

Contagion or Calculated Rationality? Rethinking Crowd Behaviour in The Xenophobic Killing of Farai Kurijichita in Diepsloot Township, Johannesburg, South Africa (January 2011)

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Abstract

While the killing of an individual may be attributed to mob violence and attributed to the “madness or craziness” of the mob, this paper contends that there is rational action even in such situations. Individuals know what they are doing and every guilty person must be held accountable for their actions. Justice must prevail notwithstanding the ethnicity, nationality or even race of individuals involved. This paper is motivated by the public killing of a twenty six year old Zimbabwean migrant called Farai Kujirichita by Diepsloot residents of South Africa on the 22nd of January 2011. The main aim of this paper is to explain the killing of this Zimbabwean migrant. In this paper I dispute explanations of “irrational” crowd/mob behaviour that could easily be used as excuses for this murder, showing how this violent behaviour is rooted in the South African culture and the acquiescence and sometimes public support of political leaders.

Key Words: *Crime; Crowd; Diepsloot; Makwerekwere; Mob; Murder; Poverty; Violence; Xenophobia; Zimbabweans.*

Introduction

This paper is mainly based on the report of the murder of Farai Kujirichita by an American journalist Barry Bearak (June, 2011). Bearak’s account was the first report on the death of Farai and subsequent reports and reactions (McVeigh 2011, Moyo, 2011, Neni, 2011) were based on Bearak’s view. Bearak carried out interviews among residents of Diepsloot soon after the murder and also relied on video images taken on a mobile phone by a resident freelance reporter Golden Mtika who witnessed the death of Farai in the hands of Diepsloot’s residents. The images show 26-year-old Farai Kujirichita being set upon by a crowd of men, women and children who wrongly believed he was a criminal.

What makes this paper particularly unique is its attempt to relate the murder of foreigners to the Xenophobic and violent nature of South Africans and the subsequent conclusion that poor South Africans will always respond by killing foreigners, be they Zimbabwean or Mozambican or any other whom they blame for their misfortunes. These locals are egged on by their political leaders who acquiesce to Xenophobic attacks. The discussion reveals how political leaders resent foreigners and thus create a Xenophobic environment. Foreign migrants are accused of criminality, being hosts of all sorts of diseases, taking away South African jobs and women, and having many babies (Zinyama 2002; Harris 2008, Landau and Segatti 2009). The derogatory term '*Makwerekwere*' describes foreigners in South Africa. Violence against foreigners in South Africa was documented as early as 1994. These foreigners include Angolans, Congolese, Ugandans, Nigerians, Somalis, Mozambicans, Zimbabweans. (Crush 2000, DGPHSRC 2008, Harris 2002, Morris, 1998, Palmary, 2002, Valji 2003). In 2008 these attitudes culminated in Xenophobic attacks on foreigners that left 62 people dead and displaced between 80 000 and 200 000 people (Bloch 2010, Landau and Segatti 2009). For most Zimbabweans Xenophobia is an everyday experience (Dumba and Chirisa 2010, Harris 2008). In this paper I also argue that the economic development of South Africa has been lopsided, leaving certain sections of the populations extremely poor and frustrated with limited service delivery, while others are visibly rich (Holdt et al 2011).

Background

In 2005 Diepsloot had an estimated population of more than 150 000 people living in an area of just 5,18km² in the northern outskirts of Johannesburg. It was established in 1994, with the resettlement of Zevenfontein residents to Diepsloot West. Since then, it has become a dumping ground for many housing problems in the area (Dlamini, 2005, city of Johannesburg www.joburg.org.za). Waka'Ngobeni (2011) describes Diepsloot as follows:

"Diepsloot was established as an informal settlement in 1994 (and)... has undergone a major overhaul. RDP houses (a generic South African term for state-subsidised houses) have been built, which are now sandwiched by rented backyard dwellings. In stark contrast to its neighbour (Dainfern), electricity wires criss-cross the landscape, running through a mixture of compact corrugated iron shacks, small state-subsidised houses and larger bank-bonded houses. Spatial planning is adverse and living conditions are inauspicious. There is a growing population of more than 200 000 living heedlessly in the cluttered and unkempt environment. A flurry of

construction characterises the township, as does traffic congestion and blaring car radios, hustling traders and bustling passers-by, all working together to disturb the peace. Welcome to Diepsloot, a sprouting settlement populated by resilient migrants and immigrants, making up a cosmopolitan community. Conditions are appalling and most locals live in abject poverty. The colloquial language is a concoction of Sepedi, Zulu and Sotho" (Waka'Ngobeni 2011, city of Johannesburg, www.joburg.org.za).

A general description of Diepsloot is that of poverty and lack of basic necessities and government support. Though there are government constructed houses most residents live in informal shacks and settlements made of zinc, metal and wood without running water and electricity. There is an influx of migrants and a high level of unemployment up to 50% (McVeigh 2011). Most Zimbabwean migrants are drawn to the 'city of gold' where they believe there could be better economic chances for survival in Johannesburg, (Maphosa 2010). Crime is rife in Diepsloot while there is no nearby police station. Residents engage in community policing to deal with crime. Harber (2011) who studied and wrote a book on Diepsloot is sympathetic to residents of Diepsloot and argues that:

"If you want to condemn vigilante justice, you have to acknowledge that it is usually the only kind of justice available in Diepsloot. It is hard to be righteous about due process when people know that it is beyond their grasp. There is an indistinct line here between self-defence and vigilantism, and it is littered with the bodies of the innocent as well as the guilty" (Harber, June 2011).

Diepsloot is not very far from the posh suburb of Dainfern a community of luxury homes surrounded by a high wall topped with an electric fence, with their manicured lawns and swimming pools, (Georgy 2007).

Residents of Diepsloot's extension 1 where the murder of Farai took place do not have electricity and mostly charge their cellphone batteries for R5 and other electrical gadgets in extension 2. Up until 2008 televisions were a rare luxury in Diepsloot (Tshabalala 2008; Keepile 2009). Collective violence characterises communities going through social stress or strain. Diepsloot fits very well in this category as it is characterised by poverty and social strain. Collective violence in communities is viewed as the last resort for citizens trying to bring attention to their grievances. Communities who try to change their situation through peaceful means are often left feeling excluded, marginalised and deprived, (Holdt, Langa, Molapo, Mogapi, Ngubeni, Dlamini, and Kirsten, 2011). Holdt et al's (2011) study

of collective violence based on eight case studies in Mpumalanga, North West and Gauteng revealed that both community protests and xenophobic violence were a last resort strategy to obtain power and express grievances, particularly over inadequate service delivery. The conclusion was that marginalised communities did not feel like they had full social and economic citizenship (Holdt, Langa, Molapo, Mogapi, Ngubeni, Dlamini, and Kirsten, 2011, news24, 19 July 2011).

Theories of the “irrational crowd” entail the following 7 myths debunked by Schweingruber and Wohlstein (2005) who in turn based their arguments on McPhail (1991) and Couch (1968):

- Myth of Irrationality: the idea that individuals in a crowd lose rational thought because of the influence of the crowd.
- Myth of Emotionality: the idea that individuals in a crowd become more emotional than people in non-crowd situations.
- Myth of Suggestibility: the idea that individuals in a crowd are more likely to obey or imitate others. People in crowds are more suggestible than in other settings, have less self control, and are more likely to behave in imitation and/or engage in “herd mentality.
- Myth of Destructiveness: the idea that individuals in a crowd are more likely to act violently and destroy property and other individuals.
- Myth of Spontaneity: the idea that violence occurs more suddenly in a crowd. Behaviour in crowds, more than other social behaviour, is spontaneous, unpredictable, volatile, and/or governed by norms that emerge from the situation. People in crowds are allegedly spontaneous because their rational thought processes are not functioning, they are under the sway of emotions, and they are especially suggestible. Combined with the myth of destructiveness, this myth views seemingly peaceful crowds as capable of erupting in violence
- Myth of Anonymity: the idea that individuals in a crowd feel more anonymous. Because people in crowds are allegedly anonymous, they are unaccountable and thus do things, like behaving destructively, that they would not normally do. This also contributes to the spontaneity of the crowd.
- Myth of Uniformity/Unanimity: the idea that all individuals in a crowd act in the same way. In crowds, people are more likely than people in other situations to be doing the same thing at the same time.

Several insights are especially crucial for an understanding of crowd behaviour. First, when a crowd gathers at a physical location whatever happens and whatever

becomes visible is generated by the individuals present. Second, behaviour is situation dependent, meaning that the behaviour displayed at any point in time is dependent on the current context and the internal state of the individuals concerned. Context includes the social context, which is regarded as an important source of influence in crowds. Third, crowd behaviour is a dynamic phenomenon, and this dynamic aspect cannot be overlooked when trying to understand behaviour at a certain point in time (Schweingruber and Wohlstein 2005:140).

In order to fully comprehend what took place on the 22nd of January 2011 when Farai was murdered, I quote at length Bearak's account of the murder and his interviews with some of the suspects and residents of Diepsloot.

"Farai returned to Diepsloot on Dec. 29 (from Zimbabwe); his wife stayed behind with the children, planning to rejoin him later. Alarmed by the portentous dreams, Farai and Washington, who is 21, joined a church that accommodated both witchcraft and Jesus, trying to ward off harm under the guidance of two congregants said to be prophets. On Jan. 21, the day before he died, Farai spent the night under the stars, fasting and praying well into the pre-dawn with a few dozen others of the church..."

"Golden is the son of a Malawian father and a South African mother. By his count, he has photographed about 200 murder victims. Golden, who is 39, is among the best-known people in Diepsloot; as an American journalist, I sometimes hire him to translate for me and help with introductions. He is reliably plugged in, able to connect me with the settlement's devils and angels and everything in between. His two cellular phones seem to ring every few minutes. Many consider him their Good Samaritan of choice, and being his friend is an expense, for he is often collecting money for some pauper's funeral or the care of an orphan..."

"They told us assorted versions of what happened that Saturday, nearly all the accounts mistaken, some outlandishly so. People were not lying. But the scene had been chaotic. It was hard to see in that big a crowd, harder yet to hear. Many witnesses turned their backs to avoid the grisliest moments. In the aftermath, people repeated various story lines. As such things often go, even the most central of details mutated with each telling...."

"In one version, Farai's photo had been found in the burning shop, and that was how the mob knew he was guilty. In another, he was caught hiding in a large plastic tub and then admitted to everything. In yet another, he was slapped by a pregnant woman who fingered him as a thief or a rapist or both. There were alternate subplots to this account. In one, she was his jilted lover. In another, she

was a prostitute, and he had short-changed her by \$2. For every interview, there were two no-shows; for every person who really knew something, there was a pretender who did not..."

"The video then jumps ahead. Farai is again on dry ground, lying on his back, seemingly near death but still breathing. Blood is leaking from his head. He barely raises his left hand, and this trivial movement somehow becomes a cue for the beating to resume. A man wearing a white cap wallops him seven times in the face and neck with a plank, the assailant's arms reaching high to amplify the force of his swing. Another man repeatedly punches Farai in the groin. For some nearby, these final devastating blows are too awful, and a boy holding a soccer ball looks away. Others are celebrating the mob's triumph. A slender young woman in a tight pink top has been in and out of the picture in several scenes. She is as petite as the men are brawny. Her smile is girlish. Before Golden again stops the camera, the woman lifts a large block of cement above her head, preparing to heave it at the beaten man. A good bit later, the police finally arrive. They keep the mob from setting Farai alight and are there for his final breaths..."

"Two days later, the police arrested seven suspects in connection with the deaths of Farai Kujirichita and Patries Zonke, an earlier victim of mob justice who died a horrible death at the hands of a different mob. The killings occurred about 11 hours apart, and Golden Mtika's story about them made it to Page 1 of The Daily Sun. Another newspaper, The Star, sent a reporter to do a follow-up. While he was collecting information, a protest broke out against the police. Some of the angry demonstrators viewed the arrests as an affront to well-intentioned vigilantes; others simply believed that the cops had rounded up the wrong people. The Star's headline atop the front page was a hyperventilating declaration, "Anarchy in Diepsloot..."

"In my experience, things were hardly more lawless than usual. The streets were ordinarily safe during the day and extraordinarily dangerous at night. But the gust of publicity provoked a visit from a member of the provincial cabinet, Faith Mazibuko, who spoke in a tent meeting. An empathetic speaker, she tried to win over the huge crowd by acknowledging a fair list of the settlement's complaints about crime: the police never patrol on foot; they don't respond for hours; they prefer bribes to arrests. She was amply applauded until she bravely condemned mob justice, citing the Ten Commandments as a supporting text. Surely many people agreed with her, but from then on, the boos and catcalls prevailed. Living in squalor was bad enough; living unprotected from crime was unbearable. When people were asked to step forward with comments, the biggest ovation went to a man misquoting Jesus about "an eye for an eye..."

“The new suspects did not include the three main assailants seen in the video. These men ran off as soon as the police began poking around. But the young woman in the pink top, the one heaving a hunk of cement, was under arrest. Given her appearance in the footage, there was no point in a denial. “I hit him because I heard people saying he was a thug, and I wanted to participate,” she said flatly in one of our talks, her words translated from Tswana...Less remorseful yet was the other teenager, Sipiwe, the boy at the front of the mob. I interviewed him seven times, more than enough to know that he and the truth were only casual acquaintances. “How can I get him to stop lying?” I asked his mother, Onicah. “Before he’ll tell the truth, he has to be beaten up,” she said with commiseration. Sipiwe is the oldest of her three sons, each from a different father. She said she long ago lost control of him, and he was now off in a delinquent world of ganja smoking, petty thievery and who knew what else. He rarely slept at home”

“The two teenagers were released into the custody of their mothers, and the expectation was that, as minors, they would submit to counselling and serve no prison time. But the other two suspects, Walter Baphadu and Evens Matamisa, were locked up in Pretoria. I had known these men for two years and had doubts about the extent of their involvement, if they took part at all. Vigilante justice was surely among their enthusiasms, but they were wily about it, seemingly too clever to kill a man as hundreds watched....Baphadu 40, once headed Extension 1’s community policing forum. These quasi-legal prerogatives could lead to temptation, and some groups used them as moneymaking schemes, operating as protection rackets or functioning as housing authorities, divvying up the shacks...He and the police had a quarrelsome history. In 2009, he was arrested for his forum’s supposed excesses, which made him so angry that he quit his unofficial law-enforcement duties. One time he refused to intervene when a mob set a man on fire after compelling his “confession” by making him swallow sewer water. “If I see burning now, if I see raping, I look the other way,” he said huffily back then”.

“Matamisa, 39, was another sort of vigilante entirely, a leader of a group in Extension 1 calling itself the Comrades. Members like to present themselves as servants of justice but were nothing more than hired muscle. People sometimes paid the Comrades to retrieve stolen property, and while they solicited fees to beat up thieves, they also accepted cash to throttle unfaithful wives or anyone else their customers found annoying. This work was not always lucrative, and the group accumulated unforgiving enemies as well as satisfied customers...”

‘Once, he (Sipiwe) told me that killing Farai had been “fun”. It angered me, but I said nothing. Mob violence wasn’t mindless; there were minds at work, and

these minds were self-justifying. The murder, of course, was hardly Sipiwe's fault alone. Others also guided the mob; others confronted Farai and struck the deadlier blows. But he was the culprit conveniently at hand. "This is what we do," he said defiantly, content with what the mob accomplished, pleased with his new shoes. ...". (Bearak, 2 June 2011 New York Times).

Discussion of the killing

I shall now discuss the killing of Farai using the older theories of mob behaviour showing their inadequacies in explaining this particular event.

Theory one: The irrational mob: Explaining the murder of Farai using Herbert Blumer's active crowd explanation (1939)

Farai was attacked by a mob that is classified by Herbert Blumer (1939) as an active crowd. Herbert Blumer's theory of the acting crowd is a synthesis of Park and Burgess (1921a) and LeBon's (1895) ideas. Blumer identifies five stages that precede an acting crowd. These are:

(a) Tension or unrest-people are restless, disturbed about some conditions of society, apprehensive and vulnerable to rumours and suggestions. In the case of Farai's death, people of Diepsloot are generally very poor, suffer high levels of crime and do not have adequate government support in terms of social amenities, such as electricity, housing and water.

(b) Exciting event-an exciting event occurs one so startling that people become preoccupied with it. One 15 year old young man Sipiwe claimed that a thief stole his cellphone and he knew the shack where a gang of thieves stayed. He then led the crowd to a shack which they started burning.

(c) Milling- here people are standing, walking around talking about the exciting event. In the case of Farai people were probably talking about the gang of thieves and their failure to "catch them" in the shack. Then a circular reaction sets in.

(d) A common object of attention- here people's attention becomes riveted on some aspect of the event and they get caught up in the collective excitement. Someone saw Farai approaching talking excitedly on his cellphone. He accused Farai of being one of the criminals trying to alert his accomplices.

(e) Common impulse- here a collective agreement about what should be done emerges. What stimulates these common impulses is social contagion, a sense of excitement that is passed from one person to another. In this case someone might have suggested that Farai needed a public death to serve as a warning to all other criminals and they went on to beat him to death.

This theory cannot fully explain the killing because, from the video images, not everyone participated in the killing. Only a few individuals participated and these individuals had a history of violence themselves.

Theory two: The emergent norm theory by Ralph Turner and Lewis Killian (1987)

The term emergent norm refers to the development of new norms to cope with a new situation especially among crowds. Turner and Killian (1987) argue that in our everyday situations we are guided by our usual norms, however where an unusual event disrupts these usual ways of doing things people develop new norms to cope with the new situation. Sometimes the new norms may lead to a redefinition of right and wrong such that under the new circumstances these new norms may justify actions that they would otherwise consider wrong. Turner and Killian (1987) identify five kinds of crowd participants:

(a) the ego-involved- these feel a personal stake in the extraordinary event. For example in this case it could have been the young man who claimed someone had stolen his cellphone. His family, friends and vigilante leaders could also be classified in this category.

(b) the concerned- also have a personal interest in the event but are less so than the ego-involved. In this category one may classify those individuals who generally are fed up with crime in Diepsloot and who believe that thieves must be publicly punished as a deterrent mechanism.

(c) the insecure- these care little about the matter, but they join the crowd because it gives them a sense of power and security.

(d) the curious spectators- also care little about the event but they are inquisitive about what is going on. The freelance journalist who took video images could be classified in this category.

(e) the exploiters- do not care about the event, but they use it for their own purposes, such as hawking food or T-shirts. (Henslin, 1999: 595).

Henslin (1999) further states that the contrasting attitudes, motives and emotions of these different types of participants greatly influence the emergence of new norms though the ego-involved take leading roles and the concerned, insecure and curious join in. By not joining the crowd, the exploiters lend passive support to the crowd.

However, the emergent norm theory cannot explain the murder of Farai because the norms that governed the murderers were not new and so were the vigilante leaders who were arrested for Farai's death. Diepsloot norms did not change during the murder. Diepsloot norms are characterised by violence and self defence. Residents of Diepsloot responded in the same way as they always did and dealt with the "criminal" in the same way as they had done before. They took the law into their own hands as they had done before, where, in some instances, they set their victims on fire. The vigilante groups set in place to deal with criminals show that they had pre-existing norms. These were community-policing citizens' groups legally empowered to help the police.

These organizations operated nationwide, though the way they interpreted their powers varied widely. In Diepsloot, people were as likely to report crimes to these vigilantes as to the police. Forum members rounded up suspects on their own, and while they sometimes turned the accused over to the law, they more often judged the cases themselves and meted out beatings, fines and banishments. "Mob justice is not uncommon in Diepsloot, and most often it involves the swift capture of a supposed criminal, the villain there to beat up, to stone, perhaps even to wrap in a petrol-soaked shroud" (Bearak 2011). Nothing was new in as far as that murder was concerned. Katlego Matheta, a witness to the murder, said mob justice was normal in Diepsloot. "It's simple to kill a person here. They are not scared to kill here" (McVeigh 2011).

Why the murder of Farai was an outcome of calculated reason

Theory Three: the Social Identity Model by Turner, Oakes, Haslam and McGarty (1994).

Couch (1968:315) argues that crowds may be deemed 'irrational because they do not support the ideas established the institutions of the day, but if rationality is taken to mean choosing effective means of pursuing a goal crowds may be "very rational". Violence against Farai was perpetuated by a group of people who have a shared sense of identity and a shared sense of frustration with a bleak future. This can be explained by the Social Identity Model by Turner, Oakes, Haslam and

McGarty (1994). The theory is based on self-categorization whose premise is that collective behaviour and social influence are only possible on the basis of shared self-categorization or shared sense of identity (Zeitz et al 2009: 33). From this perspective the murder was motivated by a group of people who believed that if they did not act no-one else could since they had seen the futility of relying on the government police.

Holdt et al (2011) argue that subaltern communities in many cases seem to regard xenophobic violence as a direct way of implementing the laws of the state, which the state seems incapable of doing itself. Commenting on Diepsloot, Harber states "Diepsloot should force us to be more realistic about this country and its prospects, and make us wary of grand election promises of quick and easy solutions" (Interview with Harber by Pillay, 26 May 2011, Mail and Guardian Online). Residents of Diepsloot feel betrayed by empty promises of politicians such that even when these politicians visit them or even spend a night in Diepsloot (as happened with Tokyo Sexwale the then Minister of human settlements in 2009) that behaviour is interpreted as a joke and rather patronising).

In 2007 Altbeker revealed how crime and violence are so common that few lives have been left untouched and that the poor are both more likely to be victimised and less able to secure themselves (Altbeker, 2007). It is in such cases that Diepsloot residents unite and become a law unto themselves, unfortunately branding foreigners as "the out-group" and criminals that must be punished. It is not in Diepsloot only where Zimbabweans are killed. In Seshego, Limpopo, City Press (19 June 2011) reported "thousands of Zimbabweans violently being driven from their homes into the bush. Their crime was that of being Zimbabwean. During their brutal rampage, residents of Seshego cornered and stoned to death Godfrey Sibanda. Without any proof, Sibanda was labelled a criminal and rapist. He was also Zimbabwean".

Therefore, I argue that violence against Farai was specifically directed to him as an outsider-a makwerekwere. Eleven hours earlier, in a different part of Diepsloot, another Zimbabwean was killed by a different mob. "Just being a Zimbabwean is a crime here; you do not have to be a criminal or to be a thief....We have been waiting for something to happen, it is very tense, said Joseph Makota another Zimbabwean (McVeigh 5 June 2011). South Africans generally do not like foreigners whom they regard as makwerekwere- the term makwerekwere itself is supposed to convey the un-understandable sounds and languages of non-South Africans which only provides 'noise' and funny sounds to the local listener because the language is dominated by the letter 'r' (Mattes, Taylor, McDonald, Poore and Richmond 1999; Maphosa 2010). Xenophobia against Zimbabweans is worse because they are the largest group of foreigners in South Africa.

As a society South Africans largely have a culture of violence. Violence solves their problems from cheating spouses, to political leaders who do not deliver on their promises and foreigners believed to be stealing jobs from locals (Harris 2001; 2002; CRAI, 2009; Holdt et al 2011). A culture of violence is defined by Hamber and Lewis (1997) as that where violence is seen as a legitimate means to achieve goals particularly because it was legitimised by past political role players (Hamber and Lewis 1997:08). Poor frustrated locals voice their grievances, especially concerning service delivery through violence and they seem to get the needed attention only after expressing it through collective violence. That same violence is institutionalised even in government departments especially when it comes to dealing with foreigners who not only have to deal with “primary Xenophobia” from the locals but also “secondary Xenophobia” from state institutions such as the police, the army, the media etc. (Harris 2001). Landau (undated) states that Xenophobia is evoked, embedded and legitimated in nationalist discourse. Hence Landau calls it the demonic society.

South African politicians and the media have led the ‘othering project’ against Zimbabweans and other non-South Africans. Recent comments made by the ANC Member of parliament chairperson of the parliamentary portfolio on domestic affairs Maggie Maunye show the deep seated, deep rooted hatred of non-South Africans. In her speech concerning immigration Maunye asked; “...for how long is South Africa going to continue tolerating this influx of people.....In Spain one sees on television how they send refugees back and here we are told of human rights and laws ... all types of excuses. Here we have people living in poverty, people who are unemployed. We have never enjoyed our freedom as South Africans since 1994 when we got independence. There have been refugees from all over” (Peter Moyo SABC 3 Special assignment programme 20 July 2011). Though she later apologised (ANC Caucus 3 July 2011) the damage had already been done. What is problematic is her attitude towards non-South Africans as a political leader in the department of Home Affairs. Her speech incites violence and it would be true that government tends to condone violence against non-South Africans through its “business as usual approach” (Polzer, 2009). There generally is reluctance by government departments to act on issues concerning foreigners (Harris 2001; Palmary 2002; Solidarity Peace Trust 2004; human Rights Watch 2006 Crush and Tawodzera 2011).

This was not the first time that a political leader made Xenophobic speeches. The Inkatha Freedom Party (IFP) leader Mangosuthu Buthelezi (former minister of Home affairs) was quoted by the Human Rights Watch (1998:20) as having said:

.if we South Africans are going to compete for scarce resources with millions of aliens who are pouring into South Africa then we can bid goodbye to our Reconstruction and Development Programme.. Non-South Africans have been referred to as .leeches. by the chairperson of the Johannesburg hawkers. committee (South Africa: Xenophobia 2008) and Zimbabweans specifically referred to as .a nuisance. and .Zim Tsunami. (Mattes, Taylor, Poore and Richmond 1999; Lefko-Everett 2004; Scheen 2011). According to the then South African Minister of Home Affairs, not only do foreign men take South African women and engage in marriages of convenience, but they also bring in diseases, notably Sexually Transmitted Diseases and HIV (Zinyama 2002: 30). Even the former president of South Africa Thabo Mbeki is said to have feigned ignorance of the offensive nature of the label .*makwerekwere*. (Mawadza and Crush 2010). This goes to show the extent to which politicians themselves have created a stigmatised identity of non-South Africans as diseased, hungry, selfish, depraved, alien, animals. They have therefore acquiesced to violence against foreigners. They have created a conducive environment for an obsession with foreigners who are used as scapegoats for all kinds of pathologies affecting South Africa (Landau Undated). Landau (ibid: 62) further highlight:Unable to bureaucratically demarcate or isolate the alien, state agents and citizens have instead worked together in ad hoc but logically consistent Scheen (2011) furthers states that South African residents in the Limpopo feel like non-South Africans in their own country because of this "Zim Tsunami".

Conclusion

This study reveals the inadequacy of some explanations of crowd behaviour as irrational with reference to the killing of Farai Kujirichita in Diepsloot. Media reports of the "mad mob" only excuse the calculated behaviours of Xenophobic South Africans. The murder of Farai shows how the Diepsloot residents view themselves as a largely forgotten lot who must save themselves by being a law to themselves creating order in a seemingly disordered community. The murder of Farai was therefore intentional and deliberate carried out by Xenophobic South Africans belonging to a subaltern community exercising what is left of their agency. This paper also shows how foreigners eventually suffer the wrath of these frustrated poor South Africans who feel let down by their own government in terms of access to resources and social amenities. These locals however get the sometimes overt and covert support of political leaders and government institutions.

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