many churches. During the dry season particularly between July and October, the Korekore hold their traditional ceremonies particularly the 'kurova guva' ceremonies. They also hold thanksgiving parties called 'dinhe' in which they express gratitude to their ancestors either for a good harvest or just being with them through challenging times. Great respect is given to their spirit mediums such as Nyanhehwe, Nyamuswa, Kasinamukwawo, Nehoreka, and Kanegocheke. Such ceremonies were promoted, disrupted or both by the Chimurenga war from 1972-1979.

Generally, church activities and traditional ceremonies were brought to a halt by the raging war. Particularly hated were members of the Johanne Marange Apostolic Church (JMAC) who usually held their night vigils in mountains. That being the case, their activities were deemed to be a threat to ZIPRA security. Moreover, the 'apostles' had always been at loggerheads with traditional leaders for disrespecting sacred hills. Mr Mubazangi pointed out that these hills became no go areas during the war. Anyone caught could be shot by guerrillas. The people did not know what to do for these hills had also been their places for undertaking community rituals.⁵

Traditional ceremonies were also under threat from ZIPRA guerrilla war. Between 1972 and 1976, people had continued to gather for their dry season traditional ceremonies called 'dinhe'

⁵ Interview with O Mubazangi, St Boniface Mission, 2011.

undertaken during the night. Afterwards the security situation no longer allowed that. Guerrillas mostly travelled at night hence moving about to attend to these ceremonies came under threat. Gathering for traditional beer drinking ceremonies was equally dangerous. Mr Chitsiga remembers that one day when he was sent by ZIPRAs on a reconnaissance trip, he got another village where people had gathered to drink beer. To his surprise, the jovial mood usually found at such places was absent on people's faces. Upon enquiry, he learnt that security forces had told people not to leave. They had taken positions anticipating that guerrillas would come so that they would deal them a blow. Luckily, none came.⁶ At another village in Maumbe, 27 people were killed by Rhodesian Security Forces while on a beer drinking party. For Kandororo village near St Boniface, things were different. People were afraid of being taken away or killed by both forces so often gathered during the day to ensure that any attack would affect them all.⁷ Even if one did not drink, it was no longer safe to be alone, so people gathered at such parties.

Funerals were at times hurriedly undertaken. Any traditional rituals especially in Kajekaje had to be done during the day in stark contrast with the expected norm. When faced with threats on their lives people had to adjust in such a manner and by the same token the war forced people to change their routines. What is apparently clear is that there was some level of tolerance to traditional ceremonies. Probably guerrillas did so to get recognition from local spirit mediums who in turn converted them into 'sons of the soil'.

Creation of the Reserve

From oral interviews undertaken, most respondents linked the creation of Hurungwe to their resettlement either from the Zambezi Valley or from other places by the colonial government during or after the Second World War. Even the Karanga who voluntarily migrated to Hurungwe largely did so after the war. Whether one is discussing with the Korekore or Karangas, Hurungwe is a *recent* creation which cannot be discussed without reference to the colonial government.

Some of the chiefs in Hurungwe used to occupy the Zambezi Valley at least up to 1956 before

⁶ Interview with E N Chitsiga, Troon Farm, Karoi, 2012.

⁷ Interview with O Mubazangi, St Boniface Mission, 2011.

they were evicted to make way for the construction of Kariba Dam. The wetlands they resided along the Zambezi River were called Gova. According to Mapuranga, they got a lot of fish from the Zambezi River.⁸ In fact, fish was almost their staple diet. They also grew crops along river banks as the Zambezi waters receded. At times such crops could be wiped away by the swelling Zambezi around October.⁹ Memories of Gova from the few surviving elders who were part of the community show that it was a country of abundance. Assertions that Gova was a country of riches are often intended to contradict it with Hurungwe which is largely barren and drought-stricken. They are also intended to drive home the fact that communities were short-changed by forced evictions from the Zambezi. That the Zambezi was a country of abundance is meant to show unhappiness with resettlement to Hurungwe district which is not endowed with similar resources. A Report by the Land Development Officer (LDO) to the Native Commissioner showed that in 1947, locals had reaped only 1-2 bags per acre.¹⁰ The yield was not good enough considering that the district did not provide for alternative sources of food during the dry season as the Zambezi Valley did. In fact, the Rhodesian colonial regime was exerting pressure on the African residents by forcing them to construct contour ridges.¹¹

When the colonial government decided to build the Kariba Dam, it was left with no choice but to resettle residents of Gova who included both the Tonga and the Korekore. The former ended up largely in Kariba and Binga districts. The manner in which they were moved affected the status of traditional leaders, community relations and access to resources. Of importance in this study are the Korekore people because they were largely moved to Hurungwe. Some of the traditional leaders who were moved to Hurungwe included Dandawa, Mudzimu, Nyamhunga and Matau. All these were moved into an area which had generally belonged to Nematombo, thus greatly reducing his domain.¹² Today, Nematombo's land stretches from Tengwe River to Kariba dam and in most areas, as a long narrow strip because of the resettlements. To the west, Nematombo's

⁸ Interviews with Mr.D. Mapuranga, Mapuranga kraal, 28 December 2006.

⁹ Interview with Mr Hokonya Chasura, Manjengwa Village, Mudzimu 18 April 2007.

¹⁰ Urungwe District ldo (Miami) Reports, June 1947-February 1951, S2989/10/1/50.

¹¹ Urungwe District ldo (Miami) Reports, June 1947-February 1951, S2989/10/1/50. The LDO's meetings with Africans emphasized soil conservation, necessity for strip contours and continuous cultivation after planting had been effected.

¹² S2929/2/9 Delineation Report, Urungwe District, February 1967-1968.

boundary is marked by the former Four-Wire cattle fence, to the east by Tengwe and Murereshi Rivers and then into Nyaodza River to the shores of lake Kariba. Nematombo has two headmen, Mzilawempi and Chanetsa who in practice regard themselves as autonomous traditional rulers just as they were before evictions.

Chanetsa was removed from his original area in Umbowe which is in Makonde district as a result of the expansion of white commercial farmland. He arrived in 1942 into an area where he was to fall under chief Nematombo. According to the late chief's son, Michael Makumbi, Chanetsa was a chief in the area today known as Umbowe which was referred to by the local people as Damba.¹³ He was first moved to Nyamahumba in 1941 but was again removed as the area had once more been set aside for commercial farms. In 1942, he was moved to the area today referred to as St Boniface which fell under the domain of chief Nematombo. Throughout the movement, Chanetsa had retained his title as chief. His demotion came when the DC from Mwami (Miami) remembered as Nyamambishi (uncooked/raw meat) told him to begin preparations to move to Sanyati after the rainy season. This is said to have greatly infuriated Chanetsa who then, in a state of rage, fired his old muzzle-loading gun at the government representative but missed him in the process. The DC retaliated by demoting him to a headman. His sons, Offias and Michael, claim that their father's insignia was taken and locked in Milton House, in Salisbury. Their battle now is to recover it.

The demotion of Chanetsa should be understood from a number of angles. To start with, by moving him so many times within a short space of time, the administration was repeatedly frustrating him in the eyes of people he led. The area he was moved to in 1942 was not big enough to justify the continuation of his title as chief. That the area was not expansive enough should be understood from the desire of the colonial administration to settle Mzilawempi in the same area. Furthermore, to the east of the area allocated to him were white commercial farms, most of them being pegged by then. He could not expand into that area. In the end, he was hemmed between Nematombo to the west, Dendera to the north and Mzilawempi to the south. It might have seemed logical for the DC to move him further. However, Sanyati was unpopular for

¹³ Interview with Michael Makumbi, Murambiwa Township, Chanetsa, 10 July 2014

its malaria and sleeping sickness, hence the refusal. The demotion of Chanetsa was also occasioned by his alleged attempt to shoot the DC. Such an act was always considered a serious offence by the colonial administration and had to be punished heavily to prevent similar occurrences in future. The interests of the administration were to create as much land as possible for whites, hence the disregard for African interests as reflected in the fate of Chanetsa. During the war of liberation, Chanetsa's area became notorious for cattle rustling from nearby white commercial farms. As a response to the problem, white farmers created Farm Militias while the government recruited local youths to become SFAs. Overcrowding, openness and poor soils of the area in question affected the attitudes of guerrillas and RSFs towards environmental preservation.

The boundary of his headmanship is the old road to Zvipani in the west. Between Mzilawempi and Chanetsa the boundary remains contested. Chanetsa has not forgotten that in the area of Umbowe, he was a chief. Technically therefore, he is not obliged to pay homage to Nematombo who is his chief because he believes that he is himself a chief even if the government does not recognize him as such. To add to Chanetsa's embarrassment, headman Mzilawempi's people were moved to an area that fell under him. Some of his villages such as Mudengezerwa, Nyamutora, Nyarumwe, Mukakatanwa, Dandaradza and Charingana refused to move when Chanetsa was told by the DC to regroup his people. Furthermore, some of Chanetsa's people moved to Rengwe with Dandawa.¹⁴ Therefore, from the time of migration, Chanetsa has little or nothing to do with Nematombo. He desires the restoration of his chieftainship from the government. Some of his village heads who refused to move when Chanetsa was told to regroup his people include Kariyana who has set himself up as Chanetsa's headman and thinks he is equivalent to Mzilawempi.¹⁵ Though Kariyana resides in an area which administratively falls under Mzilawempi, he does not recognize Mzilawempi as his headman and the DA's office has still not resolved the impasse. The movement of Chanetsa should be further understood in the context of the post-second world war resettlement scheme mooted to reward whites who had fought in the war. Preparations for the scheme therefore began when the war itself was being fought.

¹⁴ S2929/2/9 Delineation Report, Urungwe District, February 1967-1968.

¹⁵ Interview with Offias Makumbi, Murambiwa Township, Chanetsa Headman, 10 July 2013.

In the mid-1950s, Chanetsa accepted the Karanga (vaVhitori) into the area under his domain. Dendera and Kazangarare had denied them a place arguing that they were witches.¹⁶ Chanetsa embraced them hoping to suture relations with the administration but this did not earn him back his title. Chanetsa also allocated land for the construction of St Boniface Mission to the Jesuits in 1968 and volunteered to move his own homestead to pave way for the mission site. These may have been attempts to appease the colonial administration and to prove that he was now a changed man. He was no longer the same leader who had attempted to shoot the DC. The mission was definitely a requirement not only because the missionaries would mediate between the headman and the colonial administration, but because missionaries brought schools and clinics. Between 1968 and 1978, indeed many children from Chanetsa's area were able to receive primary school education at the mission which had also opened a small dispensary. In the war, Chanetsa did not oppose the administration. According to Offias Makumbi, Nhari Township where he was based became a refuge and base for various people who were fleeing the war. Chanetsa was close to Magunje and along the gravel road used by Rhodesian soldiers for attacks in the interior. Any attempts to oppose the administration would have been suicidal. As such, he was identified as a sellout for allowing SFAs to look after him.

Mzilawempi is an immigrant Karanga headman who was moved from Gwelo. He occupies land defined as belonging to Chanetsa. In fact, Chanetsa argues that he gave Mzilawempi land to look after on his behalf. He is only caretaker of Chanetsa's land.¹⁷ On the other hand, Mzilawempi counters that Chanetsa's people were advised to move to Chanetsa's land but they did not. As a result, these people now belong to him. The challenge is that throughout the war and even after, the Korekore who formerly belonged to Chanetsa did not wish to pay loyalty to him. Mzilawempi wants government to upgrade him to the status of a chief.¹⁸ Generally, Mzilawempi brought with him the Karanga from Gwelo. There is a tendency by the Korekore of Hurungwe to confuse these with the Karanga from Fort Victoria who were brought after both Chanetsa and Mzilawempi had settled. However, the Chanetsa people have tended to lump all the Karanga with Mzilawempi in order to justify that, indeed, they gave land to him when infact it was the

¹⁶ Interview with Michael Makumbi, Murambiwa Township, Chanetsa Headman, 10 July 2013.

¹⁷ *Ibid.*

¹⁸ S2929/2/9 Delineation Report, Urungwe District, February 1967-1968

colonial administration. It appears that the government was involved in trying to create a wedge between the Karanga and Korekore by speaking negatively against the former. For example, according to Mr Wallace who was well into his 90s at the time of interview, whites encouraged the Korekore not to marry vaVhitori until a 3rd or 4th generation because these were not *good people*.¹⁹ These differences had no relevance to SFAs recruitment because the major concern for the recruiters was physical fitness rather than ethnic belonging. Furthermore, ZIPRA seemed unconcerned with these differences. The advice of colonial administration had little or no effect on intermarriages between these different groups.

Unlike other traditional leaders, Chundu was left close enough to the valley, that is, in the extreme North-West. He is separated from the Zambezi River by game reserves and the Mana Pools National Park. He was moved from the Zambezi valley in 1959 again in order to facilitate the building of Kariba Dam. Mudzimu, Matau and Dandawa occupy the Southern edges of Hurungwe. Mudzimu suffered most from this movement because there wasn't enough land for him, so he was not given the chance to reclaim his chieftaincy.²⁰ Chundu's movement was not as radical because he still bordered game reserves. This enabled his people to hunt illegally into the game parks though this was risky especially if caught by game ranchers or Rhodesian soldiers during the war of liberation. The practice of *poaching* has still not died down. Though his area was remote, rocky, hilly and dry, at least there was enough space for expansion, mainly towards the game reserves. Chief Chundu's area was a major entry point for ZIPRA guerrillas coming from Zambia. The chief himself became a renowned supporter of the guerrilla war. He is remembered for providing guerrillas with protective charms, caching weapons and liaising with the medium of Chimombe on the security of guerrillas.²¹ He was eventually taken by the DC to a *Keep* in Karoi for his own *security*.

Chief Mujinga was already in Hurungwe when the forced migrations took place. He is quoted in the 1967/8 reports for being against further movement of Karangas into the area under his jurisdiction because they were undermining him. When asked about the vast Piriviri area and the

¹⁹ Interview with Mr Wallace, Chabumhe Village, Chanetsa, 8 July 2014.

²⁰ Interview with Mr Hokonya Chasura, Manjengwa Village, Mudzimu 18 April 2007.

²¹ Interview with Nkiwane, ZIPRA Veterans Trust, Bulawayo, 23 August 2012

possibility of settling more people there, the chief replied:

Yes, it can accommodate more people. But if the government intends resettling more people there, please do not send me more vaKaranga. We do not get on well together- we would prefer small groups of people. Soon there will be many vaKaranga here and they will take my chieftanship away from me.²²

The chief was also reported to be very unfriendly with the colonial administration for enforcing the Native Land Husbandry Act in his area far more than in other areas. As a result of the chief's indifference to the Karanga, there was no large scheme to put the Karanga there. Mujinga has only one unrecognized headman named Chimusimbe, whom he gave an area to rule. Chimusimbe received people moved by the Native Commissioner from Damba in Mhangura and Mananga which is located on the other side of Tengwe River. The government had not recognized him as a headman and it has still not done so today. The area of Chimusimbe was one of the hottest during the war of liberation not exactly because of its history but because it was close to the gravel road which linked areas such as Kavaya, Chijawi, Batanai, Mudzimu and Mujinga. Further, as a mountainous area, guerrillas had hideouts there. It comes as no surprise that one training camp for auxiliaries was set at Tengwe Block (of farms) which borders Mujinga.

As was the case with Mujinga, Kazangarare was not relocated because of the construction of Kariba dam. It is not clearly known when Kazangarare first settled in Hurungwe. According to traditions collected in 1968, Kazangarare gave his two sons Garara and Dendera their areas to rule. The latter got Ruvunze (farmlands) but was eventually moved to Magunje area to found Dendera chieftainship.²³ Chief Dendera was killed during the liberation war by assailants suspected to be either auxiliaries or ZIPRA. Kazangarare has only one headman called Shumbayaonda.

Dandawa who was moved to Hurungwe in 1956 had a number of grievances against the colonial administration as reported in 1968. He complained that

²² S2929/2/9 Delineation Report, Urungwe District, February 1967-1968.

²³ *Ibid.*

- a) The area given to him was too rocky to cultivate by hand.
- b) There was too much witchweed.
- c) Baboons and wild pigs raided crops
- d) Selling price of surplus maize was very low
- e) We are prevented from keeping cattle
- f) Boreholes often dry up
- g) When boreholes break down, it takes a very long time to repair them.
- h) Dog taxes give no return²⁴

The prevalence of these problems had a bearing on the manner SFAs fought the war in Hurungwe. More than other areas of Hurungwe, SFAs were quite widespread in the area under Dandawa which also covers his two headmen, Matau and Mudzimu. Matau was appointed government-recognized headmen in February 1948. Originally, he lived near Mount Hurungwe. He was therefore moved slightly to the area where he is today. Mudzimu was a chief but reduced to the position of headman upon the death of the incumbent in 1953. Archival documents at NAZ do not mention that in Gova, Mudzimu was a chief. According to the incumbent, Mudzimu was already a chief by around 1693.²⁵ He was in charge of rainmaking ceremonies in the Zambezi valley long before movement into Hurungwe and mediated on behalf of the rest of the chiefs to the medium of Nyanhewe. The installation of Nyamhunga, Nematombo and Dandawa was supposed to be officiated by him while they were still in Gova. The problem came in 1950 when Mudzimu married off his daughter Karuva whom Matapura Zaranyika had promised to marry three years back and they had actually exchanged tokens (*nhumbi*). Matapura Zaranyika had gone to work in Chakari and for three years his fate remained unknown. Karuva was then married by another man. When Zaranyika returned, he reported the matter to the DC at Mwami culminating in the temporary suspension of the Mudzimu chieftainship.²⁶

As presented by the incumbent headman Mudzimu (11 July 2014) the arrangement forced upon him by the DC was that for unlawfully marrying off his daughter twice, he would lose his insignia (*simbi*) for two months as punishment. By 1953, Mudzimu had not regained his title hence a delegation made up of his village heads such as Bandera, Nyamharepare, Nyamhondoro, Muparaganda and others went to see the DC at Mwami hoping to get back the *simbi* but without success. The same delegation went again in 1954 but failed to make headway because the DC remained adamant. Like Chanetsa, Mudzimu claims that his *simbi* was taken to Milton House in

²⁴ S2929/2/9 Delineation Report, Urungwe District, February 1967-1968

²⁵ Mudzimu knows this date from oral traditions passed on to him by his predecessors.

²⁶ Interview with Headman Mudzimu, Mudzimu Court, 11 July 2014.

Salisbury. Even with the intervention of the medium of Nyanhewe, Mudzimu could not recover his lost title. Until 1968 however, people under Mudzimu were registered as belonging to chief Mudzimu. In 1968, Mudzimu claims that his people were now regarded as Dandawa's people and then he was officially a mere headman. Again, he sent a delegation of village heads to Dandawa for clarification on the matter but they were not able to reverse that arrangement. Mudzimu attributes the failure to get back his title to his differences with Nyamupfukudza who worked at the DC's offices and jealousies from his fellow chiefs. He also thinks that because Mudzimu was the toughest of all chiefs, the colonial administration thought it wiser to demote him. To frustrate him further, he was the first to be moved from Gova in 1956.

When Mudzimu came to Hurungwe, the Karanga referred to as Mavhitori²⁷ were already in the area. These came largely from Masvingo in search of better farming land. To take an example of the 19 villages under Mudzimu, 8 belonged to the Karanga or vaVhitori. Those listed as vaVhitori or Vatogwa by 1968 were Manjengwa or William, Marangwanda, Mubengwa or Chitiki, Mudzingi or Chipere, Mukucha, Goromondo, Mhangarai and Kwirirai.²⁸ Such villages are dominated largely by the Karanga. Korekore villages inclusive of those who were in the area when Mudzimu came in 1956 were Chirasasa, Matenga of Shumba neChinanga, Mudzvamusi or Ranjisi, Jera, Mhazi, Gasura I, Mutaaurwa, Charuma, Kandiye, Manhenda and Gasura II.²⁹ To conclude therefore, some of the Karanga came to Hurungwe before the Korekore postwar resettlement hence settled earlier on land that is generally defined as belonging to the Korekore. From the account given by Mudzimu, the Karanga especially from Chitiki joined SFAs in large numbers and gave him serious trouble. The current Mudzimu became a headman in June 1977 after the death of his father. He was still a young unmarried man who became committed to the ZIPRA cause for reasons that were both opportunistic and out of frustration with the administration.

Nyamhunga was originally in the Gowa area and moved to Hurungwe to pave way for the

²⁷ They were given that name because most Karangas came from from Fort Victoria Province which is now Masvingo.

²⁸ S2929/2/9 Delineation Report, Urungwe District, February 1968.

²⁹ *Ibid.*

building of Kariba dam. He was first moved to Badze under Nematombo. Nyamhunga's people were under the leadership of Katidiga.³⁰ He found a number of villages which had switched allegiance from Nematombo to Matau. These began to pay allegiance to him but in no time, he was given a different area which is today known as Nyamhunga because the area between Badze and Tengwe Rivers was deemed too small for a chief. Some villages followed him while others such as Murota remained where they had first settled after movement from Gova. His people had moved from the valley in 1956 but only lasted a year in Badze. In 1968, Nyamhunga's grievances included the need for clinics and hospitals, lack of water, problems of baboons and that the administration was not allowing them to keep cattle.³¹ In 1978, the chief was to be killed and was buried with state assistance while auxiliaries provided security. Closer to Nyamhunga, chief Musampakaruma was the first one to be killed and the 'assassins' are still remembered as ZIPRA guerrillas.³²

The 1968 Delineation Report of Urungwe has 5 headman and 7 Chiefs. The headmen listed are Mzilamwempi, Mudzimu, Matau, Chimusimbe and Shumbayaonda while chiefs are Dendera, Nematombo, Chanetsa, Mujinga, Dandawa, Nyamhunga and Kazangare.³³ The Mashonaland list on the status of chiefs in the district identifies some of the chiefs by name except for Nematombo, Nyamhunga and headman Matau. The following were the listings as of 2006:

Chief/Headmen	Current title holder
Chundu	Murayiridzi Wilson Berewu (now deceased and replaced by Mbasera)
Kazangarare	Peter Maendaenda
Dendera	Noah Karecheni Dendera
Dandawa	Try Manyepa

³⁰ Interview with Chief Nyamhunga, Nyamhunga Village, 3 July 2012.

³¹ S2929/2/9 Delineation Report, Urungwe District, February 1967-1968.

³² Interview with Headman Mudzimu at his court, 11 July 2013.

³³ S2929/2/9 Delineation Report, Urungwe District, February 1967-1968.

Mujinga	Happy Kapumha
Mudzimu	Joseph Mudzimu
Chanetsa	Adam Katsvere
Mzilawempi	R.N. Maringindo
Shumbayaonda	K.C. Shumbayaonda ³⁴

The Korekore people of Hurungwe mostly trace their origins from Mutota, the legendary founder of the Mutapa State.³⁵ However, as noted above, there are many immigrant communities. Only Chimusimbe, Mujinga, Kazangarare, Dendera and Nematombo were already in Hurungwe before the resettlement and have only suffered reduction of their areas as a result of movements which occurred as from 1956. Mzilawempi and Chanetsa were moved from Gweru (Gwelo) and Makonde (Lomagundi) respectively. The rest of traditional leaders were moved from Gova to give way for the building of Kariba dam. Populations which were found already in Hurungwe had to decide which chief they preferred to stay under. Those who chose not to move had to live under chiefs or headmen given to them by the government of the day.

The Environment

The natural environment of Hurungwe can be understood well by following it from the Zambezi valley to Hurungwe District. The highest point in Hurungwe is Nyangawe hill which is 1411m above sea level.³⁶ The Zambezi valley is on average 70km wide before one gets to ranges of hills. In the valley itself, average annual temperatures range from 25 to 35,5 degrees Celcius. The valley is infested with tsetse flies and malaria carrying mosquitoes.³⁷ This makes it clear

³⁴ Status of Chiefs, Ministry of Local Government Mash West Province, June 2006.

³⁵ S2929/2/9 Delineation Report, Urungwe District, February 1968.

³⁶ Interviews with Mr. O. Mubazangi, Chemagamba High School, Chinhoyi, 2 August 2007.

³⁷ *School Atlas for Zimbabwe*, pp. 8-9

why cattle-keeping was not a major pre-occupation of the Zambezi valley.³⁸

The valley discussed above was not populated by people both during the war and to date because it had been turned into game parks and reserves. Hurungwe district borders a number of game parks and reserves such as Kariba, Mana Pools National Park, Chewore Game Reserve, Charara and Matusadonha.³⁹ Most of the Western side of Hurungwe is occupied by the Kariba Dam which is a huge man-made lake. The lake was a major impediment to guerrilla infiltration. Crossing into Zimbabwe was done either through the Southern edges between the Zambezi National Park and Milibizi River or to the extreme North-West. To get to Hurungwe, guerrillas had to cope with the threat of wild animals or alert Rhodesian soldiers. Rivers that flow in the northerly direction include Rukomeshi, Chewore, Charara, Tsororo and Murereshi. To the extreme east outside Hurungwe is Angwa River. When in flood, these rivers did hamper movements particularly in the rainy season. Apparently, the annual rainfall average for Hurungwe is 800mm.⁴⁰

Hurungwe has a number of hills which were deemed sacred by residents. Among these is Hurungwe from which the name of the district is derived. Others include Mudzimu, Nyangahwe and several others in Gatshe Gatshe. Accessing and using these without prior permission of the keepers was deemed harmful especially during the liberation war. In terms of vegetation, the journey along the valley and the escarpments looks unsuitable for guerrilla warfare. It is largely mopani savanna woodlands which become bare during the dry season. As such, Bhebe points out that traversing the vast, unpopulated and sparsely populated Zambezi valley and escarpment where they were easily spotted by the enemy and forced to fight battles which they had hoped to avoid was a serious challenge to guerrilla war effort.⁴¹ Such environmental impediments explain why ZANLA infiltration in the north was made to coincide with the rains 'when green foliage could provide better cover for the guerrillas, when water would be plentiful and when the

³⁸ Urungwe District Ido (Miami) Reports, June 1947-February 1951, S2989/10/1/50. Up to 1950, no cattle were being kept in this district because of the identified problems.

³⁹ *School Atlas for Zimbabwe*, pp .8-9

⁴⁰ Map of Zimbabwe, Esselt Map Service.

⁴¹ N. Bhebe, *The ZAPU and ZANU Guerrilla Warfare and the Evangelical Lutheran Church in Zimbabwe*, Gweru, Mambo Press, 1999, p. 24.

Rhodesian advantage of mechanized mobility would be reduced by flooded rivers and roads that turned into treacherous quagmires.⁴² The vegetation to the North West was different to that in the Eastern border with Mozambique which was mostly forest and mountainous with good air cover.⁴³

Several rivers which dissect Hurungwe district both impeded and helped the war effort. Among the major rivers are Tengwe, Musukwi, Badze, Chikuti and Sengwe, some of which pour their waters into Sanyati River to the South West of Hurungwe. Marowa highlighted that Musukwi marked the borderline between ZIPRA guerillas and Auxiliary forces.⁴⁴ None dared to cross the border. Similarly, civilians were compelled to behave in the same way. By crossing the boundary line, one easily became a sell-out. This thesis defines a sell-out in terms of how s/he was understood from municipal to national levels.

Though dissected by many rivers, Hurungwe has only one major tarred road from Karoi to Chirundu. The rest are dirty roads connecting major service centres such as Mudzimu, Kazangarare, Kapfunde, Nyamhunga and Tengwe. Until the peak of the war, Binga was not connected even by a dirty gravel road. The need to curtail guerilla activities led to the construction of the road. Generally, Hurungwe is a hilly country. That being the case, Rhodesian vehicles had difficulties in venturing much into the interior without being detected by guerrillas and their mujibhas. The presence of thorny bushes made movement difficult during the dry and rainy season. Such thorny bushes and thickets of *mupondo* trees are common in areas under Chief Mujinga and Dandawa. In fact, during the rainy season, the area is covered completely in vegetation inclusive of the fields. Generally such a situation provided excellent cover for guerrillas. The above contrasts areas under Chanetsa and Mzilawempi which is a vast open savanna country dotted with a few trees just like the grasslands between Gweru and Bulawayo. Additionally, these areas bordered white commercial farms during the war. Except around St

⁴²J Nkomo, *The Story of my Life*, Harare, SAPES, 2001, p. 166.

⁴³ D. Martin & P. Johnson, *The Struggle for Zimbabwe: The Chimurenga War*, Harare, ZPH, 1981, p. 19.

⁴⁴ I. Marowa, "Landscape and Memory: Understanding the Rural Heritage of the Second Chimurenga in the Dandawa Area of Hurungwe District, 1975-1980" MA Thesis Department of History of the University of Zimbabwe pp. 38-39

Boniface, guerillas did not have a policy on veldt fires. The area in question has a few dotted Muhacha trees. The rest is grassland. Burning grass would therefore expose ZIPRA fighters to Rhodesian air power. In this regard, guerrillas did not want anyone to burn grass. Zanda was accused of having started a veldfire and was subsequently killed. In fact, as soon as a fire broke out, the guerrillas quickly gathered people to put it down.⁴⁵ Around St Boniface, guerrillas were therefore excellent 'environmentalists.' Elsewhere they had no such policy because of enough cover.

Hurungwe is a good agricultural country. The most common crops of the 1970s were maize, sunflower, groundnuts, soya beans and cotton. Traditional crops grown include pumpkins, cowpeas and round nuts. Some of these crops especially maize were under the threat of baboons. Near game parks, not only baboons threatened and still threaten both crops and people, but also elephants, buffalos, leopards and lions. Like most other districts in Zimbabwe, domestic animals that were kept were mostly donkeys, cattle, sheep and goats. In Chundu communal lands, the prevalence of domestic animals increased after independence as serious attempts were made by the government to put in place measures to eradicate tsetse flies.

Grievances against the Colonial Government

Before the coming of the war to Hurungwe, residents already had a dislike of the colonial system. Gravity of differences varied from one area to another. This partly reveals the nature of these grievances. However, mention must be made that some of the grievances have already been outlined. These will not be repeated. For the people of Chundu, Mudzimu and Dandawa, their dislike of the colonial system was triggered off by how they were *force-marched* from Gova in the Zambezi valley to pave way for the construction of Kariba Dam. Mr Mapuranga pointed out that in Gova crop agriculture was done along the Zambezi River as the waters receded. Farmers did not need to use cattle but rather the traditional hoe to till the wet soil and plant maize, beans, peas and other traditional crops. Wild game was hunted without any game laws prohibiting them.⁴⁶ When the people under Mudzimu came to the area in Hurungwe they were confronted with a drastic change of fortune as these resources were generally absent.

⁴⁵ Interview with O Mubazangi, St Boniface Mission, 2011

⁴⁶ Interviews with Mr Mapuranga, Mapuranga Village, Mudzimu 28 December 2011.

Game laws by the colonial master were particularly painful. Mr Simakani who later became a ZIPRA guerrilla recalls that his father told him that in Hurungwe, they were no longer permitted to hunt as they had done in Gova. It was pointed to them that beyond the fence, the area was reserved exclusively for wild animals. Anyone who unlawfully crossed the fence was judged guilty of poaching and was punished heavily if caught.⁴⁷ Hatred for whites increased because the alternative to hunting, farming was not lucrative. Draught animals such cattle easily succumbed to diseases spread by tsetse, meaning that until 1980, there were few cattle in the district. There were few major rivers for gardening as they had done in Gova. Simakani revealed that it seemed as if they had been abandoned there to starve. Worse still they had been cut off from their relatives living on the other side of the river.⁴⁸

In a discussion with Mr Underson Jera, the unfairness of the colonial system saw their village losing its cattle. In early 1960, each family was compelled to remain with only 4 cattle. The rest were sold for not more than a pound each. Mr Jera was very furious about this but he was powerless to react as the whitemen were too strong.⁴⁹ His hatred for whites was intensified about the same time as they were forced to dig contour ridges. The task was highly labour intensive. Mr Jera and family were not properly educated on the benefits of these ridges. As a result, their assumption was that the move was intended to just make life difficult for them. Their hatred was also directed against the local agricultural demonstrator, Mr. Bwanya, who was supposed to enforce the unpopular piece of legislation.⁵⁰ The unpopularity of the administration in Mujinga's area was also intensified when peasants were compelled to dig contour ridges.

Other residents, particularly the vaVhitori, were not highly opposed to the colonial system. According to Matangi Nyahuma, Hurungwe was not a paradise but, at least, it was better than Buhera which he had left. Here, he had a large piece of land deep in the hills. The Native Land

⁴⁷ Interview with Mr. Simakani, Chitindiva Secondary School, Chundu Communal Lands, 2 December 2011.

⁴⁸ Interview with Mr. Simakani, Chitindiva Secondary School, Chundu Communal Lands, 2 December 2011.

⁴⁹ Interview with Mr Underson Jera, Mazvaramhaka Village, 19 April 2010.

⁵⁰ Interview with Mr Underson Jera, Mazvaramhaka Village, 19 April 2007.

Husbandry Act was not thoroughly enforced here as compared to his area of origin. The only major worry was the absence of schools since here, they were far away and scattered. It therefore was not seen as an option to send the girl child to school.⁵¹ Mr B. Jonasi said that his headman, Basikoro Mudzimu, was particularly arrogant to the white District Commissioner who had demoted him from the position of a Chief to a headman.⁵² Although he acknowledged that Mudzimu had made the mistake of receiving bridewealth for his already *married* daughter, the punishment meted out was too much for him to bear. Up to the present day, Mudzimu wants to be addressed as Chief and has problems in referring cases to Dandawa who is the paramount chief.

Although Hurungwe had various grievances, the most important were environmental in nature. These included the imposition of the Native Land Husbandry Act, presence of tsetse and their impact on cattle keeping, shortage of enough wetlands for gardening, deprivation of the right to hunt among others. Other grievances were social and political. Such grievances meant that the war came to a people who, for various reasons, were indifferent to the colonial system. As will be shown later, prevalence of popular grievances did not always yield the same reaction when the war finally came. Over and above popular grievances, the absence of any form of employment other than on farms was important in enticing young men to join the auxiliaries. There were no mines or big urban centers to employ them.

Conclusion

This chapter has shown that Hurungwe Reserve was largely created during the Second World War with a view to settle former white servicemen. Otherwise, before World War 2, Hurungwe was generally unknown to the white world. Chiefs who were based in Hurungwe prior to the war were Mujinga, Kazangarare, Dendera and Nematombo. The rest were moved into Hurungwe from Gova in the Zambezi Valley, with the exception of headmen Chanetsa and Mzilawempi. Hurungwe was further expanded by the immigration of the Karanga from Fort Victoria in particular. The creation of white commercial farms around Karoi and Tengwe left little land for

⁵¹ Interview with Matangi Nyahuma, Chipere Village, Mudzimu, 20 April 2010.

⁵² Interview with Jonasi Bhusvumani, Manjengwa Village, 30 December 2006.

Africans. As such, some traditional leaders such as Chanetsa and Mudzimu were demoted to become headmen.

Various traditional leaders identified above had their grievances with the colonial administration by the time the war broke out. As will be shown, of the downgraded traditional leaders, Mudzimu was to commit himself more than others. Two chiefs were to be killed by guerrillas for reasons that still remain unclear while the remaining chiefs and headmen, except for Mudzimu and Chanetsa, were taken for protection in the small town of Karoi. These traditional leaders had a close alliance with spirit mediums during the execution of the war. Those who were downgraded by the colonial regime are still eager to get their titles.

CHAPTER 3

THE QUESTION OF TRAITORS AND AUXILIARIES IN THE LIBERATION OF ZIMBABWE

Introduction

The chapter details divisions between and within various nationalist movements fighting for the liberation of Zimbabwe between 1960 and 1979. For purposes of a clear understanding of these cleavages, first the rise of nationalism in the country is reviewed up to 1961 when the Zimbabwe African People's Union (ZAPU) was formed. From then onwards, nationalist parties began to show a lot of inter-party and intra-party disharmonies. These divisions arose out of alleged ethnic animosities, competition for power, different ideologies, personality clashes, different strategies and tactical approaches, all of which were worsened by the negative intervention of Rhodesians. By 1963, differences within ZAPU had led to the formation of the Zimbabwe African National Union (ZANU). Thereafter, other nationalist parties such as the Front for Liberation of Zimbabwe (FROLIZI) and the United African National Council (UANC) were formed partly because of factionalism in early nationalist parties. At the centre of these divisions was the issue of identity. Before opponents were dealt with or eliminated, they were first manufactured into enemies for political expediency. Nationalism thus created the political definition of self and the political other. Therefore, the study demonstrates how some politicians and what they represented were perceived as beacons of patriotism and/or as stooges liable for punishment which could include physical violence.

As the liberation war intensified, inter-party and intra-party competition among nationalists intensified and these nationalists began to inscribe and re-inscribe each other as sell-outs, traitors, Tshombes, Capricorns, patriots, authentic and inauthentic formations, counter-revolutionaries and revolutionaries. Therefore it was already evident in this early period that come independence, losers would be viewed as sell-outs or traitors of the liberation war. However, what was also becoming apparent was that the definitions, understanding and visions

of the nation, nationalism and independence varied extensively. It is also within the context of the development of Zimbabwean nationalism that the genesis of the auxiliary concept and the question of traitors make sense.

Before a critical analysis of divisive problems plaguing Zimbabwean nationalism is given, I pay particular attention to how colonialism constructed people into indigenous and settlers and how these identities determined both political and economic space. According to Mamdani, it was the colonizer who gave the indigenous populations the identity of native. In the case of Rwanda, the Tutsi were not constructed as indigenous by the Belgian colonialists but as immigrants or settlers into Rwanda.⁵³ With the coming of the Rwandan genocide of 1994, Hutu participants believed that they were not killing neighbors but rather settler invaders. Similarly, when the Nazis set out to eliminate Jews, they thought of themselves as natives and the Jews as invaders. According to Mamdani, the Rwandan genocide was a native engineered genocide. It was genocide perpetrated by those who saw themselves as sons and daughters of the soil and their mission was clearing the soil of a threatening alien presence. The genocide thus sought to eliminate foreign presence from the home soil.⁵⁴

Views propounded by Mamdani are important to this study in a number of ways. To begin with, they constitute the basis of diverging from Masipula Sithole where fissures within the Zimbabwean nationalism were defined as struggles-within-the-struggle. Second, the branding of Muzorewa and Sithole as sellouts was a constructed political identity deliberately engineered in order to deny them legitimacy in the eyes of potential voters and sponsors. Third, relegating them into stooges justified the means- because they were enemies of the people- guerrilla violence against their institutions was justified. Fourth and last, their branding into enemies of the revolution plagued them to the deathbed. Based on the same notion, SFAs have not been accorded a chance to add their voices to the making of the Zimbabwean history because they are deemed to have sold out the revolution by fighting against guerrillas.

I argue in this work that branding each other as sellouts and patriots was a component of political

⁵³ M Mamdani, *When Victims Become Killers*, Princeton, Princeton University, 2001, pp.13-14.

⁵⁴ *Ibid*, p.14.

engineering used in order to displace enemies and reward friends. Masipula Sithole did not realize this phenomenon when he argued that at the centre of political bickering was tribalism as this was simply an excuse. With the war intensifying, the term became very malleable with the result that by constructing and deconstructing people, those who would become *authentic* leaders were decided. Construction of people into various political identities was a deliberate ploy in the power game. The science of the making of the political (enemy or friend) involved struggles, including/excluding, race and ethnic wars, totalization of grievances and populism.

Genesis and development of the sell-out identity, 1960-1963

The major focus of historical studies on Zimbabwean nationalism generally deal with the mid 1960s when the liberation war began up to 1979 when a ceasefire was brokered. The tendency has therefore been to concentrate on the phase of armed liberation war. As argued by Werbner, this practice tended to reduce nationalism to the liberation war right up to the extent of defining the country as born entirely out of the barrel of the gun.⁵⁵ What is crucial to understand is that the spear, the gun or all other instruments of violence were used to advance the interest of nationalists against the Rhodesian system which was wholly or partially understood as an impediment to self-determination. However, independence was also produced by other factors such as international politics in light of the Cold War. The development of the nationalist ideology served as a cornerstone in appreciating its various roots of antagonisms among nationalists.

Zimbabwean nationalism was directly opposed to the Rhodesian nationalism which was its antithesis in terms of outright enmity and labeling of ideological opponents. The latter nationalism had behind it the majority of the white population. They strongly believed that they were obliged to rule over the indigenous population by right of their conquest of Africans in the wars of 1893-4 and 1896-7. In both wars Africans had been defeated. Therefore, Rhodesia became their possession which they were obliged to defend, if need be, by force of arms. Rhodesians generally saw Africans whose territory they had forcibly acquired as second class or

⁵⁵ R Werbner, quoted in S.J Ndlovu-Gatsheni, *Do 'Zimbabwe' Exist? Trajectories of Nationalism, National Identity Formation and Crisis in the Post colonial State*, Bern and Oxford, Peter Lang AG International Academic Publishers 2009, p. 41.

third class citizens. Further, they continued to also strongly subscribe to the view that alone Africans could not effectively and logically rule themselves. To this day, such Rhodesians have continued to so believe. Even though some have transformed themselves into human rights activists, generally, they have continued to be defined by ZANU-PF as Rhodesian nationalists in order to rubbish everything they say. Therefore, to the Rhodesians, anyone among them who supported the black nationalists of ZANU and ZAPU was a sellout. Smith came to the conclusion that by supporting the dentente, Vorster was being treacherous. He added that, 'to betray one's friends, indeed to resort to treachery is something any normal person would try to avoid.'⁵⁶ Therefore, the concept of sellout had nothing to do with skin color and was not a monopoly of the nationalist but had a lot to do with association.

African nationalism in Rhodesia originally emerged out of elite and cultural associations whose major interest was achievement of limited privileges within the colonial setup. Most of these associations were ethnically-based. Therefore, those early nationalists saw African nationalism through an ethnic lens because first and foremost, they belonged to an ethnic group whose interests they were bent on advancing. According to Ndlovu-Gatsheni, nationalism was born with an ethnic birthmark camouflaged as nationalism and was always ready to tear unitary nationalism apart. Nationalist leaders like Joshua Nkomo were active members of Kalanga Cultural Society (KCS) and Matebele Home Society (MHS). Stephen Nkomo even resigned from the NDP in favor of presidency of MHS while Joseph Msika and Simon Muzenda were active members of Monomotapa Offspring Society (MOS).⁵⁷ In order to understand this state of affairs properly, cognizance should be taken of the fact that the concept of Zimbabwe was not commonly used for this country until 1960 when it was appropriated by nationalists. Otherwise, the people between Zambezi and Limpopo rivers had identified themselves as belonging to one ethnic group or another before the imposition of colonial rule and thereafter identified as Rhodesian subjects under colonial rule even though they knew each other as Tonga, Manyika, Karanga, Kalanga, Ndebele and so on. The British colonial system somehow emphasized on these ethnic differences in order to prevent their subjects (not citizens), to think in terms of unitary nationalism. Against this background, Ndlovu-Gatsheni thinks that the understanding of

⁵⁶ I Smith, *Bitter Harvest: Zimbabwe and the Aftermath of its Independence*, London, John Blake Publication, 2008, p. 237.

⁵⁷ S.J Ndlovu-Getsheni, *Do 'Zimbabwe' Exist*, pp. 69-70.

nationalism became somewhat backward looking with some regarding it as a tool to revive pre-colonial chiefdoms or political formations. He pauses and asks:

What could stop members of MOS thinking that nationalism was going to lead to the establishment of a pre-colonial Munhumutapa State? What would stop members of MHS thinking that nationalism was going to lead to the revival of the Ndebele monarch?⁵⁸

Therefore, to argue that until the formation of ZANU in 1963, the relationship between ethnicity and nationalism was cordial as argued by Msindo is indeed to misrepresent historical facts.⁵⁹ That there was ethnic disharmony within the ranks of early nationalist movements is further supported by the fact that when the term Zimbabwe was first used, the MHS rebuked the NDP for choosing the name for the imagined nation and for promoting tribal feelings. They thought Matopos was more suitable and neutral.⁶⁰ One is persuaded to admit that they too were being tribal because Matobo is a Kalanga word and the place itself is located in Matebelaland—something which the Shona were hardly going to accept. If the country was to assume an indigenous name of any archaeological site in the country, then it was still possible to quarrel over a name. The only solution could have been to adopt an outside name, probably an English name but the move could represent dining and wining with the very system which nationalists wanted to do away with. For all these reasons, there was no attempt to promote the name Zambezia earlier given to the country by Cecil John Rhodes.

Quarrels between nationalists in Rhodesia were given an ethnic birthmark by Rhodesians for political expediency. Whites had always (mistakenly) thought that Africans needed European protection without which they would revert to traditional barbarism, which in the European myth entailed permanent and ubiquitous tribal wars. Therefore, it was natural to interpret antagonisms between African nationalists as a result of ingrained tribalism.⁶¹ As early as 1980, Barber et al had completely refused that quarrels in nationalist movements were rooted in tribalism. They forward the explanation that Mugabe helped Sithole to found ZANU in opposition to Joshua Nkomo's ZAPU, but in 1979, he worked with Nkomo against Sithole.⁶² What is obvious is that

⁵⁸ S.J Ndlovu-Gatsheni, *Do 'Zimbabwe' Exist*, pp. 70.

⁵⁹ E Msindo, 'Ethnicity and Nationalism in Urban Colonial Zimbabwe: Bulawayo, 1950-1963', in *Journal of African History*, Volume 48, 2007, pp. 273-4.

⁶⁰ S.J Ndlovu-Gatsheni, *Do 'Zimbabwe' Exist*, p. 73.

⁶¹ J Barber et al, *From Rhodesia to Zimbabwe: Behind and Beyond the Lancaster House*, London, Frank Cass, 1980, p. 86.

⁶² *Ibid*, p. 85.

the Rhodesian Front exaggerated these differences in order to divide nationalists even further. Thus quarrels with Nkomo in 1963 and Chikerema in 1970 were based on ambition for power, so was desertion of Muzorewa by Nkomo, Mugabe and Sithole in 1975-6. Barber has further shown that Sithole himself, although Shona, on his father's side had been brought up in his mother's family in Matebeleland and had even written a Ndebele book. Thus he could easily identify with both groups, but he was still defined as a Shona. In the violence which rocked the nation in the wake of the ZAPU split, Nkomo had a distinct edge over ZANU both in Salisbury and the country as a whole despite his ethnic group being in the minority.

Infighting between and within liberation movements ought not to be understood only in terms of tribalism or ethnicity. Rather they are a fact of political life and a part of the dynamic human organization as expressed by Masipula Sithole. Therefore, to pretend that these movements were smooth-running and not punctuated by contradictions, some of them very violent and life threatening is to refute a historical fact. It was these fights which produced some leaders and condemned others to historical dustbins.⁶³ I argue in this chapter that the coming of Muzorewa into political life emanated from the failure of liberation movements to present an acceptable candidate to lead the rejection of British proposal partly as a result of infighting dating back to the NDP days. Like any other political actor, Muzorewa began to think of making a political career out of the opportunities availed to him. There was virtually nothing wrong with that because like every other nationalist politician, he was entitled to power as long as he could garner enough support to see him winning a reputable election. Opposition to him lay not so much in his moderate politics, but because his opponents too wanted political power. They therefore made use of every available arsenal to label him a puppet. As an extension of these struggles and to safeguard his political ambitions, Muzorewa formed an army to defend what he stood for and the same was done by Ndabaningi Sithole, Robert Mugabe and Joshua Nkomo. Their armies were crucial in campaigning for political parties to which they were affiliated and winning their leaders political mileage because of evidence that they were in charge of men under arms.

That Robert Mugabe and Joshua Nkomo denigrated Muzorewa and tried to reduce him to a

⁶³ M Sithole, *Zimbabwe's struggles within the struggle*, 1979, p. 3.

footnote in the history of the liberation was intended to legitimize themselves and was also part of a power struggle. What it means is that like all other politicians they were ambitious, self-seeking and power hungry as summarized by Masipula Sithole that:

We accept they (politicians) are. That is why it is they and not others who are so involved so risking. ... There is no selfless political and revolutionary leader in any movement, in any country at present, historically or in the distant future. ... struggles-within-the-struggle will continue over and beyond the struggle for national liberation.⁶⁴

The same argument is useful in unpacking Muzorewa's argument that he was not power hungry. In 1977, he was quoted saying:

I object violently to the malicious allegations that I am a power-hungry individual clinging to leadership. The only thing I am hungry for is a just and democratic society. If I seek power, it is to enable me to do what the people have asked me to do.⁶⁵

He was obviously refusing to accept that his failure to unite with Sithole was because he was power-hungry just as Mugabe or Nkomo, or for that matter, every other politician. According to Ndlovu-Gatsheni, nationalism just like colonialism re-tribalised politics. He turns Msindo's argument upside-down by arguing that because there were many Kalangas in the leadership of NDP, Kalanga commoners quickly gave it an ethnic interpretation stating that 'This election makes BaKalanga very happy as these men were elected to lead this party which has a membership of more than one million people.'⁶⁶ NDP was dominated by the Kalanga in the sense that George Silundika was the Finance Secretary and J.Z Moyo was the Secretary General. By the same line of thinking what could stop other ethnic groups from thinking that they were being overshadowed by a minority group. It is the kind of mentality which led to the split within the NDP. It saw the Karanga nationalists breaking away to form the short-lived Zimbabwe National Party (ZNP), accordingly, the first political party to use the name Zimbabwe for the country regardless of protestations from Matebeleland. In his resignation from the NDP, Mawema refused that he had embezzled any funds as alleged but that, 'I was called a Tshombe because I had not accepted the constitution which the great Nkomo had accepted.'⁶⁷ In the jargon of nationalists, sellouts were called Tshombes or Capricorns. These words had their roots in the secessionist movement of Katangese leader, Moise Tshombe and the formation of the Central

⁶⁴ M Sithole, *Zimbabwe's Struggles Within the Struggle*, p. 4.

⁶⁵ MS 308/5/1, NAZ ,Bishop, 'I am not power-hungry'.

⁶⁶ S.J Ndlovu-Getsheni, *Do 'Zimbabwe' Exist*, pp 112-113.

⁶⁷ M Mawema, 'Why I resigned from the NDP to join the Zimbabwe National Party' in, C Nyangoni and G Nyandoro, *Zimbabwe's Independent Movements: Selected Documents*, London, Rex Rollings, 1979, pp. 48-49.

African Capricorn Society in the 1950s which strove for multi-racialism. The Rhodesian government banned the use of such words in the early 1960s describing them as opprobrious epithets⁶⁸

The splinter group which formed ZNP was entirely Karanga to be precise and that division was not accidental but planned by the Karanga as shown by the membership and a clear ethnic polarity. The main founders were Michael Mawema, Patrick Matimba, Paul Mushonga and Edison Sithole who were all Shona. However, tribalism was not deeply rooted then. Mawema was kicked and beaten by angry opponents at his first press conference on 11 June 1961.⁶⁹ When ZAPU was banned in September 1962, ZNP developed into Pan African Socialist Union but this new body did not survive the death of its leader Paul Mushonga in a car accident in December 1962.⁷⁰

Sibanda is convinced that right from inception, Zimbabwean nationalism was riddled with ethnicity. Reminiscing over divisions in the SRANC which was formed in 1957 he quotes J Nkomo who commented that:

My friends from then Salisbury, in their endeavor to win leadership of the party used every possible means. While they too felt the need for all of us to transcend our tribal and regional affinities, for our officiousness, they for a while disregarded this awareness and tried to put Chikerema as leader, which turned out to be wrong prediction.⁷¹

Sibanda indeed downplays the assertion that Nkomo was seen as a moderate leader while Chikerema had been constructed as a militant and confrontational leader to the Rhodesian system as a whole. The idea of moderates and militants was also a political construction just like puppets and patriots. After all, there was nothing peculiar done by Chikerema which Nkomo did not do. Moreover, there could have been various other sources of cleavages, mainly ideological, which could be used to challenge Nkomo's leadership. Throughout the liberation war, Nkomo continued to believe in the politics of negotiation with Ian Smith. Along the road

⁶⁸ H Ellert, *The Rhodesian Front War*, Gweru, Mambo Press, 1993,p..2.

⁶⁹ R Cary and D Mitchell, *Who is Who? African Nationalist Leaders in Rhodesia*, Bulawayo, Books of Rhodesia, 1977, p. 52.

⁷⁰ R Cary and D Mitchell, *Who is Who? African Nationalist Leaders in Rhodesia*, Bulawayo, Books of Rhodesia, 1977, p. 52.

⁷¹ E Sibanda, *The Zimbabwe African People's Union 1961-87: Political History of Insurgency in Southern Africa*, Trenton, Africa World press, 2005, p. 36.

to independence, the Smith regime seemed to prefer Nkomo's leadership to Mugabe for a variety of reasons. Despite the criticism against Nkomo for being too soft, the settlement which led to the 1980 election was also negotiated. Each time when there were quarrels and divisions within the nationalist parties, adversaries were easily constructed as dissidents and sell-outs. Similarly, the nationalist party leaders still in control accused their detractors of doing the same. Exactly the same type of politics permeated through ZAPU which succeeded NDP when it was banned in December 1961.

Quarrels within the nationalist movements are better understood by making use of the labeling theory which was advanced by Becker in 1963. The labeling theory comes from an understanding of deviance which is defined as an infraction of some agreed upon rule. Those who break the rule constitute a homogeneous category because they have committed the same deviant act.⁷² This was the case with those who broke away from ZAPU and later ZANU. At least for a short period of time, they were labelled deviant but it did not stick. The problem here is that the process of labeling may not be infallible- some people may be labeled deviant when, in fact, they are not deviant. Becker points out that labeling affects the individual's public identity which also means that one who has been labeled behaves accordingly.⁷³ Application of the term deviant depends on how the act is interpreted by the audience. Haralambos and Holborn add that the application of this term depends on who commits the act, when and where it is committed, who observes it and the negotiations between various actors involved. Further, those who commit the act may view it in a different way from those who observe it.⁷⁴

The above theory bears a lot of relevance to all sorts of harsh exchanges during the time of the splits identified so far and those which came later. The negative label against Takawira, Sithole, Enos Nkala and the rest who broke away to form ZANU was interpreted selectively by Africans in various townships. The fact that there were skirmishes between pro and anti-Nkomo groups suggests that ZAPU was not infallible enough to give a wholly acceptable label to its opponents. The effect of the label on those who formed ZANU on 8 August 1963 was to

⁷² H S Becker, *Outsiders: Studies in Sociology of Deviance*, The Free Press, 1963, p. 78.

⁷³ *Ibid*, p. 79.

⁷⁴ M Haralambos and M Holborn, *Sociology: Themes and Perspectives* (7th edition), London, Harper Collins Publishers, 2008, p. 335.

strengthen them towards their cause. Society generally gives people labels. If there was general agreement by Africans in all townships of Rhodesia that those who formed ZANU were sellouts, indeed, they would not have survived politically just like Morrison Nyathi, a ZANLA political commissar who sold out Nyadzonia camp to Rhodesian security forces during the liberation war.

Giving labels to the enemy was quite extensive during the political violence on the eve of South African independence. In their study of political violence in Nxamalala, Denis and his colleagues found that the residents of Nqabeni and Imbubu called their United Democratic Front (UDF) opponents ‘Indians’ (*amaIndiya*) or ‘Coolies’ (*amaKula*). They also called them ‘comrades’ (*amaqabane*).⁷⁵ Similarly members of the Inkatha Freedom Party were called Russians or *amaRusiya*.⁷⁶ Violence was directed against members of the opposite group. ‘Indians’ who failed to move or repent were often killed. During this period of political violence, these labels were very derogatory as they were indicative of the dehumanizing aspects of violence. In their struggles both groups ignored that they were both Zulus who only differed in their political affiliations. Political opponents were stripped of human dignity and they could be summarily executed as enemies of the community.⁷⁷ This indicates that sometimes political differences ought to be analyzed outside the ethnic box. Differences in political thinking are capable of producing categories which far transcend tribalism in terms of their hatred for each other. It is therefore clear why those alleged to be sellouts during Zimbabwe’s war of liberation and thereafter went out of their way to reject the dehumanizing label. Under the spirit of reconciliation, Zimbabwe did not take vindictive action against former enemies, yet none of the members formerly belonging to these compromised forces want to identify themselves publicly. This is particularly so for those who have managed to get influential posts in ZANU-PF. No one really wants to be identified with the sellout identity.

Changing Identities in the Wake of ZAPU Split

⁷⁵ P Denis, R Ntsimane and T Cannell, *Indians Versus Russians: An Oral History of Political Violence in Nxamalala (1987-1993)*, Dorpspruit, Cluster Publications, 2010, p. 22.

⁷⁶ *Ibid*, p. 24.

⁷⁷ *Ibid*, p. 25.

Right from its inception, ZAPU like any other liberation movement had multiple personality problems which ultimately led to the formation of ZANU in August 1963. As before, the allegation that Nkomo was a weak leader and possibly a sell-out stung and stuck. ZANU grew to eventually eclipse ZAPU and win the 1980 general election. It is crucial to find out why a multi-ethnic and nationalist party like ZAPU could have crumpled and the consequences this had on fortunes of all who participated in its demise and how this created a golden opportunity by 1971 for Abel Muzorewa, then Bishop of the United Methodist Church in Rhodesia to begin his political career.

For a start, I critique extensively tensions in ZAPU and its immediate aftermath following the split as presented by an affiliate and political actor to the events he describes, Maurice Nyagumbo. He later became a cabinet minister in Mugabe's government when ZANU won the 1980 election. In early 1963, Maurice Nyagumbo was sent by ZAPU to Mbeya for a job which included transporting arms and trained boys to Lusaka and also taking untrained boys to Mbeya. He claimed that he found the party representative there, Mkiwani too tribal for him. At Mbeya, Mkiwani was staying with 14 boys from Matabeleland. All of them were happy. The boys had plenty of beer, eggs, cheese, sugar, tea, coffee etc. When they left, another group of 10 from Mashonaland came. From then, everything changed. According to Nyagumbo:

I visited them and found them starving. Mkiwani told me that there was no money to buy food. I then persuaded him to telephone Dar es Salaam for money. I started fiddling with party drawers, and came across an envelope containing 30 pounds. Mkiwani told me the money belonged to Clement Muchachi, but I took 10 pounds and gave it to the boys... in fact, Mkiwani had plenty of money, but had not wanted to buy them food because they were Shona boys. I warned Mkiwani against creating a dangerous situation.⁷⁸

It ought to be remembered that through this autobiography, Nyagumbo was making a political statement which was necessary to justify the formation and ideology of ZANU. Differences had been mounting as already shown above and those opposed to Nkomo were beginning to think in terms of launching another political party. Therefore, calling fellow politicians with different political ideologies by all sorts of names was done in order to perpetuate forms of exclusion. Use of the tribal tool worked against ZAPU because of the numerical inferiority of people who identify themselves as Ndebele.

⁷⁸ M Nyagumbo, *With the People: An Autobiography from the Zimbabwe Struggle*, London, Busby Limited, 1980, p. 169.

ZAPU split on August 8 1963 to give rise to ZANU. Sibanda thinks that reasons for the split varied from tribalism to personality clashes.⁷⁹ It appears that the major criticism against Nkomo was that he was a moderate if not a compromised leader who had accepted a British proposal of 15 blacks in a parliament of 65. This was in addition to attempting to create a government in exile against the advice of Julius Nyerere. Chitepo was very bitter about Nkomo for coming to Dar es Salaam with members of the executive. According to Nyagumbo, he (Chitepo) ‘told me that the idea of the government in exile had been rejected by the Tanzanian government.’⁸⁰ Tekere goes further to describe Nkomo as a liar who led his colleagues to believe that Nyerere had invited them to Tanzania to form a government in exile.⁸¹ Malianga too was against Nkomo whom he described as a ‘quisling’.⁸² The term ‘quisling’ is used interchangeably with sell-out, puppet or traitor. Quisling was a Norwegian Nazi whom Hitler tried to install to power after overrunning Norway during the Second World War. His government proved a flop.⁸³ The reason was that he was a puppet imposed from without via the Nazi system which most of Europe was fighting against. His authority did not emanate from the Norwegians. Therefore, he was selling out his country. Similarly, the term quisling used against Nkomo meant that he was more interested in power than the attainment of democracy and civil rights by the whole country. Even though Nkomo tried to shrug off the allegation, it stung, which in part explains why ZANU nationalists got more sympathizers and eventually the mandate to power.

While in Tanzania where Nkomo had brought the whole executive, Malianga is said to have confided in Nyagumbo on the need for the executive to hold a meeting to discuss the question of Nkomo’s leadership and the function of Chikerema who was alleged to have swindled the party of 3000 British pounds set aside for military purposes.⁸⁴ According to Ranger, Simon Kapwepwe, the right hand man of Kenneth Kaunda was highly critical of Nkomo’s leadership. Kapwepwe is quoted as having said that, ‘it was all very well to talk of non-violence but Nkomo took his own talk seriously.’ He wondered why followers did not rebel against him.⁸⁵ In other words, disagreements with the leadership of Joshua Nkomo were caused by a number of factors,

⁷⁹ E Sibanda, *The Zimbabwean African People’s, Union 1961-1987*, p. 90.

⁸⁰ M Nyagumbo, *With the People*, p. 172.

⁸¹ E Z Tekere, *A Lifetime of Struggle*, Harare, SAPES Books, 2007, p. 52.

⁸² M Nyagumbo, *With the People*, p. 172.

⁸³ P.M.H Bell, *The Origin of the Second World War in Europe*, London, Pearson limited, 2007, p. 330.

⁸⁴ M Nyagumbo, *With the People*, p. 173.

⁸⁵ *Ibid*, p. 173.

among them Nkomo's own perceived *weakness*, the *militancy* of his opponent, and, above all, the in-house struggle for power. The consequences were however widespread and later drastic for ZAPU. Each group referred to the other by various names. For a moment, African nationalists forgot about the real enemy they were fighting, that is, the Rhodesian system and fought each other with devastating violent consequences which continue to plague the nation to the present day.

Since Nyagumbo was one of the players to the split, it is unfair to rely entirely on his account which obviously justified the rise of his party, ZANU. Joshua Nkomo thinks that the split in ZAPU was largely caused by tribalism, his differences with Julius Nyerere and power struggles. Nkomo thought that Nyerere regarded him as a bloodthirsty politician who was not prepared to negotiate with the enemy. Such a mindset is surprising especially in light of criticism against Nkomo by his detractors in ZAPU who portrayed him as being a weak and ready-to-compromise type of leader. From Nkomo's point of view, Nyerere supported ZAPU 'rebels' because he had personal differences with the incumbent Nkomo who did not want to be a stooge of the Tanzanian leader.⁸⁶ Further, just like Nyagumbo's account of the split, the tribal factor was very strong in the divisions rocking the party. While in Nairobi, Nkomo had been informed by his Egyptian friend on the imminence of a split driven by Nkomo's belonging to the Ndebele ethnic group. The deputy treasurer for ZAPU, Joseph Msika, had a more disturbing experience. According to Nkomo,

I saw one of our colleagues Washington Malianga, nervously hiding away a printed document. Joseph (Msika) asked to see it, Washington refused, so Joseph took it away and read it. He found it was a circular openly urging ZAPU to bring the 'majority tribes' to the leadership of the party and get rid of *Zimundevere* which is a derogatory term in the Shona language for the old Ndebele man.⁸⁷

Tribalism is not an adequate explanation for this division. ZAPU leaders like Msika and Chinamano remained with Nkomo but they were Shona. In addition, ZANU was formed in Enos Nkala's house in Highfield Township, but Nkala was himself Ndebele but at the same time Nkomo's worst enemy.⁸⁸ Divisions rocking ZAPU can further be explained as part and parcel of a normal process in the struggle for power. I am convinced that those who broke away were not

⁸⁶ J Nkomo, *The Story of My Life*, SAPES Books, Harare, 2001, p.114.

⁸⁷ *Ibid*, p. 116.

⁸⁸ Dumiso Dabengwa confessed that indeed the 2 were enemies but he did not know why they hated each other so much.

tribalists but found it a useful tool in power struggles or in working their way to the top. Though a number of factors were behind the split, indeed they were hinged on power struggles. Weber defined power as the chance of a man or a number of men to realize their own will in a communal action against resistance of others who are participating in the action. In other words, power consists of the ability to get your own way even when others are opposed to it.⁸⁹ In a struggle of this nature, it is those with power who ultimately win the struggle against their political opponents. Initially, ZANU did not have this, but with the passage of time, it grew to eclipse ZAPU. The bad label at the founding of ZANU was turned over and used effectively against ZAPU.

Results for the ZAPU split were tragic particularly for urban townships. At the same time, they brought into being a political party named ZANU which was led by Ndabaningi Sithole. The two parties fought each other with whatever weapons they could lay hands on. Deregatory terms such as traitors, stooges, sell-outs, thugs and so on were used by each group against another. This continued to be the case even in the later split which gave birth to FROLIZI. The political competition between the political parties most likely meant that those who were not going to win either the war or the election were doomed. As such, they were also liable to punishments that went with the identity. Uses of such terms were also designed to discredit opponents in the eyes of supporters. Therefore, such identities were part and parcel of the power struggle; hence there is need to subject to criticism views and opinions of nationalists themselves.

The ZAPU split led to serious violence between supporters of ZAPU and those of ZANU. Apparently, each party saw particular townships as its own base. Nyagumbo who was himself a high-ranking official believed as late as 1979 that the violence which engulfed Highfield township following the split was caused by youths mobilized by Chikerema from Mabvuku, Harare and Mufakose to stone houses belonging to, ‘dissidents’.⁹⁰ By the term dissident, he was referring to members of the newly formed ZANU. An identity like the above was not different from traitor. As such they were liable to be treated with violence. The term “dissidents” meant

⁸⁹ M Weber cited in M Haralambos and M Holborn, *Sociology: Themes and Perspectives* (7th edition), London, Harper Collins Publishers, 2008, p. 522.

⁹⁰ M Nyagumbo, *With the People*, p. 173

that supporters of ZAPU therefore had to doubt if ZANU supporters were really worth to rule this country. Once convinced that they were not, indiscriminate attacks were justified. Nyagumbo also referred to the attackers as ‘thugs planted in every shop, every bus and every public place’.⁹¹ Tekere concurs with Nyagumbo that Chikerema was behind the violence which rocked Highfields. He argues that from the launching ceremony of the People’s Caretaker Council (PCC) at Cold Comfort Farm on the outskirts of Harare, James Chikerema led crowds into Highfield... and they attacked houses of Robert Mugabe, Leopold Takawira and Enos Nkala and beat up people in the streets.⁹² The violence was such that ZANU could not operate in Salisbury and Bulawayo because ZAPU support there was strong while Gweru was effectively ZANU, with Tekere, a member of the Youth wing, directing violence on behalf of his party. Tekere concludes that ZANU was fighting a war with ZAPU.⁹³ At the same time, Nkomo and Chikerema singled out Takawira, Mugabe, Malianga and Sithole as an anti-Nkomo group who had been brought by foreigners and were in the process of selling the country to the Americans.⁹⁴ That kind of hate language was deliberately intended to arouse the anger of potential supporters against those ‘rebels’ who had not yet been fully established politically. By then, Nkomo enjoyed widespread support as a founding figure of Zimbabwe nationalism. Therefore, his word had massive support. Nyagumbo himself comments that:

At each place we arrived, the people dared not to receive us or to listen to what we had to tell them. In every village and every town, it had become a crime for anyone to be seen with any one of us. Our opponents tried to ensure that we were boycotted and not allowed to come near the people.⁹⁵

If Nkomo’s supporters in Salisbury were more numerous than ZANU supporters, it follows that political parties were not divided along ethnic lines regardless of the wishes of their leaders. Even the argument that Nkomo was weak cannot go unchallenged. ZANU and ZAPU were not radically different. The former did not devise any new methods against the minority regime. Exactly the same words were said by Muzorewa years after the split of his own party. He noted that, for a UANC member to be seen talking to a ZAPU person or Sithole was a crime in the eyes of UANC.⁹⁶ Spreading hate language was a tool used by leaders of nationalist movements to

⁹¹M Haralambos and M Holborn, *Sociology: Themes and Perspectives* (7th edition), London, Harper Collins Publishers, 2008, p. 179.

⁹²E Z Tekere, *A Lifetime of Struggle*, Harare, SAPES Books, p.54.

⁹³*Ibid*, p.55.

⁹⁴*Ibid*.

⁹⁵*Ibid*, p. 180.

⁹⁶A.T Muzorewa, *Rise Up and Walk: an Autobiography*, London, Sphere Books, 1979, p. 226.

marginalize and alienate their adversaries. Some nationalists also came to vehemently believe that their opponents were genuinely evil. Nyagumbo continued to accept that Nkomo was eventually arrested for violence against ZANU and restricted at Gonakudzingwa. To quote Nyagumbo's own words, 'No one can persuade me that Nkomo was arrested and restricted for a national cause. But it is true that he was arrested because he wanted to protect his leadership.'⁹⁷ Such statements were crafted whether deliberately or otherwise to scrap away Nkomo from history makers of Zimbabwe as ZANU-PF began a process of glorifying its role in the liberation war and downplaying that of its opponents.

Press reports also showed ZANU as the recipient of ZAPU violence. The *Rhodesian Herald* quoted Sithole attributing violence to 'thugs brought from outside for that purpose. That those attempts failed is due to our members' determination never to be subdued by thugs and any other adversaries.'⁹⁸ Pertaining to who was really a thug, a stooge or a tribalist, civilians who consumed the statements had to make their own decisions. The split in ZAPU and the formation of ZANU had nothing to do with tribalism as forwarded by politicians such as Nyagumbo. That is why the violence was high in Salisbury which was in Mashonaland. Throughout that violence, there was no mention of it being a struggle along ethnic lines. It was clearly a fight for political supremacy and nothing else.

Tribalism is claimed to have featured prominently in the ZAPU split to 1970. The divisions led to the formation of FROLIZI which officially was intended to be unifier of nationalists from both ZANU and ZAPU. To understand these divisions properly, it is inevitable to make reference to Ndlovu-Gatsheni's argument that it is wrong to assume that the rise of Zimbabwean nationalism found Africans as 'people' or Zimbabweans as 'people' who were already there as a collectivity that was agonizing under the yoke of colonialism. Once the yoke was removed, Zimbabwe would emerge automatically.⁹⁹ The truth is that far from being united, blacks in Zimbabwe were divided by many factors, one of which was ethnicity. When there were dissenting voices in ZAPU, J.Z Moyo thought that the major cause was power hungry individuals, regional and

⁹⁷ M Nyagumbo, *With the People*, p. 185.

⁹⁸ *Rhodesian Herald*, Friday September 20 1963.

⁹⁹ S.J Ndlovu-Getsheni, *Do 'Zimbabwe' Exist*, p. 47.

parochial elements, tribal and political base-seekers.¹⁰⁰ Rather than rectifying deep-seated problems within the party, it became normal to see the opponents as the others and automatically traitors or sell-outs. Similarly, instead of looking into problems of clannish cliques and sexual abuse in the ZAPU army, Chikerema responded by scathing attacks on J.Z Moyo and effecting a boardroom coup.

For many years, nationalists were not effective against the Rhodesian system which they were attempting to dislodge because they spent their energies directing battles against each other. Hudson shows that for many years nationalists were involved in interminable internecine squabbling between various political and tribal factions. He goes further to mention that as far as ZAPU was concerned, the acting president, J.R.D Chikerema, Zezuru (Shona) and Nyandoro, the Secretary General and also a Zezuru, lost control of their party to Jason Moyo, Edward Ndlovu and George Sulundika, all Ndebele (or Kalanga). ZANU was also in the state of tribal disarray and Godfrey Savanhu, Lovemore Chiota and Nathan Shamuyarira (all Shona-Zezuru), joined the dissident Shona ZAPU leaders to form a new party (FROLIZI) in October 1971 under the chairmanship of Shelton Siwela, a Shona (Ndau) who was later replaced by Chikerema in August 1972. In exile therefore, ZAPU became primarily Ndebele and ZANU primarily Shona, that is Zezuru, Manyika and Karanga groups.¹⁰¹ There is a danger of presenting Kalanga as Ndebele. Msindo has shown that these two groups were not as united as often claimed. In addition, the presentation of ZANU as a Shona party fails to see serious dissensions within the party as various groups fought for supremacy and their leadership tried to cultivate loyalists from a group of home-boys and could embrace ethnicity where it provided numerical advantage but not because they believed in it.

The mentality that ZANU was infested by sell-outs also partly led to the sacking of Sithole, the president of ZANU from the Kwekwe prison by his colleagues who included Tekere, Nyagumbo and Nkala. According to this version, Sithole had been persuaded secretly by members of the Rhodesian Special Branch (SB) to disengage from the armed struggle on the grounds that if he agreed to do so, he could be released from prison and then work constitutionally towards

¹⁰⁰ J.Z Moyo, Observations of our struggle, NAZ, 25 February 1970.

¹⁰¹ M.Hudson, *Triumph or Tragedy: Rhodesia to Zimbabwe*, Townbridge and Eisher, Redwood Burn Limited, 1981, p. 180.

majority rule. He in turn tried to persuade his incarcerated colleagues to agree with the SB proposal but they refused.¹⁰² Tekere does not provide evidence to such meetings intended to ‘turn’ Sithole. In the aftermath of the formation of ZANU in 1963, Mugabe was already appearing as a better leader than Sithole. According to Scarnercchia, Geren wrote in 1963 that, ‘We have a high estimate of Mugabe’s analytical powers and his resolve for political action.’ Mugabe is said to have passed a request to an American (Geren) that Sithole should tone down his appeals for non-violence especially in his public speeches.¹⁰³ My take is that at the formation of ZANU, squabbles over party leadership were avoided because they could have seriously dented the party. However, Sithole was not viewed even by the Rhodesians as a weak leader as he languished in prison for 11 years for the same cause as those who accused him of weakness. Every mistake which he made was taken by his opponents in ZANU to bring him down. He was thus accused of denouncing violence and flying to America to see his daughter instead of attending to guerrillas massacred by the Zambian military.

Mugabe was chosen to replace Sithole because as Secretary-General of the party, he was second in the succession line. Other reasons given by Bourne are that Sithole had been prepared to renounce violence, was stabilized by his years in prison and was the victim of stool pigeons.¹⁰⁴ Mugabe was more sympathetic to the military route to power and less willing to compromise with other nationalists. This is unlike the opinions of Masipula who puts the ethnic element at the center without getting to consult Ndabaningi (his own brother), Tekere or Nkala. He had the chance to interact with all these but somehow failed to utilize the golden opportunity for a well-argued analysis of reasons for divisions in nationalist parties. After all, ethnic tensions cannot constitute a central point to the deposition of Sithole because two of those who initiated it, that is, Nyagumbo and Tekere came from the same province of Manicaland as Sithole himself. On the other hand, Nkala came from Matebeleland, Malianga was the presiding officer while Mugabe did not vote. This alleged move by Sithole of getting into secret talks with Rhodesians was interpreted by others as a great betrayal. It is said that Nyagumbo was so devastated that he wept uncontrollably and had to be kept on guard in case he committed suicide. In fact, it was in

¹⁰² E Z Tekere, *A Lifetime of Struggle*, p. 68.

¹⁰³ T Scarnercchia, *The Sellout Logic in the Formation of Nationalist Politics*, www.hsreprpress.ac.za, 17 September 2012.

¹⁰⁴ R Bourne, *Catastrophe: What Went Wrong in Zimbabwe?* London, Zed Books, 2011, p. 68.

the Kwekwe prison in 1973 that the ZANU leadership decided that when released, they would not want to have a leader like Sithole.¹⁰⁵ The deposition of Sithole can be convincingly explained using personality clashes with his colleagues as well as his own weaknesses- alleged or real.

Beyond the prison coup, the idea of selling out continued to be applied against perceived enemies. For example, during Mugabe and Tekere's escape to Mozambique in 1974, the former felt that cadres should be told that ZANU members were now in Muzorewa's UANC in line with the Lusaka Accords. Tekere claims that he described this as treacherous and Mugabe insisted no further. Owing to the potential danger which he posed, for a brief period, Mugabe could not meet recruits when Tekere was not there too.¹⁰⁶ It means therefore that a sell-out was quite dangerous during the war because he put the life of his colleagues and of the independence movement in real danger. To elaborate further, those nationalists who attended the Geneva Conference in 1976 were regarded by the Vashandi or Workers as traitors because they were agreeing to negotiations instead of using violence as the only tool.¹⁰⁷ Last, one day when Tongogara, the commander of ZANLA forces and ZANU's Secretary for Defence and Tekere were planning a counter-response to Chimoio massacre and Tekere told his colleague not to leak information to the party president, Robert Mugabe, Tongogara is said to have leapt to his feet and commented that, 'now you have heard it yourself. You are the one who brought a sell-out here. Look now. Many people have been killed.'¹⁰⁸ Tekere's assertions also need to be taken with caution because he had a personal vendetta with Mugabe for removing him from the post of secretary general, then dismissing him from cabinet and ultimately from ZANU-PF, the party which he had helped to form. Therefore, the autobiography is an attempt to right his contribution to the making of Zimbabwe. Throughout the autobiography, he talks of his political correctness without any wrongdoing both during and after the war.

At the time of the Lancaster House Conference, suspicions of selling out continued to plague ZANU-PF. Tekere has unanswered questions going as follows:

¹⁰⁵ E Z Tekere, *A Lifetime of Struggle*, p. 68.

¹⁰⁶ *Ibid*, p. 75.

¹⁰⁷ *Ibid*, p. 86.

¹⁰⁸ *Ibid*, p.97.

Was there some kind of agreement between Tongogara and Peter Walls? Why did Tongogara take to embracing Smith at the start of each day's business? The British, of course, were trying to buy every member of our delegation, but I cannot believe that Tongogara would "sell-out." I believe that he wanted the war to genuinely end. But I cannot help being disappointed.¹⁰⁹

Without reference to other political parties, what is clear is that members of the same party were suspicious of each other despite having committed themselves to national liberation. Therefore, members of other political parties such as the UANC of Bishop Muzorewa and Sithole's ZANU were even more suspect. Before delving into the concept of auxiliaries within political thinking it is crucial to make reference to ZANU's death list: addressed to Zimbabwean 'traitors' by the ZANU-PF's Secretary for Information and publicity, Eddison Zvobgo. He identified the so-called sell-outs as Sithole, Muzorewa and Chirau as the Zimbabwean black bourgeoisie, traitors, fellow traitors, fellow travelers and puppets of the Ian Smith regime, opportunist running dogs and other imperialist vultures.¹¹⁰ His sternly worded message gives useful insights into the kind of people and their activities which the ZANU-PF party regarded as selling out. In a class of their own were all who had accepted cabinet posts in the Internal Settlement. Others such as Peter Mazaiwana and Lovemore Mbanga were labeled sellouts because they had accepted key posts in the UANC. Black MPs were also listed as sell-outs because they were deemed to be money mongers. Those who supported Sithole were also branded as sell-outs. All those listed were given time to resign their allegiances and the longest period was one month. Those in the police and armed forces were supposed to either resign or abscond.¹¹¹

The identity of sellout as demonstrated here was deliberately constructed by liberation movements in Zimbabwe's war of liberation because it had obvious advantages. To start with, it was a tool to delegitimize potential enemies from aspirations to rule the country when independence came. Second, pronouncements by Zvobgo were obviously targeted at swelling ZANU-PF ranks and incapacitating the Rhodesian system through desertions of the civil service and African soldiers. Third and obvious was that guerrilla violence was becoming popular throughout the continent. For that reason, the OAU was giving logistical and military support to

¹⁰⁹ E Z Tekere, *A Lifetime of Struggle*, p. 116.

¹¹⁰ M Hudson, *Triumph or Tragedy: Rhodesia to Zimbabwe*, Appendix 2 ZANU Death List: Addressed to Zimbabwe Traitors: This is the Time of Crisis and Decision, by E.J.M Zvobgo Deputy Secretary for Information and Publicity, p. 226.

¹¹¹ *Ibid.*

‘authentic’ liberation movements. As it was becoming clear that one day; the country would become independent, no one then and in future would want to be associated with the label of a traitor. In addition, the application of the label to all who served under Muzorewa was intended to discredit him both locally and internationally. Through radio broadcasts, pamphlets and foot guerrillas, ZANU-PF was able to relegate Sithole, Chirau and Muzorewa as stooges and at the same time turning Mugabe and his associates into heroes. The stage was therefore set under which leaders of the Internal Settlement and their fighting forces would be excluded from heroes who created Zimbabwe.

The term sell-out was also strategically used on anyone who worked with the Smith regime regardless of intention. Parpart provides convincing evidence that African MPs in Rhodesia’s parliaments were determined to better the lot of their African constituencies and to change the colonial system through non-violent means. These have been systematically ignored or ridiculed as failed nationalists. At most they have been dismissed as sell-outs and figuratively thrown into the dustbin of history. Parpart points out that African members of parliament were deliberately excluded from Cary and Mitchell’s book on nationalist leaders and have either been ignored or nullified by scholars and politicians.¹¹² If that was the case of a people who were in a representative capacity, those who fought as auxiliaries were unsurprisingly completely obscured yet they deserve attention as a people who contributed to the making of Zimbabwe either positively or negatively depending on the way one is to take it. Although Michel-Roliph Trouillot reminds readers that in the domains of knowledge production, ‘at best, history is a story about power and a story about who won’¹¹³, the approach is dysfunctional in that it gives only one version of history and silences voices to the contrary despite their utility in the creation of a comprehensive coverage. Trouillot was fully aware of this dysfunctional part of the victor’s version of history. For example, though many African MPs in the Rhodesian parliament ended up supporting guerrilla violence, they continued to be identified as traitors by nationalists because they were advocating for change from within. One black MP recalled that despite the

¹¹² L.T Parpart, ‘Silenced Visions of Citizenship, Democracy and Nation’, in, S.J Ndlovu-Gatsheni and J Muzondidya (eds), *Redemptive or Grotesque Nationalism: Re-thinking Contemporary Politics in Zimbabwe*, Oxford and Bern: Peter Lang A.G, International Academic Publishers, 2011.

¹¹³ M R Trouillot cited in M R Munochiveyi, ‘War Vet Nation’, in S J Ndlovu-Gatsheni and J Muzondidya, *Redemptive or Grotesque Nationalism*, p,125.

label of a traitor, some nationalists avoided him in public and yet came to his house at night and said, 'keep doing what you are doing.'¹¹⁴ The term traitor therefore was a political device used to discredit others for reasons of political expediency. Despite having languished in Rhodesian prisons for 11 years Sithole was to be regarded as a sell-out. When he died, he was not buried at the National Heroes Acre where many latecomers into nationalist politics found a place.

The other crucial result of the split was a permanent division between the armed guerrillas of the two main liberation movements. The army was portrayed by Rhodesians as divided along tribal lines even if the leadership may not have wished so. Writing on his wartime experiences as a member of the Police Anti-Terrorist Unit (PATU), Godwin makes this distinction quite clear but without giving it a critical analysis. In Filabusi on the northern end of Godhwayo Reserve, he describes ZANLA which operated there as a Shona army.¹¹⁵ The Ndebele population of Filabusi did not regard ZANLA as their own army and were therefore quick to sell it out even under the lightest pressure from Rhodesian forces. Against this background, ZANLA was responsible for atrocities against those accused of selling out. Such people were killed 'to make an example.'¹¹⁶ Similarly, Joshua Nkomo was viewed as a Matebele nationalist leader, thus reducing him to a king or paramount chief. Godwin also believes that ZIPRAs were a Matebele guerrilla army who were battling with their enemies from ZANLA.¹¹⁷ The Rhodesian Special Branch capitalized on these differences by creating the SFAs from local ethnic groups so as to deny guerrillas sanctuary. In the Midlands and Matebeleland provinces, this programme was a fiasco. As they had done during the war, former ZANLA and ZIPRA armies were to fight each other after independence in what the ZANU-PF government described as Gukurahundi which means the early rains which washes away rubbish. The Five Brigade was part of wartime ZANLA but was now reconstituted into a Shona army called 5 Brigade which was trained by North Koreans.

Muzorewa made constructive demands at the Geneva Conference of 1976 and these bring to question his sell-out identity then. His demands show that he was for a democratic Zimbabwe

¹¹⁴ M R Munochiveyi, 'War Vet Nation', in S J Ndlovu-Gatsheni and J Muzondidya, *Redemptive or Grotesque Nationalism*, p. 125.

¹¹⁵ P Godwin, *Mukiwa: A White Boy in Africa*, London, Picardo, 1996, p.257.

¹¹⁶ *Ibid*, p. 259.

¹¹⁷ *Ibid*, p. 329.

which had respect for human rights. He voiced against PVs, of livestock in the war zones, indiscriminate killing of civilians during curfew hours, massacre of refugees in neighboring Mozambique and the torture of detainees for interrogation purposes.¹¹⁸ Before his address, he placed a placard on each of the two seats flanking his own. One bore the name of Enos Nkala, the Secretary General of the UANC arrested by the Rhodesian Police in April 1976 and the other bore the name of Dr Edson Sithole, UANC Publicity Secretary who disappeared in October 1972. These two turned up to be ZANU heroes but not Muzorewa. Further, even though he had agreed to the name Zimbabwe-Rhodesia, at the end of August 1979, he announced that the word Rhodesia was to be dropped from his country's name prior to the constitutional Conference due to open on 10 September.¹¹⁹ His compromise which led him to be friends with Smith and to create his own militia countering guerrillas did much to tarnish his image.

The sell-out identity ought to be taken cautiously as it is quite fluid judging by the information provided so far. One publication in the pro-ZANU-PF weekly, the *Patriot*, was at pains on what identity to use on Africans who fought for the Empire in the two world wars. They were not fighting for democracy and rule of law in their own countries. Rather, they served their repressive colonial leaders from being vanquished. This would look treacherous but the columnist argued that until the beginning of the armed struggle, fighting to defend the repressive system was not an evil. Rather, the Africans should have stopped there¹²⁰ which otherwise means that by remaining in the force when the liberation war began, they were betraying the revolution. Thus people become either patriots or traitors if they are otherwise so identified. African soldiers who fought in the World War 2 are a minority obviously since the majority of them are dead. This makes it easier to invite them to the nation as opposed to the numerous formerly pro-Muzorewa forces.

Early Attempts by Muzorewa to create/control an army

Muzorewa started as a credible leader (in the eyes of nationalists) when he led African people to reject the proposed constitution in 1972 which could have radically delayed the coming of

¹¹⁸ IDAF for Southern Africa, *The Political Prisoners in Rhodesia*, 104 Newgate Street, London, September 1979, p.1.

¹¹⁹ IDAF for Southern Africa, *The Political Prisoners in Rhodesia*, 104 Newgate Street, London, September 1979, p.2.

¹²⁰ *The Patriot*, 3-9 August 2012.

independence. Prior to 1974 nationalists in and out of prison held him with high esteem because he told people that he was not the real leader of the Africans, but was merely acting on behalf of the imprisoned African leaders. By so doing, he was promoting detained nationalists and those in exile which was why they hailed him. If he was to continue singing in their praise, they in turn would have constructed him into a hero. Therefore, as long as he worked for them, he was popular but not when he should decide to lead the liberation war himself. The character of Muzorewa became questionable when he struck an agreement with Smith and signed a document containing proposals which were identical to the 1971 proposal without consulting the Central Committee which subsequently rejected them at a meeting held on 2 December 1974.¹²¹ When he signed this document without the authority of his executive, ZANU leaders who were in detention issued a statement dissociating their party from Muzorewa's talks with Smith's regime. From this point, Muzorewa was continuously accused of selling out Africans and destroying the unity which had prevailed. In fact, he lost support from both ZANU and ZAPU leaders who thought the country was in future to be ruled by any of them. This therefore does not mean that Muzorewa was not a credible leader, but as a contender, opponents had to find a way of de-campaigning him by way of immediately labling him into a sellout. However, the continuation of ANC also allowed Muzorewa to position himself for political ascendancy. He realized that he was being used by jailed and exiled political actors to advance their political ambitions. When he became the undisputed leader of ANC, he later formed his own private army so as to defend what he stood for.

From 1974, Muzorewa battled to control the guerrilla armies but without success. Both Nkomo and Mugabe did not allow him into their military training camps. Despite claiming to be the commander-in-chief of guerrillas, practically he did not control any armed force until the creation of the SFAs. At the same time, having some fighting men was a means of gaining acceptance and credibility both at home and internationally. ZANU and ZAPU initially battled to convince the OAU Liberation Committee that they were a force to reckon with because they had the armies which evidently attacked the 'enemy'. As such, Muzorewa had to prove the same through a force under his control. In addition, a military force visible amidst the people was the

¹²¹ A C Chambati, 'National Unity-ANC' in C S Banana (ed), *Turmoil and Tenacity in Zimbabwe 1890-1980*, Harare, College Press, 1989, p.152.

useful tool for purposes of political campaign. In the case of Muzorewa, only a handful of guerrillas had paid heed to the amnesty extended to them within the confines of the Internal Settlement. To every nationalist leader, whether moderate or radical, an enemy was indispensable. By any means therefore, Muzorewa had to have one in order to justify his claim to power.

In his struggle to be a leader of independent Zimbabwe, Muzorewa realized the importance of having force behind words in light of the adoption of violence by ZANU and ZAPU as the only way of removing Rhodesian minority rule. Both Nkomo and Mugabe were also determined that Muzorewa would not get control of their armies. These leaders not only understood the importance of an army, but were reluctant to surrender power to the UANC. When the UANC wrote to the OAU Liberation Committee in 1977 on political developments in the struggle, the party tried to paint a picture that it was in charge of guerrillas inside and outside the country. The statement purported that there was no selling out or tribalism in the liberation struggle.¹²² In light of the struggles-within-the-struggle, the statement was obviously untrue but intended to attract material support from the OAU. Further, the statement exaggerated the unity of Zimbabweans as follows:

The Zimbabwe people today remain faithful and loyal to the national tradition. There will be no sellout. Our people realized that they had to fight in order to expel and not to accommodate the enemy, they forgot their tribal petty differences and came together.¹²³

Since the UANC was under attack from other nationalist parties, it had the right not only to defend its position but to show that it was authentic and committed to the liberation war and also discredit its detractors. That the movement was unitary is contradicted by a statement that prior to the formation of the ANC, 'our people had become accustomed to fighting one another.' The ANC had not ended this fighting but intensified it by forming its own military wing. In 1977, Muzorewa had sent members of his 'military department' to make contact with guerrillas in Mozambique, but they were 'arrested' and put into isolation by the Mozambican government.¹²⁴ The assumption that the ANC leadership was out to fill a leadership vacuum was incorrect because all that was in place and in fact, ZANLA had consolidated its strength through massive

¹²² MS775/1, UANC Statement to the Liberation Committee of the OAU on Political Developments in the Struggle with Particular Reference to ANC: 1977 January, p.2.

¹²³ *Ibid.*

¹²⁴ *Ibid*, p.3.

training and infiltration into the country. The statement claimed that the ANC had fighting cadres in Mozambique and Zambia but was being sabotaged by ZANU, ZAPU and Frontline States. In light of all that, the Liberation Committee withdrew its support to ANC because it had no fighting cadres. By the 1970s, fighting for liberation had incorporated an army as the norm. When interviewed on the choice of Zimbabwe's leadership come election time, a young female African nurse at Harare Hospital said, 'I will vote for the one I am most frightened of.'¹²⁵ It was indeed a frank admission of realpolitik in Africa as the liberation wars peaked- the man with the most threatening show of strength was the winner. Gibson Magaramombe, a Co-Minister of Health, Education, Labor and Social Welfare in the Transitional Government commented that, 'It must be pointed out that throughout Africa power is seen to lie with those who use force to obtain their objectives.'¹²⁶ For the same reasons, Muzorewa was supposed to have an army if he intended to remain politically relevant.

In the Rhodesian parliament, there was pronounced opposition to the creation SFAs and the Internal Settlement which were still shrouded in secrecy. For example, one black MP, Mr Maposa asked Smith whether he wanted to get the Internal Settlement without US approval. Smith replied that as long as it had majority support, that was not a problem. Asked why he had earlier on said the settlement would work with US and British support, the Prime Minister replied arrogantly that the speaker is lost.¹²⁷ Smith was similarly opposed by other black MPs, namely Zawaira, Sadomba, Dewa, Mabika, Bhebe, Gandanzara among others.¹²⁸ When the Internal Settlement was eventually promulgated, African MPs had done everything within their means to thwart it but failed. The persistence of the opposition discourse is not intended to demonstrate that these men who eventually failed to prevent the formation of SFAs were indifferent to nationalists such as Mugabe and Nkomo. On the contrary, they opposed any settlement which excluded these two men.

The genesis of the auxiliary concept is also understood from a laager mentality. As the liberation war intensified the white community found itself decimated by deaths in combat as well as

¹²⁵ H Holland, 'A Look at Private Armies and Voting Clubs', in *Illustrated Life in Rhodesia*, 9 November 1978, p.8.

¹²⁶ MS775/1, UANC Statement to the Liberation Committee of the OAU on Political Developments in the Struggle with Particular Reference to ANC: 1977 January, p.9.

¹²⁷ Parliamentary Debates, Wednesday 23 June 1977, Volume 95, 1976-77, UZ Library.

¹²⁸ *Ibid.*

migrations especially to South Africa. To preserve the white stock, it was politically and logically expedient to send as few as possible of the whites to areas where the war was hot. Generally, white soldiers became confined to barracks in urban areas. According to Murphy, the creation of an all black military wing meant that white soldiers' lives were spared, thus providing some assurance to the European community that its sons and husbands will not continue to die in war infinitely. The auxiliary would act as a buffer and an early warning system. To the parties, the auxiliaries were a vote insurance if elections were held.¹²⁹ The SFAs represented the extension of policy or politics by other means if it is read from both the Rhodesian and Muzorewa's perspectives. Through the force Muzorewa hoped to wrestle political power while through the same force, Smith thought he would preserve it. The ways in which the new combatants would understand the arrangement would depend on the type of political education they were to receive during the training period. At the same time, the war was supposed to continue hence the creation of the Rhodesian Defense Regiment composed of coloreds and Asians and the SFAs. Consequently, Africans were left to butcher each other while the white community waited to reap from the battlefield.

As the liberation war progressed towards the attainment of independence, it was not unusual for anyone in a position of potential authority to begin to think in terms of political ascendancy. Within this context, once Muzorewa had successfully led protests against the Pearce Commission, he used his new position to rise in national politics. Masipula Sithole shows that when liberation organization begins to show appreciable measures of success, there develops a tendency towards a crisis of expectations among its rank and file. Here, I quote Masipula extensively before I discuss the implications on Muzorewa:

Top and middle level leadership begin to translate hypothetical positions into quasi-real posts. A camp commander begins to wonder whether this position will translate to prison guard or major-general as independence is won. The leader of an organization begins to worry about his deputy who also begins to realize that being a deputy translates to president any time the one above him is incapacitated. The chief of defense and general commander begins to temper with such a calculus as would indicate whether it were wiser to first become Minister of Defense in the coming republic before he stages the military coup etc.¹³⁰

For Muzorewa, nothing could therefore stop him from translating leadership skills which he had learnt as a bishop into leading an organization which would rule Zimbabwe. He was given more

¹²⁹B Murphy, 'Who is Who in the Auxiliary Forces', in *Illustrated Life in Rhodesia*, 4 September 1979, p. 9.

¹³⁰M Sithole, *Zimbabwe's struggle Within the Struggle*, Harare, Rujeko publishers (Pvt) Ltd, 1990, p. 10.

encouragement by the December 7, 1974 Zimbabwe Declaration of Unity signed by him, Ndabaningi Sithole, Joshua Nkomo and J.R.D Chikerema. ZANU, ZAPU, FROLIZI and ANC had agreed to unite in the ANC. All the parties agreed to call upon their supporters and all Zimbabweans to rally behind the ANC- all recognized the ANC as the unifying force of the people of Zimbabwe.¹³¹ As the president of the ANC, it was inevitable for Muzorewa to realize that he had been given a golden opportunity to lead Zimbabwe to independence. His major handicap was that he did not control any liberation army and neither were ZANU, ZAPU and FROLIZI serious about surrendering military and political power to him. Nevertheless he tried to control liberation armies, but without success. If Nkomo and Mugabe had armies to campaign for them, why could he not establish his own to do the same? These among other reasons will be used to explain the politics of auxiliary forces. However, first an account is given on why and how Muzorewa failed to control or take over guerrilla armies.

In his autobiography, Muzorewa reiterates his extremely positive views of guerrillas. He argues that he found himself greatly attracted to guerrilla violence and he longed to go into the training camps in Mozambique and live with guerrillas but above all, fill a leadership vacuum.¹³² Those feelings he might have harbored before he became the Prime Minister of Zimbabwe-Rhodesia. Such views had changed by late 1978 when he had his own force which was directly trying to thwart the military ascendancy of guerrillas through an armed confrontation and trying to get to power with the help of his own army. Moreover, his autobiography was also an official statement which he intended to use in explaining his legitimacy to power. Before he went into a self-imposed exile to try to take charge of guerrillas, Muzorewa first attempted to put himself as head of guerrilla armed forces by taking command of the Zimbabwe Liberation Council (ZLC). The decision to come up with the ZLC was arrived at in Dar es Salaam on 8 July 1975, at the ANC summit of the Frontline States. The intention was to intensify the armed struggle. As explained by Masipula Sithole, struggles within the struggle led to the failure of the ZLC. Nkomo was taking moves to over-take the ANC, hence he refused to participate in the ZLC and so did the Mozambican-based ZANU. After initially joining the ANC-ZLC, Michael Mawema, Simon Muzenda and Rev Makoni left it. In no time, Mawema denounced ZLC despite his midwifery

¹³¹ *Ibid.*

¹³² A Muzorewa, *Rise Up and Walk: An Autobiography*, London, Sphere Books Limited, 1978, pp. 188-192.

role to its formation. He argued that it should be disbanded. ‘Muzorewa and Sithole, he wrote, have unilaterally taken power into their own hands and they have excluded everybody even the freedom fighter from the ZLC... they are microphone revolutionaries.’¹³³ ANC-ZLC came to be dominated by the Manyika and Zezuru ethnic groups.¹³⁴ Muzorewa’s identity had been smeared among ZANU guerrillas, hence even when he went to Mozambique he could not be given access to their camps by Samora Machel himself. In September 1976, Sithole withdrew his faction of ZANU from the ZLC. Without control of any army and the ZLC having literally collapsed, Muzorewa returned home from self-imposed exile on 4 October 1976 and was received by a thunderous crowd estimated at totals of 50 000, 150 000 and 500 000 supporters.¹³⁵

A critical assessment of cracks in the ZLC reveals the necessity on the part of Muzorewa to create his own army if he had to remain politically relevant. Martin and Johnson think that ZLC was intended to enable Sithole and Chikerema political mileage.¹³⁶ Though the two authors do not explain how they arrived at such a conclusion, the other explanation is that both leaders could easily arm-twist Muzorewa who was politically inexperienced. By taking command of ZLC, Muzorewa was leading an organization which was politically and militarily defunct. To start with, Sithole appointed to the ZLC Noel Mukono and Simpson Mutambanengwe, both who had lost their positions in the Dare or ZANLA High Command. Noel Mukono had already been replaced by Tongogara as Secretary for Defence while Mutambanengwe had lost his post as a political Commissar.¹³⁷ Both of them were therefore unacceptable to ZANLA guerrillas. Secondly, the vice-chairman J.Z Moyo and the Secretary, Chikerema, could not possibly work together after having seriously quarreled leading to the ZAPU crisis of 1970 which gave rise to the formation of FROLIZI by the later. In addition, Tongogara could not accept these appointments because he was the commander and not Mukono.

Robert Mugabe was critical of ANC-ZLC for failing to take care of guerrillas though one can easily note that it was his strategy of working to the top. By 1976, detained ZANU leaders had

¹³³ R Cary and D Mitchell, *Who is Who? African Nationalist Leaders in Rhodesia*, Bulawayo, Books of Rhodesia, 1977, p.53.

¹³⁴ M Sithole , *Zimbabwe’s Struggle Within the Struggle*, p. 148-9.

¹³⁵ *Ibid*, p. 148-9.

¹³⁶ Figures vary. Look at the works of Martin and Johnson, M Sithole,(*Zimbabwe’s struggle Within the Struggle* p. 150 and Muzorewa’s autobiography).

¹³⁷ D Martin and P Johnson , *The struggle for Zimbabwe*, Harare, ZPH, 1981, p. 196.

already denounced Sithole and appointed Mugabe as their representative. In allowing the ANC-ZLC to gain political mileage, Mugabe could be digging his own grave. Therefore he accused the ANC external wing of failing to provide guerrillas with guidance, food, clothing, medical supplies, arms and ammunition.¹³⁸ The fact that Muzorewa belonged to an organization which had not found a military wing continued to plague his ZLC. Robert Mugabe took advantage of ZANLA military strength to further attack ANC on the grounds that it did not have an army. He charged that the entire external army belonged to ZANU and therefore ZANU must of necessity command a dominant position in all the organs. He concluded that the whole ZLC must be disbanded.¹³⁹

Furthermore, control of a military wing was crucial to the capture of political power. Robert Mugabe refused to surrender his army to the ANC-ZLC or worse still to bring it under FROLIZI. In addition, no ZAPU member had been given the chairmanship of the six ZLC standing committees and by expelling Nkomo from the ANC; Bishop Muzorewa was also expelling ZAPU.¹⁴⁰ Muzorewa was therefore left as a Commander-in-chief but without any army whether inside or outside the country. A military wing of the ZLC was also unacceptable to ZANU given that Sithole was fast losing grip of the party to Mugabe. By entering into an agreement with Sithole and not Mugabe, the parentage of ZLC remained unacceptable to the main wing of ZANU. In fact, by 1976, Sithole was solely clinging to a small fraction of ZANU. The year before, ZANU could not put a strong argument against ZLC as it was still recuperating from the 1974 Nhari Rebellion in which many rebellious commanders and guerrillas had been put to death by Josiah Tongogara. Moreover, the party was also suffering from a leadership crisis which culminated in the rise of Robert Mugabe to presidency of ZANU. By the same year, the OAU had stopped financing both ZANU and ZAPU as a means of compelling them to come up with some form of alliance at a time when they were financially handicapped. The transitional government in Mozambique was not yet firm enough to start strongly helping ZANU. Last, there was confusion at home because the Rhodesians waged a propaganda war in which they circulated ceasefire leaflets telling guerrillas to hide their weapons and surrender to the nearest

¹³⁸ D Martin and P Johnson, *The struggle for Zimbabwe*, Harare, ZPH, 1981, page 196.

¹³⁹ *Ibid*, p. 209-10.

¹⁴⁰ *Ibid*, p.210.

soldier, policeman or district commissioner.¹⁴¹ The ANC-ZLC had brought together rivals joined together by their hatred of Smith. Once that denominator had been removed, they would once more fight each other. ZLC had been dictated by the Frontline States owing to feuds and power struggles between and among nationalist leaders. It came from the wrong assumption that the ANC was a unitary movement which it was until other nationalist leaders began to realize that they were fast losing legitimacy to Muzorewa who was the Commander-in-chief of the ZLC.

As from 1975, Muzorewa made frantic efforts to ensure that his ZLC intensified the liberation struggle or at most bring about majority rule. To that effect, he also approached the OAU Liberation Committee which temporarily ceased to assist ZANU or ZAPU directly but through the ZLC. By 1976, the committee had resumed assistance to the two having realized the impotence of Muzorewa in halting or intensifying the liberation struggle. Alternatively the OAU had allowed ZIPA to be formed. Through this new organization, they hoped to by-pass the political leadership whose inner struggles they had become tired of and instead deal directly with the military leadership. For that Muzorewa delivered a scathing attack on the OAU which he charged alongside the Frontline States of preventing him and his allies from taking control of freedom fighters.¹⁴² He therefore ended up being aggressive to fellow African statesmen and not to the minority regime in Salisbury. He had not realized that ZANU entered into the ZLC in order to give itself time to recover from setbacks which the party was suffering from as a result of the 1974 Nhari Rebellion. Further, ZANU was desperately short of funds because the OAU had insisted on channeling funds through ANC-ZLC which was headed by Bishop Abel Muzorewa. In addition, Zambia had removed its diplomatic backing to ZANU in the aftermath of Chitepo's death. Further, ZANU's base in Mozambique was still shaky because Samora Machel at first distrusted Mugabe and Tekere and as such put them under loose house arrest.

Muzorewa's project was also compromised by Frontline States. Each leader wanted to be seen as the king maker in the Zimbabwe to come. Nyerere and Machel supported the coming to power of a ZANU government while Kaunda wanted a ZAPU-led government.¹⁴³ To be seen to be supporting Muzorewa was naïve because he did not have the capacity to control guerrillas. It

¹⁴¹ *Ibid.*, p. 216.

¹⁴² D Martin and P Johnson, *The Struggle for Zimbabwe*, p. 276.

¹⁴³ F Chung, *Re-living the Second Chimurenga*, Harare, Weaver Press, 2007, pp. 145-6.

would therefore appear that Muzorewa wanted to usurp power by entering through the backdoor which Smith could open because the bishop was a moderate leader. Chung portrayed Muzorewa as a peace-loving and obedient cleric who had little political experience as constantly revealed in negotiating weaknesses and inexperience.¹⁴⁴ His major handicap was that he did not have a strong personal army as his colleagues. Despite his protestations, he could do nothing to intensify the war. To that end therefore, he was Smith's best choice for negotiations. As a compromise leader, Smith would have his own way by transferring to Muzorewa cosmetic political power. Having realized that Muzorewa had these weaknesses, some of the senior executive members in the ANC including Canaan Banana who was to become the Zimbabwe's first non executive president, resigned from the ANC during the Geneva conference and joined ZANU.

It must not come as surprise that Muzorewa and Sithole could be labeled sellouts if some within ZANU itself were equally branded when they failed to abide by the party's code of conduct. At the second Central Committee meeting held in September 1977, Robert Mugabe delivered the historic Chimoio speech defining the party line as well as the 'enemy' whom he described as

...destructive forces who strive in any direction that militates against party line or seek like the rebels of 1974 and 1975/6 to bring about change in the leadership of the party...their actions are a negation of the struggle...we must negate.¹⁴⁵

Therefore when Sithole and Muzorewa formed their own armies they further qualified themselves as real enemies of ZANU which already had the audacity to label any challengers from within as enemies. It was strategically and politically expedient for Smith to allow Muzorewa and Sithole to have their armies as the war intensified. According to Chung, severe shortages of manpower were being felt in the Rhodesian army. Young white men were leaving the country to avoid conscription. There was so much desperation that by October 1978, the regime had decided to conscript blacks targeting African males between 18 and 35 years of age and also college and university students.¹⁴⁶ That desperation explains the laager mentality discussed earlier. While Smith thought that he could use such an army to advance his political mileage, Muzorewa no doubt had the same sentiments on the importance of such an army to him.

¹⁴⁴ F Chung, *Re-living the Second Chimurenga*, p.146.

¹⁴⁵ W Z Sadomba, *War Veterans in Zimbabwe's Land Occupations: Complexities of a Liberation Movement in an African Post-Colonial Settler Society*, Research School for Resource Studies for Development, 2008, p.51.

¹⁴⁶ F Chung, *Re-living the Second Chimurenga*, p. 226.

Politically, Muzorewa had unsuccessfully attempted several negotiations with Smith but these had failed to yield him political powers because he did not have the alternative force behind his words. Earlier, he had negotiated for a 'one-man one vote', but Smith refused to give in. All Smith could offer in the June 1971 talks was an extra 6 seats for Africans in parliament. At such a snail pace, it would take 40-50 years to achieve majority rule.¹⁴⁷ From then, he attended other talks including the Victoria Falls Conference, Dar-es-Salaam Summit, and Geneva Conference but without Smith budging. The coming of the Internal Settlement gave Muzorewa a golden opportunity to make it to the State House. This he could not do without an army loyal to him. Rhodesian Security Forces were loyal to the Smith regime while guerrillas were loyal to ZANU or ZAPU. In each case, these armies were busy campaigning for their own candidates in the front. Since Muzorewa intended to also rule independent Zimbabwe, he was obliged to have soldiers and civilians busy campaigning for him in preparation for a free and fair election.

Persistence of the sell-out identity

The fear and labeling of opponents as sell-outs continued even after independence. During the Lancaster House Constitutional Conference in London, both the ZAPU and ZANU delegations did all they could in order to prove to their various constituencies that they were not traitors. Mugabe is said to have been suspicious that other parties were trying to stitch up an agreement to his disadvantage. He threatened to walk out on several occasions, and once got as far as Heathrow airport before Samora Machel persuaded him to return.¹⁴⁸ As already noted, Tongogara met his death while going to brief his commanders that he and his political colleagues had not sold out at Lancaster. Leaders of the Internal Settlement had to cope with the sell-out identity, the idea being that they were now scapegoats of wartime evils. The identity of sell-out was used against Joshua Nkomo during the dissident era and as well as opposition parties in independent Zimbabwe.

Those who fought on the *wrong* side of the war still do not want to be so identified. For example, the Police Commissioner at independence had formerly belonged to the British South Africa

¹⁴⁷ F Chung, *Re-living the Second Chimurenga*, p. 235.

¹⁴⁸ R Bourne, *Catastrophe: What Went Wrong in Zimbabwe?* p. 87.

Police where he served as a sergeant. According to Godwin, it was something he did not quite like to be reminded about.¹⁴⁹ Even Godwin, then working as a journalist, did not openly discuss his service to the Rhodesians because that was a *wrong* side. To General Mujuru, he was therefore someone unworthy to investigate disturbances in Matebeleland. During a tour by journalists, Mujuru confronted Godwin and said: ‘We all know all about you, you were a Selous Scout in the war. He went on, ‘You..., you swine... ‘You bloody swine.’¹⁵⁰ The editorial of the Herald described people like him as belonging to the category which deserved the hangman for their war crimes. Shortly afterwards, he was declared an enemy of the state.¹⁵¹ Such events indicate that those who continued to challenge the state after independence risked being identified as sell-outs. African members of the Rhodesian Security Forces enjoyed the advantage that they usually did not operate in their home areas, making it impossible for them to suffer humiliation at the hands of their communities. Locally recruited members of the SFA definitely had a complex experience both during the war and afterwards. This is unlike the case of Mozambique where the ruling FRELIMO and the opposition RENAMO fought a protracted civil war. At the end of the conflict, both combatants were treated as war veterans and similarly compensated. However, reconciliation against RENAMO and vice-versa is still to be achieved because scars of the war remain. Those who fought the war on the *wrong* side also have ideas of how lasting peace, healing and reconciliation can be attained.

Parties identified as composed of sell-outs during the liberation war have somehow retained the identity to date. Only their individual members could transcend this negative label by joining other political parties so as to cleanse themselves of the bad omen of having once ‘sold out’. Getting support from outside was used as a means to identify Muzorewa as a sell-out. For example, in the run-up to the 1980 general election, he was generously funded by apartheid South Africa in the hope that he would win resoundingly as he had done the year before. Competitive elections which followed 1980 had a winner-takes-all quality where opponents could be trashed as national traitors and hence excluded from posts; friends and family members would be rewarded.¹⁵² During the land invasions which started in 2000, white commercial

¹⁴⁹ P Godwin, *Mukiwa: A White Boy in Africa*, London, Picardo, 1996, p.373.

¹⁵⁰ *Ibid*, p.376.

¹⁵¹ *Ibid*, pp. 376 and 381.

¹⁵² R Bourne, *Catastrophe: What Went Wrong in Zimbabwe?* p.141.

farmers were referred to as enemies- a term which is sometimes used side by side with sell-out. At the launching of the ZANU-PF manifesto on 3 May 2000, Mugabe denounced whites as sell-outs and said the MDC were their puppets.¹⁵³ As was the norm during the war of liberation, sell-outs were dangerous hence liable to be shot dead, beaten or in various ways humiliated. At ZANU-PF organized rallies, those in attendance were told that the MDC was composed of sell-outs, were British stooges and betrayers of the country's liberation.

The identity of sell-out became so 'realistic' that those so labeled have failed to shrug it off even in death. When Ndabaningi Sithole died, he could not secure a place at the National Heroes Acre. Similarly, when Muzorewa died in 2010, there were no attempts to discuss his hero status for reasons of having sold out along the road to independence. The sellout identity pursued Muzorewa to his grave and no one has been able to rescue him. The whole lot of most politicians who could not find their way into ZANU-PF became forgotten sell-outs whose views are completely excluded because they are not a reflection of 'history'. The same applies to those who in their thousands fought the war as members of the SFAs. Sachikonye maintains that the months leading to the Lancaster House Agreement and ceasefire in December 1979 were marked by declining morale within the SFAs who spent most of their time huddled in base camps. Soon after independence about 20 000 SFAs and 4 000 Guard Forces were disbanded.¹⁵⁴ These people represent a history and which is supposed to be captured while it is possible to do so. The fact that they have been excluded means that somehow they are a worthwhile composition. The ruling party has been able to silence them for a long time, but multi-party politics in Zimbabwe and the wave of democracy in 21st century has made it possible for people to criticize even the liberation movements which brought independence being enjoyed today. After all, if former members of the notorious Selous Scouts, especially those of the white stock, have been tracked down to give their account of the liberation war; a worse evil would be the exclusion of African combatant voices outside party militias of ZAPU and ZANU. Colonial governments across the continent did try to silence voices of those who had resisted the imposition of colonial rule while elevating those who had collaborated with them. The history of those who had resisted was kept in people's minds to become a rallying point of mass nationalism especially in the aftermath of

¹⁵³ R Bourne, *Catastrophe: What Went Wrong in Zimbabwe?* p.170.

¹⁵⁴ L Sachikonye, *When a State Turns Against its Citizens*, Sunnyside, Jacana Media, 2011, pp. 13-14.

the Second World War.

In the 21st century, Zimbabwe found itself politically polarized between the ruling ZANU-PF party and the two factions of the MDC. Because of the need to maintain itself in power, ZANU-PF has presented itself as being in a permanent state of an anti-colonial war. Today, the nationalist discourse of the ZANU-PF regime is oversimplified and rigid in its dualism of insider/outsider, indigene/stranger, authentic/inauthentic, patriot/sell-out and so on.¹⁵⁵ This kind of political history needs to be deconstructed because it does not accommodate alternative voices and experiences in the making of the nation. Moreover, that mentality is dysfunctional to the nation because it silences and dumps otherwise quite useful voices to the history of the liberation war and the rehabilitation of those forces who were opposed to the winners of the 1980 election. After all, political thinking is subject to changes. Therefore, even if some former SFAs have now joined ZANU-PF, it is historically more correct to get their version of the war and how they came to be what they are today. Regarding dissenting voices as threats to the nation constitutes what Christiansen has described as the Third Chimurenga discourse which he claims ZANU-PF has used since the land invasions of 2000. It uses antagonistic language of war, depicting opponents as enemies or sell-outs, thus justifying violent punishment as during the war of liberation.¹⁵⁶ The complexities of circumstances leading one to join any of the armed forces during the liberation war puts the whole label of sell-out under serious scrutiny as demonstrated in succeeding chapters.

Conclusion

Struggles-within-the-struggle, and politics of identity explain the origins and the development of nationalist movements in Zimbabwe. Attempts to present the Zimbabwean nationalists as having been united against the same enemy (minority rule) and envisioning the same independent Zimbabwe are not correct. Generally the road to independence was punctuated by ethnicity, scheming against each other, power struggles and, as much as possible, manipulation of the said

¹⁵⁵ L B Christiansen, 'Zimbabwe's Liberation War Recycled: Remembering the Principles of the Liberation War in Political Ways', in C Saunders, Documenting the Liberation Struggles in Southern Africa, Select Papers from the Nordic Africa Document Project Workshop, 26-27 November 2009, Pretoria, South Africa, p.50.

¹⁵⁶ *Ibid*, p.52.

differences by minority regimes. All that led to a deliberate process of constructing nationalists like Sithole and Muzorewa into sellouts while at the same time making the victorious Mugabe and his followers, heroes. ZANU-PF also constructed Joshua Nkomo into a traitor at least during the 1979/80 campaign era and thereafter, the dissident era.

The chapter has discussed divisions which led to splits in NDP, ZAPU, ZANU and the ANC. It has argued that of importance in the struggle-within-the-struggle was the issue of power. The way in which Muzorewa came into prominence has been fully attended to. That Muzorewa led the African National Council (ANC) to reject the Smith-Home proposals put him on the political frontline. Like every other politician he hung onto his new-found political organization, the ANC which also became riddled with factionalism. ZANU did not respect it, so did Nkomo's ZAPU. One immediate problem faced by the ANC in the aftermath of the Pearce Commission was how it could exert control of the military wings of ZANU and ZAPU. In spite of the resistance within the respective party to the ANC, Muzorewa persisted in his claim that he had authority over the liberation armies. In August 1975, he therefore formed the ANC-Liberation Council as an expression of his claims.¹⁵⁷ He failed because Nkomo refused to have ZIPRA under them and neither did ZANU submit its forces. Clearly therefore as long as Muzorewa, Sithole or for that matter anyone who regarded himself as a nationalist talked but lacked the capacity to use force, that was not of any use. If therefore the logic lay in the creation of an army, it is important to understand the auxiliary concept within both the Rhodesian and nationalist historical paradigm.

¹⁵⁷D Martin and P Johnson, *The struggle for Zimbabwe*, Harare, ZPH, 1981, pp. 122-4

CHAPTER 4

GENESIS AND DEVELOPMENT OF THE AUXILIARY FORCES

Introduction

The liberation war *officially started* on 28 April 1966 when seven ZANU guerrillas battled with Rhodesian security and police forces just outside the small town of Sinoia. All the guerrillas perished. From then, the war of liberation continued with fluctuating episodes of guerrilla engagements inside and outside the country as well as some periods of non-military activities often associated with guerrilla mobilization for support. By 1978, the war had literally engulfed the whole country with ZIPRA guerrillas mounting pressure from their rear bases in Zambia and ZANLA forces from Mozambique. The pressure was such that although Rhodesians could win battles, they were fast losing the war. As a government, the minority regime was failing to guarantee the security of its citizens. Informed by both military and security considerations, Rhodesians regarded the creation of militias or private armies through Operation Favour as the best mechanism for robbing guerrillas of their much needed support. They were greatly assisted by moderate nationalists, especially Muzorewa and Sithole, and District Commissioners. Moderate nationalists believed that through this project, they would probably lead independent Zimbabwe using the argument that now they had men under arms. They too hoped to win the countryside by using their armed men to campaign for them. This chapter discusses the theoretical and contemporary military and security considerations informing the Rhodesian adoption of Operation Favour and how Muzorewa thought he could successfully use the force to his advantage.

State of the Rhodesian War to 1978

In July 1964, a ZANU group calling itself the Crocodile Commando killed Petrus Oberholtzer, a farmer and member of the Rhodesian Front Party, at a crude roadblock in the Melsetter area.¹

¹ P Moorcraft and P McLaughlin, *The Rhodesian War: A Military History*, Johannesburg and Cape Town, Jonathan

Rhodesian Security Forces were still too strong against such poorly trained insurgents. Most of the members who had killed Oberholtzer were apprehended. Two members of the gang, Dhlamini and Mlambo were tried, found guilty and executed.² As early as 1963, ZANU had already sent a small contingent of five men for military training in China and these actually became the first trainers of ZANLA forces in Tanzania.³ Similarly, ZAPU had already started training its militants especially in the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR). The earliest to be trained included Dumiso Dabengwa who was to become ZIPRA's Chief of Intelligence. By the time of the clashes in Sinoia (now Chinhoyi), both ZANU and ZAPU had a considerable number of men under arms. The 1960s incursions were a disaster for both nationalist parties. ZAPU guerrillas were annihilated in both Wankie and Sipolilo.⁴ The few who survived were either captured or found their way back to Zambia where they had come from.

The period between 1968 and 1972 was largely used to reorganize the two parties by the respective leaderships. At the same time, it was a moment of prosperity on the part of the Rhodesian security forces since they had subdued the insurgents. For ZAPU, internal squabbles were such that it could not do much in the front as the party itself was threatened with a split. In fact, by 1971, the ZAPU vice president, James Chikerema, formed his own party FROLIZI, alongside some ZANU members as already noted in the previous chapter. ZANU used this opportunity to negotiate with FRELIMO who offered her Mozambican rear bases. Although ZANU still kept its Zambian offices, it had begun to operate strictly from Mozambique where the party subsequently transferred its military headquarters. ZAPU retained its offices and headquarters in Zambia. Tribalism and factionalism in nationalist parties cannot explain why the Mozambican offer was not quite acceptable to Nkomo of ZAPU. Nkomo might have felt that his guerrillas would not be safe enough in a territory (the eastern) which was populated almost exclusively by Shona speaking people, but quarrels in ZAPU give a more sound explanation. The party was grappling with attempts to find a lasting solution to infighting. Squabbles resulted in the party losing most of its senior commanders, the likes of Robson Manyika who defected to ZANU and facilitated the securing of the Mozambican rear. ZANU also used this opportunity to

Ball Publishers, 2008, p..29.

² H Ellert, *The Rhodesian Front War: Counterinsurgency and Guerrilla Warfare*, Gweru, Mambo Press, 1993 p. 9.

³ *Ibid.*

⁴ P Moorcraft and P McLaughlin, *The Rhodesian Front War: A Military History*, pp. 29-34.

mobilize people behind the party and to cache arms in preparation for an onslaught. Both parties resumed the war in 1972.


Generally, the period 1972 to 1976 was a period of stalemate between guerrilla armies and Rhodesian Security Forces. It was a no-win confrontation. Guerrillas were too numerous to be contained. In addition, none of the RSFs had been given political orientation of the war as was the case especially with ZANLA guerrillas. The trainers made the wrong assumption that the war would be won in the battlefield whereas the ZANU commissariat made sure that, above all, they would win civilians to their side either by propaganda, coercion or both. According to Moorcraft and McLaughlin, during the period of training, the guerrilla spent most of his time attending political lectures which hammered on a few revolutionary themes while the Rhodesian soldier received no professional political indoctrination. RSFs did not have a school of political warfare. On the other hand, the guerrilla was infused with a historical mission and turned into a political animal rather than a simple soldier as his Rhodesian counterpart.⁵ The guerrilla was already beginning to imagine the Zimbabwe to come. It is surprising that Rhodesian soldiers had not been taught this important aspect which had a long history going beyond the French Revolution. In the aftermath of the American War of Independence, the ordinary soldier ceased to see himself as the subject of the king but as the citizen of the nation. Therefore, this made him more willing to 'give his life', if that was required, because he now had something to give it up for - the nation he conceived as *his* nation. Before the revolution, no effort had been made to 'encourage soldiers to identify with the aims of (the) war. After the war the soldier no longer fought merely on behalf of a king, but for an ideal which encompassed the whole nation under the symbols of a tricolor.⁶ As will be shown in the next chapter, Rhodesian military instructors eventually decided to remedy this loophole by giving political lessons to trainee SFAs in a bid to turn them into political animals.

The RSFs had done everything in their capacity in order to crush guerrillas but without dampening the spirit of insurgents. Raids by RSF into Mozambique, Zambia and Angola had succeeded in killing thousands but could not stop the war. The country had been divided into

⁵ P Moorcraft and P McLaughlin, *The Rhodesian War: A Military History*, p. 64.

⁶ B Ehrenreich, *Blood Rites*, p. 187.

military operational zones. These were Hurricane, Salops, Splinter, Tangent and Grapple, Repulse and Thrasher as shown on the map below.



Source: Maphill 2011.

These Rhodesian operations covered the whole country by 1978 indicating that Rhodesia was in a total state of war. On the other hand, ZANLA named its provincial operation zones in the eastern half of the country after Mozambican provinces. Its three provinces were Gaza, Manica and Tete which were in turn divided into sectors. To the west and southwest, ZIPRA had Northern Region Fronts 1, 2 and 3. By 1978 more than 80% of the country was under martial law and the war was intensifying every day. With two civilian passenger airlines downed in 1978 and 19789 by ZIPRA guerrillas, Rhodesia was no longer a secure destination for tourists.

Generally as from 1977, the security situation was deteriorating with each passing month. Security forces were suffering a serious shortage of manpower desperately needed to continue with the execution of the war. All white youths between the ages of 18 and 25 became liable for

conscription (call-up) for a period of up to 18 months.⁷ Even when the call-up was extended to the 38-50 age groups, the dire shortage of white manpower in the military failed to improve. Under these circumstances, Smith was forced into an Internal Settlement from which the SFAs were created partly to meet the challenge of troop shortages.

Rhodesian Security Considerations

Guerrilla penetration into the country became a security concern and therefore the issue had to be securitized. Incursions became a security issue because the government of the day declared them to be. Otherwise Rhodesians would have avoided a bloody civil war by negotiating for independence with the nationalists in the 1960s, but they opted to go through a protracted and bloody war. The tide of violent nationalism was gaining popularity across the African continent implying that there was no way Rhodesia was to be excluded. An issue becomes a security issue if it can be argued that this issue is more important than other issues and should take absolute priority. This must be the case because it upsets the entire process of weighing as such.⁸ Of course, the guerrilla war was frustrating the survival of the Rhodesian nation. The government argued the whole country was under serious threats from Marxists and Communists. The last two terms were meant to convince the capitalist international system of the need to assist Rhodesians who were ostensibly under siege. Violation of rules and the fear that the other party will not let 'us' survive is a motivation for a country under threat to securitize issues. Buzzan and others point out that by labeling an issue as security; the agent is justified in claiming the need for and a right to tackle it by extraordinary means. Security itself means survival in the face of existential threats.⁹ Securitization is undertaken by a threatened state. It can either be ad hoc or institutionalized. When a state securitizes an issue whether correctly or not, it is a move that has consequences because this securitization will cause the actors to operate in a different mode than under normal circumstances. The Rhodesian government could therefore justify internal and external raids on the basis that they were under threat from communist or terrorists belonging to ZANU or ZAPU. Threatened like this, the state itself had become a referent object- which is a

⁷ J K Cilliers, *Counter-Insurgency in Rhodesia*, London, Croom Helm, 1985, p.43.

⁸ B Buzzan, O Waever and J de Wilde, *Security: A New Framework for Analysis*, London, Lynne Reiner Publishers, 1998, p.24.

⁹ *Ibid*, pp. 26-27.

term used to refer to things that are seen to be existentially threatened.

In order to secure the territory which he ruled over, Smith took a host of measures. To start with, the government used its strong air force which always facilitated the success of other Rhodesian units by frustrating guerrilla counter-attacks. In fact, it was because of Rhodesian airpower that guerrillas avoided protracted shootouts with the enemy. All military units had reserves which were city and district-based. The International Institute of Strategic Studies estimated that by 1978, the police reserve totaled 35 000 though this figure is probably too high.¹⁰ Asian and colored youths were conscripted into the Rhodesian Defense Regiment which was nicknamed the Rhodesian Daggga Regiment because of its poor discipline. The Guard Force was created in 1975 as fourth regiment to man Protected Villages, a Rhodesian version of the strategic hamlets in Malaya and Vietnam.¹¹ The Ministry of Internal Affairs had to administer the African population through the use of force hence the creation of District Security Assistants (DSAs) and District Assistants (DAs). When all that could not contain the influx of guerrillas, the interests of Muzorewa and the white minority regime coincided over the creation of SFAs.

Governing elites have evolved legally and politically as the prime claimants of the legitimate right to use force both inside and outside their domain.¹² Force is particularly effective as a way of acquiring and controlling territory. The fundamentally territorial nature of the state underpins the traditional primacy of its concern with the use of force. Throughout history, militarily weaker states have found it difficult to cope with threats from powerful neighbors or even from threats within. By extension, the right to govern has been established by the capacity to defend that claim against armed challengers from within and without. Challengers from within include secessionists, unionists, revolutionaries and other would-be states.¹³ Governments securitize so as to survive in power and usually not because they are advancing national interests. The Rhodesian regime was doing all within its limits to block a possible takeover of the country by nationalist guerrillas. There was no separation of the Rhodesian state and government of the day.

¹⁰ P Moorcraft and P McLaughlin, *The Rhodesian Front War: A Military History*, Johannesburg and Cape Town, Jonathan Ball Publishers, 2008, p.57.

¹¹ *Ibid*, p. 58.

¹² B Buzzan et aal, *Security: A New Framework for Analysis*, p.49.

¹³ *Ibid*, p. 53.

To justify its military action against the ‘invaders’, the government banned nationalist political parties for most of the war. Technically therefore both ZANU and ZAPU were operating outside the confines of the law hence liable to violent reactions of the state. When a political unit is not recognized by others, its socio-political units are not considered to embody legitimacy; its territory is considered politically empty and available for occupation. As such, because ZANU and ZAPU were illegal organizations, its people were not recognized as fully human. Buzzan and others go on to argue that such people risk being treated like domesticated animals or to be enslaved or to be treated like vermin, to be eradicated.¹⁴ The behavior of Rhodesian soldiers especially against black civilians is an indication that they had begun to doubt the humanity of those who opposed their political thinking. ZIPRA guerrillas who downed Air Rhodesia’s Viscount RH825 and allegedly killed 10 survivors on 3 September 1978 were described by Rhodesians as ‘vermin, sub-humans, Neanderthal, animals.’ Their presumed backers were in the words of the Afrikaner farmer who represented Karoi, ‘dripping with blood- blood of the innocent and helpless.’¹⁵ It was on the basis of such arguments that raids into Zambia were justified to kill thousands to avenge for the 58 dead who were obviously regarded as more superior to pro-ZAPU blacks. The killing of thousands of blacks by RSFs in Zambia, Angola and Mozambique did not attract such widespread condemnation from the Rhodesian white community. It was out of the same belief that Africans were sometimes haphazardly trained as SFAs and thrust to the battlefield because in the European sense, their lives were not as grievable as white lives. Whites did not receive such poor quality training and neither were they given poor weaponry to use at the front.

SFAs were also created because the Rhodesian government had become weakened as a result of the prolonged war and economic sanctions. Government control was shrinking particularly in the rural areas where the war was very hot. SFAs were attractive due to incompetent local policing and inept counterinsurgency practices. In the rural areas, they could be useful in several ways. To start with, they were required by security forces out of the belief that they could be effective in collecting intelligence on guerrilla insurgents because of their permanent presence in the village where they could tap information about structure, organization and support base of insurgents.

¹⁴ B Buzzan et al, *Security: A New Framework for Analysis*, p.54.

¹⁵ P Godwin and A Hancock, *Rhodesians Never Die*, Harare, Boabab Books, 1993, p. 229.

Second, they were useful in eliciting information on guerrilla sympathizers in the village. Third, they were needed for the very purpose of tracking down guerrillas. In Indonesia, the government relied on some 6000 militia in Sumatra to track down guerrillas in the jungle during the 1950s. As one insurgent leader acknowledged, ‘being local lads, they knew every creek and path just as our people did and could guide Javanese forces.’¹⁶ SFAs recruited locally were potentially so advantageous.

SFAs emanated from the failure of the Rhodesian government to protect people in the rural areas from alleged guerrilla coercion and violence. Such a scenario cost the Rhodesians the little legitimacy which they had. In order to weed out guerrillas from the rural population, what the government needed most was support so that, at least, people could report guerrilla presence from time to time. As a result of the war being fought in the rural areas which could not be covered effectively by professional foot soldiers, private armies had to fill that gap. SFAs would take the form of local militias defending themselves against insurgents. Originally, the force was intended to be a local force within protected villages.¹⁷ In fact, they were presented by both Sithole and Muzorewa as children of Zimbabwe who had come back from a just fight in the bush to defend what was now a just cause- one-man-one-vote.¹⁸ At a rally in Mangwende TTL at Mukarakate Village on 17 May 1978, Muzorewa encouraged guerrillas to return home so that they would become soldiers of Zimbabwe ready to fight ‘whoever will want to fight majority rule government.’¹⁹ Within Special Branch, it was known as the impi-idea while a District Commissioner for Sipolilo presented a paper on the subject late in 1973.²⁰ The idea was praised by the media as a popular one. Bishop Muzorewa was quoted saying that many members of his political movement were asking him where they would go and be trained to fight the Cubans.²¹ Taken from that angle, it implies that there were sections of the African society who were opposed to ZIPRA and ZANLA but aligned to the Internal Settlement. Of course, one cannot rule out the possibility of propaganda in the same statement.

¹⁶ S G Jones, ‘The Strategic Logic of Militia, Working Paper’, January 2012, p.16.

¹⁷ J K Cilliers, *Counter-Insurgency in Rhodesia*, p. 203.

¹⁸ B Murphy, *Illustrated Life in Rhodesia*, 4 September 1979, p. 8.

¹⁹ *The Herald*, 18 May 1978.

²⁰ J K Cilliers, *Counter-Insurgency in Rhodesia*, p.203.

²¹ *The Herald*, 9 March 1978.

Reasons for the Creation of SFAs

It is crucial to appreciate the decline in good relations between South Africa and Rhodesia as pivotal to the genesis of Operation Favour in Rhodesia. South Africa was slipping away from the time the then Prime Minister Vorster began to follow the détente policy as a means of guaranteeing himself good relations with any blacks who were in power then in Southern Africa and who were to come. By 1976, the South African Foreign Minister, Pik Botha, started complaining that his country was being subjected to pressures even by friends of the free world. The defense ministry spoke of financial stringencies militating against giving Rhodesia further military assistance. Last, the Finance Ministry was of the opinion that Rhodesia's oil embargo and sanctions could delay SASOL II, the second oil from coal plant.²² Smith was therefore under pressure to accept majority rule due to exertions from the South. Vorster was also being compelled to give such directives by the US and Britain who were trying to contain the spread of communism to Rhodesia. As such, the SFAs were an attempt to resist insurgents using locally available resources and personnel in light of resistance from the outside world.

Realizing that South African support was dissipating, Smith concluded that the solution to the Rhodesian problem lay in working together with 'our internal black leaders- in spite of their shortcomings, they seemed more reliable than our so-called friends of the free world.'²³ Smith therefore snubbed the 1978 Malta Conference as he was preoccupied with internal negotiations with him on the driving seat. Although Smith thought that he was leading the talks, South Africa indeed remote-controlled deliberations making it mandatory that the talks must succeed if that is what would please the free world. As a result, when there was a breakdown in the talks in January 1977, Vorster told Malan to plan for the removal of certain military equipment from Rhodesia.²⁴ The intention was to compel Smith to make negotiations a success story for the good of South Africa.

Muzorewa, Sithole, Chirau and Ndiweni joined the Internal Settlement with a strong view that

²² I Smith, *Bitter Harvest: Zimbabwe and the Aftermath of its Independence*, London, John Blake Publications, 2008, p.234.

²³ I Smith, *Bitter Harvest*, p. 237.

²⁴ *Ibid.*

they would be accommodated by Smith and the international community as moderate leaders who would not convert the country into a communist state. Senator Chirau described his group as ‘internally based African nationalists who are working peacefully to effect a change in our constitutional problems.’²⁵ He was critical of the political leadership of Mozambique and Tanzania whom he said ‘...are life servants of communists and they have no freedom... Although we complain about our condition here, they are much worse.’²⁶ The experiment failed to end the war culminating in the creation of private armies by the internal leaders. Rhodesia therefore found itself militarily weak without South African support. Coupled with loss of morale among the fighting men, Smith found the idea of forming a militia attractive as will be demonstrated in this chapter. It was a strategy designed to deal with the withdrawal of South African and British help.

The decision to use African militias against guerrillas was arrived at by the Rhodesian military and Muzorewa because of a number of reasons. To start with, various forms of punishments to rural civilians had failed to tilt the war in favor of the minority regime. Other factors include the successful application of the concept in Malaya and Kenya, the need to create support for the Internal Settlement, to command Protected Villages to meet troop shortages, to transfer the burden of the war to Africans and above all, to destroy the support base of guerrillas. Moreover, Muzorewa was supportive of the idea because he thought that he could work his way to the top by sidelining guerrillas whom he had failed to take charge of.

Conceptually, governments resort to the use of militias because of a number of reasons as propounded by Jones. They use militias because state security forces are weak and that policymakers believe that militias can help to pacify key areas of the country especially rural areas where state control is minimal or even non-existent. According to this line of thinking, a militia is an armed sub-state group that performs security and governance functions within a state. These functions include basic self-defense in a village, intelligence collection, reconnaissance and surveillance and offensive military operations.²⁷ A militia is so called because it officially does not fall under command and control of the state’s military police,

²⁵ *Rhodesian Herald*, 28 December 1977.

²⁶ *Umtali Post*, 9 August 1977.

²⁷ S G Jones, ‘The strategic Logic of Militia’, Working Paper, January 2012, pp.3-4.

intelligence agencies and other central government institutions. This is regardless of the force receiving money, uniform, directives, weapons and other equipment from the government. That being the case, both the military and the state can disown the militia if need arises. To both therefore, this becomes the strategic logic of using militias. For example, Chief Khaisa Ndiweni and Chief Chirau could condemn the role which private armies were playing despite the fact that they also owned theirs.²⁸ Two clashes between Rhodesian Security Forces and Sithole's Security Force Auxiliaries demonstrate this quite clearly. The first one involved the massacre of about ninety of Sithole's auxiliaries by security forces at Spurwing farm near Chivhu in 1979. Again in May 1979, 183 auxiliaries were also killed by Rhodesian forces in Gokwe.²⁹ Though prepared to use them, government could also take ruthless measures against the same militias. Following from the presentation above, the absence of a central command to the SFAs was intended to rid the government of responsibility should the militia become problematic.

In order for the government to shrug off paternity should need arise, auxiliary forces were deeply divided. Part of the force was under Selous Scouts, another supported by the Internal Affairs Department and still another by the Special Branch.³⁰ Moreso, part of the smaller force belonged to Chief Jeremiah Chirau and Khaisa Ndiweni. All this was intended to prevent turning them into a unitary force which might become problematic in future and to give a semblance of security to such traditional leaders. The Rhodesian government intended to maintain a semblance of legitimacy by having SFAs in remote areas of the country.

Use of the SFA in the liberation war was informed by the 'same element theory'. As summarized by Robinson who studied the Mozambican civil war, guerrillas could be fought more efficiently by a force that mirrored their organization, weaponry and knowledge of the terrain.³¹ First, the theory is useful in explaining the Africanization of the Mozambican armed forces under Portuguese colonial rule. By 1973, there were 27 000 African soldiers making up more than 50%

²⁸ MS 308/58/8, NAZ, Southern African News Bulletin, 11 February 1979.

²⁹ Security Force Auxiliaries: An Abridged History, <http://home.wanadoo.nl.rhodesia/sfa.htm>, 19 February 2012.

³⁰ C Pfukwa, Book Review, Soldiers in Zimbabwe's liberation War, *Zambezia* (1995), xxiv (1), p. 102.

³¹ D A Robinson, Curse of the Land: A History of the Mozambican Civil War, Thesis presented for a Doctor of Philosophy of History for the University of Western Australia, School of Humanities, Discipline of History, 2006, p.95.

of the total troop numbers.³² The same element theory was also behind the Africanization of the Selous Scouts regiment. The real reasons for forming the Selous Scouts regiment were summarized by Ron Reid Dally at the first pass-out parade in the following words:

The great problem we face is not killing the insurgents. It is finding them so that we can bring them to contact and kill them. We have all, I believe, experienced frustrating difficulties in getting information from the local tribesmen who have been subverted by the insurgents. Now you are Africans. Imagine the problems that all European units like the Rhodesian Light Infantry are experiencing. We have now discovered the new method of getting information from the subverted tribesmen. We are going to turn you into insurgents. You are going to be far better freedom fighters than the real ones ever were... You will pretend to be ZANLA or ZIPRA insurgents and infiltrate the population.³³

The same strategy used for Selous Scouts also applied to the formation of SFAs. When they were initially deployed, they presented themselves as guerrillas who had paid heed to the amnesty call and Bishop Muzorewa in particular. The areas under which they operated were *frozen* or cleared of regular security forces. From a Rhodesian military point of view, a frozen area was one in which security forces were precluded from operating, other than along main roads. Armed security forces in the area declared frozen were withdrawn by the time stipulated in the signal intimating that such an area is to be frozen.³⁴ The all-African SFAs began to operate in such an area. Therefore the fact that they were all African fulfilled the idea of invisibility as they looked just like their opponents. European soldiers were easily identifiable by both guerrillas and civilians through stature and skin colour, hence fitted well into the identity of enemy.

Like the counterinsurgent forces in Kenya during the Mau Mau Uprising (1951-1954), SFAs, could disguise themselves as insurgent operatives. In Kenya, Major Frank Kitson began to systematically train ex-Mau Mau and other Africans to regularly impersonate the insurgents. This provided excellent information that would enable precise targeting of insurgents. Impersonators were not limited to Africans but also Europeans who participated in a number of interactions especially at night. Through such operations, elusive leaders and their gangs were either captured or killed.³⁵ Pseudo operations in Kenya were responsible for the capture of Dedan Kimathi in 1956 by operators under the direction of Superintendent Ian Henderson.³⁶ Such

³² *Ibid.*

³³ M Gomo, *The Patriot*, 6-12 January 2012.

³⁴ J K Cilliers, *Counter-Insurgency in Rhodesia*, Sydney, Croom Helm, 1985, p. 122.

³⁵ M S Thibodeaux, *The Utility of Military Deception During Counterinsurgency*, US Command and General Staff College, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas, 2007, pp. 24-26.

³⁶ *Ibid.*, pp. 25.

success stories made the use of pseudo operations in Rhodesia quite attractive. It ought to be noted that in early 1978, SFAs operated just like guerrillas in terms of mimicking guerrilla dressing, habits and language. It was only that following the enactment of the Internal Settlement, SFAs became openly a counterinsurgent militia and began to wear their brown uniform.

That the Rhodesian white population was tired of the war whose end was out of sight, informed the creation of the SFA. Generally, whites were tired of the call-up and many of them were leaving Rhodesia for other countries especially South Africa. Minutes of the War Council of 15 December 1977 recorded the following:

The Chief of Staff, Army, reported that most of the officers in the field were of the opinion that the vast majority of men currently serving on indefinite call-up would leave Rhodesia as soon as they were relieved from continuous service and it was suggested that a measure of reassurance preferably in the form of a statement from the Prime Minister might assist in minimizing the predicted increase in emigration.³⁷

In moving a motion on call-up, Wing Commander Gaunt started by noting that, “there is no doubt in my mind that the single and most inhibiting factor of this war is shortage of manpower.”³⁸ He pointed out to the need to register all people because

Unlike some of my colleagues, I am of the opinion that there are a few malingerers still at large in our country and I look forward to the commission bearing out this contention... I am thinking of course, of those blacks who enjoy a high standard of education, who are fluent in English and who have benefitted over the years from the undoubted good government that has existed in this country. I am perfectly certain that these people will leap at the opportunity of being able to serve their country.³⁹

Therefore the government of the day had serious troop shortages which they believed would be corrected by a militia capable of holding territory against insurgents or even wrestle territory from guerrillas. So desperate were military strategists in the Joint Planning Staff (JPS) that at one time they suggested to Smith the creation of *sterile zones*. The idea was to sterilize an area not for anyone's health but to cause death and render the area uninhabitable. Thus the JPS produced a memorandum called *Sterile Zones and Food Control*. However, it upset Smith on the grounds that peasants would lose their land and homes and out of frustration, some would end up supporting or joining guerrillas.⁴⁰ Such desperate measures were likely to discredit Smith's government even from the eyes of those who had supported him. Militias could not only counter

³⁷ K Flower, *Serving Secretly: Rhodesia into Zimbabwe, 1964-1981*, London, John Murray, 1987, pp. 175-176.

³⁸ Parliamentary Debates, 24 October 1977.

³⁹ *Ibid.*

⁴⁰ K Flower, *Serving Secretly: Rhodesia into Zimbabwe*, p.178

guerrilla propaganda by campaigning heavily for internal leaders but also without decimating people and animals as biological warfare would have done. Militias were an assurance that the government was now in control and therefore guerrillas could be persuaded to take heed of the safe return policy announced by internal leaders.

The safe-return policy was first enunciated by Ndabaningi Sithole as a means to bring the war to an end using the argument that what guerrillas had been fighting for had now been achieved. The document outlining the full amnesty scheme such as the one below was first circulated outside Rhodesia to show external governments how the safe return policy could be operated internally without requiring supervision by officials appointed outside the country notably the US and UK.⁴¹ The poster below shows one such poster intended to persuade guerrillas to surrender.

⁴¹ MS 308/58/7, Sithole Plans \$1000 Loans to Resettle Terrorists.

TO ALL ZIPRA FORCES

A GUARANTEE FROM THE COMMANDER OF COMBINED OPERATIONS



In accordance with the instructions I have received from the Government:

I guarantee the safety of all ZIPRA Forces who wish to return home before the Elections. You will come to no harm at the hands of the Security Forces. You will be fed and clothed and given proper medical treatment. If you so wish, arrangements will be made for your transfer to the Interim Government Auxiliaries (Umkonto waBantu) under the command of Combined Operations. The Umkonto waBantu already have many ex-ZIPRA Forces working with them. You will be supplied with your own weapon and will be allowed to choose your area of operation. If you wish to be reunited with your family and operate in their area, this can be arranged. You will be allowed to participate with no restriction in the April Elections. This will enable you to play an important part in the establishment of the first black Majority Rule Government in Zimbabwe/Rhodesia.

Come home before the Elections in April 1979, and I guarantee you a safe return.

A handwritten signature in dark ink, appearing to read 'G. P. Walls'.

LT. GEN. G. P. WALLS, G.L.M., D.C.D., M.B.E.

THIS MEANS ...

"That any member of the ZIPRA Forces who returns home in peace before the election will be well treated. They will be fed, clothed and given proper medical treatment. They will be integrated with the Interim Government Auxiliaries (Umkonto waBantu) under the command of Combined Operations, and will be armed for this purpose. On no account will those returning members of the ZIPRA Forces be stopped from voting in the elections in April, should they wish to do so."

Source: National Archives of Zimbabwe

Returnees were promised loans not exceeding \$1000 for homes and land while other loans and grants might be made available to buy equipment and to aid farming and other businesses and

trades. Scholarships were also to be provided.⁴² The problem was that these were promises whose practicality was in doubt. According to Galula, sometimes a government is able to bring to an end to a revolutionary war by providing to the population things which insurgents are fighting for, especially the issue of land. For example, land reform looked like a promising cause to the Hukbalahaps after the defeat of Japan and the accession of the Philippines to independence, but when the government offered land to the Huks' actual and potential supporters, the insurgents lost their cause and the game. Similarly, the same disaster struck the Malayan Communist Party once Britain promised independence to the country and set the date for it.⁴³

Military strategists like Clausewitz used to think that war can be won through sheer physical power. However, the failure of the USA to achieve that victory in Vietnam War (1954-1973) has invited a revision of that school of thought. Modern warfare today is largely about the psyche. Once psychological support is secured, chances of winning the war become high. Sun Tzu thus came to the conclusion that deception is the way of war and that knowledge of one's self and one's enemy is a guarantor of a hundred consecutive victories.⁴⁴ Deception was initially a tool of the weak who could not confront a strong government directly. Subsequent developments saw the use of the tactic by both sides of the quarrel. The SFAs who regularly applied the system were part and parcel of the RSFs and thus the government. As noted in Reid Daly's pass-out parade speech, it was a mammoth task to kill or capture guerrillas without pseudo operators. The terrain was too rugged and the country too big for Rhodesians to regulate and control the influx of guerrillas.

Although Hurungwe had its own differences with the colonial system, these were not prohibitive enough to compromise the recruitment of its people into the force. Most chiefs in the district had been removed from the Zambezi Valley to pave way for the construction of the Kariba dam. Its people had not participated in the first Chimurenga, therefore they had no history of an anti-colonial war. Moreover, besides being neglected by colonialists, nationalists too had neglected it. The whole district had no government secondary school and neither was ZAPU or ZANU

⁴² *Ibid.*

⁴³ D Galula, *Counter Insurgency Warfare: Theory and Practice*, London and New York, Frederick A Praeger, 1964, p.15.

⁴⁴ Sun Tzu, *Sun Tzu's Art of War: The Modern Chinese Interpretation*, New York, Sterling Publishing Company, 1987, p.121.

entrenched by 1975. In terms of political consciousness, the district lagged behind. The context and circumstances of isolation help to explain massive recruitment into SFA. Last, the absence of any mineral resource implied that most youths in the district were unemployed hence they welcomed military service as an option.

For a revolution to be sustainable for as long as the revolutionary war is fought it is important that its cause for example shortage of land also continues to be prevalent. That cause is a rallying point to which the government is prepared to go to war. By extension, the issue of both land and independence was the key cause for the violent liberation war. The Rhodesian government was obviously not serious about its land promises as enunciated by Sithole in the name of the safe return policy. Even the nature of protracted arguments on the same question at the Lancaster House Conference and later on the international condemnation after the fast track land reform program of 2000 indicate that promises given by Sithole were not sustainable. After all, such radical reforms often come from the government but what is clear is that under the March 3 Agreement, neither Muzorewa nor Sithole had the powers which they purported to have. Real power lay in the hands of Smith who was not ready to make such sweeping changes against his kith and kin. In Zimbabwe-Rhodesia not even minimal land reform took place, thereby leaving guerrillas and their nationalist parties with a clear justification to continue mounting attacks on what they clearly saw as a minority regime. The safe return policy failed to lead to a ceasefire which would have robbed Mugabe and Nkomo of their fighting forces, thus rendering them politically irrelevant. The interim government could not stop the war without the cooperation of the enemy who was obviously Nkomo and Mugabe. Neither were free entry zones created to facilitate that surrender. Without guerrillas surrendering, bogus guerrillas in most cases gave themselves up thereby giving birth to Operation Favor.

SFAs came into being to enable Muzorewa and Sithole to campaign for their parties in rural areas which were strongholds of guerrillas. There were several reports of campaigners of the two² being killed in rural areas by guerrillas because they were not protected by armed personnel. For example, four envoys sent to Victoria to promote the ceasefire in line with the March 3 Agreement were taken prisoner by ZANLA, labeled sellouts and shot before a crowd assembled for the spectacle. In addition, over forty of Sithole's supporters were gunned down in

the company of unarmed envoys sent to Hwedza. Ken Flower concludes that it was against this background that the CIO arranged for 50 of Sithole's guerrillas training in Uganda to return.⁴⁵ On 31 December 1977, the UANC National Executive member, S Parrafin was attacked by Zimbabwe United People's Organization (ZUPO) members as he returned from a rally in Sinoia. The attack led to the death of Joseph Pote who was secretary for Boterekwa district.⁴⁶ Without visible men on the ground actually fighting the war and defending territory, the Internal Settlement was doomed. Having men under arms had become the norm in Southern Africa. There was no way unarmed envoys belonging to an opposite party from guerrillas would persuade guerrillas to lay down arms in line with the call for amnesty. Force behind words was necessary to bring guerrillas home. By extension, independence was presumed to come from the barrel of the gun and not the barrel of the mouth but in the end, independence was still negotiated.

Attacks on Muzorewa and Sithole's so-called peace envoys were important causes to the creation of SFAs. The two leaders were sending out unarmed envoys in to rural areas to convince guerrillas to lay down their arms as the country was under responsible African moderate leaders. The whole idea was to deny external leaders the opportunity to have men under arms. However, the nationalist guerrilla propaganda was well entrenched to allow for that. Envoys were often killed and if lucky, thoroughly beaten because they were identified as the enemy. There were actually spates of such happenings in 1978. In May 1978, four UANC peace envoys Reverend Ephraim Chiduku, Mr Austin Madondo, Mr Issac Takavada and Mrs Nyengeterai Marinye were killed as they tried to contact guerrillas to persuade them to lay down their arms in support of the transitional government. The 4 were killed in the Charumbira area.⁴⁷ In the same month, 4 members of Sithole's ZANU were killed in an operational area 50 miles SE of Salisbury as they campaigned in favour of the Internal Settlement.⁴⁸ Similar reports of such killings came from Runde TTL and the Midlands Province.⁴⁹

In light of the amnesty programme clearly facing challenges, internal leaders had to find a

⁴⁵ K Flower, *Serving Secretly*, p.104.

⁴⁶ *National Observer*, 31 December 1977, MS678/1

⁴⁷ Muzorewa Men Found Dead in a Shallow Grave, MS 308/5/1, NAZ.

⁴⁸ Bullets Meet Peace Envoys, *Rhodesian Daily Mirror*, 8 July 1978.

⁴⁹ *Rhodesian Herald*, 9 November 1978 and *Rhodesian Daily Mirror*, 9 November 1978.

justification for their political existence. Addressing a rally at Kapfunde School in Hurungwe, Chikerema told the crowd gathered that he had been left with no choice but to stop fire with fire.⁵⁰ This meant that since guerrillas were armed, only by sending out armed men would the amnesty scheme prove workable. These armed men became auxiliaries whose creation indicated that after all, the internal leaders were planning to be powerful enough to stop the war. The Rhodesian war could be won by one who had the strongest show of strength even if that may be psychological.

This kind of havoc, in addition to the destruction of schools, bridges, dip tanks and shops especially in rural areas, informed the birth of militias. According to counter insurgency theorist David Galula, insurgency is cheap whereas counter insurgency is expensive. Promoting disorder is a legitimate objective for the insurgent. It helps to disrupt the economy because it produces discontent and serves to undermine the strength and authority of the counter insurgent.⁵¹ There was an attempt at the life of Emmanuel Grey Mutemasango who, by 1979, was the UANC ceasefire director. Prior to that, he had been the regional auxiliary commander for Hrungrwe. His exploits had been displayed by local and international journalists the previous month.⁵² As *disorder* became the order of the day, the government which also provided counter insurgent forces could not just watch the deteriorating state of affairs because its obligation was to offer security to unarmed civilians. The killing of government officials such as policemen, councillors and teachers is what Galula called selective terrorism⁵³ which indeed destroys government structures particularly in rural areas. The expenses to the counter insurgent lies in the fact that when an insurgent blows up a bridge, it follows that every bridge has to be guarded and when an insurgent burns a farm, all farmers clamor for protection and if they do not get it, they may enter into private agreements with insurgents as happened in Indo China and Algeria.⁵⁴ In short, when an insurgent increases his terrorism or guerrilla activity by a factor of two, three or five, he does not force the counter insurgent to multiply his expenditures by the same factors. Sooner a saturation point is reached which is destructive to the counter insurgent for his opponent has neither responsibility nor concrete assets.

⁵⁰ Interview with Peter Noise Kofi, Magunje, 2 July 2013.

⁵¹ D Galula, *Counter Insurgency Warfare: Theory and Practice*, p. 9.

⁵² *Moto*, 18 April 1979.

⁵³ D Galula, *Counter Insurgency Warfare: Theory and Practice*, p.9

⁵⁴ *Ibid.*

To maintain its legitimacy, the minority government was forced to use militias, a scheme which it had started in 1975 when the Guard Force was dispatched to man protected villages in the eastern districts. Use of SFAs was thought to be more palatable as they were initially presented as neutral forces and, later, largely Muzorewa's forces. Having fallen out with Mugabe and Nkomo, this was an opportunity for him to claim power without having sweated much and for that, it would have been naïve to turn down the offer. Frustration came with the refusal by guerrillas to pay heed to the amnesty call, leaving Muzorewa with the option of coming up with his own force which would maintain a permanent presence in areas up to then subverted by guerrilla fighters.

Faced with the daunting task of guerrilla incursions, the Rhodesian military realized that to defeat an enemy, it was important to behave like him and learn to think as he does. One of my informants who trained as a member of the Selous Scouts between 1976 and 1977 indicated that after training, he was deployed to Hurungwe leading a group of SFAs who were trained to behave and act like guerrillas.⁵⁵ That approach had a long history in both European and African military history as a way of gathering intelligence before delivering a destructive blow to the enemy. According to Ehrenreich, among the ancient South Americans living near the Putumayo River, before Achilles can kill Hektor, he must become as much like him as possible, spending 18-20 books of the *Iliad* mimicking him and usurping his identity as a hunter.⁵⁶

Muzorewa and Sithole were playing into the hands of international conspiracy against the East when they agreed to have their own armies. Mugabe and Nkomo were presented as Marxists and Communists whose ideologies were not welcome in the West. South Africa still under apartheid was also not prepared for a Communist neighbor. All these were not for a candidate with Marxist leanings. In the end, Muzorewa was to go on international tours to sell the March 3 Agreement and later on the internal settlement. To sell the same idea to civilians in Zimbabwe-Rhodesia, Muzorewa was supposed to have foot soldiers busy campaigning for what he represented as

⁵⁵ Interview with Dzomba, Chitindiva Township, Chundu, May 2011.

⁵⁶ B Ehrenreich, *Blood Rites*, p.139.

opposed to guerrilla propaganda.

The creation of the SFA followed the failure of spirited efforts to persuade guerrillas to surrender and align themselves with Muzorewa. In public addresses, Muzorewa presented nationalist leaders as sellouts arguing that ‘they dine and wine in luxurious hotels of Lusaka and Maputo and other parts of the world... let me or any other person of your choice know when you are ready to return to Zimbabwe and we will ensure your safe conduct whenever you send us the word but please come home now.’⁵⁷ The encouragement by Muzorewa further stipulated that there would be absolute indemnity for all guerrillas and security forces. Still, other than on paper, guerrillas were not surrendering, hence the creation of ‘Comrade Max’ in Musana by Rhodesians to try and achieve that. Mugabe and Nkomo soon branded Ndabaningi Sithole and Muzorewa who signed the Salisbury Agreement⁵⁸ as part and parcel of Smith’s regime and owing to effective dissemination of that kind of information, guerrillas could not surrender as required. The *Zimbabwe News* which was ZANU-PF’s propaganda magazine went on to say that Sithole, Muzorewa and Chirau must die because they signed the bill of sale namely the Internal Settlement. They were described as tricksters who would hang as many times as DuPont, Van der Byl, Wrathal and their desperadoes.⁵⁹ Those in ZANU-PF gave insulting names to leaders of the Internal Settlement. These included ‘marionettes’ which is an equivalent of sellout, House Negro, Uncle Tom or Oriol Cookies in America. In Shona they were called *zimbwasungata*.⁶⁰

A circular justifying the launch of Operation Favour indicated that the so-called People’s Militia was intended to deny guerrillas support. The main aim was to ‘protect the people by maintaining a permanent presence in their area of operation and as result, deny the insurgent access to people thereby causing the collapse of the insurgent’s *modus operandi* and finally winning the war. Use of the SFAs was justified on the grounds that security forces had failed to win the allegiance of

⁵⁷ *The Herald*, 14 July 1978.

⁵⁸ B Whyte, *Yesterday, Today and Tomorrow*, Harare, ADP Publications, 1990, p. 149. The Agreement came up with what became known as a Transitional government signed by Smith, Muzorewa, Chirau and Sithole. This was supposed to run the country for a year during the four could rule as executive council. Though Smith would remain as Prime Minister, the chairmanship of the council was to rotate among them. Their task was to come up with a ceasefire and to negotiate the lifting of sanctions.

⁵⁹ *The Zimbabwe News*, volume 10, number 2 March-April 1979, p.1.

⁶⁰ *Ibid*, p.45.

the people and SFAs would achieve that because it was a people's army.⁶¹ Although both ZANU and ZAPU had refused to submit themselves under UANC, Muzorewa still thought that with the advantage of being at home and with the backing of the then battered Smith; he would find his way to the top. An army was only necessary in as far as it would counter guerrilla propaganda in the rural areas. After all, other nationalists as in Malawi, Zambia and Botswana had attained independence without protracted war. By the same token Muzorewa could do the same without first becoming a guerrilla commander-in-chief. That he later came to be painted a traitor was part and parcel of political mud-slinging intended to deny the opponent any legitimacy.

With the help of SFAs, Muzorewa and Sithole hoped to motivate the insurgents to accept the amnesty, re-establish community development, local government and civil administration and motivate people to support the government, thereby creating an atmosphere of normalcy. All these had been closed by guerrillas who wanted to make rural areas ungovernable. When the program started, it was more of a propaganda campaign by both the army and the Internal leaders. The transitional government began to recruit young men who would be shown to civilians as returning guerrillas taking advantage of the safe return policy.⁶² On 4 November 1978, Lt General Peter Walls revealed that more than 2000 former ZANLA and ZIPRA previously belonging to Mugabe and Nkomo were now fighting alongside Security Forces in the tribal areas as auxiliaries and were being used to deny ground to terrorists.⁶³ Walls was therefore beefing up the propaganda machine of the government in a bid to encourage guerrillas to surrender and bring to an end the protracted war. In practice however, guerrillas were not surrendering as stated. For example, a government official reported that out of at least one hundred *gooks* (Rhodesian derogatory name for guerrillas) in Hrungwe, only two had come *on side*. His argument for the failure of the amnesty scheme was that the message from the Bishop had not been well-delivered and that the Bishop was not from the same ethnic group as the people of Urungwe.⁶⁴

In Malaya and Kenya, Home Guards who were an equivalent of private armies had been

⁶¹ GEN/PFU NAZ, Pfumo Re Vanhu- Why

⁶² MS 308/58/8, The Post, 10 April 1979.

⁶³ J R T Wood, *The War Diaries of Andre Dennison*, Gibraltar, Ashanti Publications, 1989, p.288.

⁶⁴ MS 308/58/8, NAZ, The Boys Won't Go Home.

successfully used to counter guerrilla insurgents. Rhodesians took these two examples as role models under which they would launch Operation Favor but at the same time ignored to account for the failure of the same scheme in Algeria and Vietnam. Ron Reid Daly who had fought in Malaya was therefore tasked by Lt General Peter Walls to come up with a secret plan to make it appear the guerrillas were surrendering in large numbers as a response to the amnesty call by the Internal leaders.⁶⁵ Since there were no large scale surrenders, the recruited private armies were to become offensive and attack guerrillas openly. Combined Operations directed that they should discard communist-oriented systems in favor of NATO style of training. Guerrilla type of weapons were similarly dropped and replaced by G3 rifles while denim guerrilla style uniforms were replaced by brown SADF supplied uniforms.⁶⁶

In Kenya, the colonial government facilitated the creation of a militia following the Emergency of 1952. The militias were called Home Guards and largely came out of the Kikuyu and to a lesser extent, the Meru and Embu populations. The program targeted traders, artisans, school teachers, chiefs, headmen and simple peasants.⁶⁷ According to Maloba, the initiative was led by Roman Catholic Missions in Kikuyuland, followed by Chief Njiri of Fort Hall until the concept spread to other districts as a strategy against Mau Mau. Home Guards denied Mau Mau supremacy in the reserves, curtailed contact with the majority of the population, cut food supplies and even went on to kill 42% of the insurgents.⁶⁸ Despite the fact that the Mau Mau was a peasant revolt, it had sharp differences with the war in Rhodesia. The Mau Mau revolt was led by peasants themselves implying that it was lacking in both resources and strategy. The standard practice in Africa was for such revolts to get their leadership from intellectuals and other elites who had international connections and sound military training. It was in part the opposite scenario which explained the failure of the private army scheme in Rhodesia. In the case of Kenya, created villages were provided with resources and other incentives as long as they were willing to discard their commitment to insurgents. In Rhodesia, PVs were a source of frustration and actually increased guerrilla support partly because they were grossly lacking in resources.

⁶⁵ J Parker, *Assignment Selous Scouts*, Alberton, Galago Publishers, 2006, p.196.

⁶⁶ *Ibid*, 198

⁶⁷ W.O.Maloba, *Mau Mau and Kenya*, Oxford, James Currey, 1998, p.89.

⁶⁸ *Ibid*, pp. 89-90.

Counterinsurgency is a reaction against insurgents meaning that the initiative is always set by the insurgent. That being the case, the creation of local militiamen as a counterinsurgency measure comes from the fact that the civilian population has been subverted and finds itself offering help to insurgents. Classical and contemporary theories of counterinsurgency all point to the centrality of controlling the civilian population as the method best suitable for winning a counterinsurgent war because it instills confidence in the territory where the war is being fought and where the civilian population is permanently resident. Key counterinsurgency theorists include David Galula, Kilcullen, Kitson, Mao, Che Guevarra and Benard Fall. Galula proposes four laws of counterinsurgency which culminate in effective control of the population at the detriment of the insurgent. The first law involves the dispersal and expulsion of insurgent forces, the destruction of its political organization and, where possible, the creation of political cells with people's cooperation. Second, the support of the active minority is sought and the passive majority will follow suit. The favorable minority will rally the neutral minority in order to neutralize or eliminate the hostile majority. In the third law, support of the population is established through a resident counterinsurgent force which lives among the population. Last, effort to gain more support is attained through rescue operations by the counterinsurgent.⁶⁹

David Kilcullen describes the classical theory of counterinsurgency as counter-revolutionary warfare developed in response to the wars of liberation from 1944 to 1982.⁷⁰ His conclusion is that whether in the classical or contemporary sense counterinsurgency remains fundamentally concerned with displacing enemy influence from social networks, supplanting the insurgent's support within the population and maneuvering to marginalize the enemy and deny them a popular base. It remains a competition between several sides each trying to mobilize the population to its cause.⁷¹ The centrality of population control informed the use of the SFAs. As already noted, Rhodesian forces were dangerously short-staffed to maintain a permanent presence in rural areas. The fact that they attacked and withdrew to bases enabled guerrillas to re-establish authority. The liberation war was also a political war hence the need to explain its motive to the people. Worse, the training and the intensification of the war made it virtually

⁶⁹ D Galula, *Counterinsurgency Warfare: Theory and Practice*, London and New York, Frederick A Praeger, 1964, pp.67-71.

⁷⁰ D Kilcullen, *Counterinsurgency Redux*, p.1.

⁷¹ *Ibid*, p. 6.

impossible for Rhodesian forces to maintain a permanent presence as guerrillas did. What started as guerrilla surrenders later turned out to be a civilian force whose purpose was to win support for both Sithole and Muzorewa. By taking charge of PVs, schools, re-establishing government control and opening shops, they were playing a civilian role which had political consequences.

The Mechanics of Creating SFAs

The idea of a local militia was revised in 1978 but it had been mooted as early as 1973 with the creation of a related force in Musana Communal Lands. Through active support of the Special Branch, 42 Africans were introduced into Musana, half of these being former insurgents but they all originated from the specific area. Each of them was given an extra weapon to recruit one member as he went. Therefore, by March 1973, Musana had a force of 90 men under arms.⁷² Initially, this force was known as Interim Government Forces which were supposed to be apolitical but with negotiations going on between Smith on the one hand and Muzorewa, Sithole and Chief Chirau on the other, it was clear that the force would fall under these black nationalists.

Despite the fact that SFAs were created by the Rhodesian government, Smith's memoirs⁷³ did not mention them at all. This is in spite of the enormous amount of time he spent dealing with the whole subject of the internal settlement. One would think that he was making use of professional soldiers only throughout the war. Smith's memoirs are therefore a political statement justifying his reasons for preferring an internal settlement which would exclude both Mugabe and Nkomo. He does not deal with the darker side which saw him making use of militias in order to pacify rural areas. He does not mention that after the failure of the safe return policy, SFAs were created to give a semblance that guerrillas were returning.

The creation of auxiliaries was originally done secretly in order to catch and crush guerrillas by surprise. Although SFAs were fully operational by 1978, the Rhodesian Minister of Combined Operations continued to deny that any private armies had been established in Rhodesia. He denied this in the House of Assembly in relation to a question from Mr William Chimpaka, the

⁷² J K Cilliers, *Counter-Insurgency in Rhodesia*, p. 204.

⁷³ I Smith, *Bitter Harvest: Zimbabwe and the Aftermath of its independence*, London, John Blake Publication, 2008.

independent member for Nemalekonde.⁷⁴ Press reports to the existence of an extensive ranch given to Sithole by the Rhodesian government were similarly rejected.⁷⁵

SFAs were initially developed from farmers' militias which according to Mr Mukucha were operational in Hurungwe farms by 1975.⁷⁶ These militias originally guarded cattle on white commercial farms to prevent rustling by guerrillas and other independent looters. They also protected farm equipment from insurgents and ensured that fences were not being cut. In Tengwe farms, these militias were given more training to patrol with soldiers and when Operation Favor was mooted, they joined so as to provide tight security first to the white commercial farms and then to the subverted people in the communal areas. Mr Mukucha also added that once the militia idea was agreed upon, whites at the Cold Storage Commission (CSC) in Sinoia encouraged some of their workers to join. As a result, sometime in 1978, about 28 workers left en masse to join SFA and the company soon replaced them. Mr Mukucha, who at that time was not aware of the deal, asked his white supervisor why workers had left the company and was told not to worry as others would take their places in no time.⁷⁷ The same informant added that SFAs originally operated as Selous Scouts disguising themselves as guerrillas before directing soldiers to homes that supported ZIPRA guerrillas. The liberation war in Hurungwe before the open adoption of Operation Favor was one of serious uncertainties because civilians were supposed to distinguish between real guerrillas and imposters. If they did not report that their village had been visited by armed men, they risked being branded guerrilla sympathisers whose result was detrimental. At last, when their true identity became known, they were withdrawn for *political education*.⁷⁸ Similarly, Matamba and Francis Dungiro were killed by armed men who presented themselves as ZIPRA. Both of them lived in the area of Jinga area under headman Mudzimu and were active members of Muzorewa's UANC. They were taken from their houses by two armed men ostensibly to discuss politics and then shot.⁷⁹ Therefore when the auxiliary scheme was introduced, it was welcomed by a population which was used to a daily life of harassment at the hands of armed assailants who had a tendency of travelling at night.

⁷⁴MS 308/58/7, NAZ. BBC, Minister Denies the Presence of Private Armies.

⁷⁵ Sithole Wallows in Luxury, *Sunday News*, 29 September 1978.

⁷⁶ Interview with Mr Mukucha, Maumbe Primary School, 26 July 2012.

⁷⁷ *Ibid.*

⁷⁸ Interview with Mushongahande, Chitindiva, 20 May 2011.

⁷⁹ Interview with Mrs Kamutsonzowa, Mazvaramhaka Village 7 May 2012.

Killings, beatings and threats by unknown assailants who travelled at night actually decreased the popularity of ZIPRA because RSFs were quick to accuse guerrillas of being responsible. For example, a Mr Mudavanhu was approached in August 1978 by armed men dressed as SFAs. When they asked him about the war situation, he pre-empted that the community was enjoying peace as a result of protection which it was getting from *dzakutsaku* boys who were a disciplined lot. At night, the same group returned, claimed that they were ZIPRA guerrillas and accused him of selling out. He was at once shot dead and only buried after some days which the assailants had stipulated.⁸⁰ RSFs used this incident to discredit guerrillas and more important to sell to locals in the Chitiki area advantages which would accrue from being defended by local militias.

At the end of 1977 before the launch of Operation Favor, members of the RSFs used to travel in schools and ‘educating’ senior boys on the impending war. They told them of the evils of guerrilla governments and urged them to be ready for self-protection should ‘terrorists’ give them trouble. The senior boys especially in grade 6-7 and secondary school were told that in future they would have to protect their own villages after undergoing military training.⁸¹ Seeing as they were some of their relatives and friends being killed (for reasons they could not understand) by armed men who purported to be guerrillas, the boys were gradually being psychologically prepared for what was to come. In addition to that, films were shown of the disastrous end which befell those who decided to become ‘terrorists’ as opposed to the merits of joining the Rhodesian army.

In the Karuru area of Hurungwe, SFAs were created to man PVs. ZIPRA guerrillas had become so numerous and had effectively subdued the population. Thus, people were headed into PVs along with their belongings including livestock so as to deny guerrillas access to food and security. Government soldiers could not take control of these villages as they were continuously being airlifted to fight insurgents in other places. As such, locals were taken to Chabwino farm for military training and these became the core of SFAs in the area.⁸² By recruiting locals, RSFs were minimizing chances of people selling each other out to guerrillas. Any attempt to do so

⁸⁰ Interview with Mrs Chakawa, Chipere Village, 6 May 2012.

⁸¹ *Ibid.*

⁸² Interview with Mrs Chabayanzara, Manyenyedzi Primary School, 23 May 2011.

meant the death of kith and kin under the new dispensation of locally-trained militias.

The Internal Settlement failed to prove to the outside world that moderate African nationalists had some credibility. Therefore, the CIO, SB officers on the national Joint Operations Command (JOC) and Combined Operations (COMOPS) were tasked to produce a scheme which would result in surrenders so as to convince the international community that the war had come to an end. According to Ellert and Parker, the job fell on Mac McGuinness who was commander of the SS Department Z of the CIO who was an acknowledged expert in nationalist tactics. He is the one who came up with a secret plan code-named Operation Favour which officially created the SFAs. He also came up with the idea of frozen zones which have already been discussed.⁸³ Muzorewa and Sithole complied by preparing lists of districts which they thought were loyal to them. Muzorewa chose Musana and Masembura which were the first to receive the SFAs. Sithole's men were brought from Uganda and sent to Spurwing farm near Enkeldoorn (Chivhu). They were welcomed by Sithole himself, Peter Sheba and Sam Chindawa.⁸⁴ The area was chosen partly because it was far from the UANC training centre and also because it was remote as all surrounding farmers had deserted because of the war. This is how Sithole was attempting to nurse wounds and engineer his political comeback after being toppled as the president of ZANU in favour of Robert Mugabe who was the Secretary-General.

In the process of trying to make the safe return policy work, the Rhodesian government unbanned ZAPU and ZANU. The logic was that if guerrillas could return in sufficiently large numbers, then the war would stop. More importantly, nationalist leaders would become irrelevant without fighting forces on the ground. In addition, stopping the war would demonstrate the strength of Internal Settlement leaders to the world. In mid-April 1978, Ken Flower noted the following in his brief to the executive council:

Britain, America and most of the world believe that we cannot secure a ceasefire- and because of this, the Internal Settlement will fail... They even doubt that we can de-escalate the war sufficiently to be able to hold elections... Nkomo and Mugabe are currently committed to continuing... even intensifying the war and refusing to join the Internal Settlement.⁸⁵

⁸³ H Ellert, *Rhodesian Front War: Counter-Insurgency and Guerrilla Warfare 1962-1980*, Gweru, Mambo Press, 1993, pages 179-180 and J Parker, *Assignment Selous Scouts*, Alberton, Galago Publishers, 2006, p. 196..

⁸⁴ *Ibid*, pp. 181-182.

⁸⁵ K Fower, *Serving Secretly*, p. 201.

The failure of the safe return policy lies in the refusal of guerrillas to give up fighting. Since only a handful of real guerrillas were surrendering, the number was boosted with recruits from townships who were persuaded to join on promises of jobs and also detainees who were conditionally released from Chikurubi and Wha Wha prisons. Cilliers thinks that these township boys lacked discipline and were thus responsible for the failure of the scheme as their community relations were bad. In practice, there is need to look at the quality of training given to the SFAs, the propaganda capacity of guerrillas and the preparedness of rural people to embrace SFAs as opposed to guerrillas. In Hurungwe, the bulk of SFAs who fought there were locals and not from urban centres. The failure of the scheme reflected the failure of political leaders who came up with the whole program.

Militarization of the Ministry of Internal Affairs (Intaf)

The ministry in question was as old as the imposition of colonial rule itself and its major role was to administer Africans. Informed by the pseudo-scientific racist theories originated by Charles Darwin, the British colonizers believed that Africans were inferior specie hence they had to be administered differently from their white superiors. Effective administration in sometimes hostile environment demanded that whoever was appointed as district commissioner needed African assistants. The first was the Matebele Native Police (MNP) created in 1894. Up to the outbreak of the Second Chimurenga, Intaf existed for civil administration. As the war intensified, it created a paramilitary wing in order to keep civil administration running and to also confront guerrillas when the need arose. It was in charge of DSAs, DAs and SFAs. This section was crucial as it set the background to the role of the DA's office in as far as taking charge of the SFAs was concerned.

According to Bundock, the District Assistants have their origin in the MNP, a force which was raised in 1894 and placed under the Chief Native Commissioner (CNC) of Bulawayo. It was the eyes and ears of the administration.⁸⁶ It was responsible for law enforcement, recruitment of labor and tax collection. Thereafter, the organization was known as the Native Department and changed its name. Eventually there were 54 districts throughout Rhodesia by the time of the

⁸⁶ A J Bundock, *The District Assistant and his Uniform*, *NADA* Volume 2 Number 1, 1974, p. 126.

liberation war and each district was headed by a District Commissioner who was deputized by the Assistant Native Commissioner. The Department's name was changed to Internal Affairs.⁸⁷ The wartime role of the department entailed patrolling, manning PVs, gathering intelligence and sometimes fighting guerrillas. The same ministry under which the SFAs were to fall was unpopular when it came to revenue collection among Africans. In the First Chimurenga, members of the MNP realized the unpopularity of their role leading some of them to cross the floor and join fellow Africans taking up arms against the colonial administration. The same spirit is shown by the en masse disappearance of about 200 SFAs to join ZIPRA guerrillas in the Silobela area in the Midlands province. However, this study found that this was not an entirely common phenomenon as guerrillas sometimes joined SFAs while a lot of *mujibhas* were recruited into the same militia.

Lifestyles of the Native and District Commissioners in the outlying rural districts had been uneasy long before the military role was added to their job description. Weale Edwards who was in charge of Mangwende district in the 1890s once wrote that:

There were no written instructions to our duties. No weekly circulars asking for reports on this, that and the next thing... Get to know your district, your people, keep an eye on them, collect tax if possible, but for God's sake, don't worry the headquarters if you can avoid it. Weale adds, 'The only answer I could get to any question I might ask as to my official duties was that I must use my own discretion.'⁸⁸

Duties of the district commissioners then included revenue collection, giving instructions to cattle inspectors, arranging supplies of labor to Europeans and keeping a register of the terms of service. After the 1896/7 war, the duties encompassed collection of loot cattle.⁸⁹ More than any other European administrator, the DC and his assistant were more in touch with the African population, no wonder why many of them had African nicknames. Between the two Chimurenga wars, they could travel around their district unarmed but, of course, with their African assistants.

The coming of the war radically altered the whole picture. Fynn uses the case study of Chiweshe to elaborate the changing circumstances. He notes that in 1972, the DC Mr V Merredith began to carry a 303 with him in his private vehicle on his trips into Chiweshe. This marked the end of leisurely unarmed foot patrols with just one or two DAs. Sub-offices were fenced and everybody

⁸⁷ Rhodesian Intaf, 2/10/12.

⁸⁸ C Coggin, Don't Worry Headquarters, *NADA*, Volume 2 1974-8, p. 133.

⁸⁹ *Ibid.*

from the DA's office carried a gun. People in rural areas were headed into PVs to prevent them from having any contact with guerrillas.⁹⁰ In order to control these PVs, more DAs and Guard Forces were trained. By 1978, that duty was being taken over by the SFAs. The need to put the welfare of the people under the DCs was because he was 'respected' by fellow whites for his knowledge of the district including its traditional leaders, its customs, its influential people and its infrastructure. Due to that knowledge, he was therefore the best man to lead in the formation of a network of informers, a situation which was envisaged to lead to guerrilla kills. Further, he was aware of which areas in the district were supportive and also opposed to the administration.

Mr Chikomba, a former ZANLA guerrilla who was deployed to Mashonaland West to help diffuse the powers of the DCs in Urungwe and Makonde districts at the end of the war gave a thorough summary of the new role of the DC's office in the war. It included supplying arms and ammunition to white commercial farmers and their farm militias so that they could defend themselves against guerrillas. DSAs were directly under the office of the DC. They provided security to the DC and his personnel and accompanied members of the Road Department whose duty was to ensure that roads were in good condition to enable swift movement of military trucks if guerrillas were detected. They could also accompany workers undertaking public works such as maintaining electricity pylons, telephone lines or providing security to chiefs and other friendly traditional leaders.⁹¹ In light of the militarization of this Ministry, the new Zimbabwean government was obliged to send its own Political Commissars (PC) to each office to monitor its demilitarization. The PC was to oversee the collection of all arms and their sending to the armoury at Inkomo Barracks outside Harare.

Conclusion

The beginning of the SFA scheme was largely defined by the intensification of the war particularly after 1976. At least before that, sections of the Rhodesian society still believed that the war was winnable and hence they were prepared to continue fighting without the assistance of militias. However the war continued to intensify. Various regiments sent for punitive attacks

⁹⁰ A R Fynn, *The New Administration, NADA*, Vol xi, Number 5, 1978, p .519.

⁹¹ Interview with Mr Chikomba, Mashonaland West ZANU-PF Provincial offices, 15 September 2012

in the countryside could sometimes win battles but they were fast losing the war itself. The major problem was that after fighting a battle, security forces went back to their bases and the area once more reverted to guerrillas. As visiting soldiers, government forces found it difficult to win the support of people in rural areas. With the war intensifying, controlling villagers and denying guerrillas support was attempted without success because living conditions in the PVs made the government less popular.

Faced with these challenges the Rhodesian military finally decided to implement Operation Favor whose genesis date back to 1973. Central to this strategy was the provision of local security to people in communal areas manned by their own children, relatives and other people they knew. Should they decide to sell out such a force, they would be doing so to their own detriment. While the original idea was to implement the programme that way, manpower shortages could not allow. The government ended up recruiting from townships and wherever they would find recruits. From the discussion above, the SFAs were clearly a Rhodesian creation aimed at upholding privileges of the white community which were being challenged by nationalist insurgents. It was also a reflection of manpower shortages to fight the war for Zimbabwe-Rhodesia. In racial terms, the arrangement was intended to reduce the deaths of whites in action by sending blacks to butcher each other for the benefit of the Rhodesians.

One ought not to lose sight of attempts by Sithole and Muzorewa to persuade guerrillas to surrender through the amnesty plan. Their envoys were being murdered throughout the country because they were neither armed nor protected. The only way to have an impact was by also having their own armed men fighting and campaigning for their respective leaders. Therefore SFAs were like ZANLA guerrillas, a political force. Their recruitment, training and deployment reflect that, so are their military engagements. As such their failure to come to power is explainable more in political terms than in military terms.

CHAPTER 6

RECRUITMENT, TRAINING AND DEPLOYMENT OF SECURITY FORCE AUXILIARIES IN ZIMBABWE'S WAR OF LIBERATION

Introduction

The study of the liberation war in Hurungwe commences with ZIPRA penetration and activities because it was the first guerrilla movement to enter the district while various counterinsurgent forces, inclusive of auxiliaries, were deployed in the aftermath in reaction to the incursions. Generally, most young men who joined SFA in the period 1977 and 1978 were part of the ZIPRA mujibha strategy. Often, these young men were press-ganged by the Rhodesian Security Forces (RSFs) and recruited into SFAs. The choices available made it difficult to resist the offer. Some were captured during the course of battles between Rhodesian security forces and ZIPRA while others were raided from their homes and taken to training camps. By 1979, some young boys were joining the force willingly because of a number of advantages that accrued to those who carried the gun. The research established that most of them were deployed back to their home areas to give the impression that through, the local militia, the community was being responsible for the security of its own people. However, others were sent to fight in other districts. Apparently, those who fought outside Hurungwe had radically different experiences from those who fought in the district under study. SFAs that operated in Hurungwe were generally trained at bases such as Magunje, Paradise Farm, Chabwino Farm, Musana, Chinamhora, Alfida and Domboshava. There were no reports of any SFAs trained in Uganda, Zaire or Libya who fought in Hurungwe, nor was evidence found that some were recruited from Rhodesian prisons. All SFAs interviewed had been trained within Rhodesia.

The auxiliary concept was introduced in order to destroy the 'mujibha' strategy which was the life blood of guerrillas. These mujibhas were young men and boys who disseminated intelligence information to guerrillas, thereby enabling the latter not only to evade the enemy but also to

inflict lethal attacks. Recruitment into the private armies by Rhodesian Security Forces targeted these mujibhas in a bid to starve guerrillas of intelligence and food. Rhodesians had come to the full realization of this state of affairs as noted in the *Post* that:

‘Every kid you see in the bush is a potential intelligence officer. They are all over the place. An army of eyes which watches, absorbs and then tells all to their big brothers in the bush. They are more feared than terrorists they purport to serve’.¹

The coming of the SFA was thus intended not only to destroy that network but to turn it against guerrillas. Against this background, the first groups of SFAs to enter the district disguised themselves as guerrillas and hence were armed, dressed and behaved similarly in order to hoodwink their opponents before possibly striking havoc. All former SFAs interviewed pointed that at one time or the other, they used a war name (*nom de guerre*). According to Barnes and Pfukwa, a *nom de guerre* or war name was formerly a pseudonym assumed by a French soldier entering military service. In Shona language, it was called *zita re Chimurenga*² (liberation war name). It is these names which are used in this study. As is demonstrated, these slurs were non aggressive for most part and they were used to conceal the real identity even though the majority of SFAs were fighting in their home areas. Of course, at other times they also fought outside the district particularly Gokwe, Makonde and Zvimba. According to Chideipa, such names were also indicative of the behavior of the SFA in question. Torturers at times assumed names such as ‘Killer’ to denote that they meant nothing other than serious business of the war and also to instill fear to those coming for interrogation.³ Other names such as Ese Matambo Pahondo were meant to take the war merely as a joke. All of them again preferred that the researcher uses their war names instead of real ones since they are still not sure if harm will not befall them for having fought on the side of Muzorewa. At the same time, they wanted to be properly re-written into history so as to prevent extinction or denigration of their contribution.

Through the process of recruitment, training, deployment and naming, SFAs were being transformed from mere ‘boys’ into *dzakutsaku* and ultimately, though unintentionally, *vatengesesi*, (sellouts) as those who identified themselves with the nationalist cause believed. Before their recruitment, all former SFAs confessed that they were mujibhas which means that guerrillas had

¹ MS 308/58/8, *The Post*.

² L A Barnes and C Pfukwa, ‘Ethnic Slurs as War Names in the Zimbabwean Liberation War’, *Names*, 55.4 (December 2007), p. 428.

³ Interview with Chideipa, Masaga, 13 December 2012.

so constructed them for purposes of information dissemination. My findings were influenced by the prevailing political environment where former guerrillas are held with high esteem and the idea of having sold out during the war is frowned at. As such, former SFAs placed themselves in as safe a position as possible. The persistent mentioning of having operated as a mujibha also suggests that they are bent on asserting that they had been associated with the ‘popular’ side of the liberation war. It might also have been a mechanism of insulating themselves from being completely excluded by the current political dispensation which they desire to be part of in some cases. For the same reasons, some former SFAs prefer to play it safe by insisting that they were recruited through compulsion. Guerrillas used the term mujibha as a way of hiding the use of children in military roles. Through this elevation, the boys and girls were transformed from being mere children into lethal weapons all in the name of the struggle.

The Coming of Auxiliaries into Hurungwe

According to Dzomba, SFAs first entered Hurungwe in 1977.⁴ The interviewee pointed out that in these early years, they presented themselves as guerrillas until such a time that people began to doubt them because they fought real ZIPRA guerrillas. They also survived on whatever rural people could supply them as food because they were generally not paid.⁵ However, in 1978, they went for re-training, returned with a new denim brown uniform and operated openly as SFAs. They continued in this way, training others locally until the end of the war when they went to either Karoi or Magunje to surrender their kit.

Rhodesian Security Forces initially targeted schools as recruiting grounds for SFAs. The same approach had also been used by guerrillas operating in border areas. Dzomba, a former SFA operative made the following comment on these early exploits in schools:

We were initially taught the war by Rhodesian forces who told us of the imminent coming of terrorists who were going to take away our cattle and persecute us. Long before the introduction of the SFA programme in Hurungwe, RSFs were coming to schools and training grade 7 pupils how to shoot in preparation, as they

⁴ Interview with Dzomba, 18 May 2011, Chitindiva Township. Besides this informant, no other respondent mentioned this date. This suggests that he was in one of the earliest groups to be deployed before Operation Favour became official.

⁵ Interview with Dzomba, 18 May 2011. Dzomba explained that his group spent almost a year in the bush without a monetary allowance or provisions. They had to get weapons and ammunition from guerrillas killed in combat. The truth in that kind of statement is highly questionable especially when cognisance is taken of the fact that they were in constant touch with security forces. As will be shown more or less the same information also appeared from interviews with Matamba.

said, for a war which was soon to come. Our targets were given names such as Nkomo, Tongogara, Sithole or Mugabe.⁶

This was the beginning of preparing them for what was to come in practice. Using names such as Mugabe⁷ and Nkomo was the beginning of an orientation indicating that the war to be fought was obviously against these and whatever they represented. Dzomba pointed out that grade 5-7 pupils then began to train how to shoot using the school bell at St Martin's Primary as the target. By the end of the war the school was no more, having been razed down by guerrillas. Pupils were being told that terrorists were to come and they would take people's cattle, rape women and kill civilians indiscriminately. The school-going boys were being prepared to defend themselves if the need arose in future.

When RSFs came to schools in a bid to entice boys to join the SFAs, they spoke strongly against fighters from ZIPRA and ZANLA whom they described as poorly-trained terrorists who could not withstand the onslaught from highly competent government forces. Ridiculing them was intended to discourage youths from becoming guerrillas. Praising government forces served the purpose of swelling the ranks of SFAs. From recruitment to deployment and right into the war theatre, forces were trained to hate their opponents. It is this kind of orientation which explains the post war antagonisms and reconciliation challenges in Zimbabwe.

Some of the youths were often sent by guerrillas to rustle cattle from white commercial farms in order to feed both guerrillas and their rural supporters. According to Kanyairabanda (a former SFA), *mujibhas* used to rustle cattle from Tengwe farms but at times they went as far as Lions' Den. All these trips were negotiated on foot. These youngmen had only grenades to protect them against any form of attack.⁸ Recovery missions by white farmers and Rhodesian soldiers led not only to beatings of civilians in targeted areas, but also forced recruitment of any available young men into SFA as a strategy to liquidate insurgents and at the same time avail local defense militias which could deny guerrillas sanctuary.

⁶ Interview with Dzomba, Chitindiva Township, 18 May 2012

⁷ The name Mugabe for a white torturer appeared in many interviews including one schoolhead from Chundu. He was quite notorious for using inhumane methods to extract information from those arrested for cattle rustling and supporting guerrillas. He owned a farm in Tengwe Block (of farms).

⁸ Interview with Kanyairabanda, Mutaurwa Village, Headmen Mudzimu, 4 May 2012. The same information on cattle rustling came from Noise and Ndivharaini Gasura.

Recruitment

The last years of Zimbabwe's war of liberation reflect desperate struggles by the Rhodesian government to vanquish guerrillas using any available arsenal. As pointed out in chapter 3, the Rhodesian military was dangerously short of human resources to fight the war and to contain the ever expanding influx of guerrillas. It was this desperation which explained the various forms of recruitment discussed below.

From oral interviews I conducted in Hurungwe, many voices reiterated that the recruitment into SFA took the form of abductions or press-ganging. The respondents said they were often arrested by RSFs on allegations of rustling cattle or conniving with guerrillas. Sometimes, they were just taken by force on trumped up charges to Tengwe Country Club located in the midst of white farms where they were beaten thoroughly and given the choice of rotting in jail with a clear possibility of dying there or joining SFAs so that they would return and protect their parents against guerrillas. It was only in the last months of the war that an increasing number of young men began to make conscious decisions of joining the force because it was becoming attractive as some sections of the SFAs were well-fed, given a monthly allowance and carried a gun to defend themselves and also going on the offensive. In all the cases which I encountered, there was hardly time for an input from parents and guardians on whether their son should join the war as a militia or not. Largely, this was due to methods of recruitment which left no chance for that. Again, in all cases it was boys rather than girls who were recruited. Such is the case because the war itself used men at the front though both ZANLA and ZIPRA had female battalions. Female guerrillas hardly went into the battlefield and were mostly used to guard camps and to carry baggage for their male counterparts to border areas. In most cases, the new SFAs recruits had no idea as to where they were to be trained, what they were to be trained for and whether the war they were to fight was rational or not. However, given the circumstances under which they were recruited, they chose to join the SFAs and served it loyally to the end but they complain that they did not reap the benefits of having fought in the war.

In one extreme case, boys and young men were caught by SFAs and RSFs during a battle with ZIPRA guerrillas at Nyamhondoro village near Mudzimu Township in 1978 and taken to join

auxiliaries. Their crime was that they were supporting the so-called terrorists hence and they were punished by being compelled to join the SFAs which, in other words was a means of turning them into counterinsurgent forces. Consequently, they were taken for training as SFAs. One of those captured during the same attack was Francis Nyamande's brother, Nicholas. Guerrillas had gathered for a traditional beer drink by then nicknamed a *bhavhadhe* (birthday party) in vernacular, though in practice they were not celebrating anyone's birthday but just enjoying themselves in an area they deemed was free from Rhodesian forces. Once captured, guerrillas automatically labeled him an informer and information from mujibhas had it that he was now a Selous Scout—a term which was at times used side by side with sellout. The Nyamande family which, all along had looked after ZIPRA guerrillas became a target for selling out and was eventually attacked. That strategy of recruiting mujibhas enabled Rhodesian forces to capture as much intelligence information as possible from captives who were later *turned*.⁹ More importantly, it was intended to demoralize guerrillas. In this case, there is need to deconstruct the Rhodesian approach to the liberation struggle which acknowledges only guerrillas as the ones who were *turned*. Mujibhas were also *turned* around to begin identifying with Muzorewa's cause.

Sometimes, RSFs left potential recruits with no chance of escaping at all. Friday Kavhu from Nyaodza recalled that one day in early 1979, a helicopter landed directly in a field which he was weeding together with other older boys from the same area. From it came out 4 heavily armed soldiers who gave the boys no chance of escaping. On that fine morning, 3 boys were taken away and walked to military trucks which came later on the same day. According to Kavhu, the boys were Setty Mpaswi, Costain and Crispen Kawisi. Only Crispen was later released for being asthmatic.¹⁰ The information on forced abductions in the same area also came from Kavhu's distant brother Svova.¹¹ The parents who were there had completely no say about the abduction but they were deeply affected, yet in the media Rhodesians were never tired of boasting that Africans voluntarily joined SFAs to fight because each regiment was a source of income, stability and family pride. In 1975 for example, Colonel David Heppenstal of the RAR claimed

⁹ This means that they were then convinced or compelled to begin fighting against guerrillas whom they had worked with all along. Similarly, if a guerrilla was turned, he would begin fighting against his former colleagues.

¹⁰ Interview with Friday Kavhu, Matenga Village, Chief Nyamhunga, 16 October 2012.

¹¹ Interview with Svova, Kaje Kaje Township, 19 October 2015

that, ‘...in many instances he (the African) was doing the same job as his father and grandfather had done before him.’¹² Therefore the assertion that Africans chose to fight fellow blacks is a social construction. The use of coercion was manipulated so that it would be made to appear as consent. Worse still, such statements did not elicit the voices of Africans who were compelled to join the force so that their line of thinking at the time of recruitment can be included to provide a comprehensive history of the war.

In the case of Francis Nyamande, it was clear that as long as he had chosen to remain at home, ZIPRA guerrillas were going to attack him as sellout because his brother had already been branded a sellout, implying that by extension he was also one. Francis’ father was killed for having a sellout son despite the commitment to the welfare of guerrillas before the Nyamhondoro battle. Francis’ plight became even more complicated because the burial of his father was attended and presided over by members of the SFAs who had killed one ZIPRA guerrilla in a bid to rescue the father. That alone in the eyes of guerrillas was sound confirmation that Francis’ father was a sellout. In practice, SFAs just like RSFs had a tendency to take anyone killed by guerrillas as one of theirs in order to win support for Muzorewa. Although locals had not seen Nyamande as a sellout, his burial suggested otherwise and guerrillas were similarly convinced. With full knowledge of that, Francis joined SFA, but surprisingly, he says through a call-up. He did so because he feared that if he was to remain at home, he would be killed by guerrillas. It is clear that he wanted to brush aside the point that he willingly joined the militia despite it being apparent that he arrived at the decision under difficult circumstances.

The case of Francis presents complexities surrounding what exactly was ‘call-up’ from experiences in Hurungwe. As noted earlier, he saw himself as a victim of circumstances because his father had already been killed by guerrillas. On the other hand, he also positions himself as a recruit of the call-up strategy. This means that self-preservation of his life compelled him to offer himself for call-up. As his brother had already joined Rhodesian forces, it was clear that he would be branded a sellout and as such, the results were obvious. Even if he had remained at

¹² Major M P Stewart, ‘The Rhodesian African Rifles: The Growth and Adaptation of a Multicultural Regiment Through the Rhodesian Bush War, 1965-1980’, a thesis presented to the Faculty of the US Army in partial fulfillment for Doctor of Military Art and Science, Military History, US Army and General Staff College, 2011, p.16.

home, chances of him being recruited into SFA were still high. In addition, Francis wanted to avenge the death of his father at the hands of guerrillas. This, he was not able to do because he was posted far away from home in Manicaland province. Except for a few SFAs such as Kanyairabanda, Jakaza and Mabasa, there were very few SFAs who in their time of service operated outside their district of origin.

RSFs were experiencing serious manpower shortages culminating in them ambushing boys for recruitment into SFAs. Enock Shava and five of his friends were such victims. Before being abducted, Enock was a mujibha or guerrilla messenger in Chitiki area. His mujibha roles included collecting food from as far as Zvipani which is some 20km away and also disseminating information on enemy movements and sellouts. Sometimes he was sent to Zvipani to collect provisions which included soft drinks, sugar, bread and cigarettes. On the fateful day in 1978, he was caught by members of the RAR while he and his fellow colleagues totalling five were weeding in Enock's field as part of their work-together parties. RAR forces suddenly appeared from different directions of the field, surrounded the group and demanded that the boys accompany them to Mudzimu Township (which was some 4km away) where these soldiers were sometimes based.¹³ Enock had no time to bid farewell to his parents who only heard what had happened but could not make a follow-up for fear of their lives. The war meant loss of influence by parents concerning the nature of job their child might take up.

Having a relative known to have joined ZIPRA was a sure means of being recruited to the opposite camp, namely SFAs. According to Kanyairabanda, his late brother named Chimera was recruited by ZIPRA guerrillas and went for training in Zambia. That very same week, RSFs came to arrest Kanyairabanda, in connection with assisting guerrillas. When they realized that Chimera had already been taken away by guerrillas, they took away Kanyairabanda and his father to Tengwe for interrogation and torture which culminated in the young man joining SFA. For a start, they intended to establish the whereabouts of guerrillas through these two and others. Rhodesian soldiers believed that guerrillas were in the vicinity. Therefore, they raided the village in the early hours of the morning. They were led by a mujibha, Lovemore Kadzanga, who had been captured at the Nyamhondoro battle near Mudzimu Township. He was compelled to

¹³ Interview with Enock Shava, Chitiki Primary School, 2 June 2011.

pinpoint homes of guerrilla sympathizers and guerrilla bases since he had been a ‘runner’ or a chief mujibha. As such, the raid took place in his presence so as to prove that he was not leading government forces into a death trap. First, government security forces sealed the home and fired at one hut which belonged to Chimera and which they also believed to house guerrillas who sometimes slept in huts rather than in the bush. Kanyairabanda was in the hut together with 2 of his young brothers. They continued to lie flat on the ground until the shooting stopped. During the mayhem, security forces bumped into a pair of jean trousers accidentally dropped by Micho, elder brother to Kanyairabanda but younger than Chimera, as he fled the shooting scene from a separate hut which was at the extreme end of the line of thatched huts. That pair of jeans was used as evidence that guerrillas (known for wearing similar jeans) had been in the area. For that Kanyairabanda was thoroughly beaten using rifle butts before being walked to a nearby shop owned by Over Gono where he joined other boys recruited similarly by way of early morning raids. More young men were also taken from Kawanza village and Kariyana villages. Thereafter, they were beaten daily by two white farmers namely Mudhonza and Kamuzezuru.¹⁴ This went on for a week before being given the option of joining the war against guerillas but in support of another black politician, Abel Muzorewa.

The above incident indicates that the choice of certain villages for attack and ultimate recruitment of SFAs was not accidental but deliberately intended to frustrate guerrilla support and possibly destroy their legitimacy in the rural areas. Once arrested, the young men were first lashed at Tengwe before being given difficult choices of either serving long jail terms where coming out alive was least likely, or joining the newly formed SFA. Knowing the dangers of going to jail especially for cattle rustling and politically-related crimes, in all cases, they chose to join SFA which made their chances of surviving the war higher because, at least they could protect themselves. These sentiments came from former SFAs namely Kanyairabanda, Jakaza, Esematambo Pahondo, Murambiwa and Zinhatha. They all claimed that the thorough beatings they had been exposed to in addition to heavy manual jobs and rigorous exercises accompanied by food shortages clearly showed that by remaining at the holding camp, they would in no time meet their death. When Esematambo Pahondo’s mother came to see him at Tengwe, she could not withhold her tears as her son had been sapped and was clearly in pain. She only talked to him

¹⁴ Interview with Kanyairabanda, 4 May 2012

briefly under the watchful eyes of a black policeman. Therefore to quickly jump to the conclusion that anyone who fought neither on the side of ZANLA nor ZIPRA was a traitor in the absence of these circumstances is deceiving to the military history of Zimbabwe. Even a number of early guerrilla recruits were actually press-ganged, but today, an image is portrayed in patriotic history that they joined the war exclusively to liberate their country from colonial bondage. The choices which these young men made had nothing to do with any ideology or vision of an independent Zimbabwe but were rational decisions derived from the need to survive and wait to see how everything would go about. In the case of Kanyairabanda, security forces dressed him in army uniform and started to patrol with him until they got to Mukototsi village which was a guerrilla base not far from his own home. With him compelled to participate in the beating of local villagers known to him, there was obviously no way of coming back to prove his innocence without being harmed by guerrillas for selling out. That alone meant that he was now seen by ZIPRA guerrillas as an enemy or sellout and could not safely return to his village unarmed. Any attempt to do so put him along the road to death. It is these circumstances which must be appreciated before giving labels to those who fought the war on any side of the quarrel. The RSFs' strategy in this case was to tarnish and defile one's image in the eyes of potential guerrilla sympathizers before recruiting him into SFA ranks.

Abductions were partly caused by cattle *rustling* from white commercial farms which guerrillas initiated as part of the struggle. Mujibhas armed with grenades and usually accompanied by a single guerrilla went for these errands. Independent rustlers outside the control of guerrillas also emerged. The only way to reduce this support and from the point of view of white farmers was to recruit youngmen into the newly created SFA. If they refused, they risked jail terms of up to 9 years per beast stolen. To illustrate how that happened, I shall extensively rely on Zinhatha who was a victim. He claimed that:

On that day soldiers came in hot pursuit of those who were stealing cattle from white commercial farms. First, they went to Gorinje's home and beat him thoroughly before tying him by the neck to a rope tied to a horse and proceeding to Bhirijsani's home where they took Ndivharaini who by then was a *mujibha*. From there, soldiers mounting horses and others on foot came to our home. It was very early in the morning and just before sunrise. On that day, I was not feeling well and was sleeping in my hut. I heard them asking my mother, 'Is it here where Zinhatha stays?' My mother said 'yes'. My young brothers were huddled on my door. The soldiers had now surrounded my hut and an FN was pointed at me through the window. At about the same time that I wanted to rise from blankets, the door was forced open by a heavy boot. I began to shake from both my sickness and fear. As I could not walk properly, a rough stretcher bed (*chibanda*) was hastily

made for me. I was carried by Gorinje, Wevison, David and Ndivharaini and taken across Nyaruchekwa River and then into the bushes passing through Chipikiri's home. When we got to Tengwe Gate, I was locked in Over's shop which had been abandoned by then. Colleagues who had been abducted from elsewhere had also been locked there. We were then taken on the same day by lorries to Tengwe Club which was in the midst of commercial farms. We were kept there for one week and then whites took us to Chabwino farm for military training.¹⁵

From the experience of Zinhatha, the recruitment can also be understood as white commercial farmers' own struggle to reduce the theft of their cattle. This is so because it was the mujibhas who were sent by guerrillas to rustle cattle at night. By arresting and eventually co-opting the young men into a militia, guerrillas would be left with no one to undertake these errands. In addition, the militias would intensify war by bringing it on to the doorsteps of guerrillas. That Zinhatha was feeble in light of his sickness did not deter soldiers from taking him. It shows their level of desperation as they sought any young man to assist them to win the war against guerrillas. Above all, recruitment of mujibhas would leave guerrillas with less Maoist waters¹⁶ hence much easier to hunt down and kill.

Murambiwa was also recruited just like his colleagues one day in the morning. Members of the RSF raided his village and he hid under a bed in his hut. Unbeknown to him, he had already been spotted by a white policeman better known in vernacular as *mujoni*. It was this policeman who pulled him out and marched him together with others who had been captured elsewhere to Tengwe. They were tortured for a whole week. A plank with protruding nails was sometimes used to beat them on their backs. Such beatings thus left them bleeding profusely. The most notorious torturer was a white policeman remembered as Mugabe. They were being punished for being mujibhas. At the end of that week, Murambiwa and his friends were given the option of either continuing with beatings before being finally jailed or going for military training. Knowing that by remaining at Tengwe, death was imminent; he painfully opted for military training and was taken to Chabwino Farm.

Having been a mujibha, Murambiwa's parents were left more troubled suspecting that after all, he might be dead. There was information circulating to the effect that those who had been

¹⁵ Interview with Zinhatha, Mutaaurwa Village, 6 May 2012.

¹⁶ With the help of people (water) guerrillas (fish) would be in a safe position to fight the war just as fish can only survive in water.

abducted from surrounding villages had been killed at Gwihwa in a battle with ZIPRA guerrillas. Murambiwa was told that his father was highly troubled until a fellow SFA named Handireki delivered the message home that Murambiwa was alive and training to become a Dzakutsaku.¹⁷ To compound the parents' problems, a lone ZIPRA guerrilla called Mandebvu came home in search of Murambiwa. He used to travel around with him on cattle rustling missions on white commercial farms such as Madrum, Dhukutu and Chikovhoru. He was informed that Murambiwa had been abducted by RSFs. By his own discretion, he did not punish the parents for 'letting' their child to join enemy forces.

In extreme cases, potential SFAs were left with no choice but to surrender themselves. Chideipa is one such example which in this instance should help to illustrate the long road to becoming a member of the SFA. By 1977, he was a mujibha and had been promoted to the position of area coordinator for ZIPRA. The position meant that guerrillas entering into Mudzimu area had to obtain information from him in terms of linking up with other groups and knowing enemy movements. Therefore, SFAs targeted him partly to kill guerrillas he was linked to and also to recruit him into their force. Towards the end of 1977, they raided Nyoni's home in the early hours of the morning on suspicions that Chideipa who slept there had brought guerrillas with him. He claims that the hut he was sleeping in was forced open by gun butts. As he came out, there were 6 SFAs all pointing their AK 47 rifles at him. His two other colleagues were similarly flushed out. Fortunately there were no guerrillas in the hut where he was sleeping. SFAs who had taken positions in various corners of the home were angry to find no ZIPRAs. Accordingly, they started thoroughly beating him with logs in a bid to extract information on the whereabouts of guerrillas. One of the SFAs fired a shot in order to compel him to release information. It was this which woke up guerrillas who were sleeping next door. As one of them fled, he accidentally dropped a rifle magazine on a protruding rock in the yard and SFAs realized that there were guerrillas nearby. In the shootout which followed, he was able to run away. All Mrs Nyoni could remember in light of the above was that there was a fierce battle at Nyamande which led to the death of one guerrilla.

Back at Mudzimu base the SFA commander by the name Munangatire announced that if

¹⁷ Interview with *Murambiwa*, *Gasura* Village, 5 May 2012.

Chideipa was not caught, his parents and relatives were going to die. After some 3 days, Chideipa surrendered himself in order to save his parents who had been taken hostage. While some might take his decision as naïve, by then, he strongly believed that if he did not do so, his family was going to perish. At the same time, that he gave himself up serves to confirm his belief that SFAs would serve his life. When he did surrender, it was not for purposes of enlisting himself but to iron out issues to do with his differences with SFAs and some members of the RSFs based at Mudzimu. He was first beaten intermittently for 3 days before being forced to stay and work at the SFA base. Still, SFAs did not compel him to go for training. They only turned him into their own *mujibha*. He could have remained in that capacity, but proceeded to go for military training in 1978 out of frustration. According to him:

ZIPRA guerrillas were obviously after me because they knew that I had sold them out. I had gone out on patrol with them, but this was not the reason why I joined auxiliaries. I was getting embarrassed by having to be sent on errands by young boys who had already trained. For any delay, they could slap me because I was still a *mujibha*. Moreover, I was being told by the area commander Munangatire that once trained, we would be dropped to our own bases by helicopter. Owing to all this, I joined and went for training first at Magunje, then Domboshawa and finally Alfida.¹⁸

Chideipa's version indicates that he was eventually attracted to a force he had formerly scoffed at. This explains why he did not try to escape during many patrols he had had with the SFAs before he went for military training willingly. Chideipa was also trying to write himself into history by giving an emphasis to the role which he played as a *mujibha* for ZIPRA guerrillas. The mere mention of being punished by small armed boys shows that Chideipa went for training in order to be at par with those who were forcing him to run around. He wanted to put an end to the humiliation suffered at their hands. The white soldier by the name Kamakombe had already declared that Chideipa's life must be spared because he had complied. Therefore, the version by the informant that he was compelled to join the SFAs ought to be treated with caution. The emphasis on compulsion is an attempt to make him historically relevant because SFAs have been constructed into sellouts- a view which they are battling to deconstruct if given a platform to challenge it.

Some recruits were, in extreme cases, pulled out of classes. Dzomba was a victim of that kind of abduction when he was in form 3 at Sortbury Primary School. This was abduction in the strictest sense in which all forms 3 and 4 physically fit boys were taken away by RSFs in 1977. Such was

¹⁸ Interview with Chideipa, Masaga, Headman Mudzimu, 14 December 2012.

the desperation reached by the colonial government that it had to make use of every available arsenal in order to ensure that it contained guerrilla incursions. Forced recruitment is also attributed to absence of enough recruits willing to come forward and offer themselves even in light of monetary incentives. The majority of these recruits ended up attending military training either at Paradise or Chabwino Farm close to the small town of Karoi.

Raids which often resulted in the forced recruitment of boys into SFA were marked with high levels of failure in Chundu which is close to the Zambezi River. Both Madzura and Mai Ellen made it clear that many people in Chundu understood the concept of SFA as a ploy to wipe most young men. Their argument was based on information doing rounds at the time that the battle between SFAs and ZIPRA guerrillas near the Catholic Church at St Martin's primary school in early 1979 had resulted in massive deaths of SFAs. Civilians had been compelled first to load the bodies in the church building and then on to military trucks the following day. ZIPRA did not concede that anyone had been killed, captured or injured.¹⁹ ZIPRA guerrillas had therefore placed themselves as a superior force in Chundu Communal Lands. When the policy of press-ganging began as in other areas already identified, young men were not willing to join because they were convinced that SFAs were poorly trained and implying that they could not withstand guerrilla firepower. In addition, a large group was usually accompanied by only one white soldier who was better armed than the rest, suggesting that he had a better right to life than his black counterparts. The result of attempts at forced recruitment was to swell the ranks of ZIPRA recruits as young men fled to join guerrillas and were taken across the Zambezi into Zambia for military training. Fleeing across the border emanated from real commitment to the war judging by the positive legacy of success which the guerrillas enjoyed in the whole of Chundu. Their success was such that the PVs concept was not applied as it had been in other parts of the district. Consequently, SFAs became notorious for beating up civilians and punishing them on allegations of supporting guerrillas.²⁰

Despite the general use of force and deceit in the recruitment process, the Rhodesian media which was working in cahoots with the regime of the day projected a picture of people coming

¹⁹ Interview with Madzura and Mai Ellen, Chitindiva, 17 May 2011.

²⁰ Interview with Mrs Mlambo, Kujakwenzara Village, 17 May 2011.

willingly to join the SFAs. The press thus portrayed the SFA as composed of volunteer men and boys.²¹ One member of the DSA was asked to explain why he joined the militia. His answer was that:

‘...I joined for the love of my country...to defend it from evil-minded people and also protecting my land rights...to give protection to law-abiding citizens and my relatives. Lastly, I like money and good things given to me in the course of my duties.’²²

Throughout the war, the minority regime presented a picture of young men willingly coming to join various militarized departments of the Ministry of Internal Affairs. They swept under the carpet facts on the ground that they were using coercion to lure young men into the force and that they were also using child soldiers. The media was simply echoing the interests of the Rhodesian government in order to help garner support for the RF. The opposite narrative of force was not covered in the media but forestalled by the Rhodesian.

The Rhodesian recruitment strategy shares so much in common with the Portuguese mechanisms in Angola, Guinea-Bissau and Mozambique. Portugal, after Israel, had the highest number of men under arms with an annual increase of 11% between 1961 and 1973.²³ In the 19th century, Portuguese recruitment was unsystematic and arbitrary, similar to forced labour requisitions for public work or plantation undertakings. Coelho goes on to elaborate that raids were undertaken to capture ‘idlers’ who were tied to a rope and taken to military quarters, a procedure which made victims of this recruitment widely and sarcastically known as volunteers of the rope.²⁴ Besides serving well-defined military role, Africans also assumed auxiliary roles in the military of all the three countries partly owing to their knowledge of the terrain. The intention was all but the same with that of the Rhodesians- to win support of the population. By the 1960s, the Portuguese had militias of all kinds especially in rural areas of the three colonies. They operated under the authority of local leaders, be it white or black, traditional or European.²⁵ The intention was to provide local defense against insurgent attacks. Most of the militias were made to operate in the same areas they had been recruited.

²¹ *Rhodesian Herald*, 31 May 1979.

²² The reasons why I Joined the Ministry and Serving as a DSA, *NADA* Vol xii, No 1, 1979, p.72.

²³ J P B Coeiho, ‘African Troops in the Portuguese Colonial Army, 1961-1974: Angola, Guinea-Bissau and Mozambique’, *Portuguese Studies Review* 10 (1), 2002, p. 133.

²⁴ *Ibid.*

²⁵ *Ibid*, p. 38.

The tactics identified above can be further understood by applying the ‘coloniality of being’ theory (though not coined at the time). Gatsheni-Ndlovu describes it as a useful analytical tool that helps to analyse the dehumanization of colonized Africans into damned and the wretched of the earth.²⁶ Coloniality on the other hand refers to the long standing patterns of power which emerged as a result of colonialism, and defines culture, labor; inter subjective relations and knowledge production well beyond the strict limits of administrations.²⁷ Scientific racism and the very idea of race determined the manner in which youths were recruited into SFAs without any regard for their feelings. Feelings which Africans did harbor were regarded as not that important due to the placement of Africans on the bottom of the social ladder if world races are put on a hierarchy.

In the area of Chanetsa, SFAs were recruited by mobile units of the RSFs who travelled by a military lorry. According to Offias Makumbi, wherever they found physically fit young men, they loaded them on to their truck.²⁸ In this manner, recruits were taken away without bidding their relatives some kind of farewell. This does not mean that all of them were recruited in this manner. Though Offias pointed to press-ganging, he was personally not abducted but voluntarily gave himself to RSFs who had addressed a rally at St Boniface. His argument was that young men were joining to defend their parents and sisters from ZIPRA onslaught.

Propaganda Campaigns

Rhodesian Security Forces also used propaganda to lure boys into joining the SFA. One interviewee revealed that one day when he was already in grade seven at a school in Karereshi, members of the RSF came ostensibly to discuss the war situation in the country. For that session, all boys who looked at least 14 years of age and above were asked to attend. RSFs explained that the state of the war was that ZIPRA guerrillas were on a war path to kill all law abiding citizens especially those of Shona origin who made up the bulk of the population in Hurungwe district.

²⁶ S J Ndlovu-Gatsheni, *Colonial Matrix of Power in Post-colonial Africa: Myths of Decolonization*, Dakar. CODSERIA, 2013, p. 8.

²⁷ N Maldonado Torres, ‘On the Coloniality of Being, in *Cultural Studies*’, Volume 21, Numbers 2-3, March- May 2013, p. 243.

²⁸ Interview with Offias Makumbi, Murambiwa Township, 10 July 2014

That state of affairs meant that if the boys present were not willing to come up, join the SFA and be responsible not only for their security but also that of their immediate community, ZIPRA guerrillas were still going to compulsorily take them to Zambia for military training. RSFs emphasized that because of the efficiency of the Rhodesian war machine, these recruits would be pursued by ‘choppers’ and ground soldiers with obvious devastating effects on the boys because they were completely untrained. It was further emphasized that, whites had already accepted that Africans must rule themselves as long as their leaders were not communists like Nkomo and Mugabe. They sold the idea that the best leader for Africans was Muzorewa who had SFAs on the ground. Judging by the disaster which such campaigns against recruits often met, most of the boys gathered at the school chose to join SFA. These included young boys like Matamba who went for training at Domboshava but could not complete the training owing to the ceasefire. This was part of the psychological warfare, a deliberate attempt to construct guerrillas as murderous nocturnal animals and ultimately deny them support. Reality was therefore a social construction. The SFA human mind was therefore socialized to think along these lines and justifying their decision, hence avoiding having to feel ashamed of joining surrogate forces. Joining the force was an act of patriotism.

The above mechanisms of recruitment go a long way in explaining the localized understanding of the conflict. The boys who joined the SFA were concerned more with their own security rather than envisioning a liberated Zimbabwe. According to Matamba, all those who had at any one time worked for the Rhodesian government were being hunted down to be killed for selling out. He further pointed that even innocent people ran the same risk. The only secure thing to do was to arm oneself.²⁹ At their prime age, the boys were not sure what independence was, let alone when it was to come and neither would they cope with sophisticated propaganda displayed by Rhodesian soldiers. In addition, with monetary incentives promised, chances were obviously slim that they would resist. With evidence of civilian killings by alleged guerrillas, to expect grade seven pupils to discern that assertions by visiting RSFs were an ethnic ploy against ZIPRA guerrillas would be naïve. Moreover, the use of propaganda as recruitment tool points to the failure of ZIPRA guerrillas to provide convincing political education for a people whose hearts and minds they hoped to win. Coupled with films the pupils were shown on the dangers of

²⁹ Interview with Matamba, Chinhoyi 12 April 2012

crossing into Zambia on foot, the boys saw very few chances of them returning alive. Moreso, the need to protect their parents from guerrilla threats also spoke volumes in enticing them to join SFA. The use of persuasive language was obviously intended to equip trained SFAs with a military and political mission just like guerrillas though the missions contradicted each other. There is no evidence to suppose that the use of persuasion was caused by high levels of desertion among SFAs.

The Rhodesian mind was that ZIPRA guerrillas were so evil and were completely against the Shonas. For example, the district commissioner of Hurungwe reported in 1977 that:

The Zipra terrorists (mostly Ndebeles) operating in a Mashona area have almost completely disrupted normal life and normal administration in this district to the detriment of people living in the Tribal Trust Lands. The tribesmen are bitterly opposed to the terrorists... The Ndebele terrorists do not care for the overall welfare of the Shona tribesmen and refer to them as amahole, a Ndebele name for slaves.³⁰

This kind of mentality informed the approach of Rhodesian recruitment teams who went into rural areas. Convinced that their parents and other relatives were being killed for belonging to a different ethnic group, school-going boys were left with no choice but to join SFAs. Thus, Rhodesian soldiers were merely capitalizing on the ethnic differences sown right at the beginning of colonial rule. Muzondidya and Gatsheni-Ndlovu assert that this was achieved by dividing the country into administrative units which were then named after ethnic groups who constituted the bulk of the population in those provinces. Mashonaland was for Zezuru-speaking Shonas, Matebeleland for Ndebele speaking groups, Fort Victoria for the Karanga and Manicaland for Manyikas.³¹ In the end, despite ZIPRA's heroic exploits and SFAs' inherent military weakness, ethnic propaganda swayed to ZANU which had the majority Shonas on its side. In fact, UANC which had deployed SFAs was even more popular than ZIPRA and continued to do the same when in 1985 it won 4,6% of the vote against ZAPU's 2,6% for the Karoi constituency under which Hurungwe fell.³² This result cannot be explained without roping in political engineering which was behind ZAPU's tumbling of fortunes. As shall be demonstrated later, ZIPRA was reduced by Rhodesian propaganda to an invading Ndebele force

³⁰ History of Urungwe District, Background to the Development of Tribal Trust Lands in Urungwe, 1977, Ministry of Internal Affairs, Karoi.

³¹ J Muzondidya and S Gatsheni Ndlovu, 'Echoing Silences': Ethnicity in Post-Colonial Zimbabwe, 1980-2007, in *The African Journal of Conflict Resolution: Special Issue of Identity and Cultural Diversity in Conflict Resolution in Africa*, Volume 7, Number 2, December 2007, p. 278.

³² Zimbabwe's Parliamentary Election, 1980, www.wikipedia.org, 15 September 2013.

sent to wipe out the Shona who then found SFAs to be a lesser evil.

There were numerous examples in which ZIPRA guerrillas were captured in battle and compelled to change sides. These were persuaded through propaganda to change sides. I tracked some of the former combatants who were recruited in this way and found them less willing to discuss how and why they crossed floors. Part of the reason appears to be that they have once more metamorphosed into veterans of the liberation war hence such a discussion might be a dent in their war credentials. This again brings into question who really is a war veteran because these were trained as ones, fought as guerrillas and also destroyed guerrillas. Related issues are discussed in the last chapter where different groups had to devise new strategies of surviving the new dispensation.

According to Dzomba, some were captured and ‘turned’, for example Charles who became chief commander of SFAs. He lost one leg in Mozambique during a battle and was ultimately captured and persuaded to change sides.³³ The same Charles appeared in Chideipa’s account of the war as a ZIPRA guerrilla whom Rhodesian soldiers were looking for. When they caught Chideipa, they realized that he was not Charles who had previously escaped them. In cases of outright desperation, on 13 April 1979, 100 detainees were *freed* of whom 42 went to Muzorewa, 29 to Sithole, with the remainder being held in reserve by the SB for training and political orientation duties at the training camps.³⁴ Bringing in former guerrillas was a means to indoctrinate SFAs so as to counter guerrilla propaganda and to convince recruits on the uselessness of fighting a force deemed dysfunctional.

Volunteering

By 1979, SFAs were swelling their ranks with volunteers who were interested in carrying the gun and enjoy associated benefits. This is how George, who was Kanyairabanda’s young brother, joined the force. After the forced recruitment of Kanyairabanda, the remainder of the family was taken to a miniature PV at Mahwada Base. There, George was always in company of SFAs who

³³ Interview with Dzomba, May 2011

³⁴ H Ellert, *Rhodesian Front War*, p183.

enjoyed various benefits including easy access to establishing love affairs with local girls some of whom had been taken for *safekeeping*. These young SFA combatants were provided with tinned beef and enjoyed the other advantage of being able to defend themselves against ZIPRA guerrillas. Unlike areas such as Karambazungu where DSAs were decimated, in the area of Mudzimu they had been able to withstand ZIPRA pressure hence they became the centre of attraction. Further, the period of training had now been reduced to 2 or 3 weeks which was attractive to most boys. Therefore, George was trained for just 3 weeks and deployed back to Mahwada where he fought until the end of the war.

The wartime District Commissioner for Hurungwe claimed that SFA bases were indeed a safe haven for those who feared being killed by guerrillas. He claimed that when the SFA entered Hurungwe in late 1978, they formed a Home Guard for the people who voluntarily moved to their bases for protection and it was this protection which facilitated the re-opening of schools.³⁵ This is a grey area in the history of the liberation because some of the base occupants were parents with children fighting for Muzorewa while others had been labeled sellouts for various reasons. As elaborated by Murambiwa and Jakaza, girls who came to SFA bases found themselves being compelled into sexual relationships with auxiliaries who however claimed that they did not use force against civilians.³⁶

Kanyairabanda claimed that one former SFA, Jakaza, was similarly recruited. However, the interview with him indicated that at first, he was a victim of coercion. He fell into a group of SFAs who thoroughly beat him for not telling them where ZIPRA guerrillas could be found. He was only left when it was realized that he was a twin brother to Bishard, one young boy at Mahwada Base. That being the case, Jakaza was told to go and bid farewell to his mother, aBhikibhiki, and come to Mahwada Base. He did his initial training there before he was taken to Paradise Farm for actual military training. At a tender age of 14 years he was at first refused the chance to go and train but was eventually permitted. On the other hand, his twin brother evaded to Karoi in fear of being forced to join SFA.³⁷ Jakaza's tender age could not allow him to carry a

³⁵ History of Urungwe District, Background to the Development of Tribal Trust Lands in Urungwe, 1977, Ministry of Internal Affairs, Karoi.

³⁶ Interview with Murambiwa and Jakaza, 5 May 2012.

³⁷ Interview with Jakaza, Chamonyonga Village, 6 April 2012.

G3 gun which was obviously too heavy for him. He therefore carried a rifle which was lighter for the first 3 months. Thereafter he qualified to carry a G3 which made him no more a boy. Jakaza's case is the only unique one in which he was given the chance of bidding farewell to his mother Bhikibhiki. With his twin brother already at the base, trying to escape would have been detrimental to Bishard.

By 1979 many boys and youngmen were volunteering to become SFAs. Recruiters visited townships to entice youths to join SFAs. On 27 January 1979, one such group successfully recruited 20 youngmen from Mudzimu Township. They included Debson and Ndivha Gasura as forwarded by one white recruiter Pearson Madison.³⁸ The testimony itself needs to be taken with caution because Debson himself claimed to have been a victim of call-up. Since he had volunteered, Ndivha was also allowed to resign and go to look for work in Salisbury towards the end of 1979.

On the Quality of Training

I found huge differences surrounding the quality of training for SFAs. Those who were recruited during the period 1977 to 1978 had long periods of training ranging between 3 and 8 months and were indeed well-trained fighters. Some operatives like Dzomba were trained as Selous Scouts but they operated as SFAs from the moment the auxiliary scheme was introduced in 1978. In the last years of the civil war, the Rhodesian military was plagued by the increasing number of poorly-trained counter-insurgents due to the huge influx of guerrillas and the flight of whites from the country in a bid to avoid conscription or call-up. Findings from discussions with various respondents from Hurungwe district proved that even guerrillas were plagued by the same challenge. Therefore battles between SFAs and guerrillas depended on the quality of training of the two forces clashing at any one particular. At times guerrillas found themselves on the receiving side and vice-versa. Both Kanyairabanda and Ndivharaini stated that because of the numerical superiority of SFAs, by the end of 1979, ZIPRA guerrillas had abandoned open savanna grasslands for thickets which afforded them cover both during the day and at night. The same was also confirmed by Matamba's wife from Kaje Kaje where guerrillas took to hiding.

³⁸ Telephone Interview with Pearson Madison, 1 January 2015.

There is evidence that indeed, in some areas, guerrillas had been defeated and it was taking platoons to reclaim territory. Chikomba, who was a ZANLA guerrilla, was once sent into Mt Darwin in 1978 as a platoon commander along with many other platoons to reclaim territory which had been lost to SFA. The concentrated group went about destroying SFA camps until it got to Kangaire Mission.³⁹ As such the persistent notion from both Rhodesian circles and nationalist praise texts in Zimbabwe seems to disregard completely the existence of strong SFA groups who could effectively wrestle territory from guerrillas. Negative identities of the force by Rhodesians emanate from the failure of the scheme. Moreover, SFAs who defected were hardly sent for further training implying that their training was not as bad. More so, that Jakaza was in 1981 temporarily tasked for a week to train paratroopers before being chased away for having served SFA during the war⁴⁰ further brings into question the allegations that SFAs were a badly trained rabble. The assertion is difficult to generalize on a national or district scale but at micro-level it finds relevance.

The Ministry of Internal Affairs began to train its own militias before the introduction of the SFA scheme in order to be able to administer rural areas which were fast falling into guerrilla hands. In Chiweshe as in many parts of Mashonaland West and East, they were responsible for manning Protected Villages (PVs). This was so because the concept of PVs was totally different from that in the East. That this militia was poorly trained is evidenced by the killing of 74 District Assistants (DAs) heading towards Karambazungu (Hurungwe district) in 1978 by ZIPRA guerrillas in a shootout as told by Mr Mushongahande and Mr Ngwarai. This brings into question the quality of militia training because guerrillas did not concede any of their members killed or injured.

Mushunje's SFA training took 3 months which was below the standard period of guerrillas covering a total of at least 6 months. The training of Kanyairabanda took only one month at a mujibha farm called Chabwino where numerous SFAs were also trained. It involved shooting targets, rolling, dismantling and assembling guns. In the afternoon, they went for 'lessons' which

³⁹ Interview with Cde Chikomba, ZANU-PF Mashonaland West Provincial Offices, Chinhoyi, 14 September 2012.

⁴⁰ Interview with Jakaza, Chamonyonga Village, Mudzimu, 5 May 2012.

included political education, collecting intelligence information on guerrillas and so on. The training according to him was so tough that along the way some died. However, he could not be drawn into giving an example of anyone who so died. This suggests exaggerations from a respondent. Others had the opportunity to go for refresher courses, for example Dzomba who took a leadership course at Alfida base in Domboshava towards the end of the war.

SFAs led the attack at Nyamhondoro village which led to the deaths of some guerrillas. According to Dzomba:

...people were enjoying themselves. There were so many people at the village and we could not determine the number of guerrillas but we thought that they were numerous. Therefore we radioed for air support and two helicopters came. People began to run away though some paid heed to our call to lie flat on the ground. Civilians who were caught identified some of the guerrillas as Vander Beira, Clever and Skarera. One climbed up a tree, the other went into a granary. Both were killed and the rest escaped dressed like women. So out of six guerrillas, we killed two.⁴¹

Those who escaped, according to a villager named Gogo⁴², included Khumalo and Mtombeni. Gogo was shot in the thigh but survived the ordeal. The actual killing was done by helicopters while the SFAs were largely involved in the capturing of all boys who had been attending the event. These were taken for training. The same informant identified many battles which culminated in the fleeing or deaths of guerrillas. In one incident at Kapfunde, a military vehicle carrying SFAs hit a land mine but instead of shooting at the victims, guerrillas only fired a few shots and ran away. Near Zvipani, SFAs under Dzomba ambushed a ZIPRA guerrilla at his girlfriend's home and killed him using an LMG. His colleague, Mandebvu, who was at the next home, heard the gunshot and escaped with his life.

There is need to look at recruitment and deployment of SFAs in the various districts of the country from an ethnic identity point of view. Rhodesians were aware of the ethnic cleavages within the nationalist parties and decided to take advantage of that. Therefore they preferred to use a force which was ethnically acceptable to the local community in order to wreck havoc on guerrillas who were identified not only as Ndebele but outsiders. That kind of a force would be more effective in the hearts and minds battle. That it was so ethnic suggested divisions which would then make it less difficult to disband it because after all, it was not national but a local

⁴¹ Interview with Dzomba, May 2011

⁴² Interview with Gogo, Masaga, Headman Mudzimu, 29 June 2013.

militia to defend the assigned area.

Ideology

According to Bhebe, nationalist fighters were taught to hate their opponents by the commissariat departments of their respective parties. Here I quote Bhebe's views on postwar factional fighting between ZANU and ZAPU in entirety before explaining the relevance to the ideological teachings in the training of SFAs:

These young men and women were trained to hate each other by their leaders who wanted to justify the separate existence of their parties. Each party had its own commissariat department, whose task was to teach recruits the history of the party, how the party was different from the other, who the leaders were and how they were different from the less revolutionary or sell-out leaders of the rival party. Thus the cadres were brought up to hate the rival party.⁴³

The ZANU Commissariat for example published extensively material that had to be used by its guerrilla trainers and its foot soldiers. The most accessible of these was the *Zimbabwe African National Union- ZANU* which was published by the Zimbabwe Printing and Publishing House in Maputo. One such booklet published in 1979 made these distinctions loud and clear. It was entitled 'The People's Power and the People's Army are Inseparable'. Below I quote one of the snippets from Robert Mugabe.

As they confer in me (the Rhodesians), and Comrade Nkomo, they are also sometimes openly and at times furtively, deliberating with racist rebel Smith and the treacherous threesome of renegade and quisling Sithole, stooge Muzorewa and puppet Smith. ...the sponsoring and promotion of reactionary forces comprised of Smith, Muzorewa, Chirau and Sithole in an unholy solidarity against our revolutionary leadership.... We cannot allow acquisitive stooges to be made our rulers. Those who don't fight neither shall they rule.⁴⁴

Similarly, SFAs were infused with a political mission during their period of training. There recruits were told that their duty was to protect civilians from Marxist and Communist guerrillas.⁴⁵ On the other hand SFAs like, Zinhatha did not encounter any political education during his training period. He claims that he was trained to fight *terrorists* and to be given a monetary reward at the end of the war. That he would be given a cash bounty kept him fighting

⁴³ N Bhebe, *Simon Vengai Muzenda and the Struggle for and Liberation of Zimbabwe*, Gweru, Mambo Press, 2004, p. 257.

⁴⁴ *Zimbabwe African National Union- ZANU: The People's Power and the People's Army are Inseparable Number 3*, Zimbabwe Publishing and Printing House, Maputo, August 1979.

⁴⁵ Interview with Mushunje, May 2011

throughout the war. Having been an unemployed youth for quite some time, he believed that the end of the war would enable him to buy cattle, a plough, a yoke, build a decent house and probably get married.⁴⁶ The type of political education given to Chideipa during military training was intended to indoctrinate the SFAs so that they would provide information best able to sell Muzorewa to the people. Chideipa alluded that first they were taught the evils of communism where people would become property-less and men could share women. Trainees were told that under Muzorewa, people were going to be given land, education was going to be free and jobs would be created. They were told that Muzorewa was a man of God and that being the case, people were going to leave peacefully. Mugabe and Nkomo were described as incarnations of evil who would bring chaos and violence into the country. At the same time, youths who joined SFAs had also made up their minds to do so. Some were merely adventurous and were trying to run away from the frustrations and boredom of rural life.

Training Camps

Former SFAs who trained in Hurungwe mention Chabwino and Paradise farm as their training ground. Ellert also identified Goodhope farm near the small town of Karoi as one of the training camps.⁴⁷ No-one mentioned Goodhope farm which appears in published literature. Some were however trained in Musana which is mentioned in the introduction. Musana was the cradle of the Operation Favour concept. Chabwino or Mujibha farm near Karoi also featured and that is where one, Mushongahande, was trained according to his testimony.⁴⁸ Only Chideipa identified Magunje as one of the areas where military training was undertaken. However, it was initial stages of the training process which took place here. Trainers included Mr Chiweshe and Happy who trained Mushongahande. Zinhatha who was also abducted from his home was first taken to Chabwino Farm near Karoi for possible military training. However, unlike others whose training started and ended at Chabwino, Zinhatha went to Musana for further training before coming back for passout parade at the same farm where he had started. In all, his training period was extended over a period of 6 months which is commensurate even with the standard period of

⁴⁶ Interview with Zinhatha, May 2012

⁴⁷ H Ellert, *Rhodesian Front War*, page.187.

⁴⁸ Interview with Mushingahande, Buya Village, chief Chundu, 19 May 2011.

training in Zimbabwe.⁴⁹

Dzomba was first taken to Harare and then Musana for training. He alluded that:

I was first trained as Selous Scout. My trainers were former Zanla guerrillas who had been caught in Mozambique. Among these instructors were Komboniyatsva, Max and Jecha. I was trained in guerrilla warfare which trainers called mosquito bite. Further, I was also trained in guerrilla weapons. The period of training was six months but the passout parade came after eight months because guerrilla guns, ammunition and clothing were not enough.⁵⁰

Francis Nyamande was trained at Paradise farm in 1979 for 3 months and deployed to Chipinge. Enock Shava was trained for 3 weeks at Paradise farm near Karoi. By the end of that short stint, he was ready for deployment and was posted to Zvipani though he would have preferred to come home to protect his parents.

None of the informants except Chideipa appeared to have been paid during training. However, for the 6 months which he spent at Domboshawa and Alfiga, he was paid a monthly allowance of \$30 and once deployed, he was paid \$200 per month. This continued until the end of the war. The huge cash given to SFAs like Chideipa is explained by the unpopularity of the scheme in Masvingo where the militias were hated by the local communities as explained by Chideipa himself. As a result, many of his colleagues defected to join ZANLA guerrillas.⁵¹ The better way to keep them was through an attractive salary. ZIPRA had not similarly politicized or subverted the people of Hurungwe hence there was no need for a huge salary.

Deployment

Generally, trained SFAs talk of being deployed to various bases that included Tengwe Chimusimbe, Kavaya, Gwihwa, Mahwada, Mukonori, Mudzimu, Chidamoyo, Chitiki, Karereshi, Zvarai, Kapfunde, St Boniface and so on. Just as happened in Namibia during its liberation war, these bases were at schools which thus left most of the schools closed. Sometimes, deployment meant having to spend many days walking on foot to the assigned base. After the passout, Dzomba has it that his group was taken by a military truck to Matoranjera in Zvimba Communal

⁴⁹ P Moocraft and P McLaughlin, *The Rhodesian War: A Military History*.

⁵⁰ Interview with Dzomba, Chitindiva Township, May 2011.

⁵¹ J R T Wood, *The War Diaries of Andre Dennisson*, Ashanti Publishing, 1989. Wood gives a lot of evidence to large numbers of auxiliaries defecting to join up with guerrillas and military expeditions to re-capture kill them.

Lands and walked on foot to Hurungwe district, specifically to Mukonori. Thereafter, his group began to set bases at Mukonori itself, Mudzimu and Chidamoyo. Groups coming after him also took to escorting buses and guarding the new bases. Sometimes, his group went out to rescue parents from ZIPRA which had been constructed into a tribal force by Rhodesian security force propaganda machine. Dzomba argued that guerrillas were persecuting parents, by sometimes demanding that a whole beast be slaughtered just for them to take out only its liver. For a people who had very few cattle, 'we took this to be very cruel so SFA propaganda was that they had come to put to an end to that kind of behavior.'⁵² He also claimed that guerrillas were closing schools and giving material such as window frames to parents. Of course the statement needs to be taken with caution because it was somehow exaggerated.

Mushunje was deployed first to Mujinga and then to Magunje' Zvipani, Nyamhunga and Chigede. Therefore, throughout the war, he was fighting in his own home area, meeting and interacting with his own people, yet his home was not attacked by guerrillas. Trying to attack parents who had children serving as SFAs would have been disastrous to the war effort as it would have alienated too many people. On the other hand, Murambiwa alongside other trained SFAs was taken first to Magunje. They were not even told that the journey was to take them there but for some weeks they stayed there and at times were sent for military duties in many areas surrounding the service center. He refused to be deployed at Mahwada which was his home area and rather chose to go to Kavaya base which was some 20 kilometers from home. It was here that he fought some of his bloodiest battles and lost fellow combatants like Patuma from Guruve and Kasirori from Kazangarare in battles with ZIPRA guerrillas.

While many of the SFAs were deployed home in line with initial promises, military demands sometimes interrupted the arrangements. Some found themselves far away from home. The original arrangement to deploy trained SFAs in their home areas was out of the notion that they would be more effective in tracking down guerrillas and their supporters. Further, they were potentially able to lead soldiers into guerrilla arms caches. For Chideipa, his passout parade took place in Chinamhora from where he was deployed in Masvingo. As will be shown in the following chapter, this was a completely harsh and uninhabitable part of the country for SFAs.

⁵² Interview with Dzomba, Chitindiva Township, May 2011.

Conclusion

Generally, the recruitment into SFA was punctuated by coercion. Only in very rare cases did boys voluntarily join the force. Recruits were mostly under-age boys between 14 and 17 years and rarely above the age of 18. The boys were mujibhas before they became SFAs. The majority of these boys were trained on white commercial farms in the district. These had been set aside specifically for that. The chapter has demonstrated that there is no conclusive statement concerning the quality of training received by SFAs. As such, depending on the composition and training of SFAs, they could overwhelm guerrillas but at other times, they conceded great losses. However, guerrilla losses could not be astronomical as they often travelled in small groups in order to minimize losses in human life. Most youths who were recruited for SFAs in Hurungwe were often deployed back to the same district after training. Between 1977 and mid 1978, the period of training for SFAs was relatively long ranging from 3 to 6 months. As the war peaked, the training period was shortened to as little as 3 weeks.

The chapter also demonstrated that SFAs lacked a clearly grounded ideological base. They were generally trained to hate guerrillas who were assumed to be trying to bring communism and socialism to their country. The orientation to hating guerrillas started at schools which were the major recruiting grounds. Some were therefore taken from the classroom for military operations. Abduction was also used by Rhodesian forces as a means of recruitment. Once training was complete, SFAs were generally deployed to bases which were at either major townships or schools. From there, they patrolled surrounding areas to fight and do away with guerrilla influence. The war which they fought in Hurungwe was not entirely on the military front but was largely intended to win hearts and minds as demonstrated in the next chapter.

CHAPTER 6

BATTLING FOR HEARTS AND MINDS: SFAs' WARTIME COMMUNITY RELATIONS

Introduction

This chapter argues that the main driver to SFA counter insurgency warfare in Hurungwe between 1978 and 1980 was to win people's support at the expense of ZIPRA. As such, they fought to endear themselves to civilians whom they came to refer to as their parents.¹ Against this background, the war in Hurungwe was a war for hearts and minds which as shown in the theoretical framework simply means it was mainly intended to win the people's support and confidence. Winning battles was therefore one of the means to an end. Winning hearts and minds was attempted through re-opening schools and clinics, rescuing those on the verge of being killed by guerrillas, gaining the confidence of spirit mediums, smearing the image of ZIPRA and protecting locals who sought refuge from their bases. They also destroyed some ZIPRA bases. When it came to the issue of raping girls, it appears both parties were guilty, but the ZIPRA guerrillas were deemed to be far more culpable than auxiliaries hence loss of hearts.

Purporting to respect civilians in war zones such as Hurungwe was intended to deligitimise ZIPRA guerrillas as far as possible so that SFAs would appear to be people's saviors from both government security forces and guerrillas. The battle for hearts and minds was not effectively utilized by RSFs until the last two years of the war. This was rather late as the war was nearing the end. Mano de Boer attributes this lateness to the Rhodesian concern with the kill rate (Rhodesians were more interested in killing as many guerrillas as possible while losing very few of their own members). The goal was to achieve a high kill rate and to make soldiers aggressive fighters.² As such, the Rhodesian COIN manual did not mention the importance of civil-military

¹ In my interviews with former auxiliaries, the word parents appeared in every interview. It referred to all elderly local civilians whom they interacted with and also denoted that by age, most of the SFAs were just children under the age of 18 years.

² Mano de Boer, Rhodesian Approach to Counterinsurgency: A Preference for Killing, *Military Review*, November to

relations. This gap was partly filled through the creation of SFAs and pseudo guerrillas posing as ZANLA or ZIPRA with a clear mandate of beating guerrillas in the battlefield and also to steal away rural people's hearts and minds from guerrillas. This, in part, was done by tarnishing or smearing the image of guerrillas as much as possible through the use of Selous Scouts, the Rhodesian Psychological Unit and other units identified already. Acts of banditry, rape, reckless murders of civilians, closure of schools, clinics and shops were attributed to ZIPRA yet Selous Scouts had deployed pseudo groups who were posing as real guerrillas.³ Thus, even genuine former ZIPRA guerrillas who operated in Hurungwe still do not know that the few ZANLA guerrillas they remember meeting before the ceasefire were in practice pseudos working on behalf of the RSFs.⁴ Deployment of pseudo units was always made top secret as demonstrated in this chapter. They had been sent to make sure that as much as possible, ZIPRA was discredited.

It was in the last three years of the war when the importance of civil-military relations in Hurungwe was realized hence the deployment of SFAs and pseudo guerrillas. The former undertook many non-military roles in a bid to win support and discredit ZIPRA. These included opening schools, hospitals, clinics, shops, dip tanks and escorting rural buses. Pseudo guerrillas were privately involved in souring relations between real guerrillas and civilians as well as leading guerrillas into suicidal attacks told to Stiff by Daly.⁵ In practice however, the mission did not produce anticipated results because the presence of SFAs did not translate into a huge voter turnout commensurate with their deployment come the 1980 election. This chapter posits that SFAs were temporarily able to gather people around them because they preached the gospel of rescuing people from guerrilla and RSFs violence. In rural areas, people were just tired of the war and as such, they were ready to support anyone who promised an end to this conflict. This explains the initial popular support but by the end of 1979, it was clear that SFAs could not end the war. Though SFAs and ZIPRA were engaged in a propaganda war against each other, votes

December 2011, p.37.

³ P Moorcraft and P McLaughlin, *The Rhodesian War*, page. 156. The two note that Selous Scouts often dressed up as auxiliaries to entice guerrillas into attacking a supposedly soft target.

⁴ Nkiwane, 23 August 2013, ZIPRA Veterans Trust, Bulawayo. He could remember that at one time in the Kazangarare area, he held a meeting with ZANLA guerrillas and they divided themselves into clear operational areas. In practice, there is no evidence to suggest that ZANLA operated there after 1975.

⁵ P Stiff, *Selous Scouts: Top Secret War*, Alberton, Galago Publishers, 1983. As told by Daly, Stiff makes this argument throughout the book. Despite it being a secret group, there incidences in which information about them leaked and they could be killed despite being highly trained.

accrued to ZANU whose guerrillas had not fought in the district. Part of the problem with ZIPRA was the cracks in guerrilla insurgency propaganda approach and the localised origins of SFAs and above all, the use of Selous Scouts to mud-sling ZIPRA. In some parts of Hurungwe, support which the SFAs had gained went to ZANU-PF when Selous Scouts deployed ZANLA pseudo guerrillas who then became more popular than Rhodesians would have wanted. However, Dumiso Dabengwa thinks that SFAs in Hurungwe as elsewhere did not fight an effective propaganda war and they were not popular. Rather, the election was rigged with full support of Lord Soames.⁶ It is important to start off this chapter with a discussion of the role of SFAs in war time violence in Zimbabwe and then proceed to Hurungwe. Such an approach will help to explain the utility of SFAs' preoccupation with winning hearts and minds as well as the policy of reconciliation which covers the next chapter.

SFAs and the Violent War

Zimbabwean nationalism was born with a divisive violent birthmark. As a result, nationalists and their supporters fought rival groups throughout the liberation struggle and called each other by many sorts of insulting names. The 1963 ZAPU split as pointed out already left a trail of destruction behind not only in Salisbury but other towns and some rural areas as well. Maurice Nyagumbo, one of the founder members of ZANU, suffered directly from the violence as his shop in Makoni Reserve was burnt down by rival supporters.⁷ The violence was so brutal that some nationalists like Stanlake Samkange failed to withstand and hence left the country for the USA.⁸ The same violence has also been discussed by Scarnecchia who posits that following the ZAPU split, rivals insulted each other as sellouts and fought running battles.⁹ The violence which gripped early nationalism had a bearing on the theory of violence as propounded by Fanon. He asserts that violence is therapeutic when directed against colonizers hence put the other way,

⁶ Dumiso Dabengwa, Large City Hall, 4 October 2013. He pointed that in a congratulatory message to the Prime Minister elect, Nyerere said the election result was good but Soames had made the mistake of giving ZANU-PF rather too much.

⁷ T Ranger, *Writing Revolt: An Engagement with African Nationalism, 1957-1967*, Harare, Weaver Press, 2013, p. 159.

⁸ *Ibid.*

⁹ T Scarnecchia, 'The 'sellout logic' in the formation of Zimbabwean nationalist politics', S Chiumbu and M Musemwa (editors), *Crisis! What Crisis? The Multiple Dimensions of the Zimbabwean Crisis*, Cape Town, HSRC Press, 2012, pp. 225-235.

African elite sympathizers with the regime were lumped together with whites and insulted as ‘tea drinkers’. The creation of the SFAs as argued here was not only to win hearts and minds, but also to intimidate guerrillas with violence wherever it was possible to do so. Rural communities suffered from one form of violence or another, propagated by guerrillas or RSFs or both. This however does not exclude the use of persuasion by either of the forces.

SFAs directed their violence against many sections of society whether armed or unarmed, combatant or non-combatant. At national level, Muzorewa’s private army was violent against ZANLA and ZIPRA guerrillas, Sithole’s auxiliaries and Chief Chirau’s so-called bodyguards.¹⁰ The same SFAs fought dissident members of the UANC, antagonistic nationalists from rival political parties and civilians openly supporting guerrillas. Chirau’s militias or bodyguards in Zvimba beat up and sometimes killed UANC supporters until they were eventually outclassed. Similarly, Sithole’s auxiliaries rivaled those of Muzorewa whenever there was a chance. In short, militia violence targeted rival militia groups in the same manner it was against guerrillas and civilians. However, the localized nature of SFAs in some instances also compelled them to apply the art of persuasion. Below I discuss the nature of each form of violence together with its implications on the hearts and minds battle and how these operations impacted on the 1980 policy of reconciliation adopted by the government.

Wherever SFAs *drove out* guerrillas, they opened *free zones* suggesting that such regions could at times become no go areas for RSFs. ZANLA and ZIPRA guerrillas could only reclaim such areas if they could gather a lot of strength. Since the war was psychological and bent on winning as much civilian support as possible, by engaging themselves in battle, SFAs were trying to prove that they were militarily strong and thus capable of protecting the people of Hurungwe from alleged guerrilla violence. Muzorewa personally went out to open the *free zones*. In such areas, schools and clinics would re-open.¹¹ Areas where auxiliaries operated such as Gokwe, Nembudziya, Plumtree, Wedza, Manyeni, Nyabira, Gandachibvuvu, Hurungwe, Copper Queen and Sinoia were sometimes but not always designated *frozen* to avoid clashes with security

¹⁰ In 1978, twenty men selected by Senator Chirau, president of ZUPO were sent to be trained in the use of firearms by staff in the Ministry of Internal Affairs at Mutoko. A number of them were to be arraigned before the courts for murdering or beating UANC supporters in Zvimba Communal Lands.

¹¹ *Sunday Mail*, 18 February 1980.

forces.¹² The government even claimed that by December 1978, twenty-two frozen zones encompassing about 70% of Rhodesia were being policed by SFAs, the guerrillas who had come on-sides and accepted the Internal Settlement.¹³ However, in practice as shown in the previous chapter, only a handful of guerrillas had joined auxiliaries. The rest were boys and young men often recruited locally and mixed with Selous Scouts operatives. As long as guerrillas were unable to close the re-opened schools and clinics in these areas once more, SFAs would have proved psychologically to the local community that they were better off militarily. However, it is crucial to note that the identity of ZIPRA groups responsible for the closure of schools remains largely unproven; hence the possibility that some schools were closed by pseudos remains. Dumiso Dabengwa denied that it was ZIPRA policy to close schools¹⁴ while SFAs claim that it was their policy to open schools closed by *terrorists*. Surprisingly, the alleged terrorists could not give a fight when SFAs re-opened the schools. The above should be weighed against SFAs' capacity to call Fireforce (combined airforce, paratroopers, SFAs and the regular army who could arrive simultaneously) if guerrillas pitched up. ZIPRA, however, did not exploit insurgents' tools and advantages such as using every trick, for example lying, cheating and exaggerating without necessarily being called upon to prove.

Following sharp differences between Muzorewa and Chikerema which resulted in the latter forming the Zimbabwe Democratic Party (ZDP) in 1979, SFA violence was further directed against him despite being a former compatriot. Muzorewa's auxiliaries were accused by Chikerema of killing his brother, a cousin and 2 employees as they were closing a bar at Kutama in Zvimba area north-west of Salisbury. The military communiqué however blamed the death on ZIPRA despite the brother to Chikerema being threatened by auxiliaries a week earlier.¹⁵ That Chikerema had fallen out with Muzorewa in part explained his allegation that the death of his brother was at the hands UANC with whom he was at loggerheads. Chikerema argued that the murders were linked to recent alleged assaults by UANC members on ZDP officials and death threats over telephone to ZDP MPs. Whoever was responsible remains unknown but the intentions suggest the hand of the Rhodesians in order to create a wedge between Chikerema and

¹² MS 308/58/8, NAZ, CCJP, Private Armies.

¹³ P Moorcraft and P McLaughlin, *The Rhodesian War: A Military History*, Johannesburg and Cape Town, Jonathan Ball Publishers, 2008, p. 155.

¹⁴ Interview with Dumiso Dabengwa, City Hall, Bulawayo, 4 October 2013.

¹⁵ *Rhodesian Herald*, 25 April 1979.

Muzorewa on one hand, and Chikerema and Nkomo on the other. In another development, Chikerema accused SFAs of being a 'tribal mafia' when he was beaten by group.¹⁶ A little later, Chikerema's house was shaken by a bomb at midnight and once more, the accusation was laid on the door of SFAs.¹⁷ Muzorewa was obviously frustrated by Chikerema's bid for power, but that he unleashed a reign of terror against him was ballooned by the press since there was no clear evidence on the ground especially in Zvimba though there were skirmishes in Salisbury. The struggle was partly fuelled by the realization that since they were within the country, these leaders had a chance to do everything within their capacity to assume power before external leaders could come back and do the same.

Chikerema's utterances were not completely unfounded. A *Sunday Mail* report showed that an official of the ZDP, Mr Nyagura, was held at a UANC office in Norton the previous night and beaten with belts and sticks. He was taken by the UANC chartered bus from Norton to the National Sports Centre and from there driven to the UANC offices in Victoria Street where he was told to come back the following day and swear renewed allegiance to the UANC. He was then released, made a report to the police and was later taken to hospital.¹⁸ A police spokesman confirmed that Mr Nyagura was fastened face down, beaten on the back with sticks and leather straps and struck with fists; he was tormented all night and not allowed to sleep.¹⁹ The persecution of Nyagura, was intended for psychological ends. If he had agreed to be *turned*, the result would have been a psychological victory on the part of the UANC as it would confirm that Chikerema was suffering mass defections of officials. UANC was to use the same tactic with guerrillas some of whom were turned and began operating with SFAs.

A few weeks earlier, Chikerema had been busy praising auxiliaries for a job well-done against ZIPRA guerrillas. After a rally at Magunje in Hurungwe, Chikerema commented that Pfumo reVanhu (Spear of the people which was another name for SFAs) were in the area to protect people and their property from ZIPRA *savages and murderers*.²⁰ However, Chikerema had been himself instrumental in the creation of ZIPRA which he was now castigating because he was

¹⁶ *Rhodesian Herald*, 6 May 1979.

¹⁷ *Rhodesian Herald*, 17 May 1979.

¹⁸ *Sunday Mail*, 5 August 1979.

¹⁹ *Ibid.*

²⁰ MS 308/58/8, NAZ, Chikerema Praises the Auxiliaries.

campaigning for his own political party which was not as saintly as indicated. He was not to last in the UANC because he broke away and hence became critical because violence was directed against him instead of him directing the violence as he had done after the ZAPU split of 1963. Chikerema is alleged to have entered into a secret deal with the South Africans to possibly stage a coup in the aftermath of Muzorewa's victory as the latter was considered too weak to withstand Nkomo and Mugabe for a prolonged time. With the money earmarked for the coup deal, (R400 000) Chikerema formed his own party since he was already having problems with Muzorewa.²¹

SFAs were intended to preserve the party which was suffering from defections. Attacks on those who were leaving the party was evidencing that the party was still very much alive. UANC was suffering from defections of its officials by August 1978 because it had failed to end the war as promised when the Transitional government was instituted. De-escalating the war was actually one of its main agendas. As a result, SFAs directed their violence to such members who were resigning and going about tarnishing the image of the party. Among officials who had resigned were one district chairman, B. O. Chipopera, publicity secretary, O. K Matanda, deputy treasurer C Mazorodze and the deputy chair for the Southerton Branch, Mike Motsi.²² By December, Muzorewa's private secretary Mr Solomon Nenguwo and the constitutional expert, Dr Palley, had also resigned.²³ Violence was targeted against such members because they were busy denouncing the party and Muzorewa's leadership credentials. Violence was intended to silence the so-called dissidents. For example, another UANC official Herbson Nyashanu, alleged that he had resigned because of Muzorewa's dictatorship. Instead of consulting the first vice-president, he consulted Bulle who was the second.²⁴ He went on to verbally assault private armies who were fighting against each other. Youths who led the violent campaigns were described as UANC security guards and they went for top executives who criticized the leadership of Bishop Muzorewa and were calling for a party congress. One such leader was a Mr Muchenje who fled to Silveira House.²⁵ These guards were used to settle old scores with opponents. They were similarly used to

²¹ P Moorcraft and P McLaughlin, *The Rhodesian War: A Military History*, Johannesburg and Cape Town, Jonathan Ball Publishers, 2008, p. 125.

²² *Rhodesian Herald*, 22 August 1978.

²³ *Rhodesian Herald*, 9 December, 1978.

²⁴ *Zimbabwe Times*, 18 August 1978.

²⁵ MS 308/5/1, NAZ, Thugs Threaten Dissident Officials.

attack Robert Mugabe's house.²⁶

Violence had naturally become the norm in Zimbabwe's war of liberation because any political aspirant who did not command loyalists to fight and campaign for him ran the risk of falling by the wayside in the political struggle. In the wake of Muzorewa's bid to persuade guerrillas to surrender, the available arsenal was violence so as to allegedly outclass opponents in violence and above all, to subdue detractors into silence and submission. In April 1979, the UANC president announced plans to set up a nationwide intelligence corps so as to strengthen what he called internal security and intelligence operations. Accordingly, these intelligent units were to be called 'Ziso Re Vanhu (People's Eye).²⁷ The following month, Sithole was complaining that the newly formed UANC youth movement or 'Ziso Re Vanhu' was victimizing his supporters in Salisbury and Victoria.²⁸ He likened the youths to Hitler type movement employing the well-known Gestapo tactics and causing a reign of terror in African townships.²⁹ Sithole was losing the bid for power through violence to Muzorewa. According to the National Observer, in Musana, *marauding bands of thugs* were reported to be intimidating people, looting property and plundering livestock.³⁰ Musana as noted in the first chapter was the cradle of the auxiliary project. If it had turned violent, then it is most likely that auxiliaries were responsible. In Hurungwe however, SFAs conducted themselves differently. They were less responsible for attacks against civilians.

Just as Chikerema described auxiliaries as worse enemies than guerrillas, Muzorewa similarly argued that Sithole's auxiliaries were worse than PF (implying either PF-ZAPU or ZANU-PF). During the opening of a *free zone* in Zvimba, Muzorewa said that people in Rhodesia were in greater danger of physical elimination from Mr Sithole than from co-leaders of the PF. On the other hand, Joel Mandaza of ZANU-Sithole pointed out that there were many worse things which Muzorewa's auxiliaries had done which is why they had been removed from certain areas because of harassing people.³¹ Indeed, Dzomba, a former Selous Scout and SFA operative recalled that

²⁶ MS 308/5/1, NAZ, Political Violence Increases.

²⁷ *Rhodesian Herald*, 18 April 1979.

²⁸ *Rhodesian Daily Mirror*, 9 May 1979.

²⁹ BBC, 0500 GMT, 9 May 1979.

³⁰ *National Observer*, 23 September 1978.

³¹ *The Star*, 24 March 1979.

when his group was called back for re-training, which lasted a year and a half, they had operated in Hurungwe disguised as guerrillas. Acts of violence which they committed in Hurungwe at that time were attributed to ZIPRA. There is therefore need to re-appraise community attitudes towards the violent war because they were not fully aware of secret operations of Selous Scouts. After all, even guerrillas themselves would be led into death traps by SS. That being the case therefore, voices of respondents have to be analysed critically with an understanding of complications in the war.

Waves of violence orchestrated by auxiliaries were such that many of the leaders within the Internal Settlement but outside the UANC began to call for the disbandment of the force. The United National Federal Party (UNFP) of Senator Chief Kayisa Ndiweni called on Rhodesia's transitional government to ban auxiliaries or integrate them into the national army. Mr Mandaza complained that sooner or later, auxiliaries would outnumber the regular army. Further allegations were that hardcore guerrillas had found their way into the auxiliaries and were still bent on finding targets for sabotage.³² The actual reasons however were that auxiliaries belonging to Muzorewa were too numerous and openly campaigning for UANC which is what they had been purposefully created to do. As a result of such campaigns, other moderate leaders were being obliterated. That became a source of jealous and pronounced differences on the part of complainants.

SFAs succeeded in the battle for hearts and minds because they used violence against civilians far less than ZIPRA. In Hurungwe (1979) for example, auxiliaries were reported to have flushed out ZIPRA from most parts and were enjoying almost widespread power. Under pressure, ZIPRA had been compelled to retire to the perimeters of the TTL reportedly thrust back by the hostility of the people and the aggressive efficiency of the auxiliaries as the Rhodesians would have preferred to say. Masakara who was a mujibha in Maumbe area of Hurungwe pointed out that ZIPRA was pushed beyond Cheore where there was enough vegetative cover to conceal the forces. He also claimed that auxiliaries did beat people for supporting guerrillas. However, ZIPRA was more violent and sometimes killed those who were pro-government or supported SFAs.³³ Chief

³² *Rhodesian Daily Mirror*, 20 February 1979.

³³ Interview with Mr Masakara, Maumbe Primary School, Chief Dendera, 2 July 2013.

Dendera was killed on allegations of selling out and refusing to protect ZIPRA guerrillas who came to operate in his area. When Maumbe Primary School was closed, all teachers were severely beaten and compelled to sing a song called *Pasi Pamera Ziso*. One teacher, Mr Dabengwa, bled profusely from his nose and mouth. It was at the beginning of 1978 when the school was closed only to be opened later in the same year by SFAs.³⁴ An interesting component of this version is the failure of ZIPRA to put up resistance against SFAs who came to re-open the school. It is still mind-boggling to explain, how SFAs, some of whom hurriedly trained for 3 weeks, could be tactical enough to easily beat seasoned guerrillas. The conclusion therefore is that some of these so-called guerrillas were planted or that the image of real guerrillas had been tarnished, making it hard for them to operate freely within the Hurungwe community without being reported to auxiliaries. Maumbe had the other disadvantage of lacking in bush cover. Since SFAs could call Fireforce as reinforcements, it was not militarily strategic for guerrillas to hold the bare ground against destructive Rhodesian airpower. The last argument carries more weight and is logical for those who have studied guerrilla warfare especially in relation to its connectedness with the environment.

The above conclusion is very important in understanding ZIPRA guerrilla warfare in Hurungwe. Forested areas such as Chundu, Nyamhunga, Kaje Kaje, Musukwi, Kazangarare, Chinhere, Makande, Deve, Fuleche, Magororo, Jinga and Kavaya were occupied by ZIPRA throughout the war because they could effectively defend them. This is unlike grasslands such as St Boniface, Mukonori down to Samuriwo, Maumbe and many areas surrounding Magunje as well as Zvarai, Kapare and Kapfunde. These areas were taken by SFAs not so much because they were ruthless fighters but because they could easily call for reinforcements which included helicopters. Resultantly, the experience of civilians with regards to SFAs is partly punctuated by this reality. Guerrillas were more exposed in environmentally unfriendly areas and as such tended to be more worried about sellouts. Offias from St Boniface noted that ZIPRA guerrillas were quite ruthless to anyone who started a veldfire while on the other hand both RSFs and SFAs did not mind.

During the ceasefire period, auxiliaries continued to operate in areas vacated by guerrillas as they went to Assembly Points (APs). The reasons were simple and straightforward. ZANLA and

³⁴*Ibid.*

ZIPRA had both left its seasoned guerrillas outside APs busy campaigning for their parties and as a show of strength. Auxiliaries were intended to be a balance of intimidation but above all, to fill the gap left by guerrillas who had been *fenced*. They were actively electioneering on behalf of the bishop. According to Nick Fawcett of the Rhodesian Light Infantry, auxiliaries' job was to counter guerrillas' socialist ideology and implant a counter-ideology of Zimbabweanism.³⁵ During the ceasefire period, complaints by political parties alleging intimidation by auxiliaries were on the increase according to the Joint Operations Command spokesman.³⁶ Brigadier Adam Gurdon of the Commonwealth Monitoring Force on the contrary argued that 90% of the allegations against auxiliaries were false.³⁷ His views were influenced by projects such as building dams, repairing school roofs and escorting road gangs which auxiliaries were spearheading. All these were a little too late because they did not do much to gain decisive votes for Muzorewa when election time came. That auxiliaries operated without interference from any of the RSFs further entrenches the strong intention of the white community to retain their privileges by hurling a moderate leader to power. At the same time, Muzorewa was out to use the opportunity as a way of gradually dismantling colonial presence in the country.

Generally, SFAs were reported to have been violent, but there were variations in the degree of intensity from one area to another. Where auxiliaries were less popular, they tended to be more violent and vice-versa. This has been demonstrated by evidence from Chideipa and Francis who fought in Fort Victoria (now Masvingo) and Manicaland respectively. Information from Hurungwe is presented below with a view of establishing their civilian and military roles during the war in order to gain support and how such activities impacted on the battle for hearts and minds. Most of the information was obtained from oral interviews with former SFAs and ZIPRA operatives, ordinary wartime civilians and former *mujibhas*.

³⁵ MS 308/58/10, NAZ, The meaning of intimidation.

³⁶ *Rhodesian Herald*, 12 January 1980.

³⁷ MS 308/58/10, NAZ, Auxiliaries are praised.

The Role of SFAs as Remembered in Hurungwe

The war of liberation in Hurungwe was shrouded in a lot of secrecy which neither SFAs nor the civilian population in the district were aware of. The secrecy was the deployment of Selous Scouts who passed on as ZIPRA guerrillas and wrecked havoc on insurgents but generally remaining unknown. Ron Reid Daly acknowledged that ZIPRA had made a lot of inroads in Hurungwe especially in Rengwe and Mkwichi (which he mistook as different from Hurungwe) but was practically in the same district. According to him, in June 1978, a group of pseudo ZANLA was infiltrated and happily greeted by the people. He goes on to claim that the group was given a letter to take back to the ZANLA command in Mozambique requesting forces to be sent to Hurungwe from Mutoko to attack and wipe ZIPRA. This gang led by Corporal Hamale made overtures through the ZIPRA network, planned joint operations which resulted in the death or capture of eight ZIPRA guerrillas. Boundaries were agreed upon and a common policy decided for the prosecution of the war. Captures led to more guerrillas being killed in areas such as Salisbury and Zowa.³⁸ Daly further claims that one Corporal Obasi was successfully able to play ZIPRA against ZANLA in Hurungwe. For that, he was awarded a bronze medal.³⁹

All interviewees were unaware of the operations of such pseudo groups in Hurungwe. For example, a former ZIPRA guerrilla, Nkiwane, who operated in Hurungwe during the war, described some incidences in which his group divided operational areas with ZANLA guerrillas whom he described as very friendly.⁴⁰ On the other hand, ex-ZANLA guerrillas like Mutandwa Uchadei only remember their plans to enter Hurungwe from Guruve but this was not fulfilled since the ceasefire came a little earlier. Thus, the pseudos in question greatly made easier the operations of SFAs who were also unaware of the existence of pseudos whose operations were a top secret sometimes even to RSFs. There was only one incident still recalled by Jabulani Nkiwane in which a group of pseudos passing on as ZIPRA was intercepted and killed just after guerrillas had crossed the Zambezi into Rhodesia. This operation was possible because of a radio communication received from Lusaka. As discussed in this section, atrocities by ZIPRA were

³⁸ Lt. Col. Ron Reid Daly as told to P Stiff, *Selous Scouts: Top Secret War: Top Secret War*, Alberton, Galago Publishers, p. 314-319.

³⁹ *Ibid*, p. 319.

⁴⁰ Interview with Jabulani Nkiwane, ZIPRA Veterans Trust Offices, Bulawayo, 22 August 2012.

greatly ballooned as were successes of SFAs. The secrecy of pseudo operations however dealt ZIPRA a permanent damage to the writing of Zimbabwe's war of liberation. Mafela Trust and ZIPRA Veterans Trust are trying to rectify this problem by rewriting the history of ZIPRA's contribution to the liberation struggle.⁴¹

Sweeping statements about atrocities committed by auxiliaries in many parts of the country are not as extensive in Hurungwe as reported by former auxiliaries, a few members of the Selous Scouts and civilians resident in Hurungwe during the war. Such opinions are directly in contrast to the findings from ZIPRA operatives themselves who attribute acts of aggression towards civilians to Selous Scouts or both wartime and postwar ZANU-PF propaganda against ZAPU and ZIPRA. Former ZIPRA guerrillas only came to know about the extensive operations of SS at the end of the war. This section captured such memories with a view of uncovering how the war is remembered in Hurungwe with a bias towards the role of SFAs. Doing so touched on the legacy of ZIPRA which is why there is an evaluation of SFA-ZIPRA relations. Auxiliaries or Pfumo are remembered for re-opening schools, clinics, shops and escorting buses and above all, reducing guerrilla violence against civilians. They also campaigned for Muzorewa. That they were locally recruited in part explain their role in the war. Despite those contributions mentioned, people voted overwhelmingly for ZANU followed by ZAPU, but the former had not done any fighting in the area of study. It is with such knowledge at hand that the hearts and minds theory is brought to question and the question of notoriety on the part of auxiliaries is deconstructed. Below I discuss in full roles which SFAs are remembered to have played in the last two years of the war.

a) *Re-opening Schools, clinics and Transport Networks*

SFAs were deployed to restore government structures in Hurungwe by enabling buses to travel to rural area and re-opening schools. This was expected to endear them to the people for bringing back order in civil administration. By 1978, the war of liberation had brought all public transport system in Hurungwe to a standstill. Some bus companies lost both the crew and the buses to suspected guerrillas. For example, a bus belonging to Matambanadzo was taken from Mudzimu by alleged ZIPRA guerrillas and burnt. All the money was allegedly looted from the conductor.⁴²

⁴¹ Interview with Magwizi, ZIPRA Veterans Trust Offices, Bulawayo, 22 August 2012.

⁴² Interview with Mrs Dungiro, Jinga Primary School, 24 July 2013.

Raiding from buses and the use of landmines compelled operators to stop sending their buses to rural areas. For any civil administration to work, a proper transport network is important. In 1978, SFAs began to escort buses to rural areas. Most ZIPRA bases close to roads had already been vacated.⁴³

As far back as 1977, the war situation in Hurungwe was already dire with many schools and hospitals closed. A report of the same year titled *Terrorist Destruction* went as follows:

Chidamoyo Mission- American Church of Christ- Missionaries were chased away and the mission with the exception of one or two residential houses burned down.
Kapfunde- Missionaries were chased away. The clinic was robbed of drugs and nurses chased away.
Miami- Clinic not operating. Orderly beaten up and drugs taken.⁴⁴

By the time SFAs began to operate in Hurungwe, schools and clinics had been closed due to the intensifying war. Among them was Nyaodza Nyaodza where Ngwarai Chitsiga had been a teacher. The primary school was burnt down ostensibly by ZIPRA guerrillas. Other schools included Nyamutora, Mudzimu, Chitiki, St Martin's, Gwihwa, Maumbe, Zvarai, Kavaya, Nyarumwe, Dandawa, Fuleche, Tengwe and Kapfunde. In a bid to pretend that the war had come to an end through the signing of the Internal Settlement and subsequently the May 1979 election which created the Zimbabwe-Rhodesia government, SFAs were used to re-open schools and shops. Therefore SFAs occupied schools and actually ensured that they were operational even if it meant having to do with unqualified teaching staff. That way, many schools in the district became SFA bases. Mushongahande attributed the return of civil administration in Hurungwe to SFAs. He was personally involved in the opening of Chitiki Primary, Mudzimu Primary, Chidamoyo Mission Hospital, Dandawa and Nyamutora Primary.⁴⁵ According to him,

We re-opened dip tanks and encouraged parents not to sell out each other but to report guerrillas to us. Increasing numbers reported guerrilla presence to us. Many young men joined because they were being treated harshly by guerrillas. They were taking people's wives and daughters by force. We were not allowed to do that, hence we were loved by people. Sometimes we invited Fireforce by radio if guerrillas were too numerous for us as we did at Nyamhondoro battle.⁴⁶

The capacity of auxiliaries to actually call for helicopters as reinforcements was a clear indication

⁴³ Interview with Mushongahande, Chitindiva 19 May 2011.

⁴⁴ History of Urungwe District, Background to Development of Tribal Trust Lands in Urungwe District, 1977.

⁴⁵ Interview with Mushongahande, Chitindiva 19 May 2011.

⁴⁶ Interview with Dzomba, Chitindiva Township, 19 May 2011.

that SFAs were openly a Rhodesian appendage though the combatants themselves pledged loyalty to Muzorewa. Otherwise by themselves, oral interviews indicated that SFAs largely operated as home guards and hardly did they kill civilians especially in areas where they were popular. However, they also operated with members of the RSFs who regularly brought them food rations and ammunition. When interviewing civilians, that tendency to mistake RSFs for SFAs was quite rampant because of ZANU-PF attitude towards those who fought against them in the war of liberation.

James Chikerema who in 1978 was UANC first vice president took note of SFA success while addressing a rally at Magunje Township. He praised SFA for the re-opening of schools, bus routes, stores and clinics said to have been closed by ZIPRA forces. He went on to educate people in attendance that *Pfumo reVanhu* was there to protect people and their property from ZIPRA and encouraged masses to feel sufficiently confident to arm themselves with bows, arrows and spears and attack ZIPRA forces and mujibhas.⁴⁷ All these were attempts at selling the Internal Settlement and in the case of Chikerema dealing with nationalists from both ZAPU and ZANU who had objected him leading to the fall of FROLIZI.

Due to a critical shortage of teachers, auxiliaries who had attended primary school up to grade 5 were co-opted to beef up the teaching staff once schools had re-opened. Carol Nyamukozora who had been educated to grade 5 was recruited to become a teacher while at the same time he was in charge of signals at Mahwada auxiliary base.⁴⁸ Local civilians were also recruited as teachers. Among them were Chinoda, Dickson, Hunzvana and Gorimbo. A local and qualified teacher whose school had been burnt down by alleged ZIPRA guerrillas was invited to run the school. Parents were asked to mould bricks and build classrooms, something which they did without force being applied against them. At independence, the school was fully operational. By failing to open it in the last year of the war, ZIPRA had suffered a psychological defeat even though the force might not have been responsible for the closure. The same technique was used to open more and more schools. One security spokesman boasted that ‘the people of Urungwe are pig-sick of the

⁴⁷ *Rhodesian Herald*, 24 March 1979.

⁴⁸ Interview with Carol, Chaedza T/Ship, chinhoyi, 24 August 2013.

war. They look to SFAs as heroes...'⁴⁹ In short, the closure of schools was blamed on ZIPRA regardless of the secret involvement of SS. There is doubt that ZIPRA policy was to close all schools. However, this has seemed the case from civilian respondents because former ZIPRA guerrillas have not been accorded a chance to explain why and by whom schools in Hurungwe were closed during the war of liberation.

b) *Rescue Missions*

The spate of non-combatant killings which took place in Hurungwe is remembered by civilians of Hurungwe to have been carried out by Rhodesian Security Forces and guerrillas rather than auxiliaries. This is contrary to reports from Mount Darwin where auxiliaries were openly accused of killing civilians. To illustrate the Mt Darwin case, it is important to quote extensively Munyaradzi Huni's interview with a former ZANLA guerrilla from the said area:

When I came back home from the liberation struggle, I got back home and was really troubled and up to now, I am troubled by the fact that my father died after he had been killed *nemadzakutsaku*. He was killed because of me. After being killed, my father was hanged with a rope from a helicopter which flew all over with the *dzakutsaku* telling people that they had killed a *gandanga*. My father was not a *gandanga*. He was sold out *nababamukuru* who told *madzakutsaku* that he was supporting freedom fighters. *Madzakutsaku* were ruthless black soldiers who worked under the Smith regime.⁵⁰

The interviewee was not particularly wrong in lumping SFAs and RSFs together especially in such a highly contested area as Mt Darwin. In the *Africa Confidential*, it was reported that 'the auxiliaries were soon to become part of the official army and that some sections were actually forming the battalion of the RAR.'⁵¹ Ngwaru, a former ZANLA commander noted that during the integration, many former SFAs simply became part of the RAR. Since he had friends who had served as auxiliaries, he even used to put on Pfumo T-Shirts without encountering challenges.⁵² The kind of connection with security forces and former guerrillas made it hard to differentiate between SFAs and the army. More often, in Hurungwe, the absence of bloody contest with guerrillas and the local nature of SFAs made distinction easier.

⁴⁹ *Windhoek Advertiser*, 12 April 1979.

⁵⁰ *The Sunday Mail*, February 10-16 2013

⁵¹ *Africa Confidential*- Rhodesia: The Bishop on the Move.

⁵² Interview with Ngwaru, 8 January 2014.

SFAs tried to win confidence and support of rural people in Hurungwe by giving decent burials to chiefs killed allegedly by guerrillas. One former SFA recalls that his group went to Sengwe following the death of Chief Nyamhunga in 1978. Here, they found the chief's slain body lying across the doorway of his shop. His wife had been compelled to continue using the doorway as usual but in the process jumping over her husband's dead body. The late chief's children were also forced to continue doing the same until such a time guerrillas would decide to have the body taken for burial. The chief was buried through SFA's assistance and that of the Rhodesian Security forces. Whether the chief was a sellout or not is one thing, but of importance is the mileage which SFAs wanted to get by giving the chief a decent burial. Somehow, they also intended to win confidence and support of Hurungwe's spirit mediums such as Chingombe who objected body displays or delayed burials of the dead. Still, the very act of taking the body and burying had the negative impact of confirming to ZIPRA guerrillas in the area that indeed, the chief was an opponent and for that matter, a sellout.

The death of Chief Nyamhunga calls for further analysis coming from interviews with the current incumbent. An interview with the current chief Nyamhunga indicates that the late chief was killed because he had defied the spirits of the land in several ways. To start with, as a chief, he was not supposed to have extra marital affairs because that would contradict his wartime role and anger the spirits of the land. He would not effectively carry out his duties to protect guerrillas if he was unclean. Second, just like his predecessor Katidiga who had been resettled from Badze to Nyamhunga, he was a *muzukuru* (child from a son-in-law) and thus not eligible to occupy the post of chieftaincy. In his coronation as a chief, he had not won the *chitukutuku* or headdress to prove his legitimacy.⁵³ The chief did not associate the death of his predecessor with selling out during the war but his young brother quickly argued that it was mandatory for every chief to be pro-government as is the current scenario.⁵⁴ Despite this background, when the chief died, the Rhodesian government claimed that he was one of theirs and as such, gave him a heroic send-off. The presence of SFAs from Karoi and surrounding bases was enough confirmation that the role of the force was to protect and befriend those who were law abiding citizens at least from the point

⁵³ Interview with chief Nyamhunga at his homestead, 1 July 2013,

⁵⁴ Interview with Calisto, Chief Nyamhunga's homestead, 1 July 2013.

of view of the Zimbabwe-Rhodesia government.

Charles, a former ZIPRA operative in Hurungwe, pointed that chief Nyamhunga was killed because he was taking both guerrillas and auxiliaries to the spirit medium of the area in order for them to get protective snuff. Owing to the chief's double-standards, auxiliaries were able to go on an offensive and kill some guerrillas.⁵⁵ Still, he does not agree that ZIPRA killed the chief- a suggestion that such an act was shameful. Magwizi, who operated in Mwenezi as a ZIPRA combatant and visited Hurungwe in August 2013 on behalf of ZIPRA Veterans and Mafela Trusts, again denied ZIPRA involvement in the death of Nyamhunga. He argues that an auxiliary named Edson actually killed both chief Nyamhunga and Dendera in order to tarnish the image of ZIPRA.⁵⁶ None of the contending forces in Hurungwe district admitted having killed the two chiefs but agreed to have sometimes killed forces opposed to the nationalist cause. Thus there remain a number of versions concerning who really was responsible for the murders. All the versions remove responsibility from any of the interviewees. The *Rhodesian Herald* reported that both Nyamhunga and Dendera were determined to maintain the status quo. At the same time, Nyamhunga might have been killed by opponents who misrepresented him to the assailants. That he was a successful businessman owning a grocery shop, bottle store and butchery could have caused jealousies locally leading to speculations that Rhodesians had given him a pistol. For various reasons, respondents from Hurungwe still think that the two chiefs were killed by guerrillas.

Similarly, Sam Guvheya from Chundu Communal Area in Hurungwe was accused of selling out by ZIPRA guerrillas. Allegations were that the tractor he owned might have been bought using reward money from security forces who were thanking him for doing them a wonderful job. Despite his insistence that he had saved money while working in South Africa, he was killed all the same and his body was laid on the kitchen doorway. For days, the decomposing body lay where it had been left. His wife had to continue using the kitchen as per guerrilla demands. Mr Kujakwenzara who was the village head noted that only with the intervention of SFAs was Sam Guvheya buried and as above with negative consequences on the legacy of the family. The

⁵⁵ Interview with Charles, ZPRA Veterans Trust, Bulawayo, 4 October 2013

⁵⁶ Interview with Magwizi, ZPRA Veterans Trust, Bulawayo, 4 October 2013.

participation of government security forces was to many civilians in the area a confirmation that he was a sellout. In fact, it had become the norm that one could only be assisted by security forces whether dead or alive if he was one of them. Therefore it was not entirely one's actions during his lifetime which could earn the victim the label of a sellout, but rather what happened even in the event of one's death. Though Guvheya might not have been a sellout, the mere involvement of SFAs in his burial confirmed the negative. At the same time, SFAs were abiding by the demands of the spirit medium of Chundu that the dead should not go unburied for days. By so doing SFAs were battling for support even from the spiritual leaders of the area. Nyamasoka who was in Chundu throughout the war remembered that the spirit medium of Chimombe/Chingombe was the only one who denied SFAs and Rhodesian Security Forces protective snuff on the grounds that they were not fighting a spiritually correct war.⁵⁷ The same information was obtained from a former ZIPRA operative, Comrade ZZ who was visited in August 2013. To this, he further elaborated on the assistance offered by the chief. This included caching arms, treating the sick, hiding guerrillas and giving them protective snuff. Together, the chief and the medium made ZIPRA operations in the Chundu part of Hurungwe district possible.⁵⁸ The chief was eventually taken to Karoi for protection though former guerrillas insist that if his life was in danger, then it was Rhodesians who posed that threat because the chief was one of them.⁵⁹

The increase in civilian killings by assailants suspected to be ZIPRA guerrillas clinically followed by the coming in of SFAs to do the burial would suggest conspiracy. The likelihood of SS doing the killing to smear guerrillas and to rope in SFAs as concerned homeguards redressing the situation is very likely. The secret nature of SS operations and the failure by interviewees to pinpoint commanders of guerrillas linked to the deaths of Chief Dendera and Nyamhunga is a case in point. For example, Dendera is said to have been beaten thoroughly by mujibhas in the presence of ZIPRA guerrillas before being shot.⁶⁰ The informant was however not aware of the specific guerrilla group so responsible. Worse, ZIPRA attributes the death of the chief to a mysterious Edson. What is clear however is that Dendera was killed in public view of neighbours.

⁵⁷ Interview with Nyamasoka, Chitindiva Primary School, 18 May 2011

⁵⁸ Interview with comrade ZZ, Bulawayo, 23 August 2013.

⁵⁹ Interview with comrade Nkiwani, Bulawayo, 23 August 2012.

⁶⁰ Interview with Ganda, Kapare Village, Magunje, 4 July 2013

The spate of civilian killings by suspected ZIPRA guerrillas known in the area prompted the entry of SFAs so as to prove that at least, they could restore order or civil administration. Prior to their coming, ZIPRA allegedly closed Sengwe Primary School where Friday Kavhu was a pupil. He claims that guerrillas came during school morning assembly time and told both teachers and pupils that the school had been closed immediately. As such, all teachers were told to go back to their home areas while pupils were granted the permission to take any books and stationery they could carry to their homes and read until such a time guerrillas would re-open the school. From the school, the same group of guerrillas who closed the school was said to have gone on to kill Chibayambuya who had previously worked for the Rhodesian government. He was accused of constantly feeding the District Commissioner with information on guerrillas' whereabouts and as a result, he was subsequently shot dead. On the same night, Marowa was again killed ostensibly for being a traitor, and his death was to be followed by two former policemen, Mawire and Mafudhla. This was in addition to increased cases of rape which resulted in one girl from Makuwerere's village being raped to death by 9 suspected ZIPRA guerillas.⁶¹ Once SFAs came, they camped at the same schools which had been closed by ZIPRA guerrillas and converted them into keeps. They succeeded in driving guerrillas to such areas as Magumbura and Cheore which were hilly and thickly wooded. Magumbura was one such area which ZIPRA effectively defended.

There is a mystery surrounding these killings especially why and how guerrillas who had been relating well with the community all along could suddenly go on a rampage, raping and killing civilians. Further, there is no evidence of mujibhas recommending death to those who were killed. Otherwise the only skeletal evidence was that ZIPRA is said to have warned Chief Nyamhunga against going to Karoi but the chief did not oblige.⁶² What is mind-boggling is that other than this, members of the community accuse ZIPRA of being responsible but do not bother to give more evidence. Ultimately therefore, despite lack of clarity on the matter, ZIPRA goes down into history as being responsible for the above murders in the same way the force was accused of raping women.

⁶¹ Interview with Friday Kavhu, Matenga Village, Chief Nyamhunga, 16 October 2012.

⁶² Interview with Ngwarai Chitsiga, Karoi, 23 September 2013.

c) *Guns, Girls and rescue operations in Hurungwe*

SFAs with the help of the Rhodesian Psychological Unit were also able to deny ZIPRA guerrillas support through propaganda campaigns which left the image of ZIPRA smeared. Propaganda was a tool which ZANU and ZANLA were quite capable of exploiting. Nkomo himself admitted that:

ZANU and ZANLA had the further advantage of far better propaganda than ours. The Tanzanian government supported ZANU as a party and president Nyerere's skillful public relations advisors ensured that the work was well done. Even in prison, I listened with excitement to the broadcasts from Dar es Salaam with recordings that sounded as if they were made in the battlefield. ZAPU's broadcasts were put at the wrong time of the day by Radio Zambia and were sometimes unimaginative.⁶³

By the same token, ZIPRA was unable to defend itself against allegations of abusing women and girls in the district under study. This is despite the existence of consensual relationships between some guerrillas and local girls culminating in marriages during and after the war of liberation. One former combatant called Skhalela noted that after the liberation war, Joshua Nkomo encouraged his former combatants to go back and get married to their wartime girlfriends.⁶⁴ Therefore, that alone indicates that even at the highest level, guerrilla leaders were aware of affairs between their combatants and local women but abuse of power is what they discouraged. Unfortunately however, carrying the gun had an obvious leverage and both SFAs and guerrillas took advantage of this situation.

From the oral interviews, all fighting forces were responsible for sexual abuse but former members of the SFA were more vocal in blaming ZIPRA. For example, when ZAPU first used the symbol of a man holding a child in his hands (*gamba rakabata mwana*), SFAs were quick to point out that the party was celebrating and supporting its guerrillas' acts of raping of defenseless women and girls whom they left behind either pregnant, dead or with horrible diseases.⁶⁵ In practice, however, the logo of a soldier carrying a baby and two hoes was a symbol of transition from war to peace.⁶⁶ When ZAPU shifted to the symbol of a bull, the same interpretation was used because the bull is usually kept for purposes of breeding, hence a single guerrilla was capable of making pregnant as many girls as a bull would do.⁶⁷ Already, ZIPRA had tainted its name by alleged *reckless* killing of civilians. Therefore, propaganda campaigns were sown on

⁶³ J Nkomo, *The Story of My Life*, Harare, SAPES Trust, 2001, p. 167.

⁶⁴ Interview with Skhalela, Kazangarare Township, Karoi, 23 September 2013.

⁶⁵ Interview with Chibatamoto, St Boniface Mission, 28 June 2013.

⁶⁶ *ZAPU Through the Eyes of Zenzo Nkosi*, Braamfontein, South African History Archive, 2012, p.87.

⁶⁷ Interview with Chibatamoto, St Boniface Mission, 28 June 2013.

fertile soils and sprouted to an outright negative perspective of the guerrillas. Such propaganda was continually fed to SFA trainees so that they would be able to influence public opinion against guerrillas once they were deployed.

SFAs were also instrumental in the *rescue* of civilians on the verge of being killed by guerrillas on several allegations, the most common being sellouts. As such, Dzomba's group proceeded to Fuleche where they found one man tied to a tree by ZIPRA guerrillas. He was supposed to be burnt to death while tied there since he had failed to go to town to collect his son who was a member of the British South Africa Police. SFAs took him to Karoi where a holding camp (Tangwena) had been established for alleged victims of guerrilla violence. There were indeed several such rescue missions but it is very important to acknowledge that a drowning man does not really care whom his rescuer is. Those who knew that they were under threat from guerrillas usually having been reported by local mujibhas had no choice but to do anything which could save their lives. Running for protection to SFA bases was one such option. Friends and relatives would also report incidences of civilians potentially under attack by ZIPRA to SFAs leading to such rescue missions. In the same way, one headman accused of being sympathetic to ZIPRA had to spend the last half of 1979 staying in the bush with guerrillas because he was under serious threat from SFAs who had tortured him.⁶⁸ Young men under his leadership did not take his example because some of them joined SFAs. While commitment to the war was indeed crucial to him, running away with ZIPRA was a means of survival.

Sometimes, SFAs also sent girl children to Karoi ostensibly to prevent them from being raped by guerrillas. Mabasa, a former member of the SFA argued that it was true that ZIPRA guerrillas not only raped girls but also did the same to married women. The offended had no recourse to proper justice but ended up aligning themselves to members of the SFA for protection. The fear of rape allied many to SFAs and not the love of the militia. Mabasa who was himself a member of the SFA strangely defended the practice of rape because sometimes the war's commitments left them with little or no leisure time. During patrols and upon return, SFAs too raped because negotiating sex with local girls was, to some of them like Mabasa, time consuming for people accustomed to the use of force. The fast moving forces wanted quick sex and got it through the use of threats.

⁶⁸ Interview with Chagwambare, Chakamanga Village, Dandawa , 27 July 2013

Moreover, chimbwidos (female guerrilla helpers) could be punished by SFAs through gang rapes both to annoy guerrillas and to stop them from continuing to do the same. However, if auxiliaries were reported to their superiors, the punishment was heavy as long as the victim was not a chimbwido.⁶⁹ In a bid to cultivate good relations, SFAs were encouraged to propose love in the customary manner and inform their superiors of the girl they intended to take after the war.⁷⁰ In the case of guerrillas enforcing such control measures was difficult once they were in the operational field. The same was further confirmed by Mrs Nyoni who is aware that many girls got married to SFAs and lobola was actually paid for them during the war.⁷¹ To add on to that, Masakara explained that sometimes SFAs beat up girls or parents who resisted their advances, but did not go on to kill such people.⁷²

Knowing that sometimes guerrillas entered into consensual relationships with local women or girls, SFAs could get into outright offensive so as to *rescue* them from ZIPRA *rapists*. By ambushing guerrillas during their visits to girlfriends, the result would be military contacts sometimes leading to deaths. Such an account was given by a Mr Ganda who was a mujibha during the war but did not join SFA. He gave the example of a girl by the name Tabeth from around St Boniface Mission who was in such a relationship with a ZIPRA guerrilla. One fateful day, the guerrilla was ambushed by SFAs who suspected that he may have come to see his girlfriend. As they began shooting, he sneaked out of the hut and climbed into a mango tree and began firing. In the shootout, he was killed. The girl was eventually claimed by Nobert who was a member of the SFA and the two had a child together during the course of the war.⁷³ A ZIPRA guerrilla had thus lost a girl to a so-called militia, but what is also clear is that the battle fought was for purposes of winning the girl rather than fighting to liberate the country. Liberating the country was secondary to Nobert but getting back his girlfriend was the first priority. A similar case was told by Lina Simakani that one young man in Chundu was killed because his girlfriend was in love with a ZIPRA guerrilla and at the same time a member of the RSFs. The girlfriend was also killed the same day by guerrillas.⁷⁴ Just as a lot of men would fight ferociously to get

⁶⁹ Interview with Mabasa, Gasura Village, 26 June 2013.

⁷⁰ Interview with Mabasa, Gasura Village, 26 June 2013.

⁷¹ Interview with Mrs Nyoni, Gogo Village, 30 June 2013.

⁷² Interview with Mr Masakara, Magunje Growth Point, 3 July 2013

⁷³ Interview with Mr Ganda, 30 July 2007.

⁷⁴ Interview with Lina Simakani, Simakani Village, 18 May 2011

back their loved ones, such squabbles became part of community life. The only difference was that those who wielded the gun could then decide to point it against fellow competitors.

Zinhatha, a former SFA, insisted that the presence of SFAs among the people of Hurungwe was crucial in containing guerrilla excesses. As such, the SFAs went on to disrupt any guerrilla gathering and at times inflicting damage on the force. ZIPRA guerrillas according to this version usually demanded sadza and chicken or beef in general. This did not quite endear them to the impoverished residents of the district. According to Zinhatha, ‘whenever we got wind of their arrival, we were quick to fight them sometimes before they had even rested.’⁷⁵ Zinhatha also posited that unlike ZIPRA, SFAs did not demand chicken but used their allowances to buy if they needed a change of relish. Being a government force, stern measures were always available should they be reported for raping any woman. Thus they had to negotiate love affairs. On this last point, there are many contradictions. An interview with Two Bhocho in 2011 indicated a number of genuine love affairs in which ZIPRA guerrillas came back to pay bride price for their wartime beloved ones after independence. Among them was a former guerrilla named Professor who came back for his beloved wartime girl from Kwanza village.⁷⁶ It is still debatable whether such moves by guerrillas were emanating from above or genuine love which had grown side by side with the war. There is no doubt that the move was part and parcel of winning people’s support in the coming general elections and if need be afterwards. At the same time, it was also reported that SFAs married their girlfriends soon after the war. Such is an indication of the development of affectionate affairs but one cannot rule out the use of force in the establishment of the affairs. There is a huge difference between an armed man proposing love and a local unarmed young man doing the same. The former is already demonstrating his show of strength which he can use if he wants with lethal consequences unlike the later.

Murambiwa who served as an SFA explained that force was used by both guerrillas and SFAs to gain access to women. Combatants were armed and that on its own, was potentially threatening, hence tilted the negotiating power in favour of the one carrying a gun. By his own words, it was not easy to resist the advances of a man under arms. That they were sexually starved meant that

⁷⁵ Interview with Zinhatha, 6 April 2012.

⁷⁶ Interview with Two Bhocho, Nyamutora Township, 6 October 2011

rape was imminent. At SFA bases, girls had little chances of resisting sexual advances because power was tilted in favour of the former. SFAs could provide girls with tinned foods, soap, lotion, toothpaste and money, security and pride. That being the case, girls targeted were left with no choice but to give in. Those in love with guerrillas tended to fare even better. Guerrillas at times raided shops belonging to alleged sellouts partly in order to give their girlfriends all sorts of presents. In addition, such girlfriends assumed power to an extent of being determinant to whether one must die or be spared. They became respected guerrilla informers. However, the above does not rule out several examples of coercion in which married women found themselves victims. For example, reports from Gokwe showed that the whole morality of the area had been destroyed and not a girl had been left unmolested. Husbands were said to be powerless to protect their wives because if they defended them, they would be shot by Sithole's people *who do what they like with women*.⁷⁷ Mrs Nyoni also concurred with the above by pointing out that whenever guerrillas were at her home in Chitiki area of Hurungwe, they sent out mujibhas to collect girls equivalent to the number of guerrillas present. She recalls that one day, 7 guerrillas arrived at her home and in return sent out mujibhas to bring 7 young and beautiful girls. For fear of being killed, parents had no audacity to resist. Any parent who tried to send his/her girls to town ran the danger of being killed. Parents were simply told that their daughters were needed by ZIPRA for *gwesling* which was a word taken from the Shona verb *gwesera* or leaning against.⁷⁸ Since guerrillas were technically not allowed to sleep with women the term meant that these girls were simply sleeping close to guerrillas providing warmth, thus acting as blankets but were not actually engaged in sex. In practice however, people knew that raping was going on but they were powerless to prevent it.

Chimbwidos could sometimes use their privileged position to make excessive demands on shop owners. From an account by Mrs Chakawa⁷⁹, one such girl was Tecla Pasipamire and her sister Alice. They were often sent to shop owners for guerrilla requirements which included cigarettes, soap, cooking oil, soups and various other provisions. Taking advantage of their privileged position, they began to visit the same shops on their own accord to demand big pots, dishes, plates, clothes and other commodities of their own private use but pretending that they had been sent by *vakomana* or guerrillas. When a report was made to ZIPRA as to why they were making

⁷⁷ MS 308/58/8, *The Post*, 10/4/79

⁷⁸ Interview with Mrs Nyoni, Gogo Village, 1 July 2013.

⁷⁹ Interview with Mrs Chakawa, Chipere Village, 6 May 2012.

excessive and unusual demands, the two girls were paraded naked at a rally near Tengwe River and beaten up by guerrillas. All this was despite the fact that their home had been frequented by guerrillas and Tecla was already pregnant as a result of a forced relationship with one guerrilla. Abuse of power by young women aligned to guerrillas surely tarnished the image of ZIPRA especially among rural elites whose goods were confiscated.

When I tracked down down Tecla to her original home, the story was different. Obviously in a bid to prove her commitment to the struggle, she did not mention being paraded naked at a pungwe. However, her father's home was raided by Rhodesian forces for two reasons, namely to recover cattle rustled by mujibhas as part of the struggle and to deal with a family which was looking after the so-called terrorists. Purazeni, who is brother to Tecla, was arrested in the process, so were his two sisters. Tecla recalls that:

I had gone to look for our cattle in nearby fields when I was told by soldiers to put my hands up which I did. The soldiers (SFAs) asked for my name. When I told them, I was immediately taken home where 7 military vehicles were parked. They told me to leave behind cattle which I was taking home and said *watosungwa* (you are under arrest) Together with Alice and Purazeni, we were loaded onto awaiting lorries and taken to Tengwe where we were tortured and some boys were taken to Karoi to train as SFAs. On the other hand, guerrillas suspected that I had sold them out. Fearing that they would kill me, I stayed with a relative working at a farm in Tengwe after my release. ZIPRA continued to look for me thinking that I had sold them out to Rhodesians. If I returned home with my brother and sister, we were all going to be killed as traitors.⁸⁰

The information supplied by Tecla indicates that homes frequented by guerrillas were notorious to the Rhodesian regime because they were used for slaughtering cattle taken from white farms by mujibhas. Of course, Tecla said these cattle were kept in the bushes closer to her home which locals referred to as the *butchery*. If there were girls at such homes, they could not resist guerrilla sexual advances. Third and more important, such homes were destroyed by Rhodesian forces as a show of strength and for purposes of recruiting SFAs from mujibhas who were clearly linked to the rustling of cattle. Fourth and last, the minority regime was bent on turning swords into ploughshares by using mujibhas in a counterinsurgent role.

A former member of the Selous Scouts came to the conclusion that both ZIPRA and SFAs who fought in Hurungwe were not blessed by the spirits of the land. According to Chiwara, although ZIPRA guerrillas were fighting an authentic revolution, their flirting affairs with girls angered the spirits of the land, a move which lost them support from fellow members of the community. The

⁸⁰ Interview with Tecla Pasipamire, Gasura 2 Village, 2 July 2013

tragedy on the part of SFAs was even worse because their cause was not particularly popular while sexual relationships further compromised them.⁸¹ Relationships between armed combatants and local girls were a source of serious differences with local civilians and in return lost the fighters their much needed support. However, both SFAs and ZIPRA were responsible for abusing women sexually. Sweeping statements indicating that ZIPRA guerrillas were rapists while ignoring SFAs are totally misleading. Further, young women who became victims of sex-starved combatants sometimes used the position to their advantage as shown by the case of Tecla and Alice.

SFAs and the Spiritual World in Hurungwe

The spirit world is presumed to have guided the operations and conduct of SFAs as well as traditional leaders in the operational fields. SFAs wanted spiritual support in the war despite claims by opponents that their war was immoral. This section discusses the role between SFAs on one hand and spirit mediums, traditional leaders and medical practitioners on the other. The case of headman Mudzimu's close relationship with guerrillas, the punishment he received for that and the role played by spirit mediums in trying him demonstrates that traditional religion was important to both civilians and African combatants. It was therefore crucial to win hearts and minds of the spiritual world because that would translate to popular support.

Issues to do with love affairs between members of the SFA and girls seemed to vary according to the command structure of each group. In the case of Zinhatha's group of SFAs, it was not permitted for any of them to be engaged in sexual relationship at any one point whether during patrols or at base as it was believed to be detrimental should such a group clash with guerrillas. Thus any combatants who engaged in sexual affairs were heavily punished at the base and no-one would want to patrol with them until they had been cleansed of the bad omen which had the potential of leading the whole group into a death trap. Generally, this was also the guerrilla standard practice which in several ways was flouted. Accordingly, the practice of abstinence was allegedly deep-seated in Zinhatha's group because it was a highly superstitious local group the majority of whose members were almost illiterate. Zinhatha was often sent to the local spirit

⁸¹ Interview with M Chiwara, Gadzema Section, Chinhoyi, 8 January 2013.

medium for snuff which was believed to have metaphysical protective powers in case of clashes with guerrillas. He had to leave behind his gun but his colleagues provided escort to the medium. Before entering the hut, he removed his shoes, entered the hut while clapping, sat on the reed mat and asked the old woman to replenish the snuff. The woman would then roar for some time, sprinkle Zinhatha with snuff over the head and on his clothes. Then she would give him a container (*kasha*) full of snuff (*bute or mbanda*) to share with his fellows. He was then told that *Sienda muchinda ndekutarisa paunenga usifamba* meaning that ‘go young man and I will look after you throughout your journey.’ Before parade each morning, SFAs in his group for purposes of protection, washed themselves in snuff laden waters in a big clay pot. Thereafter, he distributed the snuff to his colleagues which they then sniffed. That ceremony is what they called *culture*. This gave them the much needed psychological security or armour. Whenever any one of them got confused in terms of what decision to take during patrol or in battle, he would take out the small *kasha* and sniff the *mbanda* to get back in the right frame of mind. The same spirit medium that took SFAs as sons of the soils and protected them also did the same procedures for guerrillas. In Zinhatha’s analysis, the medium could be a sellout but not the spirit which possessed him. As such, the spirit medium could flirt with both sides of the quarrel. Commitment to abstinence which Zinhatha claims may only apply to him as an individual. The difference with ZIPRA lay in the manner it was done and the magnitude.

Not all ZIPRA guerrillas who operated in Sengwe area of Hurungwe stood accused of raping women. According to Mrs Svova, those who flirted around were expelled from others on fears that they would contaminate the whole group and cause it to be killed by the enemy.⁸² The individual guerrillas who were accused formed themselves into an independent group of 5 and began to operate. However, at the beginning of 1979, they were all killed by SFAs while having a good time with their girlfriends at a local village. Accordingly, the remaining guerrillas and the community at large came to the conclusion that the dead had been disowned by the spirits of the land. That kind of talk does not explain why so many guerrillas who stood accused of the same, survived the war and some of them are still living. In Kazangarare, one such guerrilla who had raped an 18 year old girl was publicly flogged by his colleagues and disarmed for a month.⁸³ That

⁸² Interview with Mrs Svova, Chiufe, Chief Nematombo, 2 June 2013.

⁸³ Interview with ZZ, Zipra Veterans Trust, Bulawayo, 23 August 2012.

kind of practice was also common in ZANLA operational areas though cases of rape remained widespread. It would appear therefore that despite the good that ZIPRA may have done, those who abused women contaminated all the good and therefore tainted people's memories. The spiritual dimension of the war was intended not to antagonise potential supporters and was questionable in military terms.

Headman Mudzimu attributed his survival during the war to the spiritual world which SFAs too had no choice but to accept. When he became headman in 1977, the war had already engulfed Hurungwe district. He was a young unmarried man when he was appointed headman. He immediately decided to give guerrillas a hand. According to him, as was also confirmed by his village heads, Zaranyika, Bandera and Nyamharepare, Mudzimu regularly travelled with guerrillas. It was his duty to take any new group of guerrillas to the medium of Nyanhewe for snuff, treatment and other blessings. When ZIPRA guerrillas were attacked at Nyamhondoro battle close to Mudzimu Township, Mudzimu was there and he alleges that it was miraculous that he survived. He attributes his survival to the traditional snuff which he always carried with him as well as his stick.⁸⁴

In mid 1979, Mudzimu was not so fortunate to escape from Rhodesian forces. By that time he was unwell and staying in a cave near Kweche River while at the same time being treated using traditional medicines. Information concerning his whereabouts was leaked to SFAs who then captured him as he was recuperating. This is what he had to say:

I was taken to Mahwada Base which was one of the biggest in the war. When I arrived, I found out that many people had gathered at the school. I think there were about 5000 of them. The SFAs who had taken me refused that I was a *Mambo* and addressed me as a *gandanga* (terrorist). They were very angry with me for supporting guerrillas. When I was caught, Muparaganda and Nyamapfeka rushed to Karereshi to tell the medium of Nyanhewe that Mudzimu was dead. The medium told them that I was not going to die and gave them some snuff to take to me. Meanwhile, auxiliaries beat me thoroughly using big sticks. This was publicly done with some women actually ululating. With my body bleeding all over, the local businessman, Basket, was told to take me to Zvarai for my trial.⁸⁵

The lashing of headman Mudzimu shows that sometimes, SFAs could disregard the importance which was attached to such an office if the deeds of the incumbent were in direct contrast with

⁸⁴ Interview with headman Mudzimu, Mudzimu Court, 10 July 2014.

⁸⁵ Interview with headman Mudzimu, Mudzimu Court, 10 July 2014.

their motives. SFAs went as far as beating up the headman but they did not sentence him to death. This suggests that they had become superstitious. Thus when headman Mudzimu arrived at Zvarai base, the spiritual realm represented by spirit mediums had once more taken over. Mudzimu remembers that there were about 50 mediums from around Hurungwe who had been invited there by SFAs. Those he could recall were Nyamuswa, Rukodzi, Charingana, Kanegocheke and Kasinamukwawo among others. The trial was presided over by the medium of Nyamuswa who accused headman Mudzimu of sending ZIPRA guerrillas to kill the medium of Rukodzi. All the mediums except one from Mujinga agreed that Mudzimu must be sentenced to death. As the trial was going on, kraalhead Muparaganda is said to have arrived with snuff from Nyanhewe which he rubbed on headman Mudzimu's wounds. One medium from Mujinga then went into a trance arguing that it was not the duty of mediums to give a death sentence. SFAs were waiting for the outcome outside so that if the headman was sentenced to death, they would then shoot him. In the early hours of the morning, Mudzimu was found guilty and asked to pay 12 head of cattle for offending the medium of Rukodzi by misrepresenting him to ZIPRA guerrillas. He was given 4 days to bring these cattle. Once released, he once more escaped into the custody of ZIPRA who used to hide on white commercial farms around Karoi town.

The above story indicates that even in war, death was feared because of its contagious effect. SFAs feared killing a civilian like Mudzimu without the blessing of mediums. If mediums had sanctioned the death sentence, then there would have been no problem with SFAs pulling the trigger because they would simply do what they had been sent to do. At the same time, mediums are always opposed to the spilling of blood hence they would have side-stepped their role by passing a death sentence. That SFAs gave spirit mediums the power over life and death of an offender somehow shows that they vindicated themselves. Those who killed Chiefs Dendera, Nyamhunga and Musampakaruma did not give civilians or mediums the opportunity to pass a sentence. The absence of such people's courts meant that even when murders were undertaken by some other assailants, fingers would normally point at ZIPRA guerrillas.

Political Engineering and the War in Hurungwe

According to Ellert, the best success story of Operation Favour was in Hurungwe district where a former detective Inspector of the SB had been given a short-term contract to run the operation. Hurungwe district was placed completely out of bounds to all government personnel and the District Commissioner was infuriated by the move. The majority of villagers were Shona-speaking and ZANLA had not yet reached the district. SFAs went about telling villagers that it was coming to protect them from *Ndebele invaders*. That propaganda worked because ZIPRA was unjustifiably painted guilty of atrocities against villagers.⁸⁶ Throughout the war in Hurungwe, alleged ZIPRA atrocities against civilians were equated with Ndebele re-invasion of a Mashona country ostensibly as they had done in the 19th century. That kind of Rhodesian propaganda was deliberately meant to sour relations between civilians and guerrillas. Moves by the Rhodesians were part and parcel of political engineering. Unfortunately, the propaganda stung and stuck thus making some sections of society supportive of the Gukurahundi onslaught in the Matebeleland and parts of the Midlands. Using that propaganda, SFAs were allegedly created to prevent the extermination of the Shona by the Ndebele as summarized below:

The Ndebele oppression of the Mashona in the middle of the last century is now being re-enacted in Urungwe Tribal Trust Land (TTL) west of Karoi by ZIPRA terrorists according to security forces and Pfumo reVanhu personnel here. Initially people informed government forces of ZIPRA presence which then reacted by 'disciplinary killings.' This was accompanied by the closing of all schools and clinics. At about early January, Pfumo reVanhu moved into sections of the TTL little by little. After 2 and a half months of extremely delicate work, 8 schools and about 3 clinics were opened...The Mashonas are being invaded by the Ndebele all over again.⁸⁷

Rhodesian press thus tribalised the war by presenting ZIPRA guerrillas as exclusively Ndebele invaders and SFAs as Shona liberators. Even as part of their training in Karoi areas, SFA recruits were told that they would be going to rescue their parents from Ndebele killers. Therefore when guerrillas killed an alleged sellout, Rhodesians more often took it to imply ethnic cleansing. I found that in Hurungwe, many civilians came to the conclusion that the liberation struggle was a Ndebele war declared against the Shona. The propaganda did not take into consideration that not every Ndebele speaker is Ndebele in the same manner that not every Shona speaker is Shona. Worse still, people under headmen Mzilizawempi were a combination of Ndebeles and Shona

⁸⁶ H Ellert, *Rhodesian Front War*, page 189.

⁸⁷ *Rhodesian Herald*, 24 March 1979.

because the headman had been compelled to migrate from Bushy Park in Gwelo to Hurungwe.⁸⁸ Generally, Hurungwe was described as a country of about 150 000 Shonas who prior to the coming of *Pfumo reVanhu* had been subverted by Ndebele terrorists from the South West.⁸⁹ The label of Ndebele was not applied to some of Mzilawempi's people who joined SFA. To date, many people still think that ZIPRA guerrillas were tribal invaders suggesting that Rhodesian propaganda was planted deeply and unconsciously in to their hearts. They seem not to care about ZIPRA's struggle for supremacy and legitimacy against complex forces which operated against them. Both Masakara and Mrs Nyoni confirmed that ZIPRA guerrillas were referred to by SFAs as *Mandevere* for Ndebeles.⁹⁰ Accordingly therefore, ZIPRA guerrillas had no right to demand protection of the spirits of the land. That some groups were driven away into impenetrable thickets confirmed their neglect by the spirits. In practice however, it was a result of effective Rhodesian propaganda, ethnicism and failure of ZIPRA commissariat department to politicize the people in areas they fought. The smearing of ZIPRA meant that SFAs could then be sold as a protection force against ZIPRA excesses.

SFAs as a Protection Force

SFAs were tasked to protect children in re-opened schools and members of the community who had sought refuge in SFA bases. One of the duties of SFAs once deployed was opening bases at schools. Kanyairabanda recalled that the reasons for putting SFA bases at schools was to keep the school system running and preventing ZIPRA guerrillas from closing those schools.⁹¹ If SFAs could keep schools running, diptanks and shops functional, it was believed from Rhodesian circles that guerrillas would lose support and civilians would cooperate with government security forces and deny guerrillas sanctuary. Thus Kanyairabanda claims that his group opened bases such as Mukonori, Kapfunde and Mahwada. In addition, they also ensured that Mahwada Township remained operational throughout the war.⁹² From these bases, SFAs also invited the local community to attend meetings where the force explained its agenda. In short, they pointed out that Smith, Mugabe and Nkomo had failed to end the war. Therefore, they were coming in as

⁸⁸ S2805/2000, Movement from Bushy Park to Urungwe.

⁸⁹ *Windoek Advertiser*, 12 April 1979.

⁹⁰ Interview with Masakara, 3 July 2013 and Mrs Nyoni, 1 July 2013.

⁹¹ Interview with Kanyairabanda, Mutaurwa Village, Headman Mudzimu, 4 May 2012.

⁹² Ibid.

a force sent by Muzorewa to achieve that in order to enable parents to enjoy all peacetime facilities. Sometimes they held night vigils or *pungwes* for the same reasons of convincing civilians that this was a people's force. At these bases, they also *looked after* girls who were said to be under threat of being raped by guerrillas and other civilians who believed that they were being hunted down by guerrillas. They also went for expedition to rescue anyone if they had information that guerrillas were after him or her.

During night patrols, they sometimes disguised themselves as ZIPRAs and went to homes of potential sellouts to sift for intelligence information. Normally they would ask the supposed sellout whereabouts of anyone who was selling out the liberation struggle to the minority regime of Ian Smith. Out of fear or willingly, the targeted person would give a list of names. Thereafter and on a chosen day, the alleged sellout would be picked by *youths* to be taken to a *base* where he was paraded as a sellout by SFAs. They would read out the names of those who had been sold out and warn the sellout not to repeat such a dangerous crime. Although Kanyairabanda thought that such actions reduced chances of selling out each other, evidence on the ground point to more people being killed for allegedly selling out. It was noted that people usually sold each other because of local differences and not anything related to the war and its aims.

The SFAs logic of winning hearts and minds was not without its own risks. For example one militia which worked side by side with SFAs to establish civil administration was totally wiped out by ZIPRA in the area of Karambazungu. None of the 74 District Security Assistants survived the attack according to both Dzomba and Ngwarai. Villages on both sides of the road where the DSAs had perished were burnt down by Rhodesian Security Forces as punishment to civilians who were suspected of having sold out government militias. Therefore the role of winning hearts and minds to security forces was not always beneficial to people in rural areas. Even Daly acknowledged that after training in Mhangula, of the SFAs who were deployed in Wedza, 40 were killed by guerrillas within 3 days.⁹³

Although SFAs were at times sold out to guerrillas and killed, evidence from Hurungwe indicate that they were popular. Chideipa who experienced the war in Hurungwe up to the end of 1977 had

⁹³ Ron Reid Daly as told to P Stiff, *Selous Scouts: Top Secret War*, Alberton, Galago Publishers, 1982, p. 316.

a nasty experience of the war as an SFA when he fought in Masvingo between 1978 and 1979. He confessed that SFAs were very unpopular in Masvingo areas of Morgenster, Muchakata and Mutindikwe. They were referred to as Skuz Apo and civilians were not willing to co-operate with them in any way. He further asserted that when asked for guerrilla whereabouts, most civilians simply said 'look for them yourselves because if we tell you, ZANLA will kill us.' Civilians were openly unwilling to provide information which would lead to the killing or capture of guerrillas. As a result, counterinsurgency war and civilian protection was tough because local communities kept guerrillas well-informed. Unlike Masvingo, SFAs successfully engaged guerrillas in a number of Hurungwe contested areas. As mentioned earlier, the weakness of ZIPRA lay in their failure to give political education to the masses in the areas they were fighting.

Taming ZIPRAs, Destroying Guerrilla Bases and Protecting People in Keeps

SFAs also attempted to win support of the local communities by converting any guerrillas they had captured into SFA operatives. The captured guerrilla was sweet-talked until he was convinced of the need to change sides permanently. It was pivotal first to ensure that the tamed guerrilla was fully committed to the new role of fighting side by side with the SFAs. Kanyairabanda recalls that in one of his rare operations in Gokwe, they captured one ZIPRA guerrilla called Judah and operated with him in Hurungwe for 2 months. He was a Tonga. Judah ran away to rejoin ZIPRA guerrillas during one *contact*. SFAs interrogated his girlfriend by the name Connie who had been resident at Mahwada base but failed to get any information on the actual whereabouts of Judah. At ceasefire, Judah again ran away from Chivakaneyama Assembly Point (AP) in Hurungwe to rejoin his girlfriend. Since he had left his gun and ammunition at the AP, there was no attempt to track him. By this time, he had remodeled himself into a traditional healer.⁹⁴ Chigutsa or Takawira who operated extensively as a ZIPRA guerrilla in Hurungwe from the time before the creation of SFA was also captured and in the last two years of the war converted into an SFA operative. Today, he is resident in Batanai area of Hurungwe where he is not only a village head

⁹⁴ Interview with Kanyairabanda, 5 May 2012.

but also a renowned war veteran.⁹⁵ His service to the SFA has been obliterated and is not discussed at all. This is ironic. It shows that amnesia is quite operational. Those who were in the war decide what to include and exclude about their history. In doing so, they choose to make public that which serves their interests whether politically or economically. The short stint with the Rhodesians has been defined as immoral hence it is forgotten. Those who try to stitch up pieces of that negative service are said to be counterrevolutionaries.

It was SFAs' strategy to destroy ZIPRA bases and convert them into theirs in order to prove to the rural communities that they were a very strong force capable of destroying the ZIPRA war machine. Examples from Chitiki, Maumbe and Nyadara demonstrate this quite clearly. SFAs further took whole communities into Protected Villages in a bid to starve guerrillas into surrender. As explained by Peter Gasura who once attended a meeting at Katenhe School which was addressed by Chikerema, the whole idea of creating Keeps and destroying bases was to stop fire with fire. At the said meeting, Chikerema is claimed to have said the following:

When you see a fire threatening to engulf your home what do you do? Are you not supposed to start your own fire so that the 2 fires quench each other without destroying your houses and your food? Terrorists have started a fire and SFAs are out in full force to stop that fire from destroying law-abiding citizens like you. In order to stop terrorists, we have armed our local boys who are also our own children.⁹⁶

In the area of Chitiki which falls under headman Mudzimu, SFAs deliberately targeted ZIPRA bases for destruction. Normally these guerrillas operated from people's homes. In the area of Chitiki, they were based at Nyoni and Nyamande's homes. In the latter home 3 boys were to join SFAs after destruction of their home and the killing of their father by guerrillas. According to Mrs Nyoni, her husband came from Mberengwa and he happened to be fluent in Ndebele. Since most ZIPRA guerrillas were equally fluent in Ndebele, they became friends with Mr Nyoni and set up a base at his home in December 1978. Food was brought there from surrounding villages and so were girls. This went for more than 2 months until SFAs became infuriated. They openly came during the day and burnt all houses including granaries. Mrs Nyoni went on to say that her husband had information that they were looking for him hence escaped to Salisbury (now Harare).

⁹⁵ Interview with Kanyairabanda, 5 May 2012

⁹⁶ Interview with Peter Gasura, Magunje Growth Point, 2 July 2013

As a result, she followed her husband leaving behind all crops and livestock unattended. In the nights which followed, ZIPRA took punitive action against some parents whose sons had joined SFA. Specific in this case is the Hwenga family where Calisto and Nobert had joined SFA. Prior to that, they had been *mujibhas*. Once they changed sides, they showed ZIPRA's cached arms to Rhodesian forces who confiscated everything. In frustration, the guerrillas took VaMoto, father to Calisto and Nobert, alongside his wife into to a hut whose door they tied, set alight and left. VaMoto forced open the door but his wife died in the inferno, so was Mrs Rukwati.

Ndivharaini and Jakaza who served as SFAs claimed to have played an important role of blocking 'parents' from selling each other out and took others to PVs mostly located at schools.⁹⁷ Everyone was supposed to sleep in the Tangwena where exchanging fire with guerrillas was not uncommon. Francis thinks that these PVs did a great job in arresting unnecessary killings of civilians by guerrillas. His own mother stayed in the keep or PV until the end of the war.⁹⁸ The Chitiki PV was not attacked by guerrillas throughout the war because it was well-secured. People were allowed to go and graze their cattle or to work in the fields each morning and to return before sunset, meaning that they were in constant touch with guerrillas. The night was regarded as unsafe because that was usually the time when guerrillas left their hideouts and started patrolling.

Most of my informants who were SFAs during the war think that they actually prevented people of Hurungwe from being killed or abused by guerrillas through taking them to their bases situated at schools and townships. Such bases acted as miniature Protected Villages (PVs). Before a description is made of the structure of each such PV and the role of SFAs, an analysis is made of the history of the PV as it was originally applied in the Zambezi Valley in the early 1970s before the concept was transferred to other parts of the country.

According to Gorman, in guerrilla and counter-insurgency wars, the use of camps to contain civilians of a region and break their contact with fighting forces is not new. It ranges from British use of 'concentration camps' in the Boer War in South Africa at the turn of the century and the 'New Villages' in the communist insurgency in Malaya in the 1950s to the failed attempts of the

⁹⁷ Interview with Ndivharaini, Gasura Village, 6 October 2011 and Jakaza, 6 May 2012.

⁹⁸ Interview with Francis Nyamande, 14 May 2011.

US to create 'strategic hamlets' in Vietnam in the early 1960s. In the Zambezi Valley, PVs were established in the TTLs in the 1970s to cut off the oxygen of community support to the guerrillas of ZANLA.⁹⁹ The Catholic Commission for Justice and Peace in Rhodesia traces the resettlement of people into protected enclosures to the later half of 1973. This took place in the Zambezi Valley which was the first area to be affected by guerrilla incursions. By mid-1974, the government announced that the whole population of Chiweshe TTL was to be moved to 21 PVs. In a space of one month, between 43000 and 47000 people had been moved from their homes.¹⁰⁰ A typical PV was usually about 100 acres and had an outer fence, the gates which were guarded and locked during the night. The central core was surrounded by its own double fence and behind it were the European District Officer and his African assistants who were better known as District Assistants (DAs). In these PVs, people erected their own huts and were allowed to go and tend their crops and livestock during the day but they had to return before sunset.

There are various differences between PVs in the Zambezi Valley and those in Hurungwe. To start with, the former had a long history and were manned by Guard Force and not SFAs. Second, bases in Hurungwe were at schools which were therefore re-opened and 'protected' from guerrilla 'intruders' by SFAs. Unlike the Zambezi Valley, it was not whole villages who were resettled but only those who were threatened or likely to suffer at the hands of guerrillas. In this category were specific people who were being hunted by guerrillas for crimes such as selling out, witchcraft and in some cases, those whose children had joined the SFA or other government uniformed forces. Girls were indentured as they risked being sexually molested by guerrillas. Owing to that, they were also brought to these PVs or keeps. Furthermore, the miniature PVs were not fenced unlike most typical ones in the North Eastern districts. In contrast with typical PVs where DAs slept at the core protected by a human barrier of civilians, in Hurungwe SFAs slept outside in trenches which were called poshtos. Each trench was used by two SFAs. Murambiwa remembered that they could take their girlfriends into these trenches to spend the night and send them back to classrooms at dawn.¹⁰¹ Therefore girls running away from being sexually harassed by guerrillas failed to escape the eyes of SFAs. The barest protection which SFAs provided was military and

⁹⁹ E O' Gorman, *The Frontline Runs Through Every Woman: Women and Local Resistance in the Zimbabwe Liberation War*, Harare, Weaver Press, 2011, p.7.

¹⁰⁰ E O' Gorman, *The Front line Runs Through Every Woman*, Harare, Weaver Press, p.7.

¹⁰¹ Interview with Murambiwa, Gasura Village, 5 May 2012

psychological. The only 2 bases which were openly attacked by guerrillas were at Karambazungu and Zvipani.

Most SFAs were locals hence had an obligation to somehow endear themselves to the local population. Like the DAs in Chiweshe, most SFAs were not married and that explained high levels of immorality. DAs in Chiweshe were largely single and were from outside the district. Owing to that, their morals could not be regulated because there was no social obligation to do so. One informant complained in 1975 to the CCJP in Chiweshe that:

There is not a single DA who has a wife with him throughout the area. Some (abused) women are afraid to report such cases to their husbands because if it is known that if the husband knows what is going on to his wife, he is taken to the base where he is alleged to have done something and there he is beaten hard. For example Mr X at Keep 16: a wife was about to leave the keep on the DA's directives to go to his home. When this was discovered and Mr X took the case to the kraal head for trial, the husband X was taken to the base and got beaten hard by members of the DA.¹⁰²

It is an exaggeration that SFAs were always polite in their dealings with civilians. Sometimes they intimidated civilians as shown by the case of Sithole's auxiliaries in Gokwe threatening people who could not produce party cards and compelling them to attend political meetings and demanding money. There were also reports of extortion, beatings and rape.¹⁰³ Generally SFAs were playing a social role though of course they also fought. Government tried to win hearts and minds through popular support or fighting a war for people, not for terrain. According to Bruton, they thus sought to achieve this through the maintenance of government services administered by the Internal Affairs Department.¹⁰⁴ Therefore, through the establishment of PVs, they thought that they were protecting people from guerrilla violence. PVs were not a social strategy but military in the face of increasing penetration by insurgents.

Despite having been compelled to join the SFAs, members did not use their knowledge of guerrilla sympathizers' network to punish or threaten civilians. Respondents claimed that the whole intention of their deployment was to win people's support by partly persuading them to switch sides and desisting from the use of force. This is unlike the case of St Paul's Musami where former mujibhas began to threaten mission staff once they had returned from training as

¹⁰² GN-P/MAN *The Man in the Middle: Torture, Resettlement and Eviction*, A Report Compiled by the Catholic Commission for Justice and Peace in Rhodesia, 1975, p.12.

¹⁰³ M Meredith, *The Past is Another Country: Rhodesia 1890-1979*, London, Andre Deutsch, 1979.

¹⁰⁴ J K Bruton, Counterinsurgency in Rhodesia, *Military Review*, volume 6, Number 3, March 1979, p.27.

SFA. Before recruitment, some of the members, Gringo, Knowell, Kasikai and Lancelot had been leading mujibhas in the area. They began to threaten some of the staff known to be supporters of ZANLA guerrillas.¹⁰⁵ The mission staff led by Father Nigel Johnson had the courage to go and report Kasikai to the auxiliary headquarters in Marandellas. That courageous act ended auxiliary threat against the mission.

Memories of Military Engagements

Military clashes between SFAs and ZIPRA guerrillas reflect that there can be no justification to assertions of Moorcraft's findings that SFAs were always cannon fodder when they were confronted by guerrilla armies in the battlefield. As will be discussed, poorly trained or exceptionally well-trained soldiers appeared on both sides of the war. At the beginning of the war, generally fighters were well-trained but not so towards the end. Battles which were still recalled by former members of the SFAs show incidences of battlefield victories, losses and stalemates though of course the final outcome following the protracted war was decided at the negotiating table by politicians.

Kanyairabanda's recollections of battles with guerillas seem to show that like any other force, SFAs were equally strong. One such battle was fought sometime in 1979 at Makarichi village near the small river of Nyaruchekwa. It involved only five members of the SFA against numerous ZIPRA guerrillas inclusive of newly trained guerrillas coming from Zambia. Kanyairabanda still recalls that they had gone there in order to establish whether there was a guerrilla presence in light of information which they had gathered from their own intelligence sources. Indeed, there was a big welcome party for one of Makarichi's sons who was formally a mujibha and had been taken by guerrillas for military training in Zambia. Thus the crowd gathered included both civilians and combatants. Beer had been brewed and all people seemed to be enjoying. According to the interviewee,

One of us fired a shot towards the gathering without informing us. The guerrillas fired back and because of their numbers, we could not withstand. We all strategically withdrew and ran back to our base at Mahwada School. One of our members got stuck in the river and had to spend sometime hiding before he could also escape. We radioed security forces and they came. When we informed them of the possible numbers of

¹⁰⁵ J McLaughlin, *On the Frontline: Catholic Missions in Zimbabwe's War of Liberation*, Harare, Boabab Books, 1996, p. 172.

guerrillas, they refused to go and attack.¹⁰⁶

Judging by their numbers, one would have expected this small force to be wiped but surprisingly, none of them died and only one was injured but survived. Despite their willingness to reengage the said guerrillas, members of the RAR and RDR refused to proceed to Makarichi to see if they could confront ZIPRAs. In this particular encounter, it was the professional army more than the militias which hesitated to engage the enemy. Rather they only offered to airlift the injured SFA, by the name Ketty from Njengenja area and that was it. Despite their zeal to go and fight, the decision to implement the idea lay with the professional army and it was not willing. Since it was SFAs who had initiated the attack, guerrillas were not sure whom their attackers were and how well-armed they were. Guerrilla warfare thrives on the element of surprise attacks. If the enemy attacks first, it would be safer to escape. It would therefore be problematic to use this encounter to discredit ZIPRA but it does indicate that SFAs were not always as weak.

In yet another incident, Kanyairabanda's group went to Nyarumwe area where information pointed out that ZIPRA guerrillas had girlfriends at Muchineri's home and it was known they often slept there. This particular group consisted of SFAs from 4 bases namely Mahwada, Zvarai, Kavaya and Kapfunde. ZIPRA fled when shots were fired in the direction of Muchineri. In so doing, they tore Kanyairabanda's cowboy guerrilla type of hat as they tried to shoot him. Next they ran towards the township only to be chased away once more by SFAs. When they went to Muzenda's home, the same fate of being chased away haunted them until SFAs returned to Nyarumwe where the businessmen offered drinks as a thank you gesture. Businessmen sometimes so behaved because they were the target of guerrillas. Sometimes their shops were closed, robbed or burnt and in worse cases, businesspeople were killed on allegations of working with Rhodesians. The ability of SFAs to call the Rhodesian Airforce implied that guerrillas were obliged to disappear before worse things could happen.

Kanyairabanda escaped unscathed in yet another confrontation involving ZIPRA guerrillas at Mahwada Township. It so happened that on this fateful day he and 4 other colleagues went to the shops to receive ammunition from Chicago, an SFA commander who was based at Mudzimu. One young mujibha by the name Kilson Murota arrived at the township obviously on a

¹⁰⁶ Interview with Kanyairabanda, 5 May 2012

reconnaissance mission on behalf of ZIPRA guerrillas but this did not dawn onto the minds of Kanyairabanda's group. As the 5 SFAs were leaving Basket's shop, they were met with a volley of bullets from ZIPRA guerrillas but they fled hastily towards Mahwada base. Again none of the SFAs was killed and neither were guerrillas. However, the informant once more escaped death by a whisker. His AK 47 was shot at, broke into two with the butt falling off. As had been done earlier with the straw hat, the remains of the gun were taken to Harare by white members of the Rhodesian African Rifles. Despite what appeared to be good training which saved him during such and related confrontations, Kanyairabanda attributed everything to the spirits. After the war he used to liken himself to Jesus the Son of God because of his miraculous escape from death. The strong belief in ancestral and other such spirits will be clearly demonstrated by the experiences of Zinhatha who again fought in many parts of Hurungwe district.

The splendid win ZIPRA scored against SFAs as told by Kanyairabanda was at Zvipani where an SFA base was destroyed. ZIPRA guerrillas surrounded the whole base and began shooting. In the chaos which followed SFAs ran for their dear life leaving behind guns, ammunition, uniforms, food rations and most important, people whom they were supposed to protect. One SFA named Mufarakashoma Baradzanwa tried to fight back and was shot in the head. The encounter with SFAs replenished guerrilla supplies and led to the temporary closure of the Tangwena. Kanyairabanda attributed this success to ZIPRA numerical superiority and also that it was them who had initiated the attack which obviously gave them an upper hand. ZIPRA guerrillas first disabled the radio system making it impossible for the SFAs to call for either reinforcements or the airforce. In most battles which Rhodesian forces won, they often relied on superior air power which guerrillas did not have. Rhodesian forces came after the SFAs sent one of their members on foot to the small town of Karoi. Already it was too late and impractical to pursue guerrillas.

Sometimes SFAs had intelligence information on the whereabouts of guerrillas. They used this to their advantage by tracking and exchanging fire with isolated groups of ZIPRA but in the area of Birimahwe and Musukwi River, they did not dare to attack ZIPRA at its strongholds along rivers. Zinhatha participated in one such battle with guerrillas. Below I quote him for a summary of what really went on:

ZIPRAs came and attacked us at night. They fired some shots and disappeared into the night. The following morning, we tracked them across Musukwi River into Kasirori Village where we encountered a single

guerrilla. One recruit was so close to the guerrilla but he was gripped with too much fear on seeing a ZIPRA face to face. His fingers were literally trembling so he could not fire. The gun had not jammed as he later claimed. Through our C-Formation, we encircled the ZIPRA but he refused to surrender. Then his AK-47 was hit on the butt and the gun broke into two pieces. He hid behind a big log, placed his satchel where we could see it and escaped as we fired at the bag mistaking it for him. How he escaped we could not establish but blood stains showed that he had been injured. What we knew for sure was that he could have gone to their cave hideouts near Musukwi River and known as maternity where injured guerrillas recuperated. It was suicidal to track him that far so we returned to our base.¹⁰⁷

The above is of course testimonial to the poor training of some sections of the SFAs. To give a convincing explanation of how a force of 57 SFAs could be evaded by a single guerrilla they had encircled, injured and disarmed is mind boggling and yet this is what happened. However, the training of SFAs towards the end of the war had become so quick and haphazard making it difficult for them to confront the feared and legendary ZIPRA guerrillas.

At Chinhere, SFAs claimed that they were able to defeat a group of ZIPRA guerrillas with only a few reinforcements from Chimusimbe. ZIPRAs had beaten a lot of people around Chinhere on allegations of selling out. SFAs came to investigate culminating in the clash in which one member of the SFA was killed. According to Murambiwa,

...guerrillas were the first to detect us and they made use of a rocket launcher which killed one of us. However, we managed to repulse them, invaded the home on which they were preparing for a big feast. As we were hungry having walked the whole night, we helped ourselves on already prepared stocks of sadza and goat meat.¹⁰⁸

Two separate and destructive battles recalled by Murambiwa and Jakaza resulted in massive deaths of SFAs indicated that at times they were poorly trained or that they were no match for the ZIPRA war machine. A combination of 140 SFAs, RAR, RDR and the air force went to attack a ZIPRA base at Mana Pools. It was them who initiated the attack on ZIPRA guerrillas camped on a mountain. According to Murambiwa, the battle started in the morning and clearly demonstrated that they had grossly underestimated ZIPRA military strength. It is not possible to allege that only SFA weakness was responsible for the defeat. Other regiments composed of Coloureds, Indians and Whites perished in this battle. Some were actually captured in that battle and after the war, Murambiwa discovered that they had been recruited into ZIPRA. From a contingent of 140 RSFs, only 37 staggered back while the rest were either killed, injured or captured. In the case of Jakaza, out of their group of 190 who attacked a ZIPRA stronghold in Zowa area of Zvimba district, only

¹⁰⁷ Interview with Zinhatha, 6 May 2012.

¹⁰⁸ Interview with Murambiwa, 5 May 2012.

40 survived. He went further to explain that ZIPRA guerrillas in Zowa had developed a retaliatory culture of lining dead bodies of SFAs in roads as a deterrant to anyone who might want to join that force. ZIPRA guerrillas had learnt this intimidating behaviour from Rhodesian forces that were notorious for body displays in order to dissuade mujibhas from ever joining guerrillas. At the same time, this engagement led to total abandonment of the battle for hearts and minds. Jakaza concluded that in this battle and thereafter, ‘we had to kill a lot of villagers because they were not trustworthy’.¹⁰⁹ Despite this loss, Murambiwa thought that they still managed to raid guerrillas 4 days before ceasefire and took away guns, ammunition, uniforms and other supplies. However, this was too late because guerrillas were soon moving to the Assembly Point at Magurekure in Makonde.

The defeat of SFAs in the area of Zowa shows that they were not popular with civilians. Using the carrot to either gain support or subdue communities was proving unworkable. As a result, SFAs turned to the stick. Instead of protecting locals as they did in Hurungwe, they brought havoc to them. It was now a struggle for survival against unfriendly forces. Chideipa who operated in Masvingo indicated that SFAs had to use violence because the locals they had come to protect had been subverted by ZANLA guerrillas so they did not want to be associated with Skuz Apo.

Conclusion

The chapter has demonstrated that both SFAs and ZIPRA wanted to win support of civilians during the protracted war. Both forces, albeit at different degrees, were responsible for the abuse of young women but ZIPRA is remembered more negatively than SFAs. Such is the case because SFAs were locals hence they could negotiate marriages, they were more regulated in terms of their behavior and unlike guerrillas, they were allowed to marry as the war was being fought. As local government structures crumpled with closure of schools, clinics, diptanks and transport networks, ZIPRA was accused of bringing down civil administration. Therefore, SFAs were credited with re-opening schools, hospitals, roads and so on. They are also remembered for protecting people from ZIPRA. Although SFAs lost big battles to ZIPRA, this did not steal legitimacy from them. Generally, in the battle for hearts and minds, SFAs won.

¹⁰⁹ Interview with Jakaza, 5 May 2012.

CHAPTER 7

COMMUNITY-BASED RECONCILIATION, INTEGRATION AND THE SEARCH FOR HEALING IN INDEPENDENT ZIMBABWE: TRAGEDIES AND OPPORTUNITIES FOR FORMER AUXILIARIES

Introduction

Reconciliation as pronounced by the winning ZANU-PF government led by Robert Mugabe appeared removed from the majority of the rural population who had borne the brunt of the war because they saw it as imposed since they had no part in its genesis. To achieve communally acceptable reconciliation, healing and integration, localized knowledge systems were used by SFAs who were coming from a war they had technically lost. It was found that returnees undertook some traditional rituals to cleanse themselves of the very act of having participated in the war and, more importantly, cleansing themselves of any blood they may have shed either accidentally or intentionally. The war had transformed them, so they needed to become normal again. Not even a single respondent indicated to have undertaken church rituals for purposes of cleansing. Former SFAs however continue to be plagued by the associated guilt of having participated in the war on the side of Muzorewa- an experience that has created negative identities for them. Though not being physically harmed, their identity blocks them from political ascendancy as they are sometimes held in suspicion. This was the feeling gathered from almost all former SFAs interviewed. However, white soldiers were more indemnified by the Zimbabwean government partly because public action against them would have compromised military confidence in the army and attracted international condemnation.

Ndlovu-Gatsheni argues that slave trade, imperialism, colonialism, apartheid and today's globalization constitute coloniality as a global power structure that sustains asymmetrical power relations between the Euro-American world and the global South.¹ As such, technologies of imperialism and colonial matrices of power continue to exist in the minds, lives, languages,

¹ S J Ndlovu-Gatsheni, 'Why Decoloniality in the 21st Century?' *The Thinker*, Volume 48, 2013, p. 11.

dreams, imaginations and epistemologies of modern subjects in Africa and the global South.² Guided by the inherent knowledge that whites generally occupy the apex of the social-political and biological superstructure, the government of Zimbabwe sensed that it had not defeated the imperial economic and political structures in the liberation war. Coupled with its own military and economic weaknesses against the-still-eager-to-fight Rhodesian forces and the need to destroy ZAPU and ZIPRA, the new government embraced the policy of reconciliation when it came to power in 1980. The policy indemnified combatants from all sides of the wartime quarrel regardless of atrocities they may have meted out against each other during the war. In practice however, the policy of reconciliation was largely between the ZANU-PF victors, including their combatants, and the white Rhodesians who had lost the war. Otherwise servicemen aligned to Sithole and Muzorewa had no right to as much security as their white counterparts who enjoyed the full protection of the law which they had largely authored.

Though enunciated by Mugabe, that reconciliation was first and foremost intended to accommodate whites should be understood in the analysis of the world's hierarchy of races where generally whites have placed themselves at the apex of the human social ladder. To the white world therefore, reconciliation was judged by the extent to which it embraced and incorporated whites who, until the end of the war, had been military and political adversaries with Africans who sought to take over power from them. Reconciliation amongst blacks was secondary even at the Lancaster House Conference, which is why the topic was left to the discretion of electoral victors. In Latin America, a decoloniality thinker Maldonado Torres noted that discriminatory worldviews are premised on the division of humanity between those who deserve the reality or possibility of inner worldly salvation and others who are considered less than fully human agents of the inert-for consumption-and use of world nature.³ The less-than-fully humans in the 1980 Zimbabwean government approach to reconciliation were African armed men who had served under Rhodesian command during the liberation war despite fighting for Muzorewa whom they thought was not a Rhodesian. Particularly unwanted and completely abandoned were SFAs. The new ZANU-PF government embraced white soldiers who had done worse atrocities and denigrated auxiliaries.

² *Ibid.*

³ N Maldonado-Torres, *Decoloniality at Large: Towards Latin America and Global Transmodern Paradigm*, *Transmodern: Journal of Peripheral Cultural Production of the Luso-Hispanic World*, 1 (3), 2012, pp. 1-2.

As a sign of their strength and frustration, civilian and military white personnel deliberately migrated to South Africa to commence a new life while the new government was persuading them to stay on. In this case, reconciliation was a mechanism of the new and fragile government which was threatened by white exodus. Whites had to be persuaded to stay because of the strong belief that without them, the economic sector would crumple. Blacks who had fought for the minority regime remained vulnerable which explained why some of them fled to South Africa. Muzorewa's militias had to start a new life in an environment which was unfriendly to those who had 'sold out' the war of liberation. The triumphant and victorious mentality of the time disregarded circumstances under which thousands of young men joined either Sithole or Muzorewa's forces. Voices of those blacks who fought for the white regime were so feeble to the extent that their cries in private that after all they were not traitors were never audible. They got a permanent 'sellout' mark/label which compromised their future socio-political ascendancy.

As such, the coming of independence maintained the ontological density of the white race as blacks, especially those who stood accused of having lost the war, further saw their blood further losing its density. To quote Boaventura de Sousa, the human race was divided into two zones, the zone of being and the zone of non-being. Blacks are in the zone of non-being because they are characterized by a catalogue of deficits and a series of lacks.⁴ In that case, whites have a grievable life while blacks do not. Those who were defined as having sold out in some instances entered into a state of non-being and became victims of the ruling party's overzealous supporters. The purging that went on secretly against forces deemed to have been loyal to the Smith regime for most part went unreported because the victims were black. Similarly, during the Matebeleland and Midlands disturbances between 1982 and 1987, there was no international condemnation from the West. The most important reason seems to be that the victims were blacks. Holger Potzch has noted that in war films, the enemy is de-subjected and dehumanized, which renders killing him or her unproblematic.⁵ Such a situation prevails because the other is less than human and so was the general presentation of SFAs in 1980. That they may have been traumatized and similarly suffered as guerrillas during the war was not generally considered because their cause

⁴ *Ibid*, p. 12.

⁵ H Potzch, 'Borders, Barriers and Grievable Lives: The Discursive Production of Self and other in film and other audio-visual media, *Nicordian Review* 32 (2011), p 75.

was defined immoral.

According to Onslow and Berry, white soldiers who fought for Rhodesia during the Second Chimurenga are generally traumatized by their wartime activities.⁶ The two authors reported that as they were carrying out interviews, some of the whites broke down while others cut the interviews midway. I found this report to be an attempt to re-humanize whites taking into consideration that some of their activities have been unraveled today in academic works and by ZANU-PF politicians in particular. Otherwise, it is known that some of these Rhodesian soldiers went on to fight against blacks in Angola, South Africa and Namibia. Rhodesian white operatives such as Stiff, Bird, Barker, Ellert, Daly and many more have no regrets about their (mis)deeds as they fought to defend Rhodesia. To say therefore that they are traumatized by participating in the Rhodesian war is a gross exaggeration. Rather, they may be suffering from multiple traumas and the Rhodesian war is just one of these. The brutality of white soldiers against blacks had a racist background. According to Muchetu who was also a member of the SFA, sometime in 1979, two white soldiers in his group received preferential treatment following an attack by a group of guerrillas around Tengwe Chimusimbe. The two were airlifted for treatment while the rest of the injured black SFAs were only attended to when a puma (Rhodesian armoured vehicle) came and took them for treatment by road the following morning.⁷ This goes on to explain clear disregard for the lives of black servicemen as opposed to whites. The argument that only one helicopter came to ferry the 2 whites leaving no space for others is not a satisfactory explanation for the delayed attention given to the injured Africans. Despite their Christian background, I did not find any white from my readings undergoing religious ceremonies because he killed during the war under discussion. On the other hand, SFAs did cleanse themselves after the war because of the contagious situation they were in upon return.

Reconciliation, which is the major discussion in this chapter, took place at 3 levels among those who had fought the war as SFAs. Immediately following the end of the war, the former fighters had to reconcile with the spiritual world which is always against the shedding of blood. By taking a job which condoned killing, fighters had defiled themselves meaning that such ceremonies

⁶ S Onslow and A Berry, Final Report, Why did you Fight: Narratives of Rhodesian Identity During the Insurgency, 1972-1980, October 2010.

⁷ Interview with Muchetu, Kasimhure T/Ship, 18 January 2014.

implied a return to normalcy. Second, SFAs had to amend relations with relatives and friends they had wronged during the war given that most of them had fought in the same areas they were resident. This process was rather long because victims were not always local and chance meetings between ex-SFAs and their victims created confrontations which finally yielded reconciliation. At the 3rd level, they were obliged to make amends with the ruling ZANU-PF party, with the government itself and with UANC which had dismally lost the general election. In order of success, the study reveals that rituals done at family and local community level to reconcile the ex-fighters with the spiritual realm were more successful than the other two approaches. Former SFAs still find it hard to shrug off the sellout identity and at the same time to avail themselves as trustworthy people who will not sell out the revolution for the second time. There was no evidence to suggest that indifference to ZANU-PF emanated from a history of opposition to the same party during the liberation war as claimed by Richard Bourne who advances the argument that the children and grandchildren of those who had worked for the Muzorewa-Smith regime became a source of recruits for the MDC thirty years after independence.⁸

Efforts at reconciliation had begun before ZANU-PF came to power. Ralph Dodge who had acted as the bishop of the United Methodist Church in Rhodesia (Zimbabwe) when Muzorewa was concentrating fulltime on politics convened a seminar for his people on Reconciliation, Reconstruction and Religious Revival in the Tribal Trust Lands in January 1980.⁹ Similar such meetings convened by different denominations followed in February. Thus when Mugabe spelt out reconciliation and reconstruction after his electoral victory, part of the society especially in urban areas was already beginning to prepare itself for that. However, there is need to acknowledge that the war was largely fought in rural areas hence the attitude of urban dwellers who were targeted for interviews was not the same with those who had experienced the war in rural areas.

Reconciliation: A Critical Review

After a protracted war between Rhodesians and African nationalists, it came as a surprise that the

⁸ R Bourne, *Catastrophe: What went wrong in Zimbabwe*, London, Zed Books, 2011, p. 103.

⁹ C M Hallencreutz, *Religion and Politics in Harare 1890-1980*, Uppsala, Swedish Institute of Missionary Research, 1998, p. 450.

new government decided to go for reconciliation with their former adversaries. It is important to review the concept of reconciliation, its various aspects and the logic of doing so. This is done with a view to adding light on how Zimbabwe handled and mishandled the whole process. Reconciliation in post-conflict societies has sometimes been attempted through transitional justice. Today, transitional justice covers the establishment of tribunals, truth commissions, lustration of state administrations, settlement on reparations and also societal initiatives devoted to fact finding and cultures of remembrance.¹⁰ Transitional justice is thus officially sanctioned and guided by the government. It is favoured by international organizations and readily receives funding because of the belief that it brings about reconciliation by punishing those who did wrong or are assumed to have done that at the time of conflict.¹¹ Governments can use it to attract funding. In practice, it may increase differences between groups when some are arrested and imprisoned. To the defeated, it is usually viewed as victors' justice which is by extension applied selectively. It alienates elites who often perpetuate violence. Therefore transitional justice needs a strong civil society for it to be effective. In 1980 Zimbabwe, that civil society was largely very weak because the repressive colonial state apparatus operated against it. Further, the civil service was still largely Rhodesian, so were various partners. Zimbabwe thus had challenges in taking reconciliation to the grassroots.

Fischer observes that for reconciliation to work, it must always proceed from both directions (grassroots and the leaders) simultaneously.¹² The elites and the grassroots must reconcile simultaneously. Doing so is deemed positive because it reduces the desire for revenge. Still, there is a problem because it is within people's rights not to reconcile if they decide so and especially when they are victims. There was no mechanism therefore to oblige foot guerrillas to reconcile with RSFs or notorious SFA commanders if they did not want to do so at individual level. Therefore former SFAs could remain adversaries even if they may have been pardoned by the government.

Victors' justice is normally punctuated with a litany of problems as demonstrated by the Rwandan

¹⁰ M Fischer, *Transitional Justice and Reconciliation: Theory and Practice*, page. 407, www.berghof-handbook.net, 6 January 2014.

¹¹ *Ibid.*

¹² *Ibid.*

case. President Paul Kagame tried to bring about national reconciliation using the traditional *gacaca* system as well as modern courts. The approach indemnified the Rwanda Patriotic Army (RPA) because it had been fighting for the incumbent president Paul Kagame during the civil unrest and genocide. The Hutus, who are the majority, on the other hand, have been collectively stigmatized as *genocidaires*.¹³ Zorbas noted that finding the right balance between justice and healing, retribution and forgiveness, tribunals and truth commissions and moving on is messy and an impossible goal.¹⁴ What ought to have been added is that politicians who initiate such moves are bent on protecting their regimes and to please the international community and human rights champions. Rarely are such governments inward-looking. For example, the government of Rwanda has not been interested in investigating war crimes committed by RPA before and after the genocide, reprisal killings of thousands of Hutus in both Rwanda and DRC. Such issues continue to be a thorn to victims and may impede reconciliation prospects.

Shnabel and Nadler think that as long as emotional needs are not satisfied, the path to reconciliation is blocked.¹⁵ This is what they call the socio-emotional route. Perpetrators want to be accepted and re-humanized while victims want to be empowered by leading the decision to forgive. The Zimbabwean approach has largely excluded SFAs who already are seen as perpetrators of wartime violence. They are largely interested in reconciling with the government but do not wish to apologise since they still believe that they did not do anything absurd. Some of them even look forward to being rewarded for bringing independence.

Tarusarira whose study focuses on post-colonial Zimbabwe takes reconciliation to include institutional reform as much as it is about psychological reform. According to him, reconciliation deals with questions of how surviving victims and perpetrators can cope with legacies of the violent past. Perpetrators are also in need of healing just as victims.¹⁶ SFAs were both victims and perpetrators because that was war and because they were armed, it follows that they were also

¹³ E Zorbas, 'Reconciliation in Post-Genocide Rwanda', *African Journal of Legal Studies*, Volume 1, Number 1, 2004, p. 29.

¹⁴ *Ibid*, page.30.

¹⁵ N Shnabel and A Nadler, 'A Needs-Based Model of Reconciliation: Satisfying the Differential Emotional Needs of Victim and Perpetrator as a Key to Promoting Reconciliation', *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology*, Volume 94, Number 1, 2008, p.116.

¹⁶ J Tarusarira, 'Of the Spirits and Healing: Cultural Values and Post-Conflict Reconciliation in Zimbabwe', *African Review*, Volume 40, Number 1, 2013, p. 94-6.

pepertrators of violence. Both components are dealt with in this chapter.

Regional Dimensions to Reconciliation at the end of Conflicts in Southern Africa

In order to appreciate challenges and opportunities associated with reconciliation, it is important to undertake a regional review to unpack the way reconciliation has unfolded. The end of civil wars in Mozambique and Namibia brought partial reconciliation especially among fighting forces which had fought each other, but that reconciliation remains elusive in Zimbabwe. In Mozambique, the civil war came after a costly and protracted liberation war. RENAMO which started as a surrogate armed force for Smith's minority regime later transformed itself into an authentic movement with real grievances. Thus its forces were demobilized or joined the national army following the signing of the Rome Accords which ended the 17 year old civil war. Despite having fought against a legitimate government, RENAMO's former militants have been able to avail themselves as war veterans who deserve the same treatment as government soldiers whom they fought in the civil war. Still, there is lack of satisfaction with the treatment which they receive from the government. In Namibia, the Koevoet who had fought against SWAPO guerrillas were not forgiven when Namibia became independent under the leadership of Sam Nujoma. As put forward by Stiff, 'after heroically repelling SWAPO's invasion of Namibia in April 1989,.....the unit was ignominiously disbanded and its members disgracefully abandoned to take their chances at the unforgiving hands of their former SWAPO foes.'¹⁷ As if that was not enough, anti-Koevoet propaganda was dished out because a decision had been reached by SWAPO that Koevoet must go.¹⁸ The selective treatment of former fighting forces is an area where lessons should be drawn in order to assist post war conflict management in many African countries currently experiencing civil wars or recovering from the same. That kind of dissatisfaction may constitute a rallying point for other disgruntled members to resume armed conflict which is detrimental to the health of a nation.

Mozambican integration and reconciliation of former antagonistic forces was assisted by the

¹⁷ P Stiff, *The Covert War: Koevoet Operations in Namibia 1979-1989*, Alberton, Galago Publishers, 2012, page. 13.

¹⁸ *Ibid*, p. 471.

UNDP, donors and the Mozambican government. A US\$35, 4 million trust fund administered by the UNDP was set to help troops and guerrillas reintegrate into civilian life. Each of them was to get a weekly grant of \$2 for over 2 years. The programme benefitted both FRELIMO and MNR veterans who totaled 93 000.¹⁹ Former combatants were given cheques, vouchers and identity cards. The cards became a source of pride and self-importance as they did not specify the movement one had belonged to during the war.²⁰ Further, the money obtained was employed to help their families, to pay school fees and above all, something to start their life with. Former fighters did not regret having fought on either side of the quarrel.

Where the government was lacking in assisting former combatants to fully integrate as expected under the traditional set-up, communities especially in Gorongosa district called upon the *magamba* or spirits of the departed ancestors to intervene.²¹ The Mozambican government did not go for a Truth and Reconciliation Commission as was the case with South Africa. There was no official apology to the wrongs of the past. Former combatants had to use their own resources to retribute those they had wronged during the war provided they were so informed through *magamba* spirits. In a way, the ex-fighter was singularly left accountable for any wrongs committed in the fight for his political leaders. Traditional leaders who included chiefs took an active role in post-civil war Mozambique in order to ensure that people under their jurisdiction did not revenge against wartime misdeeds. Rather, they encouraged people to forgive and thus insulate themselves against future cycles of violence.²² This was not the case in Zimbabwe where traditional leaders stood accused of having collaborated with the minority regime during the war and neither was there an official statement to the co-option of any religion in the reconciliation process.

Although former UNITA combatants from Angola went through a demobilization process and were paid, that was not the case for their child soldiers. Age was used to determine who would be eligible for demobilization benefits. Former fighters who were above the age of 18 received

¹⁹R Bourne, *Catastrophe: What Went Wrong in Zimbabwe*, p.136.

²⁰ *Ibid.*

²¹V Igreja and B Dia-Labranka, Restorative Justice and the Role of Magamba Spirits in the Post-Civil War Gorongosa, Central Mozambique, *International Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance*, Stockholm, 2008, page.65.

²² *Ibid*, p. 62.

demobilization and photo identification cards, travel authorization certificate, 5 months' salary based on military rank and food assistance. They also received a transport allowance and a reinstallation kit upon return to their home communities.²³ The failure to address the concerns of boys and girls is clearly a call for an increase in criminal activities.

In Zimbabwe however, demobilization was deemed successful from a military point of view. Former militias aligned to the minority regime such as District Assistants, District Security Assistance, Guard Forces and Security Force Auxiliaries did not threaten the government at any one time following the attainment of independence in 1980. The officer commanding the Guard Force, Brigadier W A Godwin was very impolite to his men under arms from 1975. At the last parade of the force, he told his troops that it was time to quietly unfurl their tents and fade away.²⁴ They could not offer resistance because they no longer had any form of support from Rhodesians and from the incoming government. Other than integrating some SFAs into the RAR, Rhodesians had not made contingent plans for them. On the other hand, whites by virtue of being treated as a superior race were not disbanded. Disbanded units such as the SS had their members transferred to other military units. Since then, Zimbabwe has not had the problem of armed bands, militias or former guerrillas terrorizing civilians except in the case of the Midlands and Matebeleland where the government massacred thousands of civilians on allegations of supporting armed 'dissidents' in the 1980s. This is unlike West Africa and the Great Lakes region where demobilization has been awash with challenges. In fact, the continent can take notes from Zimbabwe's success story with particular emphasis to how militias exchanged guns for peace and tranquility.

SFAs were generally tarnished by the way they were presented as an impediment to a peaceful transition towards elections in 1980. The Catholic Commission for Justice and Peace (CCJP) openly condemned the activities of SFAs and security forces while paying a blind eye on the brutal and violent activities of guerrillas. Diana Auret described them as 'undisciplined and minimally trained onside guerrillas who roamed the countryside striking fear into the hearts of ZANU-PF and PF-ZAPU supporters.'²⁵ They were accused of brutally punishing ZANU-PF

²³ *Human Rights Watch*, Volume 15 Number 10(A), April 2003, www.hrw.org, 17 October 2012.

²⁴ *The Herald*, Saturday 10 May 1980.

²⁵ D Auret, *Reaching for Justice: The Catholic Commission for Justice and Peace 1972-1992*, Gweru, Mambo Press, 1992, p.129.

supporters and press-ganging men into UANC forces. Such assertions go a long way in pointing to the fact that the author wanted to identify with the ruling ZANU-PF party as the triumphant mood was not yet over. She completely ignored the presence of senior guerrillas who did not go into the Assembly Points but continued to roam the countryside. The work therefore views SFAs as an adamant lot who were not prepared to embrace an African leader and by extension, the hand of reconciliation. Of all SFAs' critics, it was Bishop Dodge, Muzorewa's predecessor who urged the United Methodist Church to compel Muzorewa to resign because he had disgraced the church by participating in politics as a result of which he was responsible for killings.²⁶ As long as he had UANC, his followers were apt to behave in a way that could gain their leader political mileage in light of circumstances then.

My thinking on the ZANU PF ruling party's effort at reconciling with former government counter-insurgent militias is informed by the works of Odhiambo and Lonsdale.²⁷ The two argue that whenever a war is fought to remove the incumbent government, it is not everyone who fights. Otherwise the majority of the population remains indifferent to an organization which is out to purportedly liberate them. More important is that these people constitute electorates in future, hence they have to be treated carefully. Liberation movements in the 1950s and 1960s did not take aboard whole nations. For example, the Convention People's Party was the party of Ghana's coastal towns. The National Council of Nigeria split between Yoruba and Igbo while Uganda's nationalists ganged up against the Baganda than against the British.²⁸ Therefore, it would not be the best idea to sideline a group of people because they were at one time opposed to what you stood for.

In light of the above, Zimbabwe's nationalism was born with a divisive birthmark. It is these which saw NDP splitting with the formation of the short-lived splinter group, the Zimbabwe National Party. As already shown, ZAPU split up and continued to do so in the course of the liberation struggle. Since whole populations cannot rise in support of a cause, the government which comes to power in Africa normally has a duty to decide who should be invited as a citizen

²⁶ *Moto*, 2 August 1980.

²⁷ E S A Odhiambo and J Lonsdale, 'Introduction' in, *Mau Mau and Nationhood: Arms, Authority and Narration*, Oxford, James Currey, 2003, p.1.

²⁸ *Ibid*, p. 2-3.

with full rights under the new dispensation. The leaders pronounce which episodes of the struggle should be remembered and which ones must be forgotten altogether. This approach is counter-productive as it alienates people who live on the same soil as those included. Indifference to the government is born out of this exclusion which is why there are some attempts today in African countries to embrace former enemies instead of shunning them thereby providing the opposition with die-hard sympathizers.

Survival Strategies, Defections and Floor Crossing in the Context of the Reconciliation Policy

Information on the survival strategies used by SFAs towards the end of the war and in the wake of Muzorewa's electoral defeat was obtained through the use of oral interviews and analysis of sources at the National Archives of Zimbabwe. There were a lot of variations but unlike other districts, there was generally no formally organized retributive action against those who had served as SFAs in Hurungwe. Like guerrillas, the war had incapacitated some members of the force but they found themselves without any form of assistance from the government. It was of interest to note that the majority of former SFAs still live in the same areas they fought the war and some were quick enough to get into ZANU-PF political structures at independence as a way of protecting themselves from overzealous supporters of the ruling party.

The coming of independence did not herald positive results for the SFAs. Their leader Bishop Muzorewa got only 3 seats against Mugabe's 57 and Nkomo's 20. It was a time for former SFA members to rebrand themselves and acknowledge that a leader whose forces they had fought against during the war was now in power. The independence euphoria saw former guerrillas and their sympathizers sometimes exerting heavy fines on former *Pfumo reVanhu* for having supported the wrong side. Unlike whites, the generality of Africans who had supported Muzorewa lacked the resources to escape to South Africa and above all, the majority had lived in no other country than Zimbabwe. Those who were financially sound found themselves leaving for as far as the USA. For example, Comrade Max, the renowned former guerrilla who became the first leader of the auxiliary forces was said to have left for London. South African newspapers said he had

sought refuge in the British capital.²⁹ Mr Joshua Nkomo noted that many people had disappeared in the war, but in the context of reconciliation, it was not possible to find out what happened to them. He added that many people such as former members of the Guard Force and Selous Scouts ought to be accepted in society though they made themselves unpopular during the war.³⁰ The end of the war did not bring reconciliation especially among fighting forces who had opposed each other. In this spirit comes the need for examining the coping mechanisms in light of the new dispensation including the meaning of independence to SFAs.

In the immediate aftermath of Zimbabwe's independence, the fate of auxiliaries was a forgone conclusion. A cabinet minister, Dr Edison Zvobgo, announced that the controversial auxiliaries would be disbanded by the incoming government and those among them interested in a career in the military would be retrained before joining the Zimbabwean army. He further explained that one of the new government's first acts would be to disband the controversial auxiliary force of 26 000 loyal to Bishop Muzorewa.³¹ Not only were SFAs to go, but they were not to be paid as former guerrillas regardless of their suffering because they were laboring for an unpopular cause. Political leaders like Sithole who also had SFAs did congratulate the new government which he praised as truly nationalist with credentials which cannot be doubted.³² His cautious statement did not help him to reconcile with a party he had founded. He was not co-opted, a clear indication that the political elites were not committed to a policy which they were pronouncing.

At grassroots some supporters of the winning party were obsessed with the spirit revenge just as their leaders who pronounced reconciliation. There were reports in March 1980 of whites being attacked and supporters of the UANC also being attacked countrywide. In the Goromonzi area, a white farmer, Peter Willerby and his wife were attacked. The sister was detained with broken ribs. The attackers were apparently singing political songs.³³ On 28 March, it was reported that 7 ZANU-PF supporters had been gaoled for assaulting a white man, McMaster, at Arcturus Mine on 15 March. They were sentenced to 18 months in prison, half of which were suspended for 5

²⁹ MS308/58/11, *National Observer*, 11 July 1980.

³⁰ MS308/58/11, .Missing Persons BBC, 6 October 1980

³¹ *The Herald*, 7 March 1980.

³² MS308/58/10, NAZ, Reverend Ndabaningi's Statements.

³³ BBC Rhodesia in Brief, 23/3/80.

years.³⁴ On the same day, a report appeared about 9 ZANU-PF supporters intimidating and assaulting supporters of the UANC in Harare. They were told by a senior magistrate that such actions damaged the image of their party.³⁵ The spate of violence indicated the level of unpreparedness to forgive before revenging. In the aftermath of 18 April, the UANC was appealing to the government for protection arguing that it was unfair to punish the party for losing elections.³⁶

In Harare, massive violence was directed against PF- ZAPU and the UANC. The *Times* reported that more than 1000 members of the police had been deployed to Harare's 9 Townships to quell violence. Despite arresting more than 400 people, the violence had not stopped by the time of going to press.³⁷ ZANU-PF supporters in Harare were alleged to be holding kangaroo courts and fining those who had belonged to other parties as much as 20 British pounds or arbitrary beatings.³⁸ The victims were predominantly followers of Bishop Muzorewa, especially members of the then disbanded SFA and their families. Condemnation of violence by both the Prime Minister and the Minister of Local Government and National Housing, Eddison Zvobgo fell on deaf ears. Those wearing T-Shirts belonging to other political parties were also targeted.³⁹ This kind of atmosphere existing had an enduring mark on memories of the whole process of reconciliation and integration.

The need to study post-war coping mechanisms is due to the adoption of reconciliation as a policy following the protracted war of Chimurenga. As such, it is radically different say from a study of Europe in the aftermath of the Second World War where perpetrators of violence and genocide were tried and punished at Nuremberg for what were called war crimes. To date, such people are still being sought after and if found stand a chance of being tried. For example, Hungarian Nazi war crimes suspect Laszlo Csatory, 97 years old; number one on the Simon Wiesenthal Centre's wanted list was reported by Budapest reporters to have been taken into custody as recently as

³⁴ BBC Rhodesia in Brief, 28/3/80

³⁵ *Ibid.*

³⁶ BBC Rhodesia in Brief, 25/4/80

³⁷ Police Move in to Quell Violence, *Times* 20/4 /80.

³⁸ Kangaroo Courts Punish Followers of Muzorewa, *Telegraph*, 28/4/80.

³⁹ MS308/58/11, NAZ ,Townships Quiet Now.

2012.⁴⁰ Csatory was accused by the Wiesenthal Centre of having organized the deportation of some 15 700 Jews to the Auschwitz death camp during the World War 2. At that time, he was a senior police officer in Kosice which was at that time occupied by a Nazi ally, Hungary and is now Slovakia. In 1948 he was condemned to death in absentia as he had fled to Canada until the 1990s after which he moved to Budapest.⁴¹ His arrest is not surprising taking into consideration that reconciliation was not taken as a policy in the aftermath of the Second World War. Memories from former SFAs in the Rhodesian war suggest that for them, reconciliation meant being ridiculed, excluded and loss of freedom to speak about the war in which some of them had been compelled to join.

The postwar experiences of former SFAs must be judged against Robert Mugabe's most famous speech he gave at Rufaro Stadium on the eve of independence in April 1980 that sought to project a new Zimbabwean personality. In it he said:

If yesterday you hated me, today you cannot avoid the love that binds you and me and me to you. Is it not folly therefore that in these circumstances, anybody should seek to revive the wounds and any grievances of the past? The ways of the past must now stand forgiven and forgotten. If ever we look to the past, let us do so for the lesson the past has taught us, namely that oppression and racism are inequities that must never find scope in our political and social system. It could never be a correct justification that because whites oppressed us yesterday, when they had power, the blacks must oppress them today because they have power. An evil becomes an evil whether practiced by white against black or black against white.⁴²

The tone of the speech was such that reconciliation was between blacks and whites yet there was need for reconciliation among blacks who had fought, quarreled and killed each other during the protracted war of independence. Therefore it was whites who were invited into the new dispensation. Peter Walls was appointed to head the armed forces, Ken Flower continued to head the CIO, David Smith became Minister of Commerce while Denis Norman was appointed Minister of Agriculture.⁴³ The hand of reconciliation was also extended to former operatives who had fought against guerrillas in the bush war. Briefing white commanders who had come to pay him homage, the Prime Minister-elect, Robert Mugabe said, "We will ensure that there is a place for everyone in this country. I want a broadly-based government to include whites and Nkomo."⁴⁴ Members of ZAPU were also invited to take up ministerial posts in the new government. No

⁴⁰ *The Citizen*, Thursday 19 July 2012.

⁴¹ *The Citizen*, Thursday 19 July 2012.

⁴² R Bourne, *Catastrophe: What went Wrong in Zimbabwe?* London, Zed Books, 2011, pp. 98-99.

⁴³ *Ibid*, page 99.

⁴⁴ P Stiff, *The Silent War*, p. 296

African Minister from Muzorewa's Zimbabwe-Rhodesia was invited into the new cabinet. The argument that they were part and parcel of Smith was applied in that case. The exclusion of Muzorewa meant that he was identified as a worse enemy than whites or more precisely he was neither a military or political threat hence least likely to threaten the new dispensation. On the contrary, government forces which operated under Smith were not disbanded but the SFAs were. When they returned home, they had to adjust to civilian life but under complex situations.

Even though the government extended the hand of reconciliation, not all whites accepted it. Some refused to stay on suggesting that they were not prepared to serve under a black-led government which they considered inferior in the world hierarchy of races and therefore unable to lead whites. One example was Lieutenant-Colonel Gath Barret who said, 'I cannot undertake to serve a Marxist/communist government. I don't believe the country will be secure in their hands.'⁴⁵ That Peter Walls stayed on was not necessarily because he accepted to serve under Mugabe. Stiff shows that Walls wanted to see whites he had served right. Second, he had the duty to repatriate South African military hardware loaned to him during the war.⁴⁶ As a result, he was compelled to address some of his colleagues to stay on so as to give the white population some form of confidence. One such meeting broke up in confusion after Sergeant Deon Breytenbach interrupted General Walls' address with his imitation of a cock crow- the cock being the election symbol for ZANU-PF.⁴⁷ This goes on to explain that the hand of reconciliation was extended to those who were not ready to accept it.

Many white soldiers were not in a reconciliatory mood in 1980. For example, a RLI on guard at the Rhodesia Broadcasting Studios was closer to provoking bloodbirth. After his 1980 electoral victory, Robert Mugabe arrived with a few bodyguards to address the nation in a television speech. Many white young troopers voiced their desire to kill him but in the end, their commanders decided against it.⁴⁸ A white commander stationed at the studios found that one of his men was missing. He found him in the studio complex with a hand grenade waiting for an opportunity to take out Mugabe. In addition to the above, one Rhodesian platoon commander who

⁴⁵ P Stiff, *The Silent War*, p. 299.

⁴⁶ *Ibid.*

⁴⁷ *Ibid*, page. 300.

⁴⁸ Mano der Boer, 'Rhodesian Approach to Counterinsurgency: A Preference for Killing', *Military Review*, November-December 2012, p.43.

knew that the planned coup against Mugabe had been called off instructed his men to provoke celebrating Africans. He told them that if the people responded with aggression, they should shoot. Yet despite actions by soldiers such as spitting and urinating on the masses, the people did not respond so the troops returned to their barracks.⁴⁹ The above is intended to emphasize that reconciliation was a policy of the weak then to win the support of the militarily lethal Rhodesians. It was not intended to be a permanent feature of the Zimbabwean government as the 1985 electoral result showed that whites had continued to support their own party instead of ZANU-PF.

The hand extended by the ZANU-PF government to former adversaries was out of strategic reasons of safeguarding the independence of a fledgling nation. For example, the government wanted the Special Air Service (SAS) to stay on because it had the potential of becoming a very useful Praetorian Guard against ZIPRA who had retained fully-equipped and manned armoured formations in Zambia.⁵⁰ Whites who remained behind were however not as victimized as their African counterparts especially those who had served as members of the Selous Scouts. For example, Morrisson Nyathi, a turned ZANLA commander who guided Selous Scouts in the attack on Nyadzonja in August 1976 was arrested and detained at a ZANLA base at Grazeley near Goromonzi. The hand of reconciliation was not offered to him. He was abandoned to his fate and eventually gruesomely flayed alive and done to death.⁵¹ In the Herald, it was reported that a man alleged to have led Rhodesian Security Forces on a raid against a guerrilla camp was being ‘detained by the masses’ on a farm in Goromonzi.⁵² All this was despite the man being covered by the amnesty ordinance. Earlier, it was reported that the man was taken to High Command HQ ‘for his personal protection’ after he had been apprehended by the masses. The same source went on to say that the man was recognized by ZANLA guerrillas at Harare Musika, overpowered and taken to the party offices.⁵³ Put simply, the masses were none other than former ZANLA guerrillas. Having lost their beloved ones and trained in the art of hating opponents, hardly would they have forgiven Nyathi.

Other blacks were not so fortunate. In an interview with one former Selous Scout operative, Stiff

⁴⁹ *Ibid.*

⁵⁰ P Stiff, *The Silent War*, p. 301.

⁵¹ P Stiff, *The Silent War*, p. 305.

⁵² *The Herald* 15 June 1980.

⁵³ *The Herald*, 12 June 1980.

was told by one man that he knew more than 10 of his former black comrades who were killed by ZANLA. The murders occurred clandestinely making it difficult to believe that it was with official blessing, but they all died within a relatively short space of time.⁵⁴ The examples he gave were of Sergeant Rich Khama who was murdered on a train between Harare and Bulawayo and Sergeant Chipedi who was shot at Mt Darwin. Several were kidnapped from bars and killed. Another was beaten, thrown in a river and drowned. Troops searched and killed 2 while they were at their home village on leave.⁵⁵ The policy of reconciliation appeared to work at the top political level but was not similarly applied at lower levels. Otherwise, it only worked for whites who were generally spared from direct attacks because they were hedged by the law. Blacks who had served the former regime were vulnerable and had no recourse to justice. In areas where militias were numerous, they were generally spared from the wrath of those they had wronged or provoked in the war.

Reconciling with the Spiritual World and Integrating Returning SFAs into their Families and the Community.

Generally, there were no incidences of open retributions against either members of the UANC or SFAs in the aftermath of political independence in Hurungwe district. On the eve of independence, former SFAs were generally ignored provided they were then supporting ZANU-PF or they were not politically active. They were disarmed at various bases, given a little money and informed that when their services were required, they would be called upon once more. In the early years of their disbandment, they had to concern themselves with traditional cleansing ceremonies and then start a new life in an environment which was not quite friendly to those who had *sold out*. To date, they are still concerned that their contribution in the liberation war has not been adequately presented.

It was ZANU-PF's major preoccupation to consolidate political power by co-opting even those who were deemed to have fought against the liberation war. Files available from the District Administrator in Karoi do not report anything on SFAs because the major political and military

⁵⁴P Stiff, *The Silent War*, p.306.

⁵⁵ *Ibid.*

threats were ZAPU and ZIPRA, and hence energy was expended on them. Communication between the Hurungwe District Commissioner (DC), P J Curran, and the ZANU-PF provincial offices indicate that UANC was still alive but neither the party nor its disbanded militias were a security threat because they were not a major threat to the new government. Thus any interference from the Chinhoyi ZANU provincial offices concerned itself mostly with ZAPU. For example, in a letter to the Provincial Commissioner dated 2 November 1980, P J Curran complained of interference from ZANU PF against holding district council elections for security reasons emanating from the presence of Assembly Points. For that election, ZAPU had supplied 19 candidates, UANC, 6 while ZANU-PF had not. When Curran enquired from the deputy Provincial Chairman why ZANU-PF had not submitted, the reply was that the DC should take instructions directly from the party. The DC was told that he was not neutral because he favoured ZIPRA.⁵⁶

Some former SFAs such as Mushongahande of Chundu Communal area in Hurungwe were delighted and relieved to receive that little monetary compensation for fighting in the war. He did not see the end of the liberation war from a completely negative lens as some of his colleagues. Alongside members he operated with, each of them was given \$60-00. Some of his friends were able to buy cattle, others got married while some went on to complete their primary education which had been disrupted by the war.⁵⁷ Therefore, those who benefitted had not suffered in vain. However, fear for having fought for Muzorewa still defined Mushongahande's behavior even during the interview. During my first interview with him, his wife and some of his children were present. As a result, Mushongahande simply indicated that he had belonged to the RAR during the liberation war. He told me of his exploits from that angle. However, when we met the following day in the absence of the rest of the family, he revealed that he had been a member of the auxiliaries in the Second Chimurenga war. His experience was that under the then volatile political environment, it would have been improper to indicate to me that he was a member of the SFAs in the war. The respectable thing was to assert that he had belonged to a professional army. Still, he asserted that he was not ashamed that he had fought the war on the side of Muzorewa.

⁵⁶ Letter to the Provincial Commissioner, November 1980, File EL, Ministry of Local Government, Karoi.

⁵⁷ Interview with Mushongahande, Chitiki, May 2012,

By the same token, Jakaza under headman Mudzimu of Hurungwe was able to buy 2 donkeys which were used not only by his brothers but other relatives as draught power.⁵⁸ Despite having used his donkeys as draught power in the 1980s, the same friends and relatives today point at him as one who sold out the liberation war by fighting for Muzorewa. These memories have been kept so alive that to date, his history blocks him from holding a post in ZANU-PF despite his commitment to the party after 1980. It would appear that the money given to former SFAs during disbandment was reasonable though not adequate. However, later developments which saw ZANLA and ZIPRA veterans of the Chimurenga war being given a preferential treatment obviously led them to query or revise the adequacy of what they had been offered at the time they were disbanded. The once-off payment of ZW\$50-000 given to nationalist former guerrilla veterans in 1997 further alienated those who had fought as compromised forces because they had been promised that at the end of the war, they would be paid. These developments appeared to have greatly influenced the attitudes and thinking of what the so-called compromised forces think should have been provided to them for fighting the war. Jakaza had to use his own resources to go back to primary school for another 3 years to finish grade seven. Going back to school helped him to close the gap of literacy and enjoy his boyhood once more. It was at Mahwada Primary School that he fell in love with Dadirai who he married in 1984. He had to pay his school fees by himself. On the other hand, former nationalist guerrillas were getting assistance if they wanted to go back to school. For Jakaza, his tenure as a member of the SFA blocked him further from being conscripted into the police despite spending more than 12 years as police constabulary after his grade seven. Even if he might have failed to qualify into the police force for other reasons, the suspicion that he is being disadvantaged for having been a member of the SFA remains evident.

Ways in which SFAs were received in their home areas largely depended on how they had related with communities where they were fighting during the course of the war and government policy of reconciliation. Those who had related badly with communities were accordingly punished while others were not only forgiven but allowed to take positions in ZANU-PF which was more worried about increasing support than sniffing out former adversaries. According to Kanyairabanda, a few returning SFAs were made to pay a fine of a goat or some money but he

⁵⁸ Interview with Jakaza, May 2012

could not be drawn to give specific examples.⁵⁹ Some former SFAs who were outgoing and calculative used the opportunity to entrench themselves within ZANU-PF though they were still looking forward to being paid for their role in the war. Others were able to join paratroopers as they recruited throughout the country from any volunteers. According to a former ZANLA combatant, Ngwaru, army recruiters were sometimes not quite particular about one's history. All they wanted were youngmen who were prepared to undergo the tough military training. Takesure Baradzanwa from Hurungwe who was an SFA in the war took the opportunity to join the force. Ngwaru went on to elaborate that some were simply transferred to the RAR by receding Rhodesians. Therefore, they automatically became part of the national army.⁶⁰ The challenge was that if the history of ever having participated in the war on behalf of Muzorewa was known, then chances for promotion in the uniformed forces were very slim. Although there were retributions on some who tried to join uniformed forces, the rest stayed at home because they were afraid that since their names had been taken down as they were being disbanded, action would be taken against them if they tried to join.

A former SFA, Dzomba, claims that at the end of the war, he was given the option of joining uniformed forces or being demobilized. He chose the latter option and got a three months' salary. He returned home to Chinhoyi after an absence from home of four years.⁶¹ Dzomba went on to point out that during the ceasefire period,

We went to Magurekure Assembly Point at one time to guard ZIPRA guerrillas based there. We also looked after refugees at Magunje. Some of these metamorphosed into war veterans. Despite having crossed the border, these had not yet received any military training. I know this from my discussions with some of them.⁶²

This brings into question who really is a war veteran. Delays in the payment of gratuities to those who fought as guerrillas culminated in the co-option of those who had not even trained as long as they could argue that they were authentic veterans of the liberation war. The meaning of who really is a war veteran however remains unchanged. According to the War Veterans Amendment Act, a war veteran is:

⁵⁹ Interview with Kanyairabanda, May 2012.

⁶⁰ Interview with Ngwaru, War Veteran, Chitungwiza 8 January 2014.

⁶¹ Interview with Dzomba, Chitindiva Township, May 2011.

⁶² *Ibid.*

1. Any person who underwent military training and participated consistently and persistently in the liberation struggle which occurred in Zimbabwe between the first of January 1962 and the 29th of January 1980 in connection with bringing about Zimbabwe's independence on 18 April 1980.
2. Any person who before was (i) served an order for his detention or restriction in terms of any enactment then in force or (ii) was convicted of any offence under any law in force...as a result of his political activity in connection with bringing about Zimbabwe's independence on the 18th of April 1980 and who was detained or restricted or imprisoned in consequence of such an order or conviction for a period of more than 2 years or for periods which in the aggregate amounted to more than 2 years.⁶³

The definition while purporting to cover restrictees and collaborators does not do so in practice. As a result, these categories formed their own associations namely the Zimbabwe Liberation War Collaborators and Restricttees Association (ZLIWACOR). The idea of consistency and persistence is fluid hence it has come to embrace some former SFAs because some of them first operated as mujibhas before they were recruited into the force. As long as they are able to move out of immediate communities where they are still remembered as SFAs, they find themselves safely and respectfully remembered. It is these complexities which underlie the division of society into heroes and sellouts. However, Dzomba was also asserting his dislike of the ZANU-PF regime by arguing in favour of the minority regime. At the end of the interview, he was to assert that Zimbabwe would have been better off if it had been ruled by Bishop Muzorewa because he was an honest clergyman. This means that his identification with Muzorewa is till enduring.

In some cases, army recruiters did not consider the military history of the recruit. For example, one former SFA from Magunje successfully joined the national army in 1981. In 1997, he was also awarded the ZW\$50 000 just like any other war veteran. He served in the army until the time of his death.⁶⁴ Such happenings bring to question the whole idea of patriots and sellouts and the cracks used in the whole process of veterans. With some tamed guerrillas operating in rural areas during the course of the war, they just entered Assembly Points in 1980 where they were defined as veterans. All the SFAs I interviewed indicated that in 1997, they could not apply for gratuities out of real fear that they could be arrested for having sold out. They indicated that there are no people prepared to listen to the rhetoric that force was used to get them into SFA and remain there until the end of the war.

During the ceasefire period, the RSFs made efforts to co-opt some of the SFAs into RAR. It

⁶³ 1997 War Veterans Amendment Act, Chapter 11:15

⁶⁴ Interview with Mhuru, war veteran, Gutu, 27 October 2011

appears that many serving SFAs failed to take this opportunity of joining the army though it was available. Mushunje who had fought the war as an SFA was provided with that opportunity which he turned down. He claimed that,

I was given the choice of remaining in the army if I wanted. I refused to join the national army but chose to leave and was given my money. I just wanted to go back home and rest after playing my part in the war. I returned home and was well-received. Traditional rituals were undertaken by my parents as a way of welcoming me.⁶⁵

Some were however not given the same opportunity especially in Manicaland where the auxiliaries were unpopular. This was the case with Francis Nyamande who fought in Manicaland despite having been recruited and trained in Hurungwe. His account went as follows:

We surrendered our guns and ammunition in Mutare and we were given travel warrants to use on our way home. I came back home and enrolled at Chitiki Primary School for my grade 6. After my JC, I joined the teaching field and taught for many years but I did not go to a teachers' college to be trained. My brother too who had served with the Rhodesians did not encounter problems when he returned. He was well-received and later on he went to work in Harare as a caretaker before transferring to Magunje Growth Point. He passed away when he had already retired. That there was no action taken against those who had been with the Rhodesian army spells out that they had not wronged the community in any way or that word for reconciliation had permeated to every sector of society.⁶⁶

Similarly, at the end of the war, Zinhatha's group was just taken by a military truck first to Magunje and then disarmed and finally disbanded in Karoi (often referred to as HQ) without any payment for having fought in the war. To him, this continues to be a bone of contention because he had been promised money during the training period. For him, this was war and anyone who fought was supposed to be compensated. He did not see the difference between him RSF who remained operational and still thinks that the current government just hates them for being recruited forcibly.⁶⁷ Reconciliation remains incomplete because the Zimbabwean government seemed to have forgotten the unfair way in which SFAs were recruited. The Rhodesian military tricked or compelled them to join SFAs but the government seems to have applied blanket amnesia. Government does not seem to remember that they were compelled but prefers to refer to them as sell-outs because it is comfortable with that political identity which often serves as a scapegoat for poor performance.

Kanyairabanda remembers that at the end of the war in 1980, SFAs to which he was part gathered

⁶⁵ Interview with Mushunje, Chitiki, May 2011.

⁶⁶ Francis Nyamande, Chitiki, May 2012.

⁶⁷ Zinhatha, Mahwada, Headman Mudzimu, May 2012

at their base and himself went to Mahwada where he had fought during the war. Members of the RSF disarmed and bused them to the small town of Karoi where they handed over their remaining kit. He went further to say that they were given a little money and sent back to their homes. The money given, he claimed, was so little that he thought that as people who had been promised payment, maybe the new government of Zimbabwe would compensate them at a later stage. That was not to be as former SFAs have not been paid but ridiculed to the present day. Their leader, Abel Muzorewa, went back to serve the church leaving them leaderless. My opinion is that SFAs in Hurungwe had not had sharp differences with ZANU-PF politicians during the liberation war because its guerrillas had not fought in the district. It was PF-ZAPU which was potentially explosive and could threaten the new government which is why Nkomo and his army were integrated into the government and the Zimbabwe National Army. In addition, although ZANU and ZAPU had sharp differences, at least they were fighting for generally the same goals hence they could identify with each other as they had done during the Lancaster House Conference which brought the final settlement for the independence of Zimbabwe. In the course of the ceasefire, even RSFs gradually dissociated themselves with the SFAs. As the force was disbanded, it found itself headless and without a point of convergence.

In the area of Maumbe where the war had been quite intense and where mass graves of SFAs are still found today the treatment of former SFAs was not as friendly. Moses Matamba and nine of his friends who had undergone military training at Domboshawa found themselves back home in June 1980.⁶⁸ Apparently, there were a number of former refugees who had been in Zambia and Mozambique. These according to Moses were able to stir up hostility against former auxiliaries. To prevent themselves from physical and verbal attacks, whenever these youngmen wanted to visit shops or other public places, they did so in groups of not less than 5.⁶⁹ That way, they were ready to square up with their opponents. The fact that they were not physically harmed was due to the potential capacity of the group to defend itself and the Prime Minister's directive against such reprisals. When the MDC was formed, Moses became one of the staunch supporters partly because of the exclusionist approach by ZANU-PF to such people. On a general note however, I noted that indifference to ZANU-PF by disgruntled SFAs did not always translate to joining the

⁶⁸ Interview with Matamba, Chinhoyi, 12 April 2012.

⁶⁹ *Ibid.*

MDC.

My personal observations in Mahwada area were that former SFAs somehow lack respect among their peers because their political history continues to haunt them. The case of Kabrit is one clear such example. He was quick to join the national army when independence came in 1980. He retired from the army in 1996 to become a full-time businessman. With the coming of the 2000 parliamentary elections, Kabrit re-modelled himself into a war veteran of the Second Chimurenga. Having been fully integrated, he led invasions of white commercial farms especially around the small town of Karoi. That is how he became fully integrated into the structures of the ruling party. When he took his violent behavior to his home area under headmen Mudzimu, youths who were accused of supporting the opposition were not respectful of him on the grounds that at one time he had fought for Muzorewa. As a result, his huts were set on fire and none of the alleged youths behind the arson was arrested. The label of sell-out stung and stuck even if he was committed to the new dispensation. The sell-out identity permeated to the lower echelons of society and was used against any former combatants of Muzorewa. This has tended to obliterate reconciliation by opening old wounds which had somehow dried.

Identities have not always been fluid but have changed over time and space. Edson Dungiro was an auxiliary during the war and based at Kazangarare.⁷⁰ His rifle grenade exploded before his face in 1978 after he detonated it accidentally. He lost his hand, both eyes and was badly burnt. He remained hospitalized in Salisbury until 1980. By the 1990s, he had changed his identity into a war veteran who was maimed in the struggle against the Smith regime. He has been completely reconciled to the ZANU-PF and the Zimbabwe Liberation War Veterans Association. The point is that despite odds against them, people are still able to change their identities if they can see clear benefits of doing so. Owing to his physical condition, no one has challenged the authenticity of his war credentials. His situation is accepted because of the critical shortage of war veterans in Hurungwe and because he openly identifies with ZANU-PF.⁷¹

Some former SFAs are still waiting for the government to honor them for fighting the war or at

⁷⁰ Interview with Mrs Chizema, Mutaurya Village, 3 May 2012.

⁷¹ Kanyairabanda, Mutaurya Village, 4 May 2012.

least to acknowledge that SFAs were compelled to join the war. The case of Murambiwa, who found himself penniless and jobless at the end of the liberation war, demonstrates the challenges of SFAs clearly. The end of the war saw them going to Karoi where military kit was taken. Then their personal details were recorded in case they would be needed for service next time. Such details included war name, actual name, addresses, next of kin and level of education. Then he was made to sign against these details and given travel warrants to take them home. Promises that they might be needed in future did not materialize. That is how he and his colleagues were thrown into the historical dustbin from where they have failed to rise and from where their voices are not audible. Moreso, they feel used for nothing but their colleagues who were similarly press-ganged into ZIPRA enjoyed the monetary and status benefits ‘for having chosen to defend the country.’ On the contrary Murambiwa lamented that most of his fellow colleagues are dying in abject poverty and no mention is made of their role during the war. He pointed out that for the first time since 1980, he was being interviewed by a researcher yet former ZANLA or ZIPRA ex combatants are visited from time to time. Worse still, Murambiwa has not been compensated for injuries he suffered during the war which deformed his left leg.⁷²

Most former SFAs whom I interviewed talked of some form of ritual or traditional ceremonies which were undertaken by elders to make children who had gone to war acceptable once more. In addition, despite having practiced certain traditional rituals during their service, their military leadership did not undertake any such processes during the dissolution of the force. All of them talked of rapturous welcomes, giving the wrong impression that despite having lost the war, they were still acceptable. However, they were met with the wrath of the new state when, in the process of joining any of the uniformed forces, some revealed their former status. It was not surprising that they were still hesitant to share with me their wartime experiences and what became of them over 3 decades from the day Zimbabwe became independent. To the present day former SFAs believe that they still have not been forgiven for fighting against ZIPRA or ZANLA despite little choices they had.

Chideipa, like many of his colleagues who had fought on the SFAs side, was well-received by his family. Despite all that, his cleansing still remains incomplete. Circumstances leading to that are

⁷² He did show me the injury but it was not possible to establish and confirm that the injury was due to war.

summarized in his statement below.

We were given the chance of joining the national army or returning home. I chose to return home since I desperately missed my parents. I used the little money which I had to buy a cow. My parents brewed beer to inform my ancestors of my safe return. The beer was not supposed to be tasted until the celebration day. My mother forgot and gave her brother to have a sip. When my father realized that, the ceremony was cancelled. Soon afterwards, my father died and no ceremony was done to the present day. It is now a closed chapter.⁷³

Chideipa was worried that after all, the ceremony might not take place as senior relatives are now deceased. This means that he still attaches importance to the undertaking of the ritual for reasons of complete acceptance. What Chideipa lamented is not different from what Lettia Kagodo (born Veronica Chigora) is also worried about. The fact that four of her family members who went to war did not return continues to haunt her. Worse still is that the family has not done anything like *kubika doro* (brewing traditional beer to appease the dead).⁷⁴ At least, Kagodo can speak her mind openly because her relatives died in a cause that has been defined as worthwhile, unlike the auxiliary cause. The situation of the SFAs is that hardly can they speak about their exploits and what still needs to be done, unlike guerrillas.

Kanyairabanda went through a traditional ceremony known as *kukupauhwa* presided over by traditional healer. He underwent this alongside his young brother Dete who again had been a member of the SFA and the eldest brother who had trained as a ZIPRA guerrilla and fought in Hurungwe during the course of the war. Kanyairabanda claimed that departed relatives and elders were thanked for keeping their sons alive during the course of the war and they had now come back. Friends and relatives were invited for the ceremony traditionally known as *bira* under which the above procedure was done. Beer was also poured on him and his brothers to insulate them against anyone they may have killed during crossfire in the war.⁷⁵ My informant did not need to visit n'angas or sangomas because he claimed not have killed any civilian throughout the war. He further pointed out that this is why him and his wife and their children are intact and surviving. Accordingly, those who had deliberately shed blood went through complex cleansing ceremonies which temporarily contained avenging spirits but until the present day, the spirits of the dead continue to plague them. At family level, that one of them had been with ZIPRA and the other two with SFA did not matter at all. Of importance was the safe return of all the three children.

⁷³ Interview with Lazarus Chideipa, Masaga, 13 December 2012.

⁷⁴ Lettia Kagodo in an interview with Munyaradzi Huni, *The Sunday Mail*, February 10-16 2013

⁷⁵ Interview with kanyairabanda, Mutaurya Village, Headman Mudzmu, 4 May 2012.

For Kanyairabanda the end of the war did not bring to him any challenges. Once he was home, he joined ZANU-PF and has held different posts from cell level right up to district level. He was also instrumental in opening cell and district structures. Although he is known to have been an SFA, no one in the community has bothered him about his past. Part of the reason is that he did not try to join the armed forces unlike his friend Jakaza. In addition, he was not implicated in the killing or abuse of any civilian from the local community during the course of the war. However, he still thinks that total healing can come if he is paid his dues for fighting in the war.

His experience is radically different from that of his late brother Chimera who was a ZIPRA guerrilla during the war. Although he could not shade more light on this, other interviewees, especially Elizabeth Mafavhuke who is the sister-in-law to the late Chimera, had valuable information pertaining to misfortunes which befell Chimera after the war. To begin with, around the end of 1978, Chimera had been involved in the killing of a farm worker who was going to Chidamoyo area to rebuild his home because ZIPRA was demanding that everyone working for a mubhunu (Boer or white farm owner) should abandon his job. As he passed through for a beer drink at Samere's home, mujibhas informed a ZIPRA guerrilla called Mandebvu who in turn instructed Chimera and his group to deal with the man. They took the man, distributed his belongings among themselves and then killed him. His body was buried in a shallow grave in Gasura Village. According to Kanyairabanda, the grave was knee-deep and as such, it was devoured by foraging domestic pigs. In addition, around ceasefire, Chimera was involved in the killing of one businessman at Mudzimu Township who was a known ZANU-PF supporter and card holding member. At about the same time, he was further implicated in the abduction of two ZANLA political commissars posted at Mudzimu to oversee the ceasefire process and also to campaign for their party. It is suspected that he took the two ZANLA members beyond Tengwe into Kavaya Mountains which is some 25km away and shot them dead.

As soon as election results were out, alleged detectives were after him in connection with their 2 missing guerrillas. They searched his home and found material from the shop which was burnt when the ZANU-PF aligned businessman was killed. Coincidentally, it was at the same time that the two guerrillas mentioned had been abducted. Throughout the 1980s and even early 1990s, he

was still being taken for interrogation and torture by alleged state operatives. By the time he died in 2000, he had been arrested and tortured several times. Furthermore, at times he went out of his mind due to persecution by the spirits of those he had killed during the war. When war veterans were awarded gratuities of 50 000 Zimbabwean dollars, he could not collect his dues because of fear that he might be nabbed by the police for wrongdoing during the war.

From the discussion above, the war did not necessarily eulogise guerrillas, neither did it automatically immiserate those who had fought for the minority regime. For Chimera, the end of the war was a time of suffering while for his young brothers life went on as usual. At higher levels therefore, reconciliation which had brought Nkomo into the cabinet was cosmetic as it did not always indemnify those who had committed atrocities during the war. If Chimera had the opportunity, he would probably have joined the so-called dissidents. The police were now after the former guerrilla and had nothing to do with former SFAs in the same family. These were left to do their day to day business without any hindrance.

The same fate was also experienced in the Nyamhunga area by those who had fought the struggle as ZIPRA guerrillas especially from 1983. All ex-ZIPRAs became suspects in any case which involved dissidents. Those who were accused of being dissidents included Paul and Pearson Matenga as well as John Mufanebadza. The latter lost some teeth during torture while the rest were jailed and tortured for 3 weeks until proven innocent. Chimusoro was similarly arrested and tortured for some time by security forces. Only one former SFA, Lawrence Mutyanda was arrested for a similar offence because his ex-ZIPRA brother was then an armed dissident who went around robbing rural shops.⁷⁶ The persecution of ZIPRA as opposed to SFA can be explained politically. Differences between ZANU and ZAPU which had started with the 1963 split were still ongoing. Thus when former ZIPRA fighters left Assembly Points with their arms, the move was presented to the public as a real threat to the fledgling independence. In practice, the real preoccupation with ZANU-PF was finding a means of destroying ZAPU. After all, the continued existence of the party worked against ZANU-PF's one-party state ideology. Moreover, the two parties had always been antagonistic since the 1963 split. On the other hand, SFAs had been disgraced by their party which sent them home empty-handed and the ruling party which

⁷⁶ Interview with Friday Kavhu, Matenga Village, Chief Nyamhunga, 16 October 2012.

looked at them as stooges. In these years, former members of the force were concerned with finding their way into life. Last, all of them had been disarmed indicating that they no longer had the means to rise against the government.

In the case of Zinhatha, there was no traditional ceremony which involved having to invite friends and relatives. Rather, his father Mr Hubo just informed the family ancestors that the son had returned and they should continue to protect him as they did during the war. He alludes to the absence of a greater ceremony to the fact that he had not shed any blood and also that his father was a modern man who had worked in South Africa for too many years. He was therefore less interested in protracted traditional ceremonies. With that, Zinhatha claims that he has not been tormented by any evil or avenging spirit from that day to the present. He is only worried that he was compelled to work under such life threatening circumstances but was not paid. To date, that is a bone of contention but the victors seem unconcerned about their plight.

Despite the policy of reconciliation, the negative legacy of backing Muzorewa has generally haunted many former members of the SFA. Their military history embarrasses them whenever there is a chance for political ascendancy. Since they stand accused of having sold out at one time, even local party members find it hard to give them serious responsibility in the ZANU-PF party. Moreover, joining the opposition confirms them as sellouts forever despite noble causes in taking the decision. If at all they rise, they are constantly watched and if they sidestep, they are always reminded that their tainted history compels them to tow the line.

As a party, ZANU-PF does tolerate those who openly renounce their former political allegiance in favour of operating under its wings. Mr Nzombe pointed out that former members of dzakutsaku just like anyone who served in Smith's forces are welcome in the party but they cannot hold influential posts when members who have served ZANU-PF consistently and faithfully from the time of the war to the present day are available. The problem as he noted was that because these people once sold out, locals have not forgotten. SFAs have a political history which is difficult to justify especially to electorates.

Political Identities and the experiences of SFAs

From a global point of view, Europeans and Anglo-Americans have made their races superior while the rest of the formerly colonized world is occupied by damned races. The global placement of people and races can also be localized and/or villagized. Under colonial rule in Rhodesia, the black majority population occupied the bottom of the social ladder. Despite being damned, the African population had their own differences emanating from political affiliations and identities as chapter 2 indicated. SFAs were defiled for fighting the war on the side that did not win the 1980 election. It is therefore necessary to conclude by exploring ways in which their given identities have affected them in independent Zimbabwe. This is done by referring to identity politics and coloniality.

Raman Grosfoguel has noted that once immigrants into the USA are structurally assimilated to the mainstream American economy, this reinforces the melting of their identities into a single Anglo-American national identity. He goes on to elaborate that blacks experienced obstacles in their assimilation which affected their integration into the mainstream of the American economy, unlike European ethnic groups.⁷⁷ In independent Zimbabwe, former SFAs are not immigrants into the country. What affected their integration was the negative attitude towards them which in part the ruling ZANU-PF government has paid a blind eye towards. As indicated already, the immediate concern upon return from war was some kind of traditional cleansing ceremony which would make them normal and ready to enter mainstream society. Like immigrants entering the USA, they found themselves unwelcome and manufactured as sellouts and other such derogatory names. All these identities are best articulated using coloniality of power, that is, the way social power relations today continue to be organized, constituted and conditioned by centuries of western colonial expansion.⁷⁸ In simple terms cultural, political and economic oppression of blacks by whites replicated itself in independent Zimbabwe. This time around it was no longer one race exploiting the other but the same race. The exploitation and exclusion has seen former SFAs as the damned of the earth. Regardless of how hard they work or how nice they may be, their past continues to be a source of condemnation. Their history has lost them self-confidence; hence they have challenges in achieving socially and economically. They are stereotyped as

⁷⁷ R Grosfoguel, Race and Ethnicities or Racialised Ethnicities?: Identities within Global Coloniality, *Ethnicities*, 2004; 4, p. 316.

⁷⁸ *Ibid*, p. 319.

traitors, a tag which is hard to remove in Zimbabwe's current political dispensation. Therefore, those who have melted into mainstream society without being realized to have been SFAs are better off that way.

According to Cessaire as quoted by Walter Mignolo, during the Holocaust in Nazi Germany, colonialist procedures had been invented and implemented on people classified as inferior, or oucast- closer to animals or unbelievers, pagans and so on.⁷⁹ Although there were no physical attacks on former SFAs for their role in Hurungwe, what is clear is that they have generally lost their ego. All of them were too afraid to go to local government offices to find out if they were going to be paid because of constant verbal reference to them as sellouts. Similarly, they did not have the guts to use their military service as a justification to join the armed forces immediately after the war of liberation. They all agreed that they cannot stand up in public to defend their role in the war of liberation because they stand condemned by those in power. For those who join the opposition parties, constant negative reference to them by the public media is hard to defend. In short, former SFAs felt dumped in independent Zimbabwe.

Mignolo goes on to assert that once you realize that your inferiority is a fiction intended to dominate you.....then you delink.⁸⁰ In the academic sense, when you delink, you need to be epistemically disobedient and you will pay the price for journals, magazines, disciplines in social sciences and humanities.⁸¹ For former SFAs that option is generally absent. The majority of them are almost illiterate. Only a few of them bothered to go to school after the war and none of those went beyond primary education. As a result, they cannot express themselves in writing. Furthermore, whites who fought against ZANLA and ZIPRA during the liberation war largely wrote their books on this war when they were already outside Zimbabwe. Again the dream of moving beyond the borders was found absent in former SFAs of Hurungwe. They cannot delink by joining the opposition because publicly, that is not enough justification for having fought for Muzorewa. Above all, they should be seen to be sincere to the government which took no radical measures against them in independent Zimbabwe. Joining the opposition is a sign of being

⁷⁹ W Mignolo, *Dispensable and Bare Lives: Coloniality and the Hidden Political/Economic Agenda of Modernity*, *Human Architecture: Journal of the Sociology of Self-Knowledge*, VII. 2 .Spring, 2009, p. 81.

⁸⁰ *Ibid*, p. 135.

⁸¹ *Ibid*, p. 137.

ungrateful. All this boils back to the power of coloniality. According to Martinot, it speaks to us so forcefully that we see no recourse but to represent it, to uphold its existence.....⁸² Similarly, former SFAs in Hurungwe have nothing much to do in order to shrug off this mark of shame. Those who are in power today have superiorized themselves through inferiorization of wartime opponents such as the SFAs. Those who fought are superior to those identified as having sold out just as those who have the power to define have the power to objectify.

The past of former SFAs has militated against their existence as they try to adjust and adapt in independent Zimbabwe. Their history is one that must be written off. Their history makes them targets of annihilation. According to Maldonado-Torres, being in some way militates against one's own existence.⁸³ Despite the freedom to talk about the war, former SFAs could not be drawn to so speak in public as veterans of the liberation war are free to. This research for the first time enabled subalterns to speak on a relatively large scale.

Civilans who commented on the role of SFAs during the war of liberation speak positively of them to a greater extent. They are similarly ready to denigrate them in times of opportunistic political situations like elections and other government aided projects. Despite knowledge to the effect that SFAs were not as harmful in the war of liberation, they speak in a manner which best suits the political environment as dictated by the ruling political elites. Former SFAs enjoy their freedom outside the public political arena where they can talk freely. Despite sometimes being referred to as traitors, they are still comfortable in that environment. As such, it is shameful to speak publicly on the good that SFAs did because it is an attack on guerrillas who liberated this country.

Conclusion

When Zimbabwe became independent, SFAs were disbanded because they were not needed by the new dispensation. They were sometimes given some money before being sent back but there were also others who were not given any money. In each case, they were informed that when their services were needed, they would be called back. As such, their details were taken by the teams

⁸² S Martinot, *The Coloniality of Power: Notes Toward De-Colonization*, San Fransisco State University.

⁸³ N Maldonado-Torres, *The typology of being and the geopolitics of knowledge: Modernity, empire, coloniality*, *City*, Volume 8, Number 1, April 2004, p. 43.

responsible for their disbandment. In the majority of cases, former SFAs returned to the same areas they had fought in during the liberation war. There were generally no cases of direct retributions by members of the public to the returning auxiliaries for wrong-doing in the war to liberate the country from the Smith regime.

The immediate major pre-occupation of former auxiliaries was to cleanse themselves of having come into contact with blood during this war. Of interest to note is that such ceremonies were not initiated by the former fighters themselves but their parents or other senior relatives. Such a move was premised on the belief that coming into contact with blood was in itself contagious. It had the capacity of spreading to the whole family and causing untold suffering. Therefore, it was in the interests of the whole family to see to it that the returning son was cleansed. In all cases, cleansing ceremonies were done using various modes of the African traditional religion which had been the main source of inspiration during the war. Further, there were not so many churches in the district so the Christian approach was not utilized.

Former SFAs were rescued from direct attacks by their popularity during the war and the need for ZANU-PF to consolidate its hold in areas where ZIPRA had fought during the war. The pre-occupation of the ruling ZANU-PF was to destroy all ZAPU structures and co-opt everyone to the ruling party. In that spirit, ZANU-PF political commissars were stationed at almost every township to welcome everyone into the ruling party. Attacks on former auxiliaries would have compromised the ZANU-PF agenda. From 1981 right up to 1985, the army was deployed into the district in search for the so-called dissidents. Therefore for a short period of time, former SFAs were forgotten.

As the dust settled, some former auxiliaries returned to primary school to continue with their education. The few who tried to look for jobs in the military were thoroughly beaten and sent back home. Such deeds by trainers discouraged former members from ever attempting to join. Actions by trainers especially paratroopers based at Sanyati were not necessarily the policy of ZANU-PF or the government but were individual decisions made by disgruntled former guerrillas who had not accepted the hand of reconciliation as directed by the Prime Minister then. There appears to have been lack of commitment by former auxiliaries to return to school and remodel

their lives which had been disturbed by the war. The critical shortage of schools in part influenced the lack of interest. Going back to school would have partly sutured gaps created as a result of the war.

While the ruling ZANU-PF party welcomed everyone, as already noted, posts were often reserved for those who were found to have been consistently loyal. In the case of Hurungwe, this refers to people who had not been auxiliaries or were known supporters of UANC. Otherwise this refers to people who had supported either ZAPU or ZANU. This selective approach has tended to create a disgruntled section which has been excluded from sharing the cake of independence. With the coming of a vibrant opposition in 2008, such people and sometimes their children became the backbone of the opposition and once more victims of attacks. It ought to be noted that even those who joined the ruling ZANU-PF were often held suspect and as the case of Kabrit showed, they had to perform beyond expectations in order to drive home the point that they would not defect once again.

CHAPTER 8

POSTSCRIPT/CONCLUSION

This thesis investigated the history, legacy and identities of SFAs during the liberation war and its aftermath. It made use of the counterinsurgency theory and the people-centric constructivist identity theory. The former theory was applied to explain the manner in which the Rhodesian military strategists countered guerrillas through the use of SFAs. As such, their training and deployment was intended to ultimately equip them with enough persuasive force to win over civilian support from ZIPRA guerrillas in a bid to defeat them with the assistance of RSFs. On the other hand, the constructivist theory of identities elaborated ways in which ZANU (PF) has since 1963 deployed the ideology of Chimurenga to install itself as the only agent of liberation and thereby controlling the direction of national history and justify its stay in power against defined opponents. Dissenting voices such as those of former SFAs in particular are therefore not tolerated on the grounds that they are perceived to be those of sellouts. That political identity is a construction which has helped political elites to divide people into insiders and outsiders is indisputable. Having fought for Muzorewa during the liberation war carries a mark of shame in independent Zimbabwe regardless of any positive former SFAs might have played both during the war and after. It is the side one was identified with in the liberation war which made some people permanent sellouts even though they have been incorporated into the ruling party. At the same time, some of those who fought for Muzorewa did not think of him as Smith's appendage but rather a nationalist just as Mugabe and Nkomo.

It was established that the use of civilian defense militias was widespread during struggles for independence in many Sub-Saharan African countries. Minority governments in Africa extensively used armed militias as they fought liberation forces fighting for majority rule. In Angola and Mozambique, the Portuguese used the Fletchas while in Namibia, the apartheid South African regime used the Koevet. The government of Muzorewa roped in auxiliaries. Researches by Stiff, Cauter, Ellert, Moorcraft and Cilliers showed that SFAs were created by the Rhodesian regime during the last two years of the war. In theory, Muzorewa presided over the transitional government and then Zimbabwe-Rhodesia. However, during his short-lived tenure real power lay in the hands of white Rhodesians. Auxiliaries fell under the Special Branch, Selous Scouts or the

Ministry of Internal Affairs. Recruitment into SFAs took a racial dimension evident in the haste and poor training they received especially in the last year of the war. Their lives were not as grievable as white combatants and their deaths in large numbers were not of serious concern to Rhodesian military planners.

Except for Muzorewa, autobiographies written on auxiliaries castigated them in more or less the same way Rhodesian writers did. Edgar Tekere and Fay Chung were ZANU-PF office bearers hence their negative perceptions of auxiliaries. Muzorewa did not discuss the presence of auxiliaries in his autobiography. Academics such as Ranger, Auret, and Alexander among others did not include SFA voices on their analysis of auxiliaries. This is the point of departure for this thesis in the sense that extensive interviews were undertaken with auxiliaries and in most cases they were found willing to discuss the war of liberation. As such, the work is groundbreaking since, for the first time, it includes voices of the formerly silenced and dehistoricised forces. Indeed, findings show that the war was something quite different from the way it has been written especially by those who were in the celebratory narrative trajectory.

The thesis triangulated the theory of counter-insurgency and the constructivist theory of identity and came to the conclusion that Zimbabwe's war of liberation was about winning the hearts and minds of the African population as much as it was about construction and deconstruction of identities. The creation and deployment of auxiliaries in Hurungwe district was intended to win civilian support and confidence from the influence of ZIPRA guerrillas. The results of the battle of hearts and minds in theory should have ended in the loss of support for the insurgents and increased support for counter-insurgent forces and by extension the government of the day. With the erosion of support, insurgent forces would then be defeated with ease. In Hurungwe, SFAs enjoyed popular support but this did not translate to electoral success because they could not end the war in line with the dictates of the people-centred counterinsurgency theory. Under pressure, civilians in Hurungwe used both auxiliaries and ZIPRA guerrillas to advance their local interests. Both forces were used by civilians to protect themselves from opposing forces who were competing for support in the same area. The counterinsurgency theory used in the thesis led to the conclusion that when militias are used in counterinsurgency, they erode the support of insurgency

in favour of the government. The study found that although the image of ZIPRA was tarnished, support for SFAs was brief. In 1980, people of Hurungwe voted overwhelmingly for ZANU-PF leaving PF-ZAPU and the UANC to scrounge and compete for the little available votes.

The triumphant mood which gripped Zimbabwe on the attainment of independence made studies on defeated forces quite unpopular because the subject was associated with lack of patriotism. Those who tried to justify the cause of the losers were often deemed to be counter-revolutionaries bent on reversing the gains of the hard-won independence. As a result, former auxiliaries were disbanded without honor and made to melt in the population with derogatory identities. That they had been recruited and fought mostly in their local communities continued to be remembered and became the localized basis for political exclusion. The study established that the majority of the auxiliary forces were willing to share information on their wartime roles and identities inclusive of how that experience has continued to burden them in the post independence era. They also thought that they had a right to be compensated for their role in the war of liberation because in most cases, they were coerced into combatant roles on promises of money when the war came to an end. Both during the liberation war and afterwards, SFAs continued to have multiple identities. Some residents of Hurungwe saw them as liberators and others branded them sellouts for fighting against guerrillas.

A number of factors were responsible for the electoral loss of UANC and the denigration the party suffered both during and after the war of liberation. On a national scale, the war which SFAs were fighting had already been considered immoral even by international standards. Second, SFA and Rhodesian anti-guerrilla propaganda fell into the hands of ZANU-PF which then enjoyed a safe electoral victory in Hurungwe where they had not fought. Rhodesian propaganda against ZIPRA in Hurungwe played into the hands of ZANU-PF. Thus when ZANLA political commissars swept across Hurungwe during the ceasefire period they found people willing to switch their support from ZAPU or UANC to ZANU-PF. Furthermore, ZAPU's image was severely tarnished by the auxiliaries. In part, ZAPU was partly responsible for its predicament owing to its failure to deploy political commissars capable of countering Rhodesian propaganda. The intended results of the SFA counter-insurgency warfare as envisaged by

theorists proved different from the outcome because they enjoyed widespread support but they did not destroy insurgent forces in line with the success of community defense forces in Malaya and Kenya. Rhodesian military commanders did not regard them as part of the professional army hence they were disbanded as a rag tag force. For strategic reasons, the majority government was similarly unprepared to take them into the army as units, but only as individuals.

Right from the inception of mass nationalism, there was a tendency to give negative political identities to those who were accused of diverting from the main agenda of eventual majority rule. They were called by all sorts of names such as sell-outs, quislings, puppets, thugs, Tshombes and Capricorns. Within ZNP, ZAPU, ZANU and UANC, this became quite a common phenomenon. Such constructed political identities justified the use of violence against people so defined. Throughout the war of liberation, consequences of being labeled a sellout were detrimental to the victim of such a label. Although such identities were used for African counterinsurgent forces by insurgents in the liberation war, the research found that the people of Hurungwe did not identify auxiliaries in the same way despite views by guerrillas that they were sellouts. SFAs are remembered for positive deeds such as re-opening of schools, clinics, shops, dip tanks and protecting civilians in 'keeps'. They are also remembered for escorting buses, reducing wartime violence against civilians and 'protecting' local women from some guerrillas. Furthermore, SFAs facilitated the burial of slain chiefs as well as other ordinary civilians killed by people suspected to be guerrillas. On the contrary, in some sections of Hurungwe district, SFAs are remembered as a poor fighting force which could not match ZIPRA guerrillas in the battlefield. Such opinions were common in areas such as Chundu, Zvipani, Karambazungu and Vuti where ZIPRA maintained a strong and dominant military presence.

Negative identities against SFAs intensified during the war as a political construct by both ZAPU and ZANU. Those identities continued to haunt them in independent Zimbabwe. They are not being judged by what they did, but by identities which were created by their opponents both during the war and after. Negative identities have tended to obliterate the positive roles which they played in the violent war. Such roles had nothing to do with selling out. They joined the war under circumstances different from those obtaining today. In Hurungwe, some thought that they were fighting a legitimate war, others joined out of adventure while others were recruited by

force. It was also employment for some.

Positive memories for auxiliaries should be weighed against ZIPRA who suffered from a litany of disadvantages during their struggle for an independent Zimbabwe in Hurungwe district. As part of its propaganda campaign, Rhodesian security forces such as Selous Scouts, RAR and auxiliaries presented them as invading Ndebele forces bent on wiping the Shona while auxiliaries were identified as people's shield. Although there was much propaganda in these assertions, judged by the high level of illiteracy, exhaustion from the war and the post-war squabbles between PF-ZAPU and ZANU-PF, the image and identity of ZIPRA suffered greatly. Furthermore, there were not many former ZIPRA guerrillas left in the district after the war implying that they were not physically visible to defend ZIPRA wartime role. Most of them came from Midlands and Matebeleland provinces. On the other hand, former auxiliaries were numerous and clearly visible in Hurungwe after independence. The local origin of auxiliaries insulated them against wholesale attacks from the local communities. Furthermore, the ruling ZANU-PF party was concerned with penetrating and spreading the party to the rest of the country, Hurungwe included, hence it did not go for an offensive against such former operatives. ZANU-PF was pre-occupied with destroying ZAPU so the UANC did not feature much in its agenda because it was a fragile political party as had been shown by its poor performance in the 1980 general election. As such, former SFAs were spared from direct physical attacks but they have not been spared political, economic and social exclusion by ambitious competitors. Further, they were not able to organize themselves into associations as white Rhodesian soldiers did.

With the end of the war, former auxiliaries pre-occupied themselves with traditional cleansing ceremonies which largely took place at family level. The invitation of friends and relatives implied integration at community level. None of the former SFAs indicated that they had undergone some Christian ceremonies for purposes of cleansing after the war. The government did not integrate SFAs as a force but theoretically welcomed them if they made individual efforts to join uniformed forces. Very few took up the opportunity with some realizing that former guerrillas had not forgiven them for the role they played in the war. Owing to lack of initiative, the majority of them did not return to school and neither did they look for jobs. Most of them felt that the government ought to have compensated them for their role in the war. They also expected

the ruling political leaders to openly express that SFAs were not sellouts in Zimbabwe's war of liberation. Reconciliation, integration and healing as spearheaded by the government in 1980 evaded former auxiliaries. Having fought for Muzorewa also obliterated chances of political ascendency in ZANU-PF as opponents were quick to point out that such people were predisposed to sell out again. The polarization of the country into patriots and sellouts did not serve former SFAs and it appeared that political victors remained unforgiving to those who did not fight in the same trenches with them in the liberation war.

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