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THE DYNAMICS OF FACTIONALISM IN ZANU PF:

1980 – 2017

BY

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DEDICATION

To my son Tapiwa Jr. Taropafadzwa

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ABSTRACT

This study is a critical examination of the dynamics of factionalism in ZANU-PF between 1980 and 2017, with the goal of identifying how factionalism has impacted on the national development agenda. This qualitative research drew data from the analysis of documents and from oral unstructured interviews. The specific aim of the study is to analyse why Zimbabwe has failed to develop for the past 37 years despite being led by a socialist revolutionary party which is ideologically informed by the modernization concept. The research's central hypothesis is, factionalism is largely to blame for Zimbabwe's economic woes that engulfed the nation for the past 3 and half decades robbing the nation of the opportunity to develop. Factionalism has resulted in corruption, civil unrest, policy paralysis, abuse of human rights and contempt of law as factions fought to take charge of both party and government. This has produced tribal/regional politics, exclusionary politics, politics of patronage and fragmentation and vulnerability. The study also highlights that factionalism is not always undesirable as it has a positive side which leads to the formulation of an important contribution to the country's politics by encouraging debate on the contentious succession issue. It also illumed the need for generational change considering that Zimbabwe is a nation with an entire generation struggling for the past 37 years to formulate an important contribution to the country's politics. Theoretically, the study deploys realism perspective aided by game theory as it fights to unmask and to illumine the causes and dynamics of factionalism in ZANU-PF. Finally, this dissertation concludes by encouraging ZANU-PF to democratize, embrace and manage factionalism for the achievement of national development since what happens in ZANU-PF directly affects activities in government.

Keywords

Factionalism; faction; political party; party: development; ZANU-PF.

LIST OF ACRONYMS

ANC - African National Congress

BDP – Botswana Democratic Party

EU - European Union

FDI - Foreign Direct Investment

G40 - Generation 40

FRROLIZI - Front for the Liberation of Zimbabwe

GDP - Gross Domestic Product

PF - People First

MDC - Movement for Democratic Change

MP – Member of Parliament

NRM - National Resistance Movement

TD - Tsholotsho Declaration

ZANU - PF- Zimbabwe African National Union-Patriotic Front

ZANLA - Zimbabwe African National Liberation Army

ZAPU - Zimbabwe African People's Union

ZIPRA - Zimbabwe People's Revolutionary Army

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CHAPTER 1

INTRODUCTION TO THE STUDY

1 INTRODUCTION

This study examines the dynamics of factionalism in Zimbabwe African Union-Patriotic Front (ZANU-PF) from 1980 to 2017 aimed at illuminating how factionalism impacts on national development. For the past 37 years, ZANU-PF under the leadership of Robert Mugabe has pursued national development policies as the incumbent party, but the nation continues to be characterised by a cash crisis, poor health services, high unemployment rate, lack of rule of law, forex shortages and burdened by corruption and lack of transparency. As such, this research endeavours to understand how ZANU-PF infights have positively/negatively affected national development agenda from a realist perspective.

It is a study of seeking to understand how factionalism has stood in between the party's goal and its pursuance of policy formulation and implementation in the drive to develop Zimbabwe. It also analyses how these dynamics and dimensions have resulted in serious overlaps between the party and the state highlighting how each, that is, ZANU-PF and Government have compromised the other particularly on matters of constitutionalism and democracy. Causes, nature, and evolution of factionalism in ZANU-PF are thoroughly investigated as a means to explain why Zimbabwe has not developed for the past 37 years. The research safely argues that the factional dynamics in ZANU-PF resulted in the ruling party neglecting government duties as they diverted all their efforts to the internal fights with the hope to influence party policy direction and to gain control of the party's corridors of power. The neglect resulted in projects and policy paralysis in the process compromising the nation's development trajectory. The

research most importantly notes that factionalism though not desirable can positively contribute towards development if it is embraced, managed, and if a political party democratises as exemplified by the case of United States of America. Factionalism stimulates debate which leads to cohesion a condition necessary for national development. This is qualitative research anchored by the realist thinking and aided by the Game theory.

1.1 BACKGROUND OF THE STUDY

Political parties are bound to the political systems where they function. They mirror progressions of state formation, national development. Political parties also highlight how social cleavages have grouped in varying factions within them. This is best exemplified by the logic of presidentialism which affects party dynamics in varying countries as ruling parties are vehicles for selecting of Presidents.

Like most developed countries, the USA has not been spared by factional fights that resulted from the 1787 federal Constitution contestation. Friction amplified as attention shifted towards establishing the extent of the vigour of the central government from whether it should be established. Alexander Hamilton the then Secretary of Treasury as the leaders of the Federalists preferred a vigorous central government since those against the federalists, headed by Thomas Jefferson were advocating for states' rights as opposed to centralized power. Federalists amalgamated around the commercial sector while their adversaries drew their strength from an agricultural society. The subsequent one-sided battles led George Washington to warn of “the baneful effects of the spirit of party” in his Farewell Address as president of the United States. (www.globalsecurity.org)

Organized factions were not caused by the emergence of the United States but with the formation of the premiership of George Washington. Initially, the Founders strongly opposed political parties as they associated them with the dysfunctionality of England. Despite the contempt of political parties, political and ideological conflicts began to emerge. These stemmed from the differing views the founders had on human nature. While Alexander Hamilton and John Adams were both highly dubious about the trustworthiness of the common people, James Madison and Thomas Jefferson believed they could prove worthy and they should be respected. Conflicts over the economy, how to handle Revolutionary France, and negotiations with England all grew from this fundamental opposition over the nature of humanity. Ultimately, these conflicts led to the fracturing and by the time Washington had left office; political factions were poised to consume the nation (Miller,1960).

One of the first elements of division came from Alexander Hamilton's fiscal policies, which he advanced in his capacity as the first Secretary of the Treasury. Hamilton believed that the debt the United States faced would have to be one of the first "objects of his attention." Jefferson's ideal was of a happy society in which every man had the right of self-government while Madison believed government and people must control one another. Madison saw Hamilton's elimination of "a dependence on the people" to be morally inexcusable. The battle over the establishment of a national bank had led to a separation and thus organized opposition resulting in these factions clearly formulating ideas and major economic and ideological differences (Miller,1960) Republicans, as led by Madison, tended to have a deep distrust of governments and were primarily farmers who had few ties to the coast (Madison, James,1791) Federalists as led by Hamilton, deeply distrusted the common people, as they believed they gullible and could be easily swayed by demagogues. Thus, the Federalists believed that controlling people was the only way for a republic to truly endure. As such, they put significant faith in the power of the president (Miller).

Factions in the USA stemmed from the leading Founders' differing views of human nature, which then exhibited themselves in arguments over policy. Hamilton aimed to control the populace, as his economic policies reveal. He and Adams also had a deep distrust of human nature. Jefferson and Madison, on the contrary, did not share similar views with Hamilton resulting in them partnering to oppose Hamilton and Adams (similar ideologies). As a result, an irreparable hole in the American political fabric was created. Adams's presidency exacerbated political tension as he attempted to control the populace. By the time Washington warned against factionalism, it was too late as factionalism had already beset the United States.

The effects of this adversarial factionalism spilt into the present United States and the effects still felt. For example, in 2002, 39% of Republicans believed the federal government had too much power, and 37% of Democrats agreed. This divide has continued widening with 82% of Republicans believe the federal government wields too much power and only 36% of Democrats agreeing (Frank Newport and Andrew Dugan, 2017) Apparently USA's divides are defined by allegiance, and the roots of the present division can be traced all the way back to conflicts among the Founders who, much like today's political figures, saw only themselves and their views as correct and legitimate. (Miller, 1960). Factionalism is also evident in Britain. Its existence in varying geographical location is indicative of its inevitability highlighting the realist thinking that human nature transcends geographical boundaries.

The Conservative Party which until May 1997 had been in office uninterrupted for eighteen years has not been spared by factional fights. The CPP found itself uptight with internal conflict, over the issue of Britain's relationship with Europe. The party whose earlier existence was marked by its ability to both portray and command party loyalty and unity among its ranks appears to be fragmented, racked with internal divisions and conflicts. The internal changes have rendered the party incapable of functioning as the party of government as it has previously

been accustomed and has resulted in party sub-units replacing the overall party as the foci for political analysis (Riddell,1992).

CPP is viewed as a party of unity within British Politics. Any disagreements have been kept firmly under lock and key, save for the historic splits of 1846 and 1903 that emanated from the repeal of the Corn Laws and Tariff Reforms respectively (Baker, Gamble, and Ludlam, 1994). This status was enjoyed well into the late 60s before Norton found evidence of an unparalleled level of public nonconformity within the Conservative Party in the 1970s as people were dissatisfied with Edward Heath (Prime Minister). CPP party unit was preserved through political party ideology propaganda which stressed party unity. Riddell (1992) branded this "Tory tribalism" because of its nature of promoting loyalty to the party and not to the leader (Riddell,1992). Survival has been and still is an essential undercurrent, which oils the very existence of CPP and thus runs close to the heart of Conservative MPs. This is best exemplified by Mrs Thatcher's exit from the leadership of CPP in 1990 as a strategy to increase electoral chances and the Party's unity (Layton-Henry,1984). The Conservatives Party has been in office for the greater part since the post-war period with the members enjoying benefits of political offices. This created a two-fold effect: firstly, being that they now regard themselves as the Party of Government, a natural selection with the right to govern. Secondly, they see themselves as the only party capable of governing (Smwdley, 1998). Thus, any attempt to disturb this status quo was quickly marginalised, as result divisions within the CPP remained unwelcome and anyone failing to support the party was viewed with contempt. The party has its own ideology as espoused by Mrs Thatcher, that is, the defence of tradition; conservation of what is known; a belief in the free market and liberal economic thinking. The current dissident within the party and the confusion in Brexit highlights a shift from the ideological perspective of Mrs Thatcher's generation in the process indicating the need for unity for them

to stay in power. Clearly May's survival of the vote of no confidence highlights a maintained unity and cohesion as the major reason for political survival in this century (Smwdley, 1998).

The most obvious implication is that, since 1970, the Conservative Party no longer represents a party with policies determined by its leadership to which most members are content to subscribe and adhere to. Instead, members seem more willing to openly defy and challenge the official party line on some issues of principal. The British Parliament is split into cross-party factions over the European Union (EU) divorce deal indicating the existence of factional fights in the international arena. Brexit marks the highest level of factionalism indicated by Mayer's survival of the vote of no confidence. Undoing 46 years of economic integration in one stroke was never going to be easy, and the Brexit process is bedevilled by the same divisions that first led to the referendum. Both Britain's Conservatives and the Labour opposition as the dominant parties are polarised and divide over course of action, leaving Parliament so factionalized with no comprehensible plan. (Layton-Henry, 1984). Factionalism transcends continents as it is a problem bedevilling Africa as well as highlighting that human nature and the wish to dominate has nothing to do with colour or race.

Gwede Mantashe (ANC Secretary General) in 2017, was quoted saying that corruption and factionalism are extinguishing the ANC and will collapse it' (News24 2017). Indeed, factionalism in ANC just like in other dominant parties in Africa has become a serious problem in the process threatening its domination. Literature has proven that many dominant parties have fallen because of internal conflicts and break-ups ANC has not been spared. ANC started experiencing internal struggles in 1994 all this emanating from ideological, material, and personality issues (Isike, 2017). The first clash came to lights in 1996 following the ANC leaders dropping, Employment and Redistribution (GEAR) strategy, Development and Reconstruction Programme for Growth, this was strongly contested by its associates in the

Tripartite Alliance – COSATU and SACP due to its neo-liberal approach (Isike, 2017). The partners were worried about the cold shoulders they got during the process leading to the acceptance of the strategy. This set the stage for internal tensions within the party which eventually led to a major breakaway from the party in the wake of its elective conference (Polokwane) in 2007. The RDP/GEAR conflict worsened after Zuma was fired as the Deputy President in 2005, leading to the fractionalization of the party into two major conflicting camps: the Zuma's 'communist' and Thabo Mbeki's 'nationalist' factions. This conflict led to the formation of a new party, the Congress of the People (COPE) by supporters of Mbeki (COPE) (Mukwedeya 2015).

Another split that resulted from internal factional fights resulting in the formation of the Economic Freedom Fighter (EFF) occurred in 2013 triggered by the divergent view over the punitive actions taken against Julius Malema the then ANC Youth League leader. Following its formation, EFF successfully emerged as a left party. EFF enjoys ever-increasing popularity among South African voting population. In parliament, EFF gives a very radical meaning as an opposition party complicating life for the ANC.

Following former President Zuma's corruption scandals, ANC was further engulfed fresh factions which threatened the survival of the party and in the process compromising its drive to develop the southern country. This became ostensible after Zuma made forceful efforts to remove Finance Minister Pravin Gordhan with some quarters within the party seeing the move as a means to pave way for an agent of the controversial Gupta family. To them, such a move would compromise the national treasury. The case degenerated after the release of the State Capture report by the Public Protector. As a result, the party divided into two factions, the 'tenderpreneur faction' (pro-Zuma) and the reformist faction that was pro-Gordhan. As a result of the corruption cases, four ministers in Zuma's cabinet led by Derek Hanekom (Tourism

Minister) called for the president's resignation in the process increasing the tempo of the factional fights. Zuma escaped resignation after his faction was able to neutralize the call at the National Executive Council in November 2016. Indeed, it cannot be denied that conflict the brewing conflict in the ANC was staggering towards another split had Zuma stayed on board. The fights were revolving around President Zuma amidst mounting cases of abuse of office for material benefits. This highlights similarities between ZANU-PF and ANC, the struggles premised on the presidency. Southern Africa is not the only part affected as epitomised by ANC, the burden of factionalism is also at the centre of East Africa, Uganda National Resistance Movement has not been spared.

East central Africa has not been spared by factionalism as epitomised by the faction-riddled Ugandan National Resistance Movement. In Uganda, the National Resistance Movement ended up forming the government exposing itself to the weaknesses of governance, that is a contestation of power. Uganda factionalism brings an important angle for this research as it highlights how factionalism leads to multiparty systems. Uganda highlights what Hyden (2006: 39) calls "a renewal of the movement idea. While the other case studies of many African political parties stem from movements fighting a colonial power Uganda like Rwanda, Chad, Ethiopia, and Eritrea ousted an incumbent African regime, not a colonial power.

Internal conflicts involving factions in the National Resistance Movement (NRM) inspired the multiparty system in Uganda. These factional tensions originated in the 1994 constitutional debates but came to light in 2001 elections when Col. Kizza Besigye challenged Museveni in the presidential elections. Literature highlights that such changes only take place when parties face an organisational crisis that impedes the leadership's ability to remain in office. (Makara, et al, 2009). The 2001 electoral challenge of Col. Besigye where he won 29% of the votes was

work up call to the party leaders that all was rosy in the process stimulating discussion about change within the NRM.

The NRM was open-minded to divergent views permitting political debate on varying issues (Kasfir and Twebaze, 2005). Despite its openness, NRM did not tolerate people who politically disagreed with the principle of the Movement system and those who disapproved Museveni's leadership. Consequently, factions within NRM developed challenging both Museveni's leadership and the one-party system. As pressure mounted the Movement became prejudiced of conflicting views resulting in leading to the centralisation of power around Museveni, his family, and around loyalists from his home area Bahima (tribalism/regionalism). This quickly became a public concern in Uganda as, 71% of his cabinet members became Bahima kinsmen controlling about 75% of the budget (Mwenda, 2008). A good example of his brother, Hon. Salim Saleh, appointed chief of the presidential guard.

In the late 1990s, the political differences degenerated having been fuelled by the centralization of power within the presidency and corruption cases. Coupled to these worries a new generation within the parliament emerged with a different agenda and less attached and less obliged to the history of the Movements. These younger MPs were against the perceived increase in corruption and lack of acceptance of criticism of the NRM leadership to start reform. During the sixth parliament, 97 of these young MPs formed "the young parliamentarians group" (YPA) to oppose the concentration of power in the executive (Kasfir and Twebaze, 2005). This development exposed the Movement to factions. Another group consisting of the army and the police forces emerged, with a third group of the historicals also coming to life. The 4th group closeted around guerrilla warfare (Museveni, 1997). NRM after taking power mutated from a guerrilla movement to a government in the process controlling all civilian state institutions. As

a result, all high-ranking people in the Uganda People's Defence Force (UPDF) and the presidential guard came from the Movement.

Museveni as Uganda's president had the prerogative to appoint the leadership. Col. Kizza Besigye, in the Constituent Assembly of 1994 together with other army representatives moved a motion to consider NRM as a transitional arrangement and indicated the need to lift the ban on parties before the 1996 elections (Onyango-Obbo, 2001). Col. Besigye's critique exposed the existence of a faction in the Movement that divided army representatives who preferred the no-party system as a temporary device and those that preferred the Movement to remain the form of leadership. To silence Col. Besigye Museveni threatened him with a court-martial but Col. Besigye swiftly announced his presidential candidacy for the November 2000 NRM National Conference. (Kituo Cha Katiba, 2002).

Zimbabwe has not been spared by factionalism as epitomised by factional fights in ZANU-PF. Zimbabwe even before its independence recorded factionalism that led to political party splits. The 1963 split gave birth to ZANU-PF and ever since factionalism has been playing out in Zimbabwe. There were 2 factions in ZANU prior to 1980 Independence. There was a faction that included Nathan Shamuyarira and the other included that of those who later left to form FROLIZI. Following Chitepo's death on 18 March 1975, Sithole assumed leadership and this led to the emergence of a faction that felt that Sithole was a hero of bargain. Subsequently, this emergency developed with the Mgagao declaration where leaders and guerillas highlighted their collective displeasure with Sithole's tactics instigating the mammoth split of ZANU. Two factions emerged, the one led by Sithole clearly disowning the violent struggle and the other faction fronted by Robert Mugabe and Simon Muzenda who favoured a violent revolution thereby attracting majority support from ZANU-PF (Sibanda 2005). Fast forward to the 21st-

century factionalism in ZANU-PF became competitive giving birth to Gamatox, Lacoste, and G40 factions competing to take over Robert Mugabe.

1.2 STATEMENT OF THE PROBLEM

Despite ZANU-PF being in power for 37 uninterrupted years, with a strong and revered leader on the helm, national development remains elusive. The country is characterised by high inflation and low Gross Domestic Product at one point hitting the highest levels of inflation symptomatic of a nation at war. ZANU-PF is a revolutionary party with nationalistic perspectives and socialist ideology, yet the masses continue to languish in poverty, unemployment, lack of democracy and poor health facilities is a menace in the polity. There are no signs of real national development in Zimbabwe as this pursuit is compounded by the dynamics of factionalism in ZANU-PF. The failure to achieve real national development for the past 37 years has been subtly blamed on internal party factional politics without really clarifying how these in-fights impacts on national development. This lack of clarity on how ZANU-PF factionalism impacts on national development warrant a deeper investigation to really prove whether factionalism in the incumbent party is positively or negatively impact on the social, political and economic development of Zimbabwe. This may then enable an inquiry into how to harness the positives of factionalism and reduce negative ones

1.3 OBJECTIVES

1.3.1 Main Objective/ AIM: TO examine the dynamics and dimensions of factionalism in ZANU-PF and there impacts on development in Zimbabwe.

1.3.2 Specific Objectives

1. To examine the causes of factionalism in ZANU-PF.
2. To explore the evolution of factionalism in ZANU-PF.
3. To evaluate the impacts of factionalism in ZANU-PF on development.
4. To identify ways and mechanism to prevent/manage factionalism.

1.4 RESEARCH QUESTIONS

1.4.1 **Main Research Question:** What are the dynamics and dimensions of factionalism in ZANU-PF and how have they impacted on development in Zimbabwe?

1.4.2 Specific Research questions

1. What are the causes of factionalism in ZANU-PF?
2. How has factionalism evolved in ZANU-PF?
3. How has factionalism in ZANU-PF impacted on national development?
4. Are there any ways and mechanisms to prevent/manage factionalism in ZANU-PF to foster national development?

1.5 CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK

To better understand the dimensions of factionalism in ZANU-PF and their impact on national development it is judicious to clarify concepts that are dominant in this research. The concepts of factionalism and development are relative, contextual, contested and not entirely generalizable. An understanding of factionalism and development, therefore, depends on contributed values and perspective. The debate and varying opinions around these two concepts thus plead the researcher to unreservedly and opportunely explain these concepts. and highlight the ones relevant for this research.

1.6 FACTION

To understand factionalism, one must first have an appreciation of what a faction is. The contemporary definitions of the term 'faction' are too broad in scope and risk being confused with other terms like 'party tendency' or 'split' and, as such, they fall too short of really defining the phenomenon. It thus becomes important to precede the research with a comprehensible narrow definition of the term followed by a descriptive characteristic to enable a clear recognition of a factional existence. This study, therefore, defines a faction as *'a systematized, unified, political group, which aggressively pursues to organise itself within a political party with the aim to influence and determine policy and policy direction of its leadership'*. This conceptualization has been adopted because it helps to distinguish factional groupings in ZANU-PF from mere groupings of individuals brought together by common aims but with no course. This concept also distinguishes factions from groups (regional groups) by regarding a faction as a systematized, and unified phenomena aimed at determining party policy. ZANU-PF as a big political party has a lot of groupings that do not qualify as factions, hence adopting

this concept helps to separate these groups from real factions. A faction in part must possess the ability to directly threaten the survival of party leadership (Smedley, 1998).

Characteristically a faction is a sub-group of a political party. It must have a political purpose, ability and the means to achieve intended goals. To achieve the intended purpose, a faction has to be competitive and formidable to the broader party. Factions are thus concerned with systematized conflict, where conflict is comprehended as "the clashing of opposing ideas and forces" between a sub-unit and the leadership of the wider party and in some instances, between two or more sub-units of a party. It is rational to accept that a faction exists for a specific time period, adequate to achieve its objectives. As factions exist for a purpose, once their ends are met the faction will disband. Factions can thus be a short-lived or lengthy occurrence (Rose, 1995). A major misconception of the term 'faction' is when people comprehend it as a struggle only bent on attaining power by replacing leadership (Rose, 1995).

1.6.1 FACTIONALISM

Factionalism is the competition between factions for scarce resources or power. It reveals its self in many forms and is observable in all parts of the continent. In the village setting, it is a critical social process linked with local power structures (Dube, 1968). In a political party, context factionalism becomes a fight or competition between or among several groupings aiming to capture the party organization, the main objective being to take control of the reins. Accordingly, factionalism, therefore, refers to antagonism between groups. Factionalism is an inevitable part of political life. In varying societies factions have become rampant characterised by a range of cultural and symbolic trappings (Dube, 1968)

From Madison's (2013) perspective, factionalism is when a group of citizens, whether a majority or a minority of the whole, unite and driven by the common impulse of passion, or of

interest, opposing the rights of other citizens, or to the perpetual and combined interests of the community. Madison highlights that the causes of faction cannot be eliminated, and relief can only be found in the means of controlling its effect (Madison, 2013). In short, he indicates that factionalism is inevitable thus making this definition of factionalism apt for this research as it recognizes the inevitability of factions that result from opposing thoughts and varying ideologies. This definition recognises that choice of a faction is a democratic practice making it apt to assess where ZANU-PF stand considering its efforts to muzzle factionalism. Any attempt to muzzle factionalism breeds, tyrants, as exemplified by the way Mugabe fired and demoted those belonging to opposing faction or those who opposed his desire to become a life president through attempting to promote dynasty rule. Two types of factionalism will be highlighted, that is Cooperative factionalism and Competitive factionalism.

Cooperative factionalism is premised on the notion that factionalism can progress into a cooperative structure influenced by developments of different social group opinions and policy ingenuities. This premise from the belief that political parties are made by from members from varying social classes who manipulates party's agenda to carry their social concerns, aiming through their diverse opinions to integrate into developing an appeal for national concern and manifesto building. This expression of factionalism was developed by Boucek (2009) who submits that a factional structure can upsurge the collective capability of political parties and can also facilitate party cooperation only centripetal motivations can be an outcome. Through its appeal in edifying cooperation between separate intra-party groups, factionalism thus promote party integration. Through its articulation of opinions and policy preferences of varying groupings as well as the mobilisation of membership with common interests within one entity, factionalism thus can play a constructive role in building integrated parties. Cooperative factionalism emanates from a primordial establishing democratic process.

In the circumstance where factionalism paves way for cooperation, it thus becomes good for political parties, democracy, and national development. To achieve cooperation, democracy and national development in cooperative factionalism centrifugal incentives must be managed well for they tend to sway the party in the direction of factional rivalry which threatens party unity as evidenced by the existing factional competition within ZANU-PF.

Cooperative factionalism in generic terms is a type used to define essential differences between subgroups in a nation-state. In this type of factionalism as stated by Lawellen, (1983) subgroups are well established and their antagonism stems from failures of larger groups. Nicholas an anthropologist stress that these are small groups bound by strong ties instead of larger groups. Nicholas states that as these groups grow beyond interpersonal relationships, they cease to be defined as a faction (Nicholas in Swartz, 1966). Thus this standpoint best explains a lot in this study of factionalism in ZANU-PF were the groupings were largely contained but allowed to grow into this kind of factionalism which also stands as a catapult of another stage of factionalism that is natured into a stage of rapture to further ruin ZANU-PF and stall national development further pushing the nation on a verge of slop towards a failed state like Somalia.

In contrast to cooperative factionalism and as the next stage of factionalism, Competitive factionalism highlights the merging cleavages and fusion. It also indicates the unravelling and splits off a party. While factional competition can be good for democracy it can really be difficult to manage, Madison, (2013) weighs in and states that polarized party opinion loosens intra-party ties in the process creating splitting pressures as factions become conflicting rather than simply distinct. Additionally, this results in extreme fragmentation which tends to complicate and compromise decision-making and the enactment of lucid policy packages impossible. As a result, political parties tend to become too divided as a result of deep-seated issues that are impossible to integrate within party ideology.

Competitive factionalism due to its sporadic nature destabilises political parties and governments. Inability to keep party fragmentation in check breeds negative outcomes that threaten party unity. It is well known that electoral systems allow competition by encouraging elections thus becoming responsible for institutionalizing competitive factionalism. This far from saying competition is bad for it sharpens performance and it improves party performance, policymaking, and intra-party democracy. This can also result in the articulation of opposing policy positions resulting in factions dictating to party leader acceptable policies (Bowler et al., 1999). In addition, competitive factionalism may offer long-term management solutions to leaders of complex parties that monopolize the government for a long time. Competitive factionalism provides a way of rotating elites thus becoming a means to rejuvenate democratic politics within less competitive party systems. Factionalism exists in political parties and there are various types of political parties.

Political parties' existence date back to the early 19th century. The present-day political parties are perceptible to the 1800 presidential election in the United States. Ever since then they became a fact of life and now exist in the majority of countries within the world. Political parties are absent in countries under authoritarian rule, military rule, theocratic regimes, absolute because they are outlawed. Political parties can either be democratic or authoritarian. Political parties can be the great tools of democracy or sources of tyranny and repression, (Heywood, 2002:247).

By definition, a political party is a group of people who organise themselves to win government power by pursuing political power through elections or revolutions (Heywood, 2002). A political party is an organized and seemingly durable association of individuals or of distinguishable groups of individuals which endeavours to place its members in governmental offices to bring about the implementation of favoured political policies or programs (Marume,

2000). The ACE Encyclopaedia defines a political party as an organized group of people with parallel political aims and ideas to influence policy through its elected candidates. (<http://aceproject.org>). Various classifications have been used to differentiate political parties. These include constitutional and revolutionary parties.

Constitutional political parties acknowledge the privileges and the prerogatives of other political parties. They are governed by a framework of rules and constraints. The constitutional party recognizes the distinction between their party and the state, between the governing party and state institutions bureaucracy, judiciary, military, and police. Even if the party and government are partisan, state institutions are left to enjoy formal independence and political neutrality. Constitutional parties also recognize regulations of electoral competition

On the other hand, revolutionary parties are antisystem or unconstitutional parties, either of the left (communist parties) or the right (fascist parties). Their thrust is to seize power and then overthrow existing constitutional structures, using tactics that range from outright insurrection and popular revolution to quasi-legalism. When they win state power, they are more skewed towards one-party systems, in the process banning all other existing political parties. The line between party and state becomes faint as the ruling party would have substituted itself for government, creating a fused 'party-state' apparatus. This form best defines the ZANU-PF party.

The researcher acknowledges the existence of other forms of political parties that include Representative and integrative parties. These forms perceive themselves as election machines. Their primary goal is to secure votes in elections. The other being the Cadre and mass parties. This cadre party boasts trained and professional party members. They are also particular about ideological clarity, e.g. socialist parties.

1.7 DEVELOPMENT-FACTIONALISM NEXUS

Development is the process by which people become better off. Development can also be the practice of improving the quality of all human lives. The creation of a conducive environment to grow people's self-esteem by establishing social, political and economic systems and institutions. This concept is most apt for this paper when weighed amongst the three essentials frequently underscored concept of development. Development has been distinct as a participatory process of social and material advancement that included greater equality, freedom, and other values for most of the people through gaining greater control of their environment (Rogers; 1976; Rodney; 1974: 3). From Sen (1999) concept of development as freedom, it entails that winning elections and in turn face public criticism and have strong incentive to undertake measures to avert famines and other calamities. Sen (1999) departs from earlier slants of development where development is synonymous to the growth of Gross National per-capita (GNP) technology and industrialization. His idea offers a far-reaching all-encompassing and humanistic approach. Sen defines development as 'a process of expanding the real freedoms that people enjoy'.

From the social perspective as sated by Suhrke and Chaudhary, (2009), social development is the reductions of poverty by improving the socio-economic conditions through the provision of adequate food and livelihoods as well as fulfilling the requirements of the SDG development goals. Thus, development becomes state and nation-building, social modernization, a process of embracing inclusivity and citizen participation for the realization of effectiveness, efficiency and political stability. From an economic perspective, development is a sustained growth rate or rather the industrialization of agrarian economies' production systems. Thus, Development is a multidimensional concept which involves major changes in political, economic and social issues (Todaro, 2003).

On the other hand, factionalism has been known to be “a concept in political anthropology that is used to describe groups of people formed around a leader who rejects a status quo and actively work against an established authority within a society, such as a state, political party, organization (Lewellen, 1983). Furthermore Lewellen (1983) further contents that, groups classed as factions engage in conflict with official power structures by means of verbal contention and at times degenerating into physical action and violence. Madison’s (2013) defines factionalism as the coming together of a group of citizens, whether a majority or a minority of the whole, unite and driven by the common impulse of passion. Madison highlights that the causes of faction cannot be eliminated, and relief can only be found in the means of controlling its effect (Madison, 2013).

A developed country is thus characterized by the increase in capital, improved and efficient utilisation of labour, organised production, a developed transport mode and communication, stable financial institutions, urbanization and a rise in the level of living, improvement in the standards of education and improved life expectancy, and the widening of the rational prospect of the people. In short, a developed economy should break the poverty cycle by bringing into being a sustainable self-generating economy. Thus, a developed economic characterises the well-being of human potential.

1.8 THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN FACTIONALISM AND POLITICAL DEVELOPMENT

There is a core-relation between factionalism and political development. Political stability is a requisite for political development. Without political stability, there cannot be any national development. Lack of development breeds competitive factionalism. Lack of development the

prominent problem of most 'post-colonies' governed by revolutionary parties burdened by factionalism.

The notion of Political development dates to the 1950s where the political study was on the increase owing to the emergence of new countries in Asia, Africa, and Latin America. The term is heavily contested and there is no agreed definition but scholars like Learner (1958) view political development as political modernization while Rostow (1990) posits that political development is the process of industrializing a community, since, industrialist were the pacesetters of the concept of political development. The aptest definition in relation to this research topic is a definition by While Shils (1961) who view the concept as a process of nation building is supported by Organ ski (1955) who denote political development as political unification, industrialization, national welfare and abundance of material affluence. Political development has indicators highlighted clearly by Pye and Verba (1966). The two highlights elements in order of significance starting with equality which signifies mass participants, followed by the rule of law epitomized by recruitment merit. On the other hand, factionalism is the competition between factions for scarce resources or power.

The above definitions make the linkage of factionalism and political development conceivable. Clearly, factionalism can impact political development negatively when it's left to degenerate to competitive factionalism. Pye and Verba homes on recruitment on merit basis as a pointer of political development a condition that becomes a mirage in highly factionalized political parties. In faction infested party's recruitment takes the form of tribalism and patrimonialism where nepotism becomes the order of the day. A good example is the mass employment of youth officers by Robert Mugabe as their patron. This was premised on the desire to return power which was being threatened by Mujuru faction. Employing youth officers was a reward and in turn, they had to ensure Mugabe wins the election by violently forcing the electorate to

vote for Mugabe. Their employment strained the national treasury in turn depriving the nation the ability to save for recapitalization and develop. For example, in 2014 the government had cumulative expenditures which amounted to US\$3.526 billion against a target of US\$3.396 billion, and this resulted in expenditure overrun of US\$130 million. These drivers of these overrun expenditure included salaries which targeted to consume US\$2,284 but ended up consuming US\$2,429 million resulting in a budget deficit of US\$-145 million (National Budget, 2014). This is reflective of the realist theory which contends that people will fight to maintain their power by selfish means.

Political development also entails political unification, of which it's difficult to achieve political unification when factionalism is ravaging political parties. This, therefore, highlights that factionalism and political development are two conflicting phenomena because, the very existence of the other undermines the utility of the other thus, to achieve political development a country has to be intact and united as a precondition for industrialization to work. Most African countries like Zimbabwe, Mozambique, and Sudan have failed to industrialize because of factional fights that polarize policy formulation and bring the nation to civil unrest a condition that robs nations billions of dollars.

Moreover, Verma (1961) further compounds the relationship between factionalism and political development when he weighs in with the concept of political democracy making it saintly clear that existence of factionalism in any political party is enrooted in the democratic processes of a country where economic development favours democratic regimes that facilitate favourable conditions that buttress economic development. Thus, if political development is a product of democracy factionalism and political development becomes correlated with political development a dependent variable on democracy. Undemocratic regimes are a menace to economic institutions due to their arbitrary nature and uncertainty around succession (Colomer,

2011). Democratic institutions embed economic freedoms, rule of law, the presence of transparency, accountability and are anti-corruption corruption. As a result, democracy and development become mutually reinforced, albeit not reliant. This does not infer that undemocratic regimes are always not economically successful. Undemocratic and authoritarian regimes have flourished in Singapore, Spain, USSR, Mexico, and Taiwan but their survival was short lived as they eventually fell in the process establishing democratic regimes. The reasoning behind the impression that democracy improves lives is premised on the knowledge that participation in government empowers citizens as well as improve accountability in government (Dreze and Sen 1989; Ghobarah, Huth, and Russett 2004). For Madison, Aristotle and other contemporary political economists, it is self-evident that democracy is an instrument for redistribution (Meltzerand Richard 1981)

Factionalism leads to political instability condition economists see as serious malady destructive to economic development. This is so because political instability shortens policymakers' prospects leading to suboptimal macroeconomic policies. It may also influence frequent switches of policies, creating instability and thus, negatively upsetting macroeconomic performance. Political instability has negative consequences on economic performance resulting also from perpetual cabinet changes, that is, how often a premier is named within a year.

As a result of factionalism, ZANU and ZAPU turned against each other and entered into elections as divided forces only to turn against each other in a civil war called Gukurahundi which for nearly 7 years ending with the appending of signatures on the Unity Accord in 1987. An estimated figure of 20,000 civilians was massacred during this time. This affected development by robbing the nation of human capital and a lot of funds diverted to buy arms.

Between 1999 and 2008, Zimbabwe's economy lost 52% of its gross domestic product (GDP) in what has become known as the „lost decade of development (Kanyeza et al, 2017)

Moreover, effectiveness and efficiency are the benchmarks of political development, in other words, factionalism is reactionary to the absence of the stated benchmarks that is effectiveness and efficiency. Thus, in a bid to develop politically, through effective and efficient ways factionalism acts as a reminder to the political loopholes. Hence factionalism may act as a wakeup call to a government in its slow progress and hence pushes it to revisit its political development arrears. In this regard, factionalism works as a push factor towards development.

1.9 THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK

A theoretical framework is a basis on which the determination of research is based. Wilson (1985) posits that:

“A research work must be one that is founded on other peoples’ experience, knowledge, and past paperwork or experimental research. It must have a foundation on what has already been tested”.

1.9.1 The Realist Theory

The realist theorists contend that; individuals are obsessive with sustaining gotten power as well as attaining new power. The propounds of the realist theory are theorists like Hans Morgenthau and Thomas Hobbes amongst others. Realist posits that there is a perpetual struggle for power, resulting in some individuals gaining power at the expense of others. Such a reflection is evident in ZANU-PF as human nature and selfish interests have driven people

into factional groupings thereby making the realist theory laudable and usable in the effort to highlight the dynamics and dimensions of factionalism in ZANU-PF and their impacts on national development.

The existence of two contemporary factional groups (the G40 and the Lacoste) in ZANU PF was and is premised on the desire to occupy the highest position both at party level and national level in the party-political arena. Inability to consent and subordinate themselves to existing leadership is an upshot of selfishness and greed that drives them to crave for more power. As a result, the ruling party was/is fragmented into many factions embracing the G40, Lacoste and formerly the Gamatox faction led by Joyce Mujuru.

Realists through the eyes of the Chinese strategist Sun Tzu (1963), who lived 2,000 years ago, see power as a means of survival in the period “warring states”. Sun Tzu contended that moral reasoning was not very beneficial to state rulers of the day, he showed rulers how to manipulate power to advance self-interests as well as protect their survival (Sun Tzu, 1963). This is exactly what we see Robert Mugabe doing throughout his political life thus becoming the father of factionalism in ZANU-PF.

1.9.2 The implication of Realist Theory on the Study

Realist theory recognises that in a multi-ethnic political party contestation of power is perpetual and is also cognisant of the fact that perpetual contestation results in major and minor ethnic groups propelling factionalism as they fight to emerge as a dominant ethnic faction. Hans Morgenthau and Thomas Hobbes amongst posit that there is a perpetual struggle for power, that results in other individuals gaining power at the expense of others. This has created political exclusion and unbalanced resource allocation in Zimbabwe. This has also polarised ZANU-PF ideological value of equitably distributing national resources. Regionalism and

tribalism as factional dimensions in ZANU-PF were necessitated by the selfish nature of Mugabe who in turn tribalized power contestation. This leads to competitive factionalism with tribal groups competing to dominate the party presidency which is seen as a means to control both party and the state. This blurred the line that separates party and government business and regulating laws.

To meet individual and tribal interest factionalism emerged in the form of competitive factionalism. The battle for supremacy between Mugabe and Ndabaningi Sithole best exemplifies how the obsession of sustaining gotten power as well as attaining new power leads to competitive factionalism. Sithole fought to maintain his position as ZANU president while Mugabe wanted to attain new powers as a result a faction emerged negatively impacting on the progress of the liberation struggle. We see the same on the clashes between Mugabe and President Munangagwa, the desire to dominate gave birth to two competing factions, that is the Lacoste and the G40 signalling stiff competition for party dominance.

Additionally, the realist theory explains why ZANU-PF succession issues have been greatly influenced and driven by entitlement and selfishness. It also highlights how individual interests if not put in check can compromise both the party and the state. Leadership became too centralised with the nation staggering towards a dynasty with the constitutions perpetually changed to meet unchecked individual interests. As a result, the party seemed more contemptuous of the rule of law and democracy yet all this was a result of selfishness and the notion of entitlement.

1.9.3 Group Theory

The study will employ the group theory. Leading proponents of the group theory include the father of the Group theory Arthur F. Bentley (1908) in his “The process of Government”, also David Truman when he wrote a book titled “Social Order and Disturbances” others include the likes of Olson M, and David Garson amid others.

The group theory encompasses the elitist perception which is a characteristic found amongst the founders of ZANU-PF, the pluralist conception of the society is also encompassed in the Group theory. Bentley (1908) in his writing contends that there is no effective individual interest for every group thus, its interests that culminates in group action and that everyone ‘s interests cannot be covered in a single grouping. Bentley (1908) further contents that activities involving government are also indomitable by the conflicting group pressures and these group pressures determine the direction of the government policies. The fights to attain personal goals takes place not individually but through groups within which they are united. Individuals thus join groups as a natural action by people with similar beliefs and interest (Truman)

The group theory really acknowledges that “the State” is composed of formal and non-formal actors, these actors are products of their own historical, socio-economic, political and varying contexts (Mjiba Adeze’ Frehiwot, 2011) Implicitly in this theory groups do have competing interests and the State comes in as a controlling mechanism. Arthur Bentley (1908) sums it up by saying, "there is no group without its interest."

1.9.4 The implication of Group Theory on the Study

Group theory underlined and recognises the multi-ethnic nature and pluralistic of a state such as Zimbabwe in the process being cognisant of how both major and minor ethnic groups,

formal/informal are fruitages and consequences of historical, political, socio-economic and varying contexts. The activities of ethnic grouping, as well as the impact of ethnicity in ZANU-PF, is a result of the quest to satisfy varying common interest from competing ethnic groups, for example, Karanga and Zezuru. This has given birth to a protracted political party powers dominance which serves as a guarantee for control of both the party and the Nation.

To achieve unique and peculiar ethnic group interest various strategies are employed e.g. character assassination like what happened to Joice Mujuru as Mugabe sought her downfall. This then results to “pressure politics” where groups use various means to exert pressure to achieve aimed goals e.g. the resignation of Mugabe which was as a result of the Lacoste faction exerting pressure on the president of Zimbabwe by allowing people from all walks of life and varying political parties e.g. MDC Alliance and civil society organisations to protest in the streets of Harare demanding Mugabe’s resignation.

Additionally, the group theory explains why the ZANU-PF party factional politics has been greatly influenced and driven by ethnic sentiments. Why dominant factions right from the liberation struggle represented the major and dominant ethnic groups and why dominated factions are products of lack of state apparatus e.g. G4O now dominated by Lacoste yet having been the dominating party before the fall of Mugabe. Likewise, the constant struggle and contest for state control in ZANU-PF between ethnic groups wearing the democracy mask and the targeting of enemies corresponds with the claim of the group theory that no group has a claim on the general will of the people.

1.10 SIGNIFICANCE OF THE STUDY

The purpose of this qualitative study of *the dynamics and dimensions of factionalism in ZANU-PF: 1980 – 2017* is to analyse whether factionalism promotes or curtail development in Zimbabwe. There is a lot of research on factionalism on ZANU-PF but there seems to be less literature that analyses how the dynamics and dimensions of ZANU-PF factionalism impacts on national development. This research becomes significant because it will also highlight the positive impacts of factionalism contrary to how research has always presented it as an undesirable phenomenon. In the case of Zimbabwe factionalism influenced the freeing of space for people to express themselves as exemplified by the protest that dethroned the Zimbabwean Liberator come tyrant. The study also aims to underwrite possible solutions to the disturbing effects of factionalism in ZANU-PF by proposing that the part should democratise and embrace factionalism opposing the criminalisation and castigation of factionalism and factional leaders. Significantly the research will also fill-in gaps to the existing standard of knowledge (literature) by highlighting the nexus between factionalism and national development in Zimbabwe. Academically, this research will add to the references and literature to be employed when people are dealing with issues related to factionalism in political parties particularly ZANU-PF. This research is justifiable because it answers WHY Zimbabwe has not developed for the past 37 years despite having a strong nationalist leader Robert Mugabe, a man whose wisdom is still tapped into by the regional block.

1.11 LITERATURE REVIEW

The study about factionalism is seething with literature covering a broad spectrum of issues. In quintessence, factionalism in political parties has been occurring in almost all contemporary

countries' political scene though vividly noticeable with a great dimension in developing countries. Largely, this has been attributable to fragility of democracy in systems that have higher levels of poverty leading to struggle to control resources, trammel of democracy by leaders, dictatorial controls, tribalism and regionalism, injustice, wealth and property imparity, an asymmetrical distribution of resources between the members, human rights issues, issues of leadership qualities and succession politics.

Much of the literature on factionalism has concentrated on its causes, management, and types of factionalism, its existence, and its occurrence. Even in the Zimbabwean context scholars like Laakso (2002) homes on the idea that, like everywhere else, politics in Zimbabwe is also subjective and factious, influenced by ideological shade, policy disparity and competing for political trajectories, even within moderately comprehensible political parties. The Zimbabwean political field has displayed this nature since time immemorial dating back to colonialism, at independence and during post-independence. On this background, and progression of time the slightest ideological shade, policy variation or any deviation from a specific political line has resulted in factional groupings that are coherent and cogent such that unity within the party could only be maintained through strict military-like command discipline or through caprice, violence, and repression (Msindo, 2012). These characteristics are evident in ZANU-PF as a political party which is why the narrative of the War-vet has been on autoplay though in varying dimensions that is from heroism to entitlement. The 2017 November incident which culminated in President Mnangagwa, a war-vet, being given the realm by one of the remaining serving members of the High Command points to the aspect of heroism and entitlement. What is not clear in all this literature is the extent to which this strict military-like command has impacted on democracy and whether these policy variations and contending political trajectories were being driven by the need to promote democracy. What is clear however in the literature is that selfish reasons have been the major driver for factionalism in

most political parties. Sartori, (1976) supports the selfish nature when he states that, party conflict can also be motivated by patronage incentives such as power, career, and spoils. Shih, (2016) showed the CCP of China having factionalism based on selfish reasons when he states that "... individual incentives, supplying an inherently economic model of behaviour, where lower-level officials join factions to secure promotions and other regime goods from powerful patrons". Shih does not go further to highlight the impact of these selfish reasons to democracy hence the need to take the interrogation further.

Masiya (2017) in his writing "The use of heroism in ZANU-PF, intra-party factional dynamics" homes at heroism as a cause for factionalism in ZANU-PF. He states that the first upsurge prior to the vividly evident 2015, 2017 factional fights the main driver was heroism status which was used to exert factional dominance. To illustrate the issue of heroism Masiya followed the lives of 5 key ZANU-PF figures namely Joyce Mujuru, Didymus Mutasa, Nicholas Goche, Jabulani Sibanda and Rugare Gumbo. What is clear on all the above names is that they are synonymous with the liberation struggle yet ironically, they were all sacked from the party after being labelled villains and sell-outs. The cautious labelling of these people as villains of the struggle regardless of having spent decades being considered as heroes and heroine specifies how heroism was used in the factional fights. Stripping off the hero status and firing them from the party without any due diligence puts a lot of shades on the constitutionality of the action. Despite indicating that the most important thing on factionalism "...is not their structural property but their activity and its consequences" Masiya (2017) does not go further to look at the impact of consequences of factionalism as he had earlier indicated, apparently this becomes a gap this research seeks to fill particularly its consequences on national development.

Raftopoulos, (2014), in his article 'Zimbabwean Politics in the Post-2013 Election Period' highlighted that factionalism was also caused by corruption when he talked about the salary-

gate scandal and exemplify with the hefty salaries paid to the Public Service Medical Aid Society Boss Cuthbert Dube, who got a monthly salary of US\$230,000 while middle Managers got between US\$15,000 and USD\$30,000 per month. The issue of corruption had long been a course of worry raised by the war-veterans it in the 1990s. All this was revealed by Jonathan Moyo the then Minister of Information and Broadcasting who was fighting in Mnangagwa's corner to dislodge Joice Mujuru. This revealing debate on corruption took centre stage in 2014.

Masunungure (2007) goes on to states that "Since Zimbabwe is technically a one-party state, with the ruling party being supreme over state institutions and structure, whatever happens in ZANU-PF directly affects the state". This shared relationship between ZANU-PF and the government makes it even crucial to carry out this research to really establish how this relationship has impacted on national development. The magnitude of the impact of factionalism and the ripple effects need establishment considering that the contemporary crisis in Zimbabwe could be as a result of the in fights presently taking place in ZANU-PF. Flora and Heaton (2004) concede that "...by criminalising succession debates and stifling internal party democracy he (Robert Mugabe) has weakened the party and undermined its capacity..." The reviewed literature focused on how factionalism has weakened internal democracy without focusing on how the internal weaknesses have also weakened or strengthened national democracy considering the shared relationship between ZANU-PF and the Government. The alluded relationship makes the need for a thorough investigation apt to establish whether the culture of stifling internal democracy in ZANU-PF has not been transferred to the state since ZANU-PF is skewed towards the idea of a single party state as highlighted by Masunungure (2007). ZANU-PF does have a direct influence on what happens to the entire country. Premised on this background as well, the researcher, therefore, seeks to establish whether the stifling of internal party democracy has impacted negatively or positively to national democracy.

1.12 METHODOLOGY AND METHODS

Research methodology refers to an analytical technique of resolving a study problem and it can be understood as a discipline of learning how a research is exactly done (Kothari, 2004). In this light Rajasekar et al (2013) contend that, “fundamentally, the procedures by which researchers go about their work of describing, elucidating and envisaging phenomena...”.

The study is based on a qualitative methodology. Hitchcock and Hughes: (1995) defines qualitative research as research that describes a phenomenon by words rather than statistical explanations. This research was exceedingly reliant on qualitative methodology because of its capability to present a detailed representation of the phenomenon under study it also empowers the researcher to absorb and partake in the study.

Qualitative research methods were used simultaneously with relevant theories coupled with extensive fieldwork with the aim to provide a detailed account of the dynamics and dimensions of factionalism in ZANU-PF and their impacts on national development. This methodology was effective because it enabled the researcher to narrow his vision on facts and opinions regarding political party factionalism. Creswell homes on this point when he states that “the researcher relies on the views of participants; asks broad, general questions and collects data consisting largely of words from participants” (Creswell, 2008) This made qualitative a methodology of choice after juxtaposing it to quantitative method which proved not apt for this type of research relating to the dynamics and dimensions of factionalism in ZANU-PF because the issues that were involved could not be quantified and its reliant on participants’ views which cannot be numerically analysed. Clearly, the adopted methodology for this research was the most appropriate, pertinent, accurate and efficient method which was enough to identify how factionalism in ZANU-PF impacted on national development.

Distinctively qualitative research is objective and aims to understand people from their own comprehension of their surrounding world without imposing the researcher's opinions. This indicates that qualitative research is not solely dependent on a single reality but believes in the existence of multiple realities. Qualitative researchers perceive factionalism as a phenomenon which can either positively or negatively impacts development, thus the researcher was convinced that a qualitative research design had the aptitude to illumine the impact of ZANU-PF factionalism on the national development without being one sided for impacts can either be negative or positive.

ZANU-PF is the party in which the researcher investigates the dynamics and dimension of factionalism in ZANU-PF and their impacts on national development as such population of the study was drawn from its party members as well as purposefully sampled amongst Zimbabwean citizens. Regarding sampling, purposive sampling and non-probability sampling methods were employed as the research was largely targeting people with relevant institutional knowledge as well as information regarding unfolding events in ZANU-PF factional fights. Purposive sampling follows the non-probability method. O'Leary (2010) views this as handpicking sampling – a selection of a sample with a particular purpose in mind. This technique is also referred to as judgemental sampling by Marshall (1996) and to him, it is a process by which sample population is acquired through the discretion given to a particular group or individuals of the population by the researcher because they hold information of the target population that is required by the researcher. The researcher opted to use this technique because accurate data would be timely obtained. The most significant decision in sampling is whether to employ probability or non-probability sampling procedures. In this case, the researcher used non-probability sampling and through purposive sampling, the researcher first defined the population and decides on the proportion of each section of the population needed to be selected as a sample. After deciding on the number of elements desirable, the researcher

then purposively sampled in choosing the required sample for the purposes of the research study. The total sample size which the researcher decided on was 52 respondents.

A sample of 20 grassroots supporters, 5 former ZANU-PF members, 5 Central committee members 5 Members of parliament, 5 top management of the District and 10 opposition supporters, and 2 political analysts. This brought the total sample to 52, these were selected to represent the entire sector under study. The most common Question about sampling is how large should the sample be? Unfortunately, there is no right answer to this except that sample size should always be a true representative of the larger population. The researcher was able to guarantee balance on all the multiple groups. Due to limited time and resources, the researcher made use of sampling because it's cost effective. Some of the people did not turn up for the meetings since some had busy schedules, with some being afraid to contribute considering the sensitivity of the research.

To have access to some of these people, Snowball Sampling or "chain referral sampling," was employed in the selection of the sample. Snowball sampling which is a non-probability sampling method is basically sociometric in nature (Showkat, 2017). This technique helped the researcher to access or locate member he was not aware had relevant information needed by this research of factionalism in ZANU-PF. Some of the people were not known to the researcher because they always operated incognito but they had first-hand information. To access these people as suggested by Daniel (2012) snowball sampling was employed because other methods proved not very useful in securing the required population that was known to the general population. Despite having a huge membership not all member in ZANU-PF are privy to relevant details about factionalism and not every member is familiar with the history of the party hence the use of snowball sampling. The researcher, however, used this technique cautiously as he avoided the high risk of sampling error which was highly probable when using

this technique because if wrong groups were targeted and wrongly selected wrong information would have been obtained

The sample was a true representation of the whole population as it included people of varying social position, top leadership, middle and grass root people. The sample size of 52 respondents included ZANU-PF and MDC serving members of parliament, former ZANU-PF members, Central committee member, political supporters and political analysts. These were chosen because they represented the correct attitude than other class of people.

The research started by digging in the existing literature to establish the dynamics and dimensions of factionalism in ZANU-PF. The research aimed to illuminate the causes, reasons, time frames, context and consequences of factionalism. This was tailed by the reading and analyses of related work on factionalism and a critical analysis of them. The analysis of document as lucidly put by Yin (1995) entails a systematic review of both primary and secondary documents carried out by those wishing to come up with credible results (Miles & Huberman, 1994). By reviewing documents, the researcher aimed to find gaps and to be pointed towards areas to focus on as well as to be informed on the right questions to ask the respondents. Journals articles, magazines, published books, newspapers, and internet electronic sources were consulted by the researcher in grasping academic standpoints and the historical background of the dynamics and dimensions of factionalism in ZANU-PF.

Their researcher used primary sources because of its capability to provide valuable data which will add value to the research area. To effectively achieve the objectives, questionnaires were used as techniques to source data from individuals in an environment characterised by factional politics which is being watered down and hidden from the public yet secretly known. Interviews were carried out with key informants from ZANU-PF members and former

members, party leaders and interest groups within provinces particularly Midlands as well as national interest groups.

The researcher followed up with unstructured face-to-face interviews, particularly in English. The researcher employed English as the main Language but also code switched where it was necessary to do so. Interviews according to Frey & Oishi (1995) are a face-to-face purposeful conversation involving to individuals the interviewer and the respondent. This research study conducted multiple interviews involving people from various standing. These included political analysts, academics, political parties, civil society activists and victims of and beneficiaries of factionalism. This research settled for an unstructured interview because of its flexibility thereby allowing the researcher room to ask questions to a point of saturation where he was no longer getting new information. It is through unstructured face-to-face interviews that the researcher was able to clarify and further inquire into the insights which will be drawn from the proposed document analysis. Fear of obtaining straight-jacketed responses from informants is discouraged the researcher from using structured interviews. Also, the structured interviews would have inhibited the researcher to reach the point of saturation.

The researcher carried data analysis simultaneously with the interview process since the preliminary analysis highlighted to him the need to redesign the questions to make them focus on the central themes for the remaining interviews. Upon completing the interview process the researcher began a thorough detail analysis. The thorough analysis enabled the researcher to identify additional themes and concepts that he used to build upon to arrive at an explanation. For the final analysis, the researcher categorised the themes and placed interview data with similar themes in the same category. The categorised material was analysed and compared to identify variations and shades in meaning. After the researcher compared varying categories and establish connections and links between themes that were juxtaposed to a theory that was

offering an accurate detailed interpretation of the research area. The researcher concluded the analysis after he was convinced that he has arrived at an interpretation worth to share with others and worth to be used in policy making as well as assist in the comprehension of the socio-political horizon.

Data collected from various sources and from the interviews were triangulated. Triangulation went a long way in augmenting the validity and reliability of the obtained information attained from different data- collection methods. This process made the research process and the outcome more conclusive and dependable. The collected data were qualitatively analysed and evaluated in the process of deciding its reliability. Subsequently, the researcher categorized the data into thematic areas and concepts, methodically weighing the collected data and interpreted it before reaching the conclusions.

1.13 DELIMITATION OF THE STUDY

The main objectives and hypothesis of the research are to investigate factionalism in ZANU-PF and its impact on development in the context of mutating factional fights in ZANU-PF. This study is centred on ZANU-PF which is the ruling party in Zimbabwe for the past 39 years. The research chose ZANU-PF as a political party because it is the oldest viable political party with factionalism that impacts directly to the citizens, democracy, and rule of law. ZANU-PF offices dote in the greater parts of the country as a result, the study will focus on ZANU-PF party factionalism with investigations being carried in 3 provincial offices namely Harare Midlands and Bulawayo but particularly at the Party Head office due to its centralized nature, hence the bigger part of the research will be carried out in Harare.

1.14 ETHICAL CONSIDERATIONS

This is a process of developing guidelines aimed at safeguarding and protecting the research respondents' rights (Rogers, 2008). Ethical considerations resulted from the Nuremberg Code and the 1964 declaration of Helsinki (World Medical Association, 2008). The researcher was aware that factionalism is politically associated, and that ZANU-PF is characterized by patronage politics that, when provoked will result in political violence.

Interviewees and other informers were openly told that the data was being gathered for research purposes only. Assurance of security and confidentiality was guaranteed and assured to the interviewees and the responded. Those requiring anonymity had their wishes granted by the researcher. In cases where individuals need their identities known the researcher took his time to advise them of possible dangers associated due to the sensitivity of the topic under study. Those who refuse to consent to offer information were not bullied but rather their wishes were respected. According to Cassell and Young (2002), informed consent is the cornerstone of ethical research, and the important aspect in this regard is the quality of information to be provided to potential respondents. The researcher came up with a consent form to be signed by consenting respondents. This aimed at enhancing the respondent's freedoms and autonomy. The research in line with the ethical consideration was able to maintain confidentiality and was independent and impartial during data collection as a way of avoiding the manipulation of results.

1.15 Conclusion

This chapter outlines the structure of the dissertation and giving an account of the research problem, the aims, objectives, significance, theoretical framework and analytical framework of

the study. In the quest to fulfil the research objectives, the study employed qualitative research methods to expose the impact of factionalism in ZANU-PF on national development from an in-depth understanding. In short, this chapter acts as the bird's eye view of the dissertation. As a preceding chapter, it lays a foundation, discusses relevant literature, and concepts that explain factionalism and development. This chapter lays the groundwork for the chapters to come.

CHAPTER 2

EVOLUTION AND CAUSES OF FACTIONALISM IN ZANU-PF

2 INTRODUCTION

There are several causes of factionalism in political parties, the general ones being socio-economic and political dynamics. The cause of factionalism in ZANU-PF are as a result of varying causes that evolved with time in the process compounding the phenomenon. Among the causes are the notion of entitlement, human nature, lack of a succession plan, ideological polarisation and the class factor. Some of these causes have become formally instituted to become default root causes of factionalism within the incumbent party. ZANU-PF's party systems have been manipulated to ensure that factional fights exist as shall be highlighted in the discussed below.

2.1 EMERGENCE OF ZANU-PF

ZANU was formed on 8 August 1963 at the background of the struggle to liberation Zimbabweans from colonization and the domination of the British white settlers. ZANU-PF's formation was necessitated by a split in the Zimbabwe African People's Union (ZAPU) in 1963 having succeeded the National Democratic Party (NDP) which was banned in 1961. NDP was formed in 1950 at the Southern Rhodesia African National Congress (Sithole 1977). The above stated 3 parties all aimed to liberate the country from the settler community. ZANU-PF's background is highly elitist in nature and was formed in Salisbury, which is today known as Harare, the capital city of Zimbabwe. The front runners of the party during its formation were Ndabaningi Sithole, Leopold Takawira, Mukudzei Midzi, Edgar Tekere, Herbert Chitepo, and

Henry Hamadziripi. The front runners were also Southern Rhodesia's evolving educated African elite, hence the elitist background. ZANU was formed in Highfields at a house belonging to once Defence Minister Enos Nkala in August 1963. ZANU appealed to the populace by identifying itself with the problems being faced by the Black majority. The problems ranged from discriminative policies, segregation, exclusion. As a result, ZANU brought up a question that was directly questioned why the rural peasantry was suffering in the process winning its self-huge support in the process giving them enough reason to wage the liberation war through its armed wing the Zimbabwe Armed National Liberation Army (ZANLA). The liberation struggle culminated in the attainment of majority rule achieved through the democratic election in 1980. Prior to 1980 in 1976, ZANU and ZAPU had merged to form the Patriotic Front (PF) as well as their military wings in the fight against the settler Rhodesian government. The Patriotic Front comprised of ZAPU headed by Joshua Nkomo and ZANU (Zimbabwe National People's Union) headed by Robert Mugabe (Sithole, 1977). The merger came to an end when they went into the 1980 election. Robert Mugabe (ZANU-PF) won the election while ZAPU under Joshua Nkomo retaining a grip in the province of Matabeleland, the 2 later joined forces in the first Government of National Unity (Makumbe and Compagnon, 2000).

Ever since its first election victory, ZANU-PF has used an overabundance of strategies to remain in power. Firstly, ZANU-PF has heavily relied on its nationalist rhetoric premised on its contribution to the liberation struggle that gained them support within the nation and from surrounding Black leadership across African. The power has also been sustained through intimidation, violence and coercive tactics highlighting the historical legacies of the liberation struggle (<http://www.usip.org/pubs/specialreports/sr109.pdf>) and lastly through serious manipulation of election results. They do all this because they regard themselves as the only

ones with the right to govern, entitlement emanating from the contribution that created heroes and heroines in their midst.

2.1.1 ZANU-PF Party Ideology

According to Erickson and Tedin (2003), an ideology is “a set of beliefs about the proper order of society and how it can be achieved”. An ideology is premised on the common understanding, a common vision and a shared strategy on achieving party goals. A shared ideology brings cohesion a critical ingredient for development. Ideology is what made up ZANU PF as well as differentiate it from other political parties. ZANU-PF ideologically believes independence (sovereignty) and control of the Zimbabwean economy. ZANU-PF’S ideology epitomizes its political moral code and worldview.

ZANU-PF is ideologically a Socialist party oriented by a Pan Africanism. As a party, it believes in Independence and sovereignty. The independence was achieved after waging the war of liberation struggle through its military wing ZANLA in which thousand willingly gave their lives so that others would be free (Party ideology, 2016). The party also believes in Resource nationalism, this highlights the desire to control all the means of production, a need that was also central to the struggle. This desire is epitomized by the “Third Chimurenga” a move the party will not relent on. Thirdly ZANU-PF believes in the Equitable distribution of resources and opportunities. ZANU-PF in its endeavour strives to spread the wealth and share it amongst the population exemplified by the empowerment policies and the land reform program. It also believes in democracy, discipline, loyalty and selflessness and sacrifices as epitomized by Cde Herbert Pfumandini Chitepo.

2.2 BATTLE FOR LEADERSHIP: MUGABE VERSUS SITHOLE

Power wrangles in ZANU-PF can be traced back to the mid-1960s as the root for factional power struggles within the Party. R.G Mugabe the puppet master of factional fights rose to power owing to his cunning nature and his ability to manipulate factional opportunities that presented themselves to him in the 70s (Faloa and Heaton 2014). His character highlights the human nature concept (ambition) and the group concept (groups/interests). Mugabe had left for Ghana in 1950 before returning to a vibrant nationalist movement (Scarnecchia, 2008). This is when He joined the National Democratic Party (NDP) which came to be as a result of the ban placed on the Southern Rhodesia African National Congress (ANC). Mugabe became the NDP Publicity Secretary (Smith et al 1981). Due to its organized defiance to settler rule, NDP was banned in 1961 subsequently succeeded by the Zimbabwe African People's Union (ZAPU) in the very year. Barely a year after ZAPU was also banned by the Edgar White heard regime in September 1962 culminating in the formation of the People's Caretaker Council which was to stand in for ZAPU until the ban was lifted (Todd, 1967). This move cast a dark shadow to the nationalist movement resulting in the emergence of two factions that precipitated a split in the process creating two rival political parties, that is ZANU and ZAPU (Musindo 2012). A very senior ZANU-PF member highlighted that:

“Anyone could have done what Mugabe did, he saw an opportunity, grabbed it and muddle himself through the leadership ranks he was not deterred by the fact that he was a novice in the political ranks. I emulated him for such a resolve”

Despite being very junior, Mugabe was nominated by a single committee member Simpson Mutambanengwe to be a runner up as the party president in 1964 at Gweru Congress. Mugabe lost the election to Ndabaningi Sithole (Sithole 1979: 50-60). This became the birth of antagonism between Mugabe and Sithole. The antagonism was both tribal and regional and has

been the nature of the factional fights troubling ZANU-PF to date amongst Karanga, Manyika, Ndebele, and Zezuru. Nyagumbo (1980:170) states that, as a result of the loss of Mugabe to Sithole "... strains in the national executive begun to be felt" and the personal political ambitions of Sithole, Mugabe, and other members have been cited as causes for the split. ZANU-PF thus emerged in part of political violence, nationalist propaganda and factionalism witnessed between it and its rival party ZAPU. The rivalry became characterized by the violent clash and prompted the colonial government to detain ZANU and ZAPU leaders.

In detention, Mugabe initiated his move to position himself as the ZANU leader by soiling Sithole's reputation. In 1969 Mugabe seized an opportunity after Sithole was convicted of an assassination attempt on Ian Smith the then Rhodesian Prime minister. During the trial, in his defence, Sithole stated that "My Lord, I wish to publicly dissociate myself in word, thought and deed from any subversive activities, from any terrorist activities and from any form of violence" (Nyagumbo, 1980). Upon hearing this Mugabe accused Sithole of cowardice and ill strategic (Venter, 1976:205). Mugabe perpetuated his drive to take over leadership from Sithole and in the 1970s the party began to crack. The trial both weakened and made Sithole an easy prey amongst the other leaders such as Chitepo (ZANU chairperson) and Tongogara (commander of the army) (Nyagumbo 1980). Leadership squabbles between Mugabe and Sithole degenerated into feast fights amongst the detainees evidencing a serious fracture. A member who faced Mugabe's wrath cited the origin of the battle between Mugabe and Sithole as the beginning of ZANU-PF factional wars.

"Our failure to check Mugabe's ambition the moment we saw it was our biggest mistake, as a Zezuru I also wanted one of my own to lead but ultimately the party paid the ultimate price."

In an effort to gain control of ZANU from Sithole, Zezurus and Shona from both ZANU-PF and ZAPU influenced by regionalism formed Front for the Liberation of Zimbabwe (FROLIZI) in 1971. Masipula Sithole contents that the plans were to appoint Mugabe (Zezuru) as the leader of FROLIZI. This plan suffered a stillbirth because it failed to hoodwink Zimbabweans and the frontline states that ZANU leader Sithole and ZAPU Nkomo had appointed Mugabe as the leader (Sithole 1979). In 1971 Sithole was finally suspended by the detained leaders namely Mugabe, Zvobgo, Nkala, and Nyagumbo basing their decision on the 1969 court blander subsequently accusing him of working with Rhodesian security to destroy ZANU (Martin and Johnson, 1985). This move aimed to push Mugabe to the helm but ZANU leadership based in Zambia and the Frontline States refused to endorse Mugabe and instead they pushed for the reinstatement of Sithole after the Zambian Government had threatened to jail all ZANU's 2,500 guerrillas who were based in Zambia in the event that ZANU executive refused to reinstate Sithole (Sithole, 1979). While Sithole and Mugabe were jostling to take leadership of ZANU, the factional fights spread to the military wing resulting in the Nhari rebellion which was a complaint about Tongogara's failure to meet their basic needs (Sadomba 2011:13). This highlights how ZANU and the Military wing has always been one and the same thing. Power struggles in ZANU affected the smooth flow of the Military wing as well.

This followed the assassination of Chitepo which led to the international investigation constituted by the Zambian government, which concludes that a ZANU faction murdered Chitepo. The commission's findings resulted in the Zambian government detaining most of the ZANU leaders who were in Zambia accusing them of murdering Chitepo. For diplomatic reasons Sithole did not confront the Zambian government and this made him lose favour amongst the leadership coupled with the letter he wrote alleging that Chitepo's death was caused by tribal factionalism in his party, Sithole came close to sealing his fate (Sithole1979:82). The final blow came when he attempted to unite ZANU and ZAPU under

the banner of reformed African National Congress (ANC) The ZANU leaders saw this as Sithole's attempt to destroy the party (Astrow, 1983:88-89). The ANC attempt and the reaction to Chitepo assassination sealed Sithole's fate and he was ousted in 1975. Vividly two high profile ZANU leaders from Manyikaland (ZANU chairperson and president) were eliminated in succession. In March 1975 nearly 250 other leaders including John Mataure the chief political commissar in the war council and Noel Mukono, the external affairs secretary both from Manyikaland had died as a result of tribal in fights in ZANU (Sithole, 1980:31). Consequently, the exiled ZANU war council remained Karanga dominated but were still detained for the death of Chitepo's assassination by the Zambian government.

The ouster of Sithole saw Mugabe taking over control of ZANU resulting in the Zezurus dominating ZANU leadership (Mugabe's faction) in the process replacing the Manyika faction (Sithole 1980:17-39). As the new leader Mugabe moved swiftly and castigated the Zambian government for detaining members of the War Council on allegation of Chitepo's assassination. The castigation of the Zambian government was Mugabe's ticket to gain favour and support of the War Council highlight the extent of the influence of the military wing on who should take reigns of the party.

After 1975 Mugabe's support was growing steadily but he was hardly known by the outside world prior to the Geneva Conference of November 1976 were leaders gathered to discuss the issue of majority rule. ZANU like ZAPU also weakened by factionalism was in danger of being excluded from the negotiation since the Rhodesian regime insisted on negotiating with ANC of Ndabaningi Sithole and Abel Muzorewa (Faloa and Heaton 2014). Sensing the dangers of suffering political irrelevance Mugabe and Nkomo allied under the banner of Patriotic Front (PF) (Smith et al 1981). It is sufficing to say the Zimbabwean independence came amidst this fragile relationship between Nkomo and Mugabe and in 1980 Mugabe calculated his sums well

and went into the elections independently. The desire to dominate compelled Mugabe to dump Nkomo highlighting human nature.

2.2.1 The Nhari Rebellion

This section looks at the history of the 1974–75 rebellion in the Zimbabwe African National Liberation Army (ZANLA). The Nhari rebellion is important for this study because it highlights that the Army has since time immemorial played a pivotal party in ZANU-PF. The rebellion was led by commander Thomas Nhari, Caesar Molife, and Dakarai Badza. The mutiny could have been avoided had the ZANLA commander, Josiah Tongogara, heeded Nhongo's advice to delay ZANU's transnational appointments by paving the way to address increasing opposition among guerrillas at the war front.

Between 1971 and beginning of 1975 ZANU's Dare and its Military High Command were faced two essentially distinct, but yet closely entangled threats to their unity and the survival of the Party: a rebellion by disgruntled ZANLA commanders and the "detente exercise" this was the southern African-inspired settlement plan (Africa Contemporary Record, 1976). The 1973 review conference held by ZANU brought with its ethnic politicking into the leadership dividing the Manyika and the Karanga further aggravated by the Nhari rebellion. As the rebellion progressed, ZANU became definitive of two warring camps. The Karanga within the Dare and the High Command opposed the rebels and the "détente exercise", while the Manyika, actively supported the rebels and supported the settlement negotiations (Warner, 1981). One of the political analysts saw the Mugabe and Sithole contestation as the beginning of tribal politics in ZANU but this becoming on the open during the Nhari rebellion.

“The Manyika through the Nhari rebellion saw an opportunity for payback for the fall of Sithole and the death of their high-ranking officers like Mataure and Mukono. They might have as well seen this as an opportunity for a comeback but what this did was to promote tribal politics”

In August 1973, during the Dare re Chimurenga’s conference in Lusaka held two yearly, Nhongo was elevated from field commander in charge of the Nehanda sector which covered Malawi, Mozambique, Zimbabwe (MMZ) war front (Dzino, 2011). Nhongo’s elevation made him the Provincial Commander of the Zambia Zimbabwe (ZZ) in charge of the guerrilla activity. Furthermore, for the first time, Nhongo was elected to the ZANLA High Command. As a result, Nhongo was deployed to ZZ front, situated to the west of Mozambique, Malawi Zimbabwe (MMZ), resulting from the two-yearly conference. The ZZ provincial commander and the MMZ provincial commanders remained in contact at the same time regularly coordinated movement of arms as a unit. It is through these exchanges that Nhongo came aware of the growing indiscipline and discontent among some guerrillas in MMZ front his former base of operation where he had worked with field commanders such as Nhari and Badza hence they had a trail bond (Dzino, 2011). These three had gone under military training together in Bulgaria between 1969 and 1970 as ZIPRA trainees but in 1971 they simultaneously defected to ZINLA in 1971. Following the 1972 ZANLA attacks on Altena and Whistle Field farms attacks Nhongo began to develop differences from Nhari and Badza after the attacks culminated in a strong response from the Rhodesian Security Forces (RSF). The differences were premised on differing war tactics approach. Nhongo narrated:

The Rhodesians were attacking us. We were losing a lot of men. We (MMZ front commanders) had a meeting to discuss our strategy. It was me, Badza and Nhari. There were problems at the meeting. Badza and Nhari were feeling pressure from the war. They said we as the commanders should go back to Zambia. I said no, we cannot leave

the boys at the front on their own. Badza and Nhari went back to Zambia. I stayed with the boys. I moved with them further into Rhodesia to avoid detection. We left the Rhodesians looking for us along the border. That is how we survived. (Dzino, 2011)

A year later another dispute between Nhongo and Nhari resulting from divergent views on war tactic. Prior to his departure Nhongo in June 1973 as ZANLA guerrillas in Nehanda sector had recruitment a huge number by using persuasion in his recruitment process in the process avoiding confrontation with the RSF (McLaughlin, interview, 1990). Nhongo's strides caught the attention of Tongogara who requested for the first-hand update from the subdivision's commander:

Tongogara wanted to know what was going on at the front. We had brought about 700 recruits in one year. Before we had never had so many being recruited in a short time. He wanted to know how we had done it. I was the commander of Nehanda. I said I could not leave until someone was sent to replace me. Thomas Nhari was sent to take my place... After that, I left... I was shocked to hear on the radio that St Albert's mission [a school in Nehanda sector] had been closed. Children [and teachers at St Albert's school] had been abducted [by Nhari] ... It seems Nhari wanted a name like Nhongo. (McLaughlin, interviews, 1990)

George Rutanhire, a Nehanda subdivision guerrilla, was aware at the time that the abductions had not been approved by Nhongo because he had objected to this tactic before leaving to meet Tongogara (McLaughlin, 1991). Nhari by abducting civilians clearly mirrored his disregard of Nhongo's authority within the Nehanda sector. Nhongo's remark that 'Nhari wanted a name like mine' indicates personal contention between the two guerrillas which, like their initial disagreement in 1972 underscored differences between ZANLA field commanders on tactics of war. Prior to 1960s, ZANLA did not prefer civilians as guerrilla recruits, but around 1973

recruitment methods were now influenced by revolutionary recruitment (McLaughlin, 1991). The Nhari-led St Albert's abductions plunged ZANLA in a compromised position. ZANLA could not publicly denounce the abductions without exposing internal indiscipline and personal rivalries and factions among some of its commanders over how to conduct the war. This highlights similarities with ZANU-PF where they could not accept the existence of factionalism until it started to play out in the public.

The first major disciplinary case for the Dare presented itself in the form of the Nhari Rebellion in 1974 pointing to indiscipline and corruption amongst members of the Dare and High Command. Though the core complaint of the rebels was about the shortages of supplies and essential commodities, ineffective communications with the ZANU headquarters, as well as the leader's failure to visit the front line, the rebels made an error of quickly pointing to the self-indulgent extravagances and comfortable living of the members of the Dare and High Command (Chung, 2007). Subsequently, they got fed up with the mismanagement of the Gava administration and assumed operational autonomy. Warner (1981) in His book *Times of Darkness* quoted One of the rebellious survivors claiming that the cadres reacted against "bad administration *"we did not have ammunition for our guns and corruption, greed and inefficiency"*. This highlights that the leadership had little interest in the welfare of the guerrillas and that the High Command was riddled with corruption and "tribalism"(Mugabe Party Strife", National Observer,1980). This position was supported by the International Commission which investigated the Nhari rebellion, and the subsequent assassination of Herbert Chitepo, the inquiry concluded that "...there were genuine grievances among the fighting cadres in the front lines which gave rise to the Nhari rebellion... there was also a lack of integrity and honesty amongst the...ZANU leadership" (Times of Zambia,1978).

Coupled to the mismanagement, having allegedly lost his wife to Tongogara Nhari thus took exemption to these abuses. The march to take over Chifombo, the main ZANLA camp in Zambia was not the premiere of the Nhari Rebellion, instead, Nhari had followed procedure and due process as stipulated in the ZANU concept of democratic centralism by highlighting his grievances together with those of his colleagues by writing letters to the High Command. His situation was compounded by the earlier courted trouble with the High Command when he abducted students from St. Albert's Mission in Centenary, this action contradicted the ZANU policy, while his co-accused Dakarai Badza and accomplices were soiled by their attempt to shoot one Rex Nhongo a ZANLA commander (Mazarire, 2011). The High Command as a result opportunely took the very act of questioning its actions as defiance thereby responded by demoting Nhari and Badza from the posts of commanders and as members of the General Staff to ordinary soldiers, in the process paying a deaf ear to the precepts of democratic centralism which calls for a consensus-based decision. In a similar manner, we see Mugabe purging everyone with presidential ambition in the process refusing his shortfalls that made Zimbabwe a pariah state for decades. This highlights that there is a thin line between the party and the military wing in terms of operational procedure.

The Nhari rebellion is insightful of the Realist theory and the Game theory in that Nhari and Badza belonged to one group because the rebellions were fighting for the similar interests which were not being addressed by the Dare and the High Command at the same time the extravagance life that was being led by the high command highlights selfishness that characterises human beings as posited by the realist theory. The unfair judgement on Nhari and his team highlights how morality is at the expense of the desires to dominate others. Significantly the Nhari Rebellion is reflective of the perpetual contestation of power and how others gain what they desire at the expense of others, all this is reflective of the realist theory.

2.2.2 The fall of Mugabe and the Rise of Mnangagwa

The rule of Robert Mugabe, a once-revered liberation war hero, revered feared tyrant, and an international pariah came to an unflattering end Tuesday, November 19, 2017, when he was forced to relinquish his 37-year hold on power in the face of possible impeachment. Robert Mugabe's ouster as president of Zimbabwe by the military led by General Chiwenga was greeted with wild eagerness throughout the country, region and International community. Thousands of people decanted onto the streets signalling a novice era in the history of Zimbabwe were people seem freer to protest together with the military and security apparatus. Indeed, the fall of Mugabe signalled the beginning of new hope for democracy and free space for people to freely express themselves. Once again, the army under "operation restore legacy" brought to light the notion of entitlement.

The protest and the request for Mugabe's resignation by people from all walks of life united all political parties for a single goal a loud "No" to dynastic politics. Many including opposition politics were ready to grant Mugabe exalted status for his contribution in the fight to liberate Zimbabweans from colonial rule, yet it was apparent that most were agreed that he had overstayed his welcome. His fall saw many hailing the elevation of President Emmerson Mnangagwa to the presidency, yet the very move puts a lot of shades on constitutionality and democracy. At this moment no one cared about how Mugabe was removed from power because all democratic means had failed for the past 37 years, in the minds of all Robert Mugabe had to go by all means necessary. A strong opposition supporter still supports his contribution to march with ZANU-PF members to remove Mugabe

“I did not care who takes after Mugabe, Mugabe had overstayed and he had to go. The succession issue had become a national problem and had become everyone’s duty to see that he goes, hence I marched”

The dismissal of Cde Emmerson Mnangagwa as his vice presidents on 7 November 2017 triggered the swift military intervention. Mugabe’s firing of his deputy was justifiably on the grounds of the latter’s alleged disloyalty. The battle between President Mnangagwa and Grace was premised on the need to end a heralding dynasty as Grace was vying for her nomination to be the next 1st vice president which was to be her one-way ticket to succeed her husband and become the first female President as well as usher dynasty rule. This severely divided ZANU-PF and plunged the party into convoluted factional fights that saw war-vets backing President Mnangagwa a fellow war-vet. During these fights, the economic agenda was set aside and the economy kept seeking deeper with the populace failing to access their hard-earned money from the banks. The groups that emerged that is Lacoste and the G40 created room for people to choose sides that accommodated their interests thereby highlight that no single group can meet everyone’s needs in the same vein vindicating the realist theory.

Following his sacking, President Mnangagwa began his exodus fearing for his life. The military as an integral part of ZANU-PF since time immemorial as highlighted by the Nhari rebellion intervened in the process pre-empting Mugabe’s plans to conduct a purge among senior members of the military, General Constantine Chiwenga included as the head of the armed forces. The indication is that Vice president Chiwenga moved in to save his career as he was also facing Mugabe’s wrath for conceding that it was time Mugabe pave way for younger president. Within a week Mugabe’s exit was secured and President Mnangagwa was elected as provisional president of ZANU-PF on 19 November. Subsequently, inaugurated as Zimbabwe’s President on 22 November (ISS 2017).

Prior to the resignation, the military had a torrid task to stress that its actions were far from being a “coup” for a coup would have resulted in Zimbabwe being alienated both by the African Union (AU) and the Southern African Development Community (SADC) for these committees do not recognise unconstitutional changes of government. Regarded as a liberation hero the army could also not risk the image that they are the one who had removed Mugabe directly for, he was one of their own at least with regards to war credential, a status he enjoyed in neighbouring countries. General Chiwenga went on to explain why they had to move in by indicating that the army was merely targeting “counter-revolutionaries” and the “criminals” who had infiltrated ZANU-PF, surrounded the president and were plundering Zimbabwe’s natural resources. One wonders therefore why he, in turn, becomes the Vice President if indeed the moving was for the benefit of the nation? Furthermore, why have there been no arrest and convictions of the so-called “criminals”? In principle, if Grace Mugabe and her chief allies within the ruling party (dubbed Generation 40, or G40) were identified as the very criminal one wonders therefore why today they walk the streets freely with no criminal charges opened against them (Dixon 2017). Of note on the fall of Mugabe is that the military explicitly and vividly claimed the right to determine who should hold political power in ZANU-PF and be the president of Zimbabwe in the process putting a lot of shade on Zimbabwe’s political development. Clearly, humans rise at the expense of others and by any means necessary, once again vindicating the realist perception.

The fall of Mugabe was just a means of changing leadership with no focus on national development as the military was changing leadership. Their continued backing of ZANU-PF and snubbing of democratic levers became an inauguration of an era of “Mugabe-ism without Mugabe” (Maromo 2017; Melber 2017). The inauguration of President Mnangagwa thus plunged the nation into an illusion on Mnangagwa’s intent to transition the nation to democracy as well as drive sufficient reforms to make life more bearable than it had been prior to the

departure of Mugabe. Months into the fall of Mugabe it is apparent that the fall of Mugabe opened Pandora's box making military personnel more readily to take public office. The hopes of many Zimbabweans were perplexed by Mnangagwa's first move of providing the top military with ample rewards in the public domains. A strong critic of ZANU-PF saw this move as being two-sided and indicated that:

“One can choose to see it as a reward or as a move to restore sanity to the civil service by employing and appointing disciplined men. Above all, every Zimbabwean has the right to hold any office of his/her choice”.

President Mnangagwa has vowed to pursue neoliberal economics which is exactly what Zimbabwe needs to undo the past 37 years of poor economic policies bend on benefiting one man.

2.3 FAULTY LINES

Presidential ambition in ZANU-PF are habitually based on conjecture and political gossip, but the sure wisdom in Zimbabwe is that factions always exist in ZANU-PF among them one always dominates in the presidential race before being relegated. In the previous dispensation, the two contenders were grouped around individuals. There were those grouped around the late Solomon Mujuru and later on his wife Joice Mujuru, and those grouped around Emmerson Mnangagwa. Rallying behind individual instead of the party has created patrimonialism, regionalism, hero worship, and God-ordained leaders. Following the fall of Mujuru, those who were aligned to her aligned around Sydney Sekeramayi as successor (The Standard 2014). One of the supporters conceded that for too long ZANU-PF has denied the existence of factionalism in the party:

“The biggest problem we have ever done as a party was to deny the existence of factions within our party and this became cancerous as it was not addressed. I think the previous dispensation felt that any attempt to acknowledge and address it would be an indicator that Mugabe was no longer a popular leader”

Running parallel are the undying wishes of the war vets and the military who “symbolically swore Emmerson Mnangagwa as shadow president” with the consent of President Mugabe to dislodge the Mujuru faction (The Telescope News, 2014). Here we see Mugabe creating an environment for clashes between rival factions as a means of perpetuating his rule. People aligned to factions in relation to their interest as highlighted by Bentley (1908) in group theory when he contends that there is no effective individual interest for every group thus its interests that culminates in group action since everyone ‘s interests cannot be covered in a single grouping.

The obscuring of the lines between the State and ZANU-PF as a party is another faulty line hindering the development of Zimbabwe since 1980. This in part is reflected in ZANU-PF Party Constitution. Evidently, the powers accorded to the Central Committee are grounded upon the postulation that ZANU PF will always be the ruling party, the notion of entitlement surfaces again. Sen (1999) highlights that democratic government always deliver as they owe their post to the people yet on the contrary non-democratic government don’t owe their re-election to the voters hence, they have no drive to deliver their election promises. Making them God’s choice indicate that their legitimacy does not originate from the electorate hence they have no obligation to the electorates. The thinking that ZANU-PF will always be in power has made the ruling party to renege on its duty to the nation instead its members divert all the attention in making sure they return lucrative posts within the party as this becomes a one-way ticket into government. This has resulted in factionalism within the party as those in the

grassroots seeks to promote their own patrons and the top recruiting followers to their factions to garner support. One of the ZANU-PF youths contended and highlighted that she condemns the close association between ZANU-PF and government as this has resulted in exclusionary politics:

“We are sick and tired of being second class citizens in our own party and state, why should it be a standard that only those belonging to the dominant faction constitute the cabinet and are the only ones employed. Appointment of government post or any post should be on merit, not on factional grounds.”

Further on the obscured line between government and ZANU-PF, we see the same on the party and national constitutions bearing similarities thereby making ZANU-PF the sole legitimate voice of the masses. This is evidenced by the preamble to the Party Constitution which is synonymous to that of the State Constitution, it reads, “Whereas we the people of Zimbabwe are an African nation” yet it should have read as “Whereas we the members of ZANU PF” since this is a political party. This again highlights the element of entitlement, Zimbabwe thus belongs to ZANU-PF, highlighting the human nature which has caused factionalism in the incumbent party as a result.

The drive towards democracy in Zimbabwe has been bumpy and rough owing to a historical fault in the Unity Accord between ZANU and ZAPU. The Unity Accord between ZANU and ZAPU to form ZANU-PF highlights a serious disregard of multiparty democracy, it reads “To unite all the people of Zimbabwe under a single political party” (Unity Accord, 1987). This highlights that factions within ZANU-PF are not allowed as they are a means to form new parties exemplified by the case of Joice Mujuru. This again explains why ZAPU was swallowed, an indication that Mugabe was not benevolent to contending factions hence the succession debate was/is a sacred cow which attracted treasonous charges.

The convergence of the Party Presidium and State Presidium present another faulty line. Both the State and the constitution of ZANU-PF incorporates the posts of a president and the two deputies. The bearers of the posts in government have always been the same individuals who hold the posts under the Party Constitution. With one man having the unconstrained pleasure to appoint both Vice-Presidents under the State Constitution. Evidently, this power affects the democratic processes under ZANU-PF Party Constitution.

Also the lack of a clear statement on term limits for the Presidium under the ZANU-PF Constitution creates another faulty line that resulted with a sector within the Presidium which included Joice Mujuru, realising a loophole and ceased an opportunity to annul nominations from the province by positing that where there is no “vacancy” in the presidium nomination become a formality rendering useless the concept of election. This self-claimed right to the office by the incumbents conflicted with other people’s interest thereby giving birth to a new group so eager to contest this thinking. The President Emmerson Mnangagwa faction’s contention was premised on the democratic principle that calls for the contestation of all posts within the Presidium after every 5 years which is to be followed by an election process with nominations coming from the Provinces being recognized. To them, nominations ought not to be an automatic endorsement of the incumbents.

2.4 CAUSES OF FACTIONALISM IN ZANU PF

Causes of factionalism in ZANU-PF are convoluted merely because of ZANU-PF’s form of establishment as a liberation party just like SWAPO in Namibia and ANC in South Africa. The origin of ZANU-PF has a bearing on the current factional fights because ZANU rose from the rabbles of internal squabble and the influence of the military wing. These historical legacies

are the reason for perpetuated clashes. The following discussion will therefore exhume and put to light the different cause of factionalism in ZANU-PF but will focus on those that are weightier than others, meaning the research will not exhaust all causes.

Apart from regionalism, tribalism, and lack of ideology being prominent causes of factionalism, other factors fuelling factionalism, these include the belief of entitlement, human nature, lack of succession plan, and social classes conflict found in the revolutionary party. Evidently, ZANU-PF's membership has ballooned over the decades, in the process opening doors within power corridors for people who do not have ideological grounding but who simply identify with the party's pro-majority policies yet lacking a clear comprehension of the party's ideology and its founding principles. By nature, these people will disregard internal party discipline and the hierarchical order. According to the realist theorist, this leads to the perpetual struggle of power resulting in some individuals gaining power at the cost of others.

2.4.1 Entitlement

Entitlement relates to an uncompromising attitude with a lack of understanding of others' needs. Those who feel entitled expect people to be concerned in their life than they are in other people's lives. To Sen (1984) this is the totality use of rights and opportunities that one faces. Self-entitled individuals make impracticable demands because to them their personal happiness comes at other's expense. This relates well with the theory of human nature which highlights that humans are naturally selfish. The war vets feel they deserve a special seat in ZANU-PF because they fought the liberation struggle and they in a way regard themselves as Kingmakers. They openly declare that the bullet is mightier than the ink. This self-entitlement has come in the way of the political development of ZANU-PF were internal elections have just become a

manipulated democratic process to suit and accommodate the needs and wishes of those entitled. They control the narrative of the factional fights in ZANU-PF, which is why we saw Mugabe surrounding himself with the Zezurus as he shielded himself from the dictates of those entitled. This had an effect on the political environment as it encouraged, nepotism tribalism/regionalism and politics of patronage culminating in factionalism within the party. One of the party supporters highlighted that

“There is nothing wrong in letting the war-vets or the army take posts in the party as long as they go through the same processes just like everyone. This desire for special treatment is what we object and what the G40 emerged to contest.”

To highlight the war-vets' hold on power, today the National Political Commissar of the Party is Rt Lt General Engelbert Rugeje a retired soldier and war vet. The National Chairperson is Oppah Muchinguri a war vet as well. At the helm is President Mnangagwa a war vet again. The current structure highlights the spirit of ownership and in the process confirming sentiments of the former Commander Defence Forces (CDF) General Chiwenga who pointed out that "We are stockholders of the country...Some are stakeholders. Stakeholders will come and go, but stockholders have nowhere to go, so we are stockholders, we come with it..." (Bulawayo 24, 2016). This is a clear statement of entitlement highlighting why the former CDF handed over power to President Mnangagwa after the forced resignation of Robert Mugabe subsequently pushing himself to become the vice president and second secretary of ZANU-PF. Vice President Chiwenga in a way felt entitled to hold that post having liberated Zimbabweans from a tyrant who had bedevilled the country. Democratically, Zimbabweans are the real stockholders and them alone, have the mandate to choose a president as enshrined in the 2013 national constitution on chapter 5. The army after ceasing power hit a snag that could only be dealt with by the people of Zimbabwe to avoid the "not coup" being labelled a coup. After

seeing the electorate marching and demanding his resignation Mugabe finally signed the resignation letter. This highlights that only the people of Zimbabwe can legally remove a president and not the army. This is reflective of the realist theory which states that individuals are obsessed with obtaining new powers apart from the ones they already have. As commander of defence forces Vice president Chiwenga was already powerful but the desire to get more made him resign from the army and join civilian politics which has higher offices and more power than service offices. His Ambition only serves to highlight that humans are the same and that contestation of power is also influenced by ambition.

The factions in ZANU-PF have been worsened by this sense of entitlement 'chinhu chedu' which highlights politics of exclusion. The 2018 Conference held in Matabeleland South Province was awash with slogans and resolutions of the 'chinhu chedu' mantra a clear reflection of politics of entitlement. All this was done by supporters who wanted to convey a message that there will be no one else other than President Emmerson Mnangagwa reminiscent of the 'VaMugabe chete' intonation and the 'Zeruru unconquerable' slogans.

At one-point Presidential spokesperson George Charamba said to the former Minister of Higher and Tertiary Education, Professor Jonathan Moyo, 'Chinhu chedu chine vene vacho' translated as 'our thing belongs to its rightful owners'. The concept of Chinhu chedu highlights a high degree of possessiveness and ownership. This in part is a self-wealth amassing system of power within ZANU-PF party. President Mnangagwa is believed to have authored the 'Chunhu chedu' concept which is the reason that saw Mugabe being ousted as the faction moved into safeguard this concept. They felt that by warming up to generational renewal and disregarding party hierarchy by pushing for Grace Mugabe to take over Mugabe was betraying the code. Thus, entitlement is at the centre of ZANU-PF factional fights (Nyabadza, 2018). This notion of entitlement, as a result, gave birth to the emergence of the Lacoste faction and the G40

faction The Lacoste realized that Mugabe was personalizing the party and the country by entitling it to himself and his family as the ideal rulers. On the party of the G40, they realized that only those with war credentials were entitled to rule epitomized by President Mnangagwa's fight to take over from Mugabe. President Mnangagwa is a war-vet and felt that he was entitled to take over from another war-vet with the former commander defence forces Vice President Chiwenga weighing in by declaring that they will never salute a person with no war credentials. This gave birth to a new dimension in the factional fights, the battle for supremacy, the young (G40) versus the old (Lacoste) in the process compromising party's code of discipline, a ZANUPF's ideological value.

The G40 faction grouping which comprised of young politicians such as Jonathan Moyo, Local Government Minister, Saviour Kasukuwere and the then increasingly influential First Lady Grace Mugabe wherein the final race to take over control of both the party and government at the departure of Mugabe as a means to decimating the concept of entitlement. G40, whose name derives from a constitutional provision which allows anyone above the age of 40 to run as a presidential candidate, is an amorphous group that was opposing Mnangagwa's ambitions of a clear take over from Mugabe by supporting the ascension of Grace Mugabe (Pigon, 2016). The formation of the G40 staggered the nation towards a dynasty as the younger generation backed the candidacy of Grace Mugabe a wife to the former president Robert Mugabe. This as well was a clear disregard of the party hierarchy and party constitution. All these infights affect cohesion within the party. When Mugabe backed the G40 he saw it as a means to right the wrongs that led to politics of exclusion on the part of the youths. From a realist perspective, morality, if employed at all, should be instrumental in justifying conduct.

Clearly, the battle between these giants had nothing to do with instrumentally supporting democratization and inclusive economic development of Zimbabwe. Instead, both sides sought

control of the party and government for selfish interests. Both have accrued enormous wealth, which requires substantial political power to preserve, protect, and expand. Mnangagwa once said “Ukabuda muZANU-PF unosvawa seshizha rabva pana mai varo” “if you go out of ZANU-PF you will wither like a leave removed from the tree.” The conflict was worsened by Mugabe’s refusal to facilitate a democratic process and his attempt to pave way for his wife to take over the reins under the banner of G40. We witnessed the humiliation that Mnangagwa suffered during the interface rallies under the hand of Grace Mugabe who accused Mnangagwa of promoting division in the party. The interface rallies were being funded by state funds in the process robbing the nation of development funds. NewsDay, (2018) reported that 8 of the interface rallies had gobbled 20 million, with News24, 2018 reporting that each interface rally costed 2,5 million to host. The purge of President Mnangagwa which came at the cost of the nation was aimed to show the war-vets who regarded themselves as a special class that all those who go against the central leader were expendable and that they were not entitled to take over the realms.

Factional politics in ZANU-PF has a lengthy account, which dates back to the struggle for independence from British settlers in the 1960s with intensity increasing significantly after Mugabe became the President of the in 1970s. Mugabe in his frail state has been the leader of both ZANU-PF since 1977 and the polity since 1980 but he seemed not to have had enough and continue declaring that he has no intention to leave the reins. Instead, there was an indication of an impending dynasty rule. This made once united factions to turn their ammunition at each other as they tussled for dominance. The contestation of President Mnangagwa’s automatic takeover by the G40 backed by Grace Mugabe has been a battle for generation renewal and a means to do away with the entitlement belief. Ironically on the part of the Lacoste, it was a battle to stop an impending dynastic politics which was being influenced by the prerogative that Robert Mugabe had awarded himself.

Operation Restore Legacy clearly highlights this entitlement concept, the “stockholders” put it on record that them alone can make key decisions and changes within the party, highlighted by how they moved in to save the sinking ship through operation restore legacy. This incident made it abundantly clear that ZANU-PF’s roots are the war vets (The Herald, 2019). This puts a lot of shade on the democracy side as it also abundantly clarified that they are not willing to let go of the helms to either the young people or to opposition politics making elections a fuss. A disgruntled G40 member indicated that Operation Restore legacy only served to herald new factional dynamics in ZANU-PF:

“I don’t see how operation restore legacy helped ZANU-PF in dealing with factionalism. In fact, it marked the beginning of ‘power grab’ politics. More factions will emerge and will use similar tactics to usurping power”.

The G40, as a result, wanted to change this syllogism and system which resulted in war veterans being placed in various arms of the State Institutions at the expense of merit, for example, Gwinji the former Permanent Secretary of the Ministry of Health and Child Care was retired from the army to take up this post, the same can be said for SB Moyo. In the process, this illuminates the human nature aspect, as divergence views started to emerge owing to the fact that the group of the chosen failed to accommodate the interests and desires of the younger generation. Thus, entitlement becomes the prominent reason for factionalism within ZANU-PF, which also made the succession issue a sacred cow for the unentitled. Entitlement in ZANU-PF is dangerous in that ZANU-PF is a house of many tribes, with all dominant tribes claiming ownership of the party hence the perpetual struggle for power as highlighted by the realist theorists will persist and at times taking the form of tribal and regional politics.

2.4.2 Human Nature

The erratic behaviour of mankind has influenced the development of the concept of human nature. Factionalism in ZANU-PF in part is a result of human nature serving also as a proof of the theory's relevance in the field of development studies. From the Hobbesian (1651) concept by nature men are greed, selfish and are ambitious and desire to dominate others. Hobbes' conceptualization best describes the conduct of ZANU-PF politicians involved in the factional fights hence one can safely conclude that this desire to dominate influences other factors in ZANU-PF factional fights. Robert Mugabe's desire to lead ZANU points to human nature, the same with Joice Mujuru and Mnangagwa. Every human is ambitious and always want to climb on top of the leader hence factionalism is inevitable just like human nature. Madison (2013) sums it up when he states that since selfishness, greed and the desire to dominate is what defines men then factions will always be there. A senior ZANU-PF member of parliament confirmed that ambition and cunning is the problem bedevilling and propelling factionalism in ZANU-PF.

“We are seized with an educated but ambitious generation without limitations to their desire to lead. Respect for hierarchy used to be our limiting factor but not for this novice and disrespectful, selfish and ambitious political crop”

The human nature concept thus aids as a complete answer to the question of why factions exist and why they seem inevitable as they are evident in ZANU-PF as supported by Ruhanya (2015). Mugabe refused to relinquish power having ruled for over three decades, this highlights how a man can be extremely selfishness. The nation became a pariah state simply because he wanted his needs met at the expense of others vindicating the position of the realist theory. In turn, the ambition of others could no longer be contained by fear of reprisal hence factional

fights began. Human by nature desire to dominate, coupled by selfishness the succession issue was ignored by Mugabe so that he continues to fulfil his selfish needs of domination.

The selfish nature of Mugabe started to affect cohesion in ZANU-PF party, Mataire (2012) has also made a similar observation when he states that, people align themselves with a faction that has influence in the event of leadership change at the helm. Change in ZANU-PF leadership during the reign of Mugabe had only 2 possible forms, that was his death and his incapacitation since ZANU PF constitution is silent on term limits. This made people align themselves to factions as an insurance policy to their already gotten power and as a means to acquire new powers. This lack of clarity illuminates Achille Mbembe's notion of Necropolitics; where He stated that “power resides outside the law” Achille (2003). The problem of the succession issue in ZANU-PF is thus premised on the fact that though both the state and the party constitutions clarify on how succession should play out both fall too short of being the ultimate authority, as they play second fiddle to development within the party because by nature ZANU PF is contemptuous of the rule of law. A point in case is Mugabe’s unconstitutional purging of President Munangagwa for aspiring to become the vice president during the Tsolotsho declaration as well as his contemporary firing of him without following party procedure of a fair hearing before dismissal for aspiring to take over the presidency after him. All this was a means to clear space for Grace to automatically take over without any competition. One would also see it as a means to block the Karangas from taking over from the Zezurus. The continuous amendment of the party constitution to suit Mugabe’s needs highlight the same point, a case in point is the one centre of power clause that was smuggled into the constitution a night before the national elective congress. Today we see the same being proposed on the running mate clause, as a means to align the national constitution to the one centre of power concept. ZANU-PF always make sure that the national constitutions run parallel to its constitution. Matching the national constitution to create one centre of power (The Sunday Mail, 2019). The fear is

that when a vice president is elected, he or she owes no allegiance to the president or might become too popular than sitting president thereby compromising cohesion. Amending the running mate clause compromises the democratic succession road map as well as creating an environment for further factional fights similar to those witnessed during Mugabe era as some within the party will not warm up to this undemocratic move.

Mugabe's selfish nature gave birth to the Tsholotsho declarations. The Tsholotsho Declaration (TD) denotes the covert meeting that was organised by a faction that was loyal to President Emmerson Mnangagwa in 2004 with the aim to overhaul the composition of ZANU-PF's presidency. The scheme's objective was to have Mnangagwa elevated to the post of first vice presidency ahead of Joyce Mujuru following the passing on of Simon Muzenda (Matyszak, 2014), A staining battle took place between the Mujuru and Mnangagwa factions ending with Mujuru camp emerging stronger after Mugabe outmanoeuvred Mnangagwa (CCZ, 2014). Despite having been debated and confirmed through the party's provincial structures and the Bulawayo Dinyane speech and prize-giving day in Tsholotsho on November 18, 2004, respectively the declaration is not in any written document.

Following the death of Vice-President Muzenda, the reformists within ZANU-PF and others seeking to acquire political power for its own sake became increasingly interested with the declaration and the context of its debate and discussion that resulted from a power vacuum in the top hierarchy of ZANU-PF. This highlights the realist theory that state that, individuals are obsessive with sustaining gotten power as well as attaining new power. Through the vacuum, it was clear that whoever occupies the vacancy would automatically be the successor to President Mugabe. This resulted in a lot of consultation and meetings in places such as Ruwa, Masvingo, Kwekwe, Gweru, and Harare around October and November of 2003 as people raced to identify a candidate to fill the vacancy during the Congress. President Mnangagwa

became the favoured candidate amongst the Karanga tribe and the Ndebele but the plan was scuffled during the 2003 congress in the process giving relief to the Solomon Mujuru camp as they got a breather for regrouping in preparation of the 2004 ZANU-PF congress which was certain to fill the vacancy. The TD highlight tribal politics as we see two tribes coming together to dislodge the Zezurus.

Clearly, Tsholotsho Declaration has arguably declined to fall away from the Zimbabwean political arena because when it was initiated it aimed to address three key issues amongst them, to rectify an error that existed in the party's presidency. The declaration wanted the presidency to be cognisant of Zimbabwe's regional and ethnic diversity balance amid and among the country's four major ethnic groupings, namely Manyika, Zezuru, Karanga, and Ndebele (The Standard, 2004). The political thrust entailed that, the top four leadership positions in the ruling ZANU-PF —presidency should be influenced by nationhood were ethnicity and regionalism cease to be the reason for appointing members with the aim to promote and maintain representative national cohesion, development, peace, and stability. The TD aimed to remove the monopoly of a single tribe on the top post of the presidency in the process promoting rotation among the four major ethnic groupings. TD also wanted to do away with the culture of imposing people on these four top posts by way of party hierarchy but should be done through democratic elections done by secret balloting. Finally, TD wanted the filling of the top four leadership positions and the democratic elections to be defined and guided by and done in accordance with the constitution of the party (The Standard, 2004). One of the propounders of TD highlighted that:

“Tsolotsho Declaration remains the best recommendation that ZANU-PF will ever get in its lifetime. What it sought to address was to curb selfishness which leads to tribal politics and lack of a clear succession plan because power corrupts.”

The situation that TD aimed to change was as a result of the ZANU'S merger with ZAPU in 1987 through the signing of Unity Accord. TD aimed to change a condition that had existed for 17 years which Mugabe had used to maintain a delicate balance with Shona always holding the first Vice-President's position. An attempt to upset this trend resulted in TD being dubbed and suppressed as a palace coup in October 2004. TD was in part a strategy hatched by six provincial chairpersons of the party and senior leaders to scuttle the ascendancy of Joice Mujuru to the post of Vice-President in the process elevating Mnangagwa. ZHRNGOF and RAU (2014) highlight that series of meetings in August 2003 which were presided over by the national political commissar and headed by provincial chairmen and provincial governors indicated that Mnangagwa had the support from seven provinces to land the Vice-Presidency. Three provinces namely Mashonaland East, Harare, and Mashonaland Central had their allegiance elsewhere. This is a clear sign of the existence of varying groups and interests.

The Mujuru faction, comprising of three disgruntled provinces convened shortly after the commencement of these meetings to devise a strategy to employ the gender issue to block the rise of Mnangagwa to the post of VP. To achieve this, they put forward a resolution at their Women's League in August 1999 in Victoria Falls. The resolution proposed that: among the top four posts of the Presidium, one seat should be reserved for a woman. To force the party to adopt the resolution the Women league threatened to boycott the forthcoming December Congress. As the Deputy Secretary of the Women's League, Oppah Muchinguri was a major player in driving this proposal. As fate would have it, Mugabe attended the League's second meeting and announced that he supported their demand. Mugabe saw an opportunity to both frustrate Mnangagwa's presidential ambitions and to manage the contending faction as a means to perpetuate his stay in power. This angered the Mnangagwa faction prompting them to hatch a plan to outmanoeuvre the Mujuru faction. They had planned to quickly move in to nominate Mnangagwa for the post ahead of the December congress, but their bid was out-weighed by

the league's September 2004 resolution and thus saw Mujuru being nominated and respectively becoming the Vice-President. As a result, as reported by the CCZ (2014), furious Mugabe moved into suspended six provincial chairpersons and redeployed Mnangagwa to an ambiguous ministerial portfolio a clear sign of demotion as punishment for harbouring presidential ambitions. The spin doctor, Jonathan Moyo was ejected from the Politburo and the party and was dethroned from his ministerial post of Minister of Information. This marked the beginning of serious factional fights that degenerated into personal fights between Mnangagwa and Jonathan Moyo hence the continuous unfolding of succession battles and factionalism in the incumbent party. Many events have since occurred following the Tsolotsho declaration in the revolutionary party with tables continuously turning as this dissertation will highlight. (The Zimbabwe Mail, 2017).

TD opened serious cleavages within ZANU-PF party. It brought to light the regional factional fights and imbalances that sustained Mugabe's power. It also highlights that Mugabe was never going to let go of the helms and how presidential ambitions were treasonous. The supposed palace coup was a battle between the Mugabe led and the allied Mujuru faction (Zezuru) versus the Mnangagwa led (Karanga). TD serves to vindicate the choice of theories as the human nature aspect is evidenced by President Mnangagwa and Mujuru's ambitions to dominate and Mugabe's selfish hold on power for over 3 decades. The group theory is highlighted by the provincial chairs who chose different factions highlighting that no single group can address everyone's interest.

The TD is reflective of the dictates of the group theory in that no single group can accommodate the interest of every member. TD is as a result of a group that felt that their needs were not being met. Selfishness blinded Mugabe of the needs and interest of others hence a new group emerged fighting for their interests. This group comprised of people who felt that the President

Mnangagwa group was better able to address their concerns as well as meet their own interests. Mugabe felt threatened and purged leaders of this group, this worked as negative encouragement for the group which later became a formidable faction.

2.4.3 Lack of Succession Plan

Julius Malema's statement "Leaders must come and go" sums up one of the main causes for clashes in ZANU-PF a party barren of successive leadership. The centralisation of power and lack of a succession agenda compounded by Mugabe's advanced age triggered successive factionalism in ZANU-PF.

The desire to succeed Mugabe triggered serious factional fights within ZANU PF. This issue remains a key conflict dynamic in Zimbabwe. During Mugabe's reign, it triggered civil unrest were the "Tajamuka" social group marched into the streets demanding Mugabe's resignations resonating with sentiments that were within the incumbent party. Prior to the uprising of pressure groups Mandaza. (2016) had predicted civil conflict. The succession issue even after the departure of Mugabe has failed to receive the attention it deserves, and this is, who takes after President Mnangagwa and through which means considering that President Mnangagwa used military intervention. On the face of it, this sounds unproblematic, but causes of the clashes between G40 and Lacoste were never addressed. Owing to human nature it is certain that a new contender will emerge and considering complexities of the ZANU PF constitution on succession the fight might be worse and detrimental with the consequence of paralysis in government. The consequence might again come from the security sector since they have ordained themselves as kingmakers through operation restore legacy a move that presage failed democracy.

The succession issue in ZANU-PF highlights partial democracy which leads to faction fighting. Thus, partial democracy is the single largest cause of political instability (Goldstone et al, 2010). Partial democracy and factionalism lead to instability when the self-imposed big man has been in power for too long. This leads to challenges to the power of the self-imposed big man as highlighted by Zvobgo's "Mugabe Must Go". Challenges to Mugabe's reign surfaced in 1998 after ZANU-PF politicians became aware that there was no way to convince the ESAP battered electorate to vote for Mugabe who was refusing to retire and was beset by factions in all levels of the party. In 1998 Dzikamai Mavhaire ZANU-PF- Politburo member and ally to the late Edson Zvobgo the drafter of the Lancaster House constitution pointed out that in the House of Assembly debate "*we believe we are not a monarchy. Honourable members will agree that we must remain a democratic republic...What I am proposing is that the President must go*" (Government of Zimbabwe: Zimbabwean Parliamentary Debates, 1998). In response, Mugabe suspended Mavhaire on the other side promoting members from anti-Mavhaire faction (Hungwe/Muzenda faction) as a means to neutralising the Mavhaire faction. Zvobgo was also removed from the cabinet and was replaced by Samuel Mumbengenwi of the rival faction (Compagnon, 2010: 18). This did not silence Zvobgo who became even more critical likening Mugabe's hold to power as symptomatic of melancholia (Faloa and Heaton 2014).

As a result of this open defiance, factions became evident in ZANU-PF, particularly in the provinces. The factions included Zvobgo/Mavhaire faction versus the Hungwe/Muzenda faction in Masvingo; the Shamuyarira (Politburo member) versus the Swithun Mombeshora (Provincial chairperson) faction in Mashonaland West province; The Didymus Mutasa faction (Politburo member) versus the Kumbirai Kangai faction (Provincial chairperson) in Manyikaland). Zvobgo passed on in 2004 and at the 2004 party congress, Joice Mujuru was elected Vice President ahead of Emmerson Mnangagwa (Matyszak, 2012). The death of Zvobgo did not mean a reprieve for Mugabe instead Zvobgo's criticism gave birth to the well

know “Bhora mudondo” strategy that was employed in 2008 elections to serious sabotage Mugabe’s presidential bid. The Mugabe Must go was a turning event in the political history of Zimbabwe as we saw ZANU-PF losing to the opposition leader in the history of its existence. Most ZANU-PF MP candidates lost, and they blamed Mugabe for their loss. General Vitalis Zvinvashe from Masvingo province and of Muzenda faction also blamed Mugabe for his loss for Gutu senatorial seat as well as for other MPs in Gutu who lost to the MDC in 2008. Zvinvashe stated that:

Most of us lost these elections not because we were no popular in our constituencies. We lost these harmonised elections because of one man. People rejected us because we were campaigning for Mugabe. People in Masvingo have rejected him and we became collateral damage. (“We lost: Zvinvashe admits, 2008)

This appointment of Joice Mujuru created an environment for contestation between a hero and a heroine with Mugabe as the referee and benefactor of these clashes. Mujuru’s takeover of the Vice Presidency was interpreted as a disapproval of President Mnangagwa who was questionably relegated both in the party and government. All this move by Mugabe was to block a formidable competitor a situation Duvenger (1964) equates to the concept of clinging on to power by political party leaders to that of Fuhrer Prinzip. This was a serious disregard of internal party election processes of choosing leadership. The process was manipulated to meet Mugabe’s desire as well as to block Karangas from getting closer to the realms of power. From this Congress, nominations from provinces were now only carried out as formalities and as a means to reinstate the incumbent leadership. For Duvenger, such actions degenerate parties into oligarchic, parties camouflaged as democratic because of conducting mock congresses to elect leaders. This is descriptive of ZANU PF. The party seems blinded in the process failing to realize that perpetuity of a leaders breeds factional groupings within party structures since

this oppose the dictates of modern democracy which stresses and promote successive leadership. This blindness made ZANU-PF miss several opportunities to effusively address the succession problem that was natured by the former Leader Robert Mugabe. Instead of addressing the succession crux, the party resorted to attacking and criminalising those who publicly declared their presidential ambitions as highlighted by the disbandment of the DCCs in 2012. The DCCs linked provincial structures with the district structures. Evidently, DCC polls were contested along Mujuru-Munangagwa Camp factional lines the frontiers of the succession race in ZANUPF (Chikerema, 2015). A political analyst also blamed lack of a clear succession plan as a cause for factionalism in ZANU-PF but also highlighted the dangers of naming one:

“Factions in ZANU-PF came to be because of Mugabe’s continued refusal to name a successor. A clear succession plan could have removed the burden of naming a successor from Mugabe. On the other side, let’s not forget that many were eyeing the post so anyone designated could have faced a mysterious death, we have seen this in the history of ZANU-PF power struggles”.

The Mugabe ghost seems to be haunting the new administration as the succession issue has not been resolved as highlighted by the “ED2023” mantra and the proposal to amend the running mate clause yet to be active in 2023.

These lack of a clear succession plan and Mugabe’s continued hold on power gave birth to the “Mugabe must Go” mantra with Zvobgo as a political contender who had had enough of Mugabe (Faloa and Heaton 2014). From this period factionalism has been in autopilot mode because the causes were never addressed. ZANU-PF supporters from the Zvobgo Must mantra took a policy direction that aimed to renew leadership reflecting the position of the game theory through the eyes of Bentley (1908) who contents that conflicting groups pressure determine

the direction of the government policies. This desire reverberated in ZANU-PF and the whole country resulting in Mugabe losing to Tsvangirai in 2008.

The succession issue was further compounded by Mugabe's naming of multiple possible successors to succeed him within the politburo in 2007. These were Simba Makoni, John Nkomo, Emmerson Mnangagwa and Sydney Sekeramayi (Zimbabwe independent, 2007). Prior in 2004, Mugabe had indicated that Joice Mujuru was her preferred successor, he told her "...for you the sky is the limit..." (Mugabe, 2004). Ironically after naming these four, he went on to highlight on their weaknesses regarding himself as the only one capable of holding the party together. The deliberate omission of Joice Mujuru from the list of preferred acted a signal to ravage her as she was becoming increasingly too powerful. Mugabe's announcement created a race to succeed him in the process diverting attention to prolonging his stay in power. This in part was a means to scuffle the succession debate one of the causes of factionalism in ZANU-PF.

Furthermore, historically the succession issues within ZANU-PF highlights that the party constitution is by large a form without substance which is why the constitution has been constantly manipulated willingly to pave way for preferred presidium candidates. A case in point that best illustrates that ZANU-PF constitution is a mere form is the manipulated ascendancy of the deposed vice president, Mujuru. In 2004, Mugabe stirred a constitutional amendment to facilitate Mujuru's ascendancy in part thwarting Mnangagwa's ascension. As highlighted above, the same also happened in 2014 where the constitution was amended overnight to give First Secretary of the party powers to appoint his deputies. All this reduced ZANU-PF to an instrument of one-man rule.

Theoretically, the succession dilemma theory supports this when it states that: When the successor is too clearly designated, weak leadership is often the result. When it is not

designated clearly enough, the result may be a destructive succession struggle (Robbins, 1974). This is so due to the fact that anyone holding a definite second position for a sustained period of time poses a potential threat to the man on top: Robbins, (1971) further indicates that if a person occupies a clear second place, every opponent of the top leader will tend to rally around him, and he will become a serious rival to the person on top. The issue of the undisputed second in command is fitting to the ZANUPF regime where Joice Mujuru became increasingly powerful and commanding a large following in the process enjoying sympathy from Mugabe's enemies. Joice Mujuru's influences triggered the factional fights with the Mnangagwa faction as she fought to succeed Mugabe at both the government and party level. The same can be depicted from the Tsolotsho declaration, the dictates of this theory were the reason why President Mnangagwa's supporters wanted him to have a clearly designated second post as Vice president highlighted by the majority rallying in support of his candidature.

Despite the departure of Mugabe, the Party has failed to learn from ample past challenges the need to evolve into an organization which recognizes the need to prevent social upheaval. ZANU-PF 's leadership is characterised by charismatic leadership and extra-institution; thus, they do not have a planned succession process in elite politics (Chikerema, 2015). A case in point is the current mantra "ED2023" which is a clear sign of blocking and ambitious people to contest the candidature of President Mnangagwa, the Mugabeism lives on. President Mnangagwa's faction in 2014 congress fought to challenge the natural appointments of leaders as Godly predestined but we see the very same behaviour a sure sign that succession issues have not been resolved in ZANU-PF. This mirrors what the realist advocates for, that man always what to dominate. The "ED2023" signals the presence of power contestation vindicating the realist theory regarding its position on the perpetual contestation of power in political parties.

2.4.4 Social Class and Factions

In the world of politics, inequality among men is a social organization and not a divinely ordained attribute of the human condition. Membership from varying social classes or constituencies have also been the source of conflicts or have also fuelled factionalism through contradictions and varying perceptions (Mataire 2012). The social classes vary from war veterans, ex-detainees, the academia and business people who have been failing to find a common footing thus end up fuelling divisions from cell level to national level. Varying grassroots people promote individuals they feel will improve their social standing through the 'carrot' System. This results in competition as groups fight to control the helm of the party. Coupled with this is the issue of social stratification as exemplified by war veterans who field and regard one of their own as "God separate" unique from the rest of the membership (Mataire, 2012).

By nature, stratification results in special treatments that lead to conflicts a major driver of factionalism. This behaviour of war vet emanates from the notion of entitlement as liberators they believe a share should always be reserved for them. For example, the ZANU-PF 2017 extra-ordinary congress resolution assimilates war veterans into the party structure. This resolution incorporates war veterans into the main party structures from cell level to provincial levels. By virtue of their social class war veterans are to be considered as chairman and vice chairman, if the chairman is a non-war veteran then the deputy chairman will automatically be a war-veteran or vice versa, the same applies on the post of the political commissar. This unconstitutional way of doing things tend to create reactionary force like in the case of Uganda where 97 MPs formed a party to oppose the ways of the old guard.

Giovanni Arrighi (1967) exploited the Marxian approach to explain the 1963 split in the nationalist movement ZAPU and ZANU and concluded that, the split was as a result of factions

that were caused by class struggle, ZANU, was being led by petty-bourgeois elites while people entrenched among peasants ZAPU. From Arrighi's conclusion Saul (1979: 112) viewed the 1963 ZAPU-ZANU split as a

“Confrontation between a faction of educated middle who joined the nationalist movement in the early sixties ... and those populists from the mid-1950s ... who had much firmer roots among migrant workers and the peasantry itself”

This highlight the extent to which class struggles leads to factionalism. Naturally when ethnicity ceases to be the cause for factionalism class kicks in. Marenin (1976) emphatically tries to dismiss class as a cause for factionalism and tried to use the Marxist approach in his dismissal yet practically class does cause factionalism.

2.4.5 Ideological Polarisation

The post-colonial reality reflects the contradictions and challenges of revolutionary optimism which was the foundation of ZANU-PF's ideology but has since been twisted to self-righteous entitlement culture by the new elite, a 'predatory elite' as highlighted by Naidoo, (2010). Van Dijk (1998:69) defines ideology as a representation of identities and what people stand for values, and relationships among groups, in particular, those who oppose what others stand for or threaten another group's interest. Put differently an ideology is a self-serving schema. When people succumb to the same ideology, they believe in the same remedies for the ills that afflict their society. An ideology, therefore, brings about social cohesion which is an ingredient for peace and development. Thus, an ideology embodies a political moral code and worldview.

The old guard which constitutes the ZANU-PF elite is closeted around radical black nationalism which embraces neo-liberalism in relation to how a society should function,

particularly during elections. But to Mugabe, all that mattered was the populist nationalist narrative which is why many policy positions seemed contradictory in the process factions emerged. For example, ideologically ZANU-PF believes in the equitable distribution of resources and opportunities, equity is at the heart of this ideology. This ideological position aims to ensure that wealth is spread as much as possible to the majority population. This has not been so during the time of Mugabe as it took the nation over 20 years before people had access to the land. During the FTLRP, the land was parcelled along patronage politics highlighting a serious ideological polarisation. Another example that highlight ideological polarisation is how democracy has been trodden by the ideological perspective. ZANU PF brought democracy in Zimbabwe in 1980 but have failed to keep its promise of ensuring that people choose their own leaders. The party internal elections have been characterised by candidate impositions and vote buying. The appointment of Joice Mujuru as the vice president ahead of Cde Mnangagwa goes against the party's democratic centralism which entails that party members discuss freely, and debate matters of policy and make their submission to leadership. This does not only compromise democracy but creates factionalism. Nominating Joice Mujuru as the party Vice President marked the beginning of her downfall as her appointment irked President Mnangagwa who after securing ZANU PF victory in 2013 saw himself on the throne as a gesture of gratitude from Mugabe and secondly President Mnangagwa felt that as a senior member he was more entitled for the vice presidency post. The appointment of Joice Mujuru ahead of Mnangagwa attest to the realists' view that humans are inherently egoistic and self-centred to the extent that self-interest overcomes moral principles. Mugabe was not turned away from the opportunities of aggrandizement by what was right or wrong

Also playing potential leaders against each other for selfish gain goes against the concept of Selflessness and sacrifice for the benefit of other epitomised by the late ZANU National

Chairman, Cde Herbert Pfumandini Chitepo who was a qualified lawyer who left his high paying profession to lead the armed struggle at a time when his colleagues were uncastrated. Mugabe polarized the ZANU-PF ideology to the detriment of the party. In ZANU-PF, members have to rise through ranks but when Mugabe realized he was racing with time he brought in Grace backed by the youths to challenge President Mnangagwa who rose through ranks. To replace her husband Grace had to first dethrone Joice Mujuru a long-serving member of ZANU-PF who had risen through ranks as demanded by ZANU-PF ideology. Since the presidium only accommodates a single woman Grace Mugabe had to decimate and disregard the party hierarchy code in the process further polarizing the ZANU-PF ideology. Grace indicated the desire to take over in Mazowe when she said, “People say I want to be president, why not? Am I not Zimbabwean?” (Mail & Guardian, October 23, 2014). Her entry into politics is marked by brutal attacks on Joice Mujuru in the process betraying the invisible hand of Mugabe since it was inconceivable that Grace Mugabe would be elected as Secretary of the Women’s League without Mugabe’s consent. Mugabe thus was using his wife to achieve his desire to be a life president, by eliminating all those who aspire to be president of Zimbabwe. From the 1980 Mugabe had indicated the desired to rule for a lifetime and his desire for a one-party state contradicting the democratic stance of ZANU-PF (Crisis in Zimbabwe Coalition, 2014).

Ideologically ZANU-PF believes in selflessness where the interest of one should come after the interest of many, but Mugabe had to find a way around all this to satisfy his interests. To ensure he got his selfish desire he initiates a move towards matrimonial succession, a means for him to rule from his death bed through his wife Grace Mugabe due to his advanced age and reverberating call for him to step down (CCZ, 2014:7). To get the ball rolling Grace’s political position had to be increased thus they crowned her Secretary of ZANU PF Women’s League replacing Oppah Muchinguri who might have willingly step aside as highlighted by her praise

of Grace “...an Angel, a Queen, and the nation’s own Cremora”. As highlighted by the realist theorist to achieve his desires Mugabe does this at the expense of others and at the expense of both the party ideology and national development. His leadership was preoccupied with the will to sustain his power as a self-gain hence he instrumentalized and weaponized his self-desires by promoting factionalism through supporting the G40, a party constituted by members way below the party hierarchy.

Today the youths are openly challenging the old disrespectfully further driving away any hope for a conducive environment between these age groups. The Chitepo ideology has been looked down as a thing of the past by the youth highlighting that the very ideology that held the party together for the past years is failing. As a result, discipline the blood of ZANU-PF ideology has been contaminated, youths are no longer disciplined and they no longer take orders, instructions, and directives from their superiors without questioning them. Mujuru’s fall was planned by the Lacoste (old) and the G40 (youths) unified together as a single force. This union was evidenced by former Education Minister Jonathan Moyo who fought tooth and nail to dethrone Mujuru. The older generation contributed to polarising the party ideology as they wielded axes against one who was up in the hierarchy (2nd Secretary). At the back of their minds, the youths took the concept of hierarchy and discipline as a condition relevant in particular political environment. One of the long-serving ZANU-PF members concurred that the party ideology has been polarised and that this has contributed to the emergence of factionalism:

“As the elders, we have failed to impart the party ideology in the younger politicians and this has created some vacuums that are haunting us and causing confusion in the party. We at times use the youths to attack the elders for political expediency. We all

saw Grace Mugabe lambasting the presidential spokes' person, this was unheard of in the history of ZANU-PF”.

In 2014 before the conference, Mujuru's fortune changed. Complicity Mugabe and his wife went on a national toll under the guise of rallies funded from state coffers to attack Joice Mujuru. Grace labelled Mujuru as incompetent, corrupt and divisive. Openly Grace told Mujuru to resign before the Congress or face humiliation. To weaken Mujuru, Mugabe axed her key allies way before Congress. Mujuru's allies who were axed included nine provincial chairpersons, central committee members and politburo members chief among them were Rugare Gumbo, Temba Mliswa, Ray Kaukonde, Flora Buka, Jason Machaya, Kalisto Gwanetsa and John Mvundura, and (Nehanda Radio, 2014). As if this was not enough her central committee seat candidature as a contestant was blocked 3 days prior to the Congress. To ensure that she is out Mugabe moved on to amend the party constitution giving himself the powers to appoint his deputies and the party national chairman (Nehanda Radio, 2014). All this was against what ZANU-PF stands for, that is democracy and equity. The desire to throne his wife polarised everything that held ZANU-PF together. The fall of Mujuru serves to highlight that as factions fight, ideologies and values suffers leaving the party with no means to instil discipline.

By nature, humans want to dominate thus the youths saw an opening and seized it but this has led to a lack of cohesion within the party. The case of Mujuru should have been dealt with differently since her fall did not only give birth to other factions but it left the party ideology heavily polarised. When the Gamatox were decimated the union of convenience between G40 and Lacoste quickly came to an end and the two turned their ammunition against each other. This became the clash of the old and the new, highlighting that in politics there is no permanent friendship but mutual interest, thus factionalism no matter how undesirable it is inevitable thus

it needs to be handled in a manner that doesn't compromise the party's internal discipline mechanisms.

All this polarisation was for one man to achieve his glory proving that realists were correct when they said that there is no place for morality in the contestation of power. We clearly see the tension between moral demands and what is required by a successful political action. Morality to Mugabe was a luxury that stood in the way of his selfish desires and interest of his faction. By subscribing to his own morality, Mugabe attests to realism which subscribes to the notion that states have their own morality different from customary morality.

2.5 Conclusion

The chapter highlighted ZANU-PF's ideology, the evolution of factionalism and the cause of factionalism in ZANU-PF. It was the mandate of this chapter to follow through a cause and bring out the dynamic and how they have impacted party cohesion in the incumbent party. The causes range from entitlement, human nature, lack of a succession plan, and varying social class interests and Ideological polarisation. The chapter in highlighting the evolution of ZANU-PF indicated that ZANU-PF is a party born out of factionalism as it owes its origin on the 1963 split necessitated by the desire to dominate, varying ideological positions and tribal politics. Patronage politics and generation renewal at this time did not play any part in causing factionalism. It is through this chapter that the inevitability of factionalism is illuminated, in the process highlighting that solace can only be sought in its management as proposed by Madison. This chapter works as a springboard for the following chapter which will look at the nature of factionalism in ZANU-PF.

CHAPTER 3

THE NATURE OF FACTIONAL FIGHTS IN ZANU-PF

3 INTRODUCTION

This Chapter focuses on the nature of factionalism on ZANU-PF highlighting how it mutated to suit the prevailing political environment. Factionalism in ZANU-PF has been influenced by various factors hence it took various form such is heroism, regionalism/tribalism, generational renewal, patronage, and ideological polarisation. These mutations were not without impacts on development.

3.1 THE USE OF HEROISM

Zimbabwe became independent after defeating the settler community in a liberation war which was collectively fought by ZIPRA and ZANLA forces. Following the victory, the military wings were highly recognised for their contribution to the liberation struggle that liberated Zimbabweans from the yoke of the colonial master resulting in the high-ranking officer and the civilian leadership extremely revered and held with high regard (Chung, 2006). Following the outbreak of ZAPU linked insurgency all would be ZAPU/ZANLA heroes were marginalised after being accused of being complicit in the insurgency subsequently labelled ‘sell-outs’ This embryo the era where any individual who opposed ZANU-PF (Mugabe) would be stripped of his/her hero status. Gatshen Ndlovu (2009) thus link the unleashing of the North Korean on the heroes that were labelled as dissidents as a signal signalling that anyone stripped of his or her hero/ heroine status was expendable in ZANU-PF. (Masiya, 2017). ZAPU leader Joshua Nkomo, as a result, exiled himself while Ndabaningi Sithole (ZANU 1st President) and

James Chikerema among others were denied the hero status. To highlight the importance of the hero status Nkomo upon returning to ZANU-PF his status was restored thereby becoming “father Zimbabwe” a title he carried up to his death. This highlights how Mugabe and ZANU-PF have used heroism to perpetuate their hold on power, Mugabe was intolerant to liberation fighters who opposed him. Following the upsurge of factionalism in ZANU-PF, the same strategy has been put in use against members belonging to contending factional groups.

The surge of factionalism in the ZANU-PF party has seen an amplified orientation of heroism as a means to exert factional dominance. Survival or the fall of factions within the incumbent party is bordered around issues of heroism that is, one’s perceived contribution or non-contributions to the liberations struggle (Masiya, 2017). Appreciation of the exploitation of heroism in factional fights can be used to elucidate ZANU-PF factional dynamics. The event that took place in ZANU-PF and still unfolding highlights that hero or heroine status is an ephemeral phenomenon highly influenced by the prevailing factional political process at a given moment. Heroism is edged around party members in ZANUPF’s factional fights in part as a means to prop images or destroy them as villains. In particular, the 2014 congress events that saw 5 leaders stripped off their status best exemplifies and stress out how heroism is perceived in ZANU-PF. Mujuru, Didymus Mutasa, Rugare Gumbo, Nicholas Goche and Jabulani Sibanda were stripped off the status they enjoyed prior to being levelled with allegations of plotting to topple Mugabe. These five were previously revered stars but all this came to a halt after Mnangagwa challenged them with the backing of the increasingly powerful first lady Grace Mugabe towards the 2014 Congress. Survival of factional leader was premised on the intact reputation of war credentials. An MDC-A MP concurred that only those with war history have a say in ZANU-PF leadership fights:

“ZANU-PF power politics has never been for those who were not there from the beginning. The match has always been amongst those with war history and those without only coming in as cheerleaders. We have seen the same at National the hero’s acre with Mugabe declaring that it’s a place for those who sacrificed their lives.”

Mujuru a once revered and presumed heir to Mugabe fell with a thud after being presented and labelled a villain contrary to the showered heroine praises. In the past, it was reported that she downed a British helicopter with a machine gun in 1974 after refusing to flee their base that was under attack (Peta, 2005). At one point she was presented as the Afro-American black woman of the year, a former commander of the Chimoio camp in 1974 at a very tender age of 19 years. This was a high achievement for a woman in the war of liberation. Such a reputation enabled her to command huge support. Her liberation war name Teurai Ropa literally meaning “Spill blood” reflects a person who mercilessly devilled the enemy. Fast forward to independence, she became the youngest serving minister at 25. Apparently, all these praises persisted only because ZANU-PF considered her a vital asset non-threatening to Mugabe’s throne and his authoritarian rule. When it became clear that she was a contender to Mugabe all those who supported her, particularly the 10 provincial Chairpersons were purged, clearly, she had the support of 10 provinces (Moyo, 2016). As a result, Mugabe and Mnangagwa labelled her a villain despite having been glorifying her for the past three decades. They castigated and presented her as unworthy to be part of the revolutionary. All this was aimed at decimating her faction. In a split second her liberation war history was rewritten, and she was publicly disallowed. New information proliferated suggesting that all the war records that accorded her the praise were a mirage a construction opposed to reality. In the process, 3rd party endorsers came through to soil her war credentials. Chris Mutsvangwa pointed out that Joice Mujuru never downed a helicopter but that it was just Party propaganda used to prop up her image

(New Zim, 17 August 2014). Also, Linda Mangwende came through contesting the identity of Mujuru in a photo poster previously used to present Joice Mujuru leading a group of ZANLA forces in the war front. Mangwende claimed that Mujuru had stolen her identity in the picture. All these claims were used to strip off Mujuru's fame and status as a leading Heroine of the Zimbabwe liberation struggle in the process weakening her standing as a factional leader.

Mutasa in a manner reminiscent to the return of Nkomo to ZANU-PF will have his hero status bestowed on him again. Mutasa a victim of heroism was labelled a villain despite having been regarded as a hero. Mutasa's image was used to epitomise strategist as key players in the liberation struggle indicating that the liberation struggle was fought in many fronts and not only through the guerrilla front in the bush. Mutasa was respected for recruiting people into the liberations struggle, mobilisation of international support as well as sending future leaders to foreign studies (Phiri, 2014). Phiri also highlights that Mutasa became active at a very young age, participating in student protests that challenged the white supremacy whilst a student at Goromonzi Secondary School.

Mataire, (2014) further contends that Mutasa, Guy Arthur Clutton Brock, and others were responsible for the establishment of the Cold Comfort Farm Society which was used to fight a prolonged battle against the Rhodesians. Later on, Mutasa was detained and had the privileged to share a prison cell with various war heroes ranging from Mugabe, Morris Nyagumbo and Mark Nzira Masanga (Phiri, 2014). During independence, Mutasa became the 1st Speaker of Parliament from 1980 to 1990 also serving as Minister of State Security and Minister of State for Presidential Affairs. This indicates that Mutasa enjoyed a good relationship with Mugabe. Despite all this hero status, in 2014 Mutasa was stripped off his Politburo, cabinet and MP position as punishment for siding with Joice Mujuru. This was all in part to undo the heroism status previously bestowed on him. In the process, Mutasa was labelled a long-time villain. To

make this stick, his period in the United Kingdom where he was previously commended for establishing party structures were turned to mean that he chickened out to partake in the war of liberation. This was aimed at making his war record empty. (New Zim 17 August 2014) This highlights how heroism was used to undo factions for one's contribution to the liberation struggle wins him/her supporters.

Considering the above it becomes apparent that, strategies are adopted to either praise or discredit heroes and heroines in the factional fights. One of the other employed strategies was the use of perceived leaders known to have contributed in the liberation war as a witness and the use of the state media to further expose an individual as a charlatan or to praise one as a hero/heroine. For example, in the case of Mutasa, Christopher Mutsvangwa weighed in stating that Mutasa was misleading Mujuru to revolt and that he has a history of leading party leaders astray giving Edgar Tekere as an example. (Nehanda Radio 16 August 2014). Mugabe at the height of the fights would castigate opponents in his speeches as a means to strip off the hero/heroine status. While this worked for them it worked against the credibility of the party's reference of heroes and heroines on their contribution in the fight for independence. People could rely on the party reference when they want to measure one's circumstances within the factional groupings. The heroism status in ZANU-PF mutated in relation to the prevailing circumstances and was no longer yielding results hence the nature of politics changed form. The fall of Mujuru transformed the nature of factionalism to take the form of regional/ tribal politics. Her fall ushered the battle of tribes, Karangas versus Zezurus.

The concept of heroism wades in the realist world from the Athenian argument based on concepts of security and power. The heroism from a realist perspective was informed not by what factionalism should be, but by what it is. Heroism disregards moral talks and look at the facts, their facts are they sacrificed their lives to free others and they suffered physical and

psychological damage hence they should be treated as first-class citizens and should be allowed to be part of what they fought for as well as think about their own survival.

3.2 REGIONALISM/ TRIBALISM

The 1963 split in ZAPU that embryo the Shona dominated Zimbabwe African National Union (ZANU) remains one protuberant event that highlights how tribalism and ethnicity were deeply rooted within nationalism (Ndlovu-Gatsheni, 2011). Tribal politics in ZANU-PF has been there since time immemorial with the magnitude worsened by colonial regional divisions. The colonial master regionally divided Zimbabweans as a means to easily manipulate and rule the people. The divide-and-rule strategy compounded the situation as it was adopted by the Nationalist Party in its endeavour for power.

Cox (1970: 317) views regionalism or ethnic group as a socio-cultural entity “while inhabiting the same state, country or economic area, consider themselves, culturally, linguistically or socially distinct from each other and most often view their relationship in actual or potentially antagonistic terms”. Azeez (2004: 329) sees regionalism as a sense of peoplehood that has its foundation in the combined remembrance of past experience and common aspiration. The Macmillan Dictionary defines tribalism as a very strong loyalty that someone feels for the group they belong to, usually combined with the feeling of disliking all other groups or being different from them. From the above definition, it becomes apparent that tribal and regional factionalism is a consciousness consideration of tribal and regional background in political decisions and grouping with a political party which explains why the old administration was comprised of Zezurus and the new administration comprised of Karangas.

The actions behind ZANU-PF politics after the fall of Mujuru has been highly tribal and regional creating competition between the rivalry tribes and regions of the Zezuru and Karanga tribes and their associated regions of Mashonaland and Midlands. This regional and tribal cognizance has swayed to a great degree the formation of G40 and Lacoste based on ethnicities and their respective regions. A political analyst stated that:

“The firing of anyone with presidential ambitions indicated that Mugabe wanted to decide his own successor without the involvement of other players because Mugabe wanted to appoint a Zezuru to take over from him”.

All this has roots in 1963 split though regionalism/ Tribalism was not pointed to as the causes. Ndlovu in Makombe (2011) concur when he states that, what has not been said about the split of 1963 is that it was partly ethnic between two groupings, that is the Ndebele-oriented and Shona-oriented to whom primal rights to rules were their natural rights. This further highlight that it was a split premised on entitlement. As a result of the cognisance of regional boundaries, the situation created an environment for titans to clash, with the Zezuru in a manner reminiscent to Ndabaningi Sithole’s miscalculated losing power to the Karangas.

Tribal politics also take the form of tribal profiling within the province and this has made some membership to relocate to provinces of birth for them to land the leadership posts, (Mataire, 2012). This is best exemplified by Mazowe district in Mashonaland Central, where they have a subconscious code that is not written down, in Mazowe they do not vote anyone who is not a Chiweshe resident by birth into positions of power. Ironically Mazowe is rampant with various tribes owing to the Fast Track Land redistribution program indicating the rainbow settlement, automatically creating a conducive environment for varying groupings. Another example is the relocation of Munyaradzi Mnangagwa from Mhondoro Ngezi (Mashonaland West) to Masvingo after some leaders in that province snubbed him in favour of a “native” son

(The Herald, 2012). This goes against the natural laws of elections which are on free will where people vote into the office an appealing candidate capable of articulating the voter's concerns. Unconstitutional choices breed corrupt leadership bent on protecting their selfish interest instead of being at the service of the people (Mataire,2012). As highlighted by the curvilinear disparity theory, these tribal conscious leaderships also don't care about the interests of the lowly ranked people.

3.3 GENERATION RENEWAL

Notably, the political factions are not mostly fashioned by ethnic, tribal and regional rivalries alone, indicative of the previous dispensation where factions were mostly premised on generational divide amid the liberation fighters unified in the Team Lacoste headed by President Emmerson Mnangagwa and the Generation 40 (G40) faction regrouping younger ZANU PF officials. This was made evident by Jonathan Moyo's open declaration "So-Called Generation 40 or G40 can't be a ZANU-PF faction, save for open mouths and shut minds. G40 is a demographic reality across parties!" highlighting that G40 at that time was/is the in-thing in Zimbabwean political parties, ZANU-PF included. This was aimed at uniting all youths in all regions and all tribes to fight the Lacoste a group representing the old guard. This saw the former first lady Grace Mugabe siding with the youths which were headed by Chipanga, with Kasukuwere and Mugabe putting their weight behind her.

In a manner reminiscent to infiltrators or sell-outs who used to work for the Rhodesian such was G40 to senior ZANU-PF Central Committee members like David Ndlovu. "During the war, we had freedom fighters who were actually members of the (Rhodesian leader Ian Douglas) Smith's army who went about posing as freedom fighters and making freedom

fighters to fight against each other. I would just take that as the same to those who want to create divisions within ZANU-PF,” David Ndlovu states.

ZANU-PF’s inability to bridge the generational gap as the old guard fought to protect their seats necessitated a change in the form of factionalism within the party. Factionalism, therefore, degenerated into competitive factionalism which fragmented the party. The change in the social-political fabric influenced party members to encapsulate themselves within age-oriented groups due to the failure of the old guard to create a conducive environment for healthy osmosis of ideas between the old and youthful members of the party (Mataire, 2012). Instead, the young generation has been viewed as a threat to the old guard who has lived on the notion of seniority. A good example is former senator Olivia Muchena who was perpetually reappointed uncontested benefiting from both the seniority mantra and quota system at the expense of both merit and democracy, a reason why today Mutoko despite being home to Black granite remain backwards in terms of development. She owed nothing to the voters as stated by Sen (199). One of the interviewed grassroots supporter show dissatisfaction on the way some leaders grabbed political posts, she highlighted that”

“We were made to believe that reserving seats was being gendered sensitive but the truth is this was masked candidate imposition. Leaders should be decided in an election, not through preferential treatment. What worried us was that this system never benefitted the youths but only ensured that the older generation remained in power”.

The birth of Generation 40 strongly highlights the human nature aspect which states that when power is not given men take it by any means necessary (Malcom X, 1965). In ZANU-PF the old and the new have failed to coexist vindicating the theory of curvilinear disparity which highlights the disregard of the wishes of those beneath by those at the top. Theory of curvilinear disparity highlights how the “Top” antagonise the youth to ensure that they remain below them

(Mataire, 2012). Similarly, the emergence of the G40 is supported by the realist theory, Bentley (1908) who postulate that there is no effective individual interest for every group thus, its interests that culminates in group action and that everyone 's interests cannot be covered in a single grouping. So, ZANU-PF's inability to bridge the interests of young age group saves as a course for competitive factionalism in the party as people chose the most competitive sides that meet their interests in this case the G40 became dominant and formidable in its challenge of the old guard's hold on power.

The snub of the need for generation renewal vindicates what the realist call "animus dominandi", which is lust for power at the centre of human existence. This insatiable human lust for power is timeless and is propelled by the desire to dominate. Depriving the young and energetic indicate that man is synonymous to power and dominance. Surrounded by young educated politicians the old guard continues to fight to dominate the political arena at the expense of development.

3.4 POLITICS OF PATRONAGE

Patronage is premised on mutual relations amongst patrons and clients. Patrons are powerful individuals who use their influence to assist and protect less powerful individuals who are referred to as clients who in return provide service willingly to the patron. Patronage therefor refers to a compound relation between those who exploit their influence, social position or some other attribute to assist and protect clients, (Boissevain, 1966). In patronage, the transactor (patron) has the power to give some benefit which the respondent (client) desires.

Historically patronage systems have been dually employed that is to either protect or exploit lower classes and peasants. On protection, patronage was used to accelerate social change as

highlighted by Taira, (1970). During the period of modernisation, the patronage systems lost the traditional concept and became a concept of "bossism" (Cohen 1977:333 and Weingrod 1977). In some cases, the politics of patronage has taken the nature of Mafia-like corrupt authoritarianism based on power and fear (Blok 1974). Thus, traditional patronage is an establishment based on a perpetual longwinded pattern of unbalanced social exchange between patron and client (Eisenstadt and Roniger 1980; Gellner and Waterbury 1977). In ZANU-PF this has been going on for too long. One of ZANU-PF serving Member of Parliament drew us to President Mnangagwa's inaugural speech indicating that he was promising to move away from this culture as an indication of the existence of patronage politics:

“Remember the president in his inauguration speech said he will not give positions to ‘please his friends and that he was afraid many will be disappointed,’ to me this was confirms that Mugabe practice patronage politics which I blame for fracturing our party”

The coming of Zimbabwe independence saw ZANU-PF being complicit with war vets and the security apparatus to acutely root itself on the ground with a capillary presence in every district of the country. The government became steadily an extension in the process appointing party cadres to key positions in public, private and parastatal sectors. Legislatively and judicially ZANU-PF had the grip to ensure the protection of the ZANU-PF party interests (Moyo,2007). This move saw the executive amassing wealth and personal privileges, privileges and wealth accumulation which required political power and influence to maintain and expand, hence the promotion of patronage politics. The dwindling of neo-patrimonial resources whistled a race for the control of the party helm. The race became one of life-and-death struggle within ZANU-PF thereby giving birth to factions (Zimbabwe situation, 2007). The situation of patronage was

compounded by a lack of clear succession road map and Mugabe's snub of a transitional process.

To sustain politics of patronage Mugabe developed economies of patronage as a way of transforming his fortune following the "Bhora Mudondo" era, Mugabe started to directly control land and mineral resources using these resources as capital weapons to fight enemies. These highlights how factional access perpetuated his stay in power as he would undercut opposing factions in terms of material reward to offer their factions. For example, upon landing the National Youth League Secretary post, Kudzanai Chipanga and crew were given land by Kasukuwere. This is the same young man who responded to the army during the Operation restore legacy. The apology he made to the army on national television where he said "I was ill-advised to read a statement which I and the Youth League had not originated neither authored. The document which I read I was handed it over by one Rodney Dangarembizi in the morning at around 8.30am which was denigrating your high office and your person," (The Herald 20,17) highlights that he was offering service to his patron, this is a clear sign of client exploitation.

From a development perspective politics of patronage riddled Zimbabwean with corruption as Mugabe awarded government positions to political supporters through the patronage system. In the process, incompetent and criminals were given strategic positions which they used to embezzle funds from an ailing economy. President Mnangagwa in his inauguration speech acknowledges that this has been taking place when he highlighted that, he will not be giving positions to please his friends, further hinting that many will be disappointed. To highlight corruption cases that went unquestioned as these people were protected the WikiLeaks mentions Supa Mandiwanzira having been involved in the \$4 million Netone Megawatt Consulting deal and was never convicted (<https://search.wikileaks.org/>) Patronage politics

breeds corruption which according to Transparency International (2014) reduces the rate of revenue growth. It indicates that an increase of a single unit of corruption index reduces the GDP growth rate from 0.9 to 0.75%.

The 19 October 2017 cabinet reshuffle highlights how Ministers were reshuffled on patronage grounds within the factional fights. For example, War-vets has always been an important part in the schemes to win the elections and sustaining Mugabe's power as the patron. The removal of Tshinga Dube as the chairman of War-vet and replacing him with Cain Matema highlights the politics of patronage (Zimbabwe Democracy Institute, 2017). As a client Colonel Tshinga Dube failed to do his job as indicated by his call for a successor, this exposed his disloyalty to the patron. Mugabe's move to replace Dube with war veteran-cum-politician Cain Mathema highlights his need for a trustworthy individual within the war veterans camp. Mathema was dismissed by Mtoliki Sibanda as MP for Tsholotsho in 2000 but he has been on the rebound and got appointments from Mugabe as a beneficiary of Robert Mugabe's patronage network. This highlights that through patronage nepotism becomes morally obligatory (Kondos, 1987: 18), it also highlights what Richard Daley, former Chicago mayor termed 'a father's duty to help his sons!' (quoted in Clark, 1994: 131). Consequently, patronage appointments negatively impact on state performance. Appointing Mathema after the Tsholotsho people had rejected him in an election renders the election process useless. Politics of patronage goes against the dictates of democracy and in the process undermines development since there will be a lack of cohesion and will on the appointed person.

Also, the 19 October reshuffle resulted with the reassignment of Chinamasa the then minister of finance. The Finance Ministry is a key ministry and a purse for the patron to reward his/her clients. Ignatius Chombo was given the ministry despite having a track record of failed ministries making it crystal clear that the appointment had nothing to do with resuscitating the

ailing economy for Chombo was not capable of doing anything better than Chinamasa. Clearly, Chombo was put there as a loyal client and conduit to religiously deploy economic resources to Mugabe's faction, at the same time sanctioning internal enemy, that is the Lacoste faction. This highlights how merit is not considered in a party deeply afflicted by patronage politics. These unruly appointments have serious repercussions to national development.

Mugabe's reorganisation of the cabinet as highlighted above was never about the need for efficient delivery of services but was motivated by vindictiveness and the desire to weed out ministers siding with his rivalry faction plotting to take over power from him. Mugabe saw cabinet as a space for rewarding his loyalists and not as policy-making organ mandated to drive government business, thus becoming an extension of his patronage system. The same is reflective in the current administration if the case of the current Minister of State Security is anything to go by, despite serious allegations of criminal cases Owen Ncube viewed as Mnangagwa's hangman gets a lucrative post as Minister of state security. He wasn't appointed based on merit but benefited through the patronage system. Owen Ncube according to Pindula.co.zw, (2019) only has a Diploma in English and Diploma in Public Relations, qualifications far from being relevant for the post he holds today. Patronage politics can only explain why he is holding that critical ministerial post worse off having served for less than a term in any government office. Considering that this is his first cabinet post surely such a critical ministry deserved better qualified and experienced individuals. The 1990 Senate abolishment is also a case in point, which was aimed at rewarding loyalist at the expense of those opposing him. Mugabe pushed through a constitutional amendment to restructure the Senate. This was a ploy to increase patronage by Mugabe, out of the 50 elected seats, Mugabe could also appoint 16 more senators obviously from his faction. This is reflective of the game theory that people join groups that meet their interest, everyone wants to safeguard his or her gotten power so in a way those benefiting through the patronage system joined varying groups

precisely to have their needs addressed. A good example is the case of Cain Mathema during the reign of Mugabe, going against him meant the end of his political career since he bounced back through the blessing of Mugabe the patron after losing his seat to Mtoliki Sibanda as MP for Tsholotsho in 2000. This highlights that some became clients by cohesion and not by choice.

3.5 Conclusion

Factionalism in ZANU-PF mutated to suit the prevailing political situation. Firstly, it was factionalism based on Heroism were the credential of the liberations struggle influenced factional groupings. Heroes and heroines in ZANU-PF factional fights were made or destroyed to suit a political environment. As this form lost relevance, regional politics became dominant particularly during the Gamatox period were the Zezuru fought to protect their hold in power. The Zezuru and the Karangas united in the form of G40 and Lacoste to decimate the Joice Mujuru faction. Following the fall of the Joice Mujuru faction Generation renewal became the form of factionalism blended with politics of patronage as factions fought to gunner support. This chapter paves way for the following chapter in that all these factional dynamics and dimensions have had an impact on the economy. The old guard fearing displacement went on a looting spree to acquire funds to give to their clients as a means, for Mugabe to remain in, they started to divert state funds to buy support.

CHAPTER 4

REFLECTIONS ON ZANU-PF FACTIONALISM AND NATIONAL DEVELOPMENT

4 INTRODUCTION

This chapter looks at how the dynamics and dimensions of factionalism in ZANU-PF have positively or negatively impacted on national development. The researcher identified policy paralysis and inconsistency, fragmentation and vulnerability, civil unrest and corruption as negative necessitated by factional dynamics in ZANU-PF. Positively factionalism has promoted democracy and led to the fall of a tyrant as well as creating a suitable environment for the implementation of democratic levers in the form of an inclusive government.

4.1 IMPACT OF FACTIONALISM

Factionalism is a phenomenon that is viewed with contempt for its gross negative impacts on economic development. No doubt that factionalism has destroyed once flourishing economies particularly in non-democratic societies. Democratic societies have begun to see factionalism as a contestation of power in the process taking advantage of its positive rather than continuously seeing it as an entirely evil phenomenon. Factionalism has been viewed as entirely evil because its benefits are not obvious as factionalism can acquire different faces such as co-operative, degenerative and competitive natures at different times under specific conditions (Boucek, 2009). As a result, factionalized political parties in established democracies end up overlooking its benefits because the positive side is often overshadowed

by the dominant negative side. This research thus juxtaposed the positives and the negatives so as to present an unbiased analysis of its impacts on development. Boucek (2009) states that factionalism is a complex phenomenon which has variation in response to incentives.

Positively, factionalism can both promote collective capacity and cooperation by affording a structure of cooperation among separate intra-party groups. Most importantly factionalism can broaden party prospects and the articulation of opinions and policy preferences and this can help in building an integrated party, in short, factionalism builds consensus (Boucek, 2009). Wafawarova (2014) see factionalism as a positive force that kills apathy and generates political interests within the country, in turn, promoting a sense of belonging to members. ZANU-PF factionalism has managed to stimulate debate about succession issue and the need for a generational change in a nation where the young generation struggles to make an important contribution to its country's body politics. Thus, factionalism promotes debate and competition within a party which is good for moderating party actions.

Negatively Factionalism leads to policy paralysis, corruption, tribalism, regionalism, nepotism, disregard of the rule of law, fragmentation and vulnerability and civil unrest. The researcher concludes that to a greater extent factionalism negatively impact development since its positives are circumstantial. In an effort to highlight how factionalism negatively impacted development a thematic analysis sequence will be carried out. Quest (1999) sees thematic analysis as a move that "... moves beyond counting explicit words or phrases, and focuses on identifying and describing both implicit and explicit ideas within the data, that is, construction of themes". Thematic analysis is a commonly used data analysis technique in qualitative research. This method was employed in the final analysis to distil the acquired data to abstract meaning.

4.1.1 Policy Paralysis and Inconsistencies.

The factional dynamic/dimensions in ZANU-PF has caused policy inconsistencies which are hampering the country's prospects of an economic turnaround as it remains a shackle in attracting FDI. There is too much politicisation of most government business at the expense of real issues because of factional dynamics within ZANU-PF, as a result, indecisive positions have become a chorus within the government. ZANU-PF factional divisions are intense and are compromising cohesion in policy formulation and implementation in the running of government business. The continued policy inconsistencies and abrupt changes of policies present serious political and socio-economic repercussions to the generality of the people. Former ZANU-PF member of parliament highlighted that:

“I don't know why we were so oblivious to all this discord. We had the best-crafted policies that addressed the needs of the people but because of this animal called factionalism all the good policies went down without being implemented”

Land Reform highlights the highest degree of policy inconsistencies and its negative impacts on other areas of the economy. Food security was negatively affected by the Fast Track Land Reform Programme (FTLRP). The Zimbabwe Vulnerability Assessment (ZimVac, 2015), highlighted that 1.49 million people in the rural areas were food insufficient during the hunger peak period between January and March 2016. Drought, just like factionalism cannot be avoided but surely poor planning can be and can minimise the impacts of droughts that tend to lead to malnutrition which in turn compromise the labour force. Due to factionalism ZANU-PF government abandoned planning in the process exacerbating the situation by plunging millions of Zimbabweans into extreme hunger and starvation. (RAU, 2016). The FTLRP 18 years after its embryo, is today set to rob the nation of millions of dollars to compensate those who were affected by irrational policies implemented decades ago with a sole purpose of

perpetuating the rule of one man and his clients as well as to quench the desires of those entitled. The Herald (2019) indicated that the government has set 17 million dollars aside as compensation money, money which can be channelled to contemporary development projects other than redress historical events that resulted from policy initiatives. FTLRP further highlights a serious contempt of fundamentals of any investment by highlighting the breach of Protection Agreements and Bilateral Investment Promotion. This also led to the contempt of international agreements and treaties like the Harare Declaration of the Commonwealth and the Cotonou Agreement. Breaching these agreements resulted in the country being placed under punitive economic sanction enacted by the Zimbabwe Democracy and Economic Recovery Act of 2001 (ZIDERA) which seeks to force democratic transition and to promote economic recovery (ZIDERA, 2001). These sanctions in turn negatively impacted the social, economic and political life of Zimbabweans, all this having been necessitated by poor policy choice. One opposition member concurred too poor policy choice by the incumbent party and stated that:

“Hondo yeminda yakaita kutivanhu veZANU-PF wavane minda kwete kuti ruzhinji ruwane minda asi kuti vazhinji tiwe nekutambura nekuda kwezviga zvebudiriro zvakatemerwa hurumende yatora minda zvisi pamutemo” (The Third Chimurenga was a means to give land to ZANU-PF supporters and not to Zimbabweans, what we got, as a result, were sanctions imposed on the government after it unlawfully confiscated land.)

The disregard of policy procedures did not only happen in the case of the FTLRP but is in fact a major problem for the economy which became also evident through the snub of property rights that began with the land seizure in 2000 which had a narrow vision of compensating war-vets for their contribution to the liberation struggle without a forecast of its impact on the

economy. FTLRP was a second step following another irrational economic policy decision of 1997 which awarded war veterans \$50 000 as compensation for participating in the liberation struggle. This money was not factored in the 1997 national budget, but a Mugabe decision. This arbitrary decision triggered the breakdown of the Zimbabwe economy which the country has never been able to recover from. Immediately after such a catastrophic policy decision Mugabe again sanctioned the army to assist in the DRC conflict without cabinet approval. As a result of these two poor policy decisions, Zimbabwe was suspended from bi-lateral support by the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund.

The enactment of a discriminatory indigenisation policy has been a source of confusion within the government highlighted by conflicting policy statements. Clearly, this policy was crafted for political expediency as it benefited those closely aligned to the Mugabe (patron) faction (clients). The confusion surrounding the Indigenisation Act was/is a deliberate misconstrue. Matyszak, (2016) elucidated on this point when he stated that the legislation has in several ways been incorrectly interpreted. Literature and media interpreted it to mean that all non-indigenous companies had to cede 51% of their shares to indigenous Zimbabweans and this affected the inflow of Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) in Zimbabwe. As a result, Zimbabwe 's economic development has failed to recover. The implementation of the indigenisation policy was necessitated by the factional dynamics, at this point, the patron had to come up with a means to pay the services of his clients, all this at the expense of property rights and the economic performance. One member belonging to the Lacoste faction blamed the failure of indigenisation policy on factionalism and misconception:

“The ultimate price we have paid as a result is economic melt-down and poor living conditions. The indigenisation policy despite being nationalistic in nature was used as a battleground by ministers separated by factional boundaries.”

Also, in 2017 the then vice Presidents, Mnangagwa and Mphoko articulated entirely opposing policy positions on the command economy, which the government was mooted at the backdrop of the successful command agriculture. Mphoko criticised the command economy model, including command agriculture indicating that they do not work. The criticism was premised on factional grounds, President Mnangagwa as the Lacoste front runner and Mphoko former Vice President a key member of the G40 faction which was coalesced around Grace Mugabe (The Independent, 2017). G40 opposed command agriculture and the proposed command economy because to them President Mnangagwa was exploiting the programs as a war chest to fund his presidential ambitions and as a campaign tool. This highlights that factionalism causes a dysfunctional policy platform (Bandauko, 2014). Due to the dysfunctional policy platform, the country missed a lot of opportunities in the process hampering the development trajectory. The policy inconsistency in the party highlighted the extent to which Human beings can be selfish as long as that gets them their desires in this case dominance, they don't care who gets hurt along the way. This signals perpetual struggle as highlighted by the realist theory that struggles within political parties are, in fact, the order of the day.

4.1.2 Fragmentation and Vulnerability

Fragmentation is the degree to which a leader is unable to effectively dominate the state's political environment Mnangagwa's ability to dominate the political environment has been degraded by internal political divisions, amongst competing political groups, associated institutions, and bureaucracies. On the other hand, Regime vulnerability focuses on the strength of the regime relative to the broader political atmosphere of the polity (Hagan, 1987). For example, what is the likelihood that the leader will be removed from office? This is also evident

in ZANU-PF as exemplified by the “ED2023” mantra aimed to safeguard President Mnangagwa’s reign which is under threat and resulting in opposing policy position between the president and his deputy. With regards the nurse strikes Vice president Chiwenga fired all nurse but President Mnangagwa moved in and vetoed the pronouncement. More than twice President Mnangagwa had to cut his trips short to come and address the varying policy positions. During the reign of Mugabe, we saw the same vulnerability, most of his decision took the populist approach because he drew most of his support from the public rather than from his fellow comrades. One of the axed members by Robert Mugabe elucidated on this matter when he indicated that Robert Mugabe owed his leadership to many within the party.

“As I see it Mugabe was vulnerable in that he owed a lot of people for making him the first secretary of ZANU so most of his decision had to get through the same very people.

We have always known it that the elevation of Joice Mujuru was because of her husband who was seen as a kingmaker in ZANU-PF and not Mugabe's choice”

The degree of fragmentation and vulnerability highlights the level of flexibility of a leader in making and passing a controversial policy decision. A leader saddled by fragmentation and vulnerability tends to avoid controversial decisions which could provoke public debate thereby limiting the leader’s room to make necessary governance decision. This has been evident in Mnangagwa administration evidenced by key political support groups alienating themselves in the process questioning his suitability for leadership. A good example is the announcement of the Fuel prices hikes that triggered mass protest in January 2019 that forced the government to shut down the internet. The truth is, the decision had to be taken owing to the fact that prices were no longer sustainable as they were lower than other countries in the region thereby compelling foreigners to take advantage of the low prices and buying fuel in bulk in Zimbabwe for resale in neighbouring countries (News 24, 2019). With the RTGS Dollar quickly losing

value another fuel price increase is imminent, the question is, will the president make the announcement considering his vulnerability to criticism? But interestingly even today including his very own supporters did not side with him indicating his level of vulnerability triggering comparison between him and Mugabe.

4.1.3 Civil Unrests

Factionalism becomes a thorn in the flesh when it curtails economic growth by triggering civil unrest that robs the nation of productive working hours. A good example is the gold output which decreased in January to 1,7 tonnes from 2,8 tonnes throughout 2018 (Fidelity Printers and refiners, 2019). Civil unrest explains the poor economic growth of a nation. Poor growth has been a result of the government concentrating on factional fights in ZANU-PF at the expense of economic development. 2016 witnessed an angry courageous Zimbabwean citizenry no longer afraid of the 2002/2008 ghost where an orgy of violence was orchestrated against the civilian by the Mugabe administration openly marching in the streets. In 2016 the civilian took the fight to the government triggering a series of civil unrest in the country. These bold civil protests were extensions of succession fights within ZANU-PF were removing Mugabe ceased to be an internal incumbent party problem since events in ZANU-PF has a bearing on the nation at large. As a result, this gave birth to social groups like the so-called “Tajamuka” who openly demanded the immediate resignation of Robert Mugabe.

This highlights the degree to which factionalism in the incumbent party strained the citizenry due to its lack of initiative ideas to resuscitate the country’s downtrodden economy as the party was dodged by serious infights. From the realist theory, no meaningful policy could be created or implemented as individuals were obsessed with sustaining gotten power as well as attaining

new powers. This over-concentration on dousing the factional fights led to the mid-year cash shortages which in turn caused delays in the imbursement of civil servants. As a result, rioters went on a rampage and looted from shops particularly Choppies giving a factional connotation as one of the shareholders was former Vice president Mpoko who was aligned to the G40 faction. This did not die with the Mugabe era as we saw the culture in the new dispensation in January of 2019 the country came to a standstill as angry protestors forced the government to “shut down” schools and companies were closed as people demanded better remunerations. This went on for a whole complete week robbing the nations of billions of dollars as productive labour stayed home with some infrastructure being destroyed during the mass protests.

4.1.4 Factionalism and Corruption

Zimbabwe in part have been sliding on the economic path owing to corruption. The country has been robbed of billions through corruption. Since independence, the country recorded serious corruption case and has never recovered a single cent as perpetrators get protection from the patron, secondly no prosecution has seen the light of day. To prosecute one of your own in Zimbabwe is synonymous with accepting that your party or grouping is corrupt. ZANU-PF factional wars have aggravated corruption within the country’s administration in the process hindering anti-corruption efforts by the government. A case in point is the Jonathan Moyo ZIMDEF loot of \$430.000 were \$1000.000 was diverted to his constituency. Despite compelling evidence, the former first lady sprung to his defence simply because the two were in the same faction. Levy Nyagura, University of Zimbabwe former Vice-Chancellor fraudulently accorded Grace Mugabe a PhD putting the University into disrepute and to date he has not been prosecuted, all this highlight how factionalism down trod a nation. Because the frontiers of factionalism are always powerful, government officials responsible for curbing

corruption for fear of persecution end up chickening, in turn, ignoring clear corrupt practices that promote corrupt governance in the country. This saw a serious degeneration of the polity sinking further into an economic quagmire as the ruling party succumbed to corruption perpetuated by serious factionalism resulting in politicians demanding a new leader under ZANU PF capable of curbing a cancerous activity hindering Zimbabwe's Economic Development. For example, during the Mugabe administration, a whole 15 billion diamond revenue disappeared with Mugabe professing ignorance. This money was equal to three and a half years of the National budget. Regarding corruptions, one of the political analysts said that:

“Robert Mugabe’s administration looted resources in the name of public projects and salary scandals and this perpetuated Zimbabwe’s malaise. Domestic and international debt ballooned because of corruption with no meaningful investments to show for it.”

On infrastructure development corruption cases have been recorded with The Mirror, (2019) newspaper reporting that 23 000 litres of tar meant for the expansion of Harare-Beitbridge worth 1 million RTGS Dollar was stolen. This road has robbed the nation of human capital through accidents. Also, through an accident, the nation loses about \$406 million every year to road traffic accidents. This figure constitutes 3% of the GDP which is estimated at \$14 billion. Deaths and injuries from a traffic accident that are caused by bad roads negatively impact on the medium- and long-term growth forecasts as prime age is removed from the labour force. Productivity is also reduced through injuries. The nation has also lost Billions of dollars as haulage truck drivers seek alternative routes because of bad roads.

The Ministry of youth was also used as a looting ground, for example, the Youth Development Fund was looted through fraudulent bogus projects. This, in turn, makes the economy the biggest loser as the \$40 million that was allocated for economic empowerment programs was washed down the drain. The Parliamentary Portfolio Committee on Youth and Indigenisation

highlighted that 95% of projects visited were non-existent with some having collapsed since they were only a means to embezzle funds. (The Standard, 2017). Apart from being a looting ground, the same Ministry was used to employ unqualified youths in the process promoting nepotism. To this, an opposition Member of parliament had this to say:

“Factionalism made the leadership to worry more about loyalty than merit when they chose their allies with the Government’s civil service being bloated with unqualified relatives of MPs. Ministry of youth was awash with people with no O’ level qualifications prior to the current staff rationalisation”.

The close connexion between ZANU-PF and government has resulted in the government losing millions of dollars as the party finance its party events as claimed by Jonathan Moyo through The Standard newspaper dated April 15, 2018. Moyo revealed that in previous elections, ZANU-PF spent a staggering \$70 million on party regalia which was acquired from China and the Democratic Republic of Congo. Moyo claims that the money was embezzled from diamond revenues. This highlights how the nation is disadvantaged in its development initiative were corruption curtails development in the process causing the entire society to suffer. On top corruption creates an unequal small middle class and the momentous discrepancy between the living standards of the upper class and lower class (World Bank, 2015).

As reported by The Independent, (2015), the Comptroller and Auditor-General Mildred Chiri highlighted that the government is struggling to provide adequate social services, among other persistent complications but it continues with the culture of bad corporate governance and mismanagement which is costly to the government. This saw the government loss \$180 million which is not properly accounted for since Treasury was making payments on behalf of ministries, yet the payments were not supported by any invoices or receipts from service providers. The corruption cases have resulted in the state losing state capacity and

professionalism. This also gave birth to new forms of elite accumulation and patronage which intensified state corruption (Alexander and McGregor 2013: 749)

As a result of corruption, the country is faced with unsustainable external debt, an antagonistic balance-of-payments position. The country is saddled with a public debt of US\$17,69 billion (The Zimbabwe Mail, 2019). There has been serious capital flight from banks as well as the stock exchange. This is compounded by a recurrent expenditure that consumes the bigger chunk of the national budget. In 2013 the government salary bill consumed 2.6 billion USD that is 68percent of the total budget (Nyakazeya, 2014). Infrastructure has dilapidated hence the need for extensive infrastructural development. The national GDP prior to the climax of the infights declined to 3 percent in 2013 from 10.5 percent in 2012 (IMF 2014). The current GDP stands at around 2,7% from time high of 22.57 percent in 1970 (Trading Economics, 2019). As a result, the manufacturing is confronted with varying obstacles ranging from working capital, power shortages further compounded by obsolete equipment.

4.1.5 Factionalism and the abuse of Human Rights

Factionalism expands freedoms by making other members exit to create new parties that offer additional avenues for new political thrust yet in the process it creates serious competition which necessitates the abuse of human rights. After losing the 2008 Presidential elections owing to the “*Bhora Mudodho*” a brainchild of the factional fights that sought to sabotage Mugabe’s presidential bid, ZANU-PF unleashed violence on the rerun elections. This was a means to force people to vote for them and as a means to secure their power and hold on government. There was a serious disregard of the rule of law by the ZANU-PF as it fights to return power by all means necessary (Clionadh Raleigh, 2005). The battle to put their candidate

on the presidential seat resulted in a lot of alleged vote rigging, vote buying and a lot of voter intimidation (Melber, 2005). An opposition supporter felt that voter intimidation deprived them the chance to freely choose their leader as their human rights were violated, voting became a luxury to many:

“As Zimbabweans, our right to choose a leader was taken away from us by violence. During the rerun, I was in Mutoko to see my sick mother and there was a slogan called “short or long sleeve”. If u choose short sleeve, they would cut your hand as this indicated you support MDC”. Those supporting ZANU-PF would choose “long sleeve”

As such factionalism has been viewed as entirely evil because its benefits are not obvious as factionalism can acquire different faces such as co-operative, degenerative and competitive natures at different times under specific conditions (Boucek, 2009).

The most intense episodes of violence against civilians in Zimbabwe include the major military operations such as the Gukurahundi massacres from 1983 to 1987, which partly resulted from the split of ZANU from ZAPU toward 1980 that made the two to go into elections as divide forces. The massacres resulted in 20,000 deaths predominantly ethnic Ndebele people. Operation Murambatsvina of 2005 was disguised as a clampdown against illegal housing and commercial activities aimed at reducing the spread of infectious disease in the area resulting in the forced displacement of more than 700,000 people. The United Nations (2005) described the operation as means to drive out and punish a section of partly urban and partly rural poor who comprised much of the internal opposition that had started to oppose Mugabe’s administration. This is best exemplified by the 2008 election that resulted in a rerun election that saw a many losing their limbs and their properties which was burnt down. In a manner

reminiscent to 2008 is the 2018 August 1 incident which almost degenerated into a blood bath where 6 people were shot by live ammunition.

4.1.6 Promotes Democracy

The multiparty system in Zimbabwe owes its existence to the democratisation processes in ZANU-PF highlighted by the existence of varying factional groups within the party. Choosing a faction is a democratic process which Mugabe tried to muzzle but failed. ZANU-PF as a party conducts internal election which is a democratic process carried from cell level to the Executive position. A president is also voted for. We have seen the same being extended to the nation highlighted by-elections that are held every 5 years. Elections have been successfully held at the end of every term with everyone at the age of majority and above allowed to freely cast their votes in a democratic manner.

Factions have resulted in a party splits, for example, ZANU Ndonga and the recent split that saw the formation of National People Party. All these parties have been permitted to contest in the harmonised election following after ZANU-PF's internal democracy epitomised by their internal elections. So, in a way, factionalism is good as it is a driver towards democracy. Factionalism in ZANU-PF has been able to broaden people's choices and do away with the one-party systems. As highlighted above political parties like ZANU NDONGA and People First are products of factionalism. Another good example is the 2018 presidential elections which had 23 presidential candidates with a peaceful campaign period. Factionalism thus expand freedoms when factionalism makes other members exit to create new parties, these new parties offer additional venues for new political thrust and competition, to SEN, (1999) this is

a higher level of development which is not measured by GDP. One of the leaders spoke highly about ZANU-PF as he highlighted that they conduct elections which is a democratic process:

“In ZANU-PF we believe in elections, our leadership is chosen by the people our supporters. I cannot claim that our systems of conducting elections are without loopholes and weaknesses which is the case globally. Trump’s administration has been characterised by vote rigging aided by the Russians so you cannot expect us to be an exception. What is important is we are in the right direction and as a party, we will improve as we go”.

18 November 2017 was dubbed the second independence of Zimbabwe as Zimbabweans marched to liberate themselves from the tyrant. This highlighted an improved level of free protest space in Zimbabwe. The army, civic groups, and oppositions all sworn enemies came together and marched freely requesting the departure of a once revered leader come, tyrant. This is the uppermost level of people exercising their democratic rights without fear. All this is owed to ZANU-PF factionalism that resulted in Mugabe being fired from both party and government. Through factionalism, Zimbabwe had an opportunity to embrace democracy as further highlighted by the free and peaceful electoral process that followed. The August 1 incident regarded as a dent, yet one is never greater than 10, no way we can erase the good by focussing on a sole incident since an election is a process, not a sole incident. Everyone from all corners of the world was invited to observe the election process something that was a taboo during the reign of Mugabe. Considering this one can safely say factionalism promotes democracy.

Factionalism stimulates debate and new ideas come to the forefront enabling Political parties to gradually break ranks with retrogressive traditional patterns of political behaviour. It was through factionalism that the inequality that had gone unnoticed came to light. For long, the

top four of the party and government has been male-dominated highlighting gender inequality. But consequences of the Joice Mujuru faction saw the country having a female vice president for the first time. Also owing to factionalism Oppah Muchinguri became the first female ZANU-PF National Chair a position that has been male-dominated since the formation of the party. In government, Muchinguri is the Minister of defence a very important Ministerial post which has been a preserve for men. Development entails equity and equality, thus regarding breaking the culture of preserving certain post for men the new administration was able to take a step in the right directions. In this case, factionalism worked to ameliorate systematic inequalities that had for long disadvantaged women.

4.1.7 Factionalism Necessitates Democratic Levers

Indicators of political development include the provision of sound social services hence Kaplan (2008), states that a country that is not capable of providing sound social services cannot regard itself as politically developed. Zimbabwean economy never really recovered from the 1992 period of Economic Structural Adjustments but 2009-2013 was marked by stability and a significant economic improvement. All this was necessitated by Mugabe's inability to acquire required majority votes in the 2008 presidential election due to in-party factionalism. Zvobgo's faction who coined the mantra "Mugabe must Go" had moved a motion in parliament which culminated in the well know "Bhora Mudondo" in 2008 a strategy which was used to sabotage Mugabe's presidential bid by party members. Mugabe's loss gave room for the formation of a Unity government as a democratic lever which was able to stabilise the economy, improve the provision of goods and social services in all four corners of the country. The medical situation currently bedevilling the nation also stabilized as a result of the Government of National Unity a product of ZANU-PF's in fights. In addition, education level soared higher coupled with

improved employment. Ndlovu, (2005) is also of the same view that during the GNU the situation in Zimbabwe improved and stabilized particularly between 2009-2013. Considering the above, factionalism created an opportunity for national development through the implementation of a democratic lever that promoted national development. The immediate priority of the GNU was ‘the restoration of economic stability and growth’. (GNU, 2009). The GNU period witnessed the economic rebound in Zimbabwe, highlighted by the GDP growth averaging 10% between 2009 and 2012 in comparison with the 3% for SSA and 2.2% world over in the same period (Kanyenze et al 2017)

Factional competition has the capacity to make rivalry groups work extra hard to outdo each other in the provision of services and good. A good example is Jonathan Moyo who was building a stadium for his constituency under the banner G40. Services which were failing to get to Tsolotsho and Bulawayo at Large was actually getting there. Some might argue that he was developing and buying bicycles for his chief from looted money but if there was no factionalism and the desire for re-election, he would have simply embezzled the money for personal wealthy like every other politician. Even opposition politicians showed gratitude to factionalism as it managed to give the Zimbabwean people a break from their misery. This is epitomised by a former MDC-T member of parliament who indicated that:

“We had a reprieve from the economic challenges of 2008 after Mugabe lost to the late Morgan Tsvangirai. That’s when we had Government of National Unity which stabilised the economy. If it wasn’t for the internal squabbles in ZANU-PF the suffering would have perpetuated. So, factionalism gave us a breather”.

As good as it sounds, the post-GNU was followed by elections in 2013 that marked a period of serious purging and factional fights that saw all the gains achieved being reversed. The GDP growth of 10% from 2009 to 2012 went down. In 2009 a growth rate of 6% also slowed down.

Everything went in reverse gear, for example, tobacco dropped to a quarter of the 2000 level and unemployment shot to 75% followed by serious shortages of money in the banks. This reversal was because ZANU-PF diverted all its attention to factional fights exemplified by the purging of the Gamatox that resulted in the firing of ministers in the process causing vacuums in policy implementations. For example, the firing of a whole vice president and all those loyal to her highlight a serious disregard to policy continuity in that, Mujuru states that “I had many wonderful plans, for example, I wanted to open 500 000 hectares of land under irrigation ...” (DailyNews, 2016). This project remains undone up to date as a result of factionalism. Carrying on with the project would have made people see Mugabe as a weak.

4.1.8 Factionalism and the fall of a Tyrant

The past decade and the unfolding event in ZANU-PF politics highlight that factionalism in a way is necessary for the development of democracy in a one-party state. In fact, party factionalism led to splits and birth of fresh political parties in the country promoting multi-partyism and democracy. People’s choices were also widened as new political emerged including female-headed political parties like People First headed by a headed by Joice Mujuru. The presidential race also a had selection of 23 candidates. The removal of political party leaders may be the only way a faction can get the opportunity to effect its aims. As stated by Smedley, (1998) a faction must possess the ability to directly threaten the survival of party leadership. Due to factionalism Mugabe’s 3 decades of rule came to an end, internal fights became the Moses of Zimbabweans. so in a way factionalism becomes desirable when they give positive results that other acceptable strategies fail. For Zimbabweans, if it was not for internal factional fights the people would have been stuck with Mugabe or worse still being under a monarchy since Mugabe wanted to put his wife in a power as a means to protect their loots.

Most Zimbabweans seem more likely to standardize how Mugabe was removed as it proved to be more effective than elections. Supporters from ZANU-PF and MDC-A concurred on this with a ZANU-PF youth stating that:

“I think the way Mugabe was removed should be put in the constitution as an acceptable way of removing all leader who rigs elections to continue their hold in power. Rigging is forcing oneself as the people's choice hence it should be met with equal measure. Elections were never going to remove Robert Mugabe from power”

Evidently, factionalism has had both negative and positive impacts on Zimbabwe development agenda with the negative outweighing the positives. Negatively it caused policy paralysis, vulnerability and fragmentation, led to civil unrest, tribalism, patrimonialism, and corruption. Positively the country was able to experience some democratic incidence through the removal of the tyrant Robert Mugabe as well as creating protest space. The factional dynamics in ZANU-PF paved way for the establishment of a democratic lever in the form of an inclusive government which was able to improve socio, political and economic situation. It is from these impacts that recommendations were arrived at in the following chapter which seeks to resolve the contentious issue of the impact of ZANU-PF factionalism on the development agenda of Zimbabwe.

4.2 Conclusion

This chapter was aimed to highlight the impacts of the dynamics of factionalism in ZANU-PF since 1980. After analysing the collected data, it cannot be eluded that factionalism brought both positive and negative effects on the political socio-economic development of Zimbabwe. ZANU-PF factional fights resulted in policy paralysis, corruption, civil unrest, and

fragmentation and vulnerability. All these impacted negatively on the economy. This is not to say factionalism is without positive, through factionalism the nation was to experience democracy. A tyrant who had bedevilled the nation fell as a result of internal party factions. Having identified the impacts, the research moves to the next chapter where it will highlight keys finds and recommendations.

CHAPTER 5: CONCLUSION

TOWARDS RESOLVING FACTIONALISM AND ITS IMPACTS

5 INTRODUCTION

This chapter marks the end of this dissertation and it presents a comprehensive summary of the research findings and draws conclusions based on the analysis of the collected data. The very chapter also condenses arguments forwarded in preceding chapters that highlighted how the dynamics of factionalism in ZANU-PF affects development. It is the mandate of this chapter to suggest recommendations and solutions that might assist in narrowing or solving the research problem. Thus, this chapter emphatically advocates for the embracement of factionalism as a conceivable solution to factional fights troubling ZANU-PF and in turn impacting negatively on national development agenda. Furthermore, the research also advocates for the proper management of factionalism as a means by which positives of factionalism can be harnessed for the benefit of the nation.

5.1 KEY FINDINGS

The dissertation concludes that factionalism though not desirable does have positive fruits if political parties embrace and manage factionalism in a democratic way. Factionalism thus can influence positive development trajectory. In line with the chief objective which examines the dynamics and dimensions of factionalism in ZANU-PF and their impacts on development in Zimbabwe, the dissertation demonstrated that factionalism has simultaneously affected ZANU-PF's internal cohesion at the same time hindering Zimbabwe's development trajectory. This is so because ZANU-PF politicians diverted all their efforts to douse internal fights in the process

neglecting the national development agenda. This highlight how selfish nature quickly kicks in, as politicians became concentrated on maintaining power and fought to obtain new powers at the expense of the economy, stressing how human nature has been a cause for factionalism. This, in turn, resulted in the diversion of state resources to fund internal party battles sabotaging the nation of every opportunity to fund development projects that are supposed to improve social welfare. Thus, the existence and occurrence of factionalism in political parties is the drive of human nature as explained by various theories of Madison, Harmel, Plato and Hobbes and other informative contributions as will be highlighted. These theories chiefly the realist theory makes it a real fact that factionalism is unavoidable as will be highlighted by practical findings and examples on the ground rather than just mere theoretical explanations.

The dissertation, also found out that criminalising factionalism compromises internal party cohesion that resulted in policy paralysis in government in turn negatively impacting on national development. During factionalism, the development agenda becomes less relevant as the desires to return and maintain existing power base takes centre stage, naturally, man desire to dominate hence the criminalisation of those threatening one's power base becomes a tool. In the effort to elucidate on the impact of ZANU-PF's factional dynamics the research looked at the continued involvement of the military in the day to day business of both party and government and noted that the arbitrary involvement is contemptuous of democracy. The Nhari rebellion serves as a traditional example of how events in either the party or the military wing affect the other with "Operation restore legacy" serving as a contemporary example of how the army and ZANU-PF activities are inseparable. At the same time operation restore legacy highlights that the war-vets as epitomised by former Commander Defence forces Chiwenga are the "stakeholders" of ZANU-PF and them alone are entitled to address the succession problem. The Military succeeded in what was formidable in the eyes of many and in the eye of the Movement for Democratic Change, a party fashioned to extricate Mugabe but failed for a

decade and a half. Before people realised it, power was shifted to Mnangagwa from Mugabe. This disclosure the influence of the army in the party and state leadership. Taking power from a civilian leader and handing it over to a war hero personality highlights that heroism is more important than democratic processes. The dissertation also found out that despite echoing sentiments of democracy in his inauguration speech President Mnangagwa and ZANU-PF remains entrapped in the metricise of the Mugabeism were leaders are Godly ordained and influenced by the historical legacy of the High Command. The fall of Mugabe thus signals the continuation of his legacy without him in the process widening the abyss between Zimbabweans and its development agenda. When Mugabe left office a loaf of bread costed \$0.95 and today it costs \$3.50 fuel price went up by over 200%. The complete snub of democracy as highlighted by the August 1 incident ushered Zimbabwe in a new era of isolation and renewed economic sanctions. America renewed its sanction and Britain is in the process of finalising its sanctions on Zimbabwe as soon as it concludes its Brexit deal. This dissertation managed to establish that the Zimbabwean problem is more political than economical in that the lack of development is both a sign and a symptom of politics of exclusion, politics of patronage, tribal politics and lack of successive politics.

In line with the objective examining the causes of factionalism in ZANU-PF. The dissertation found out that entitlement, human nature, ideological polarisation, lack of a clear succession plan and the class factor are the causes of factionalism in the incumbent party. The research highlighted that despite ZANU-PF being in power for 37 uninterrupted years pursuing national development Zimbabwe remained undeveloped in fact it became underdeveloped as the polity was plunged in economic reverse mode chiefly by corruption and patronage politics. Instead of the State to migrate from Statehood to Nationhood, it remained stuck because of the factional fights that hampered the political growth of ZANU-PF and as a result of the close association between ZANU-PF and government the State was also greatly affected. factionalism.

Factionalism led to tribal consciousness amongst the players as a factional dynamic in ZANU-PF. The entitlement aspect also hindered the osmosis of ideas between the old generation and the new generation in the process affecting cohesion and policy direction. The old guard sees the young as a threat to their positions. The emergence of a faction dubbed G40 was a result of this entitlement notion and a lack of a clear succession plan as those entitled fought to keep this issue a sacred cow reserved for the heroes and heroines anyone not fitting this criterion had no right to talk about successive politics. As such the advanced argument by this research is that factional politics should transcend selfishness, regionalism/tribalism, corruption and succession politics and thus should be seen as a contestation of power informed by democracy and should be a properly managed phenomenon. Competing ideas should, therefore, be a source of policy ideas and not as a cause for factional competition. The 2014 factional fights dragged for nearly 4 years resulting in the graceless fall of Mugabe that seemed to have opened up more democratic space before compounding the situation, democracy is a precondition for development.

In fulfilling the requirements of the third objective aimed at evaluating factionalism in ZANU-PF and its impacts on development., the researcher noted that factional fights led to policy paralysis, fragmentation and vulnerability, civil unrest, corruption, leads to the abuse of human rights opened space for democratic levers and increased the democratic pace. Through corruption, the nation has been robbed of billions of dollars with the perpetrators never arrested since they enjoyed protection from their patron (Mugabe). The patron was responsible for the protection of his/her followers. In the Mugabe era, Mugabe as a patron unleashed his wife Grace Mugabe to destabilise the balance of power and to intimidate the ZACC in its efforts to reign on corruption. Kasukuwere, Jonathan Moyo and Nyagura are clear examples of people who were protected by the patron hence they were never prosecuted. Today they remain

unprosecuted which makes one wonder if Mnangagwa is the new patron. One can therefore safely conclude that it is a continuation of Mugabeism without Mugabe.

The thesis also found out that factionalism curtailed development through policy paralysis and inconstancy resulting from the perpetuated firing of cabinet ministers as factionalism intensified. The Herald dated 22 December (2014) highlighted that within the same month 16 ministers were fired for aiding Joice Mujuru in her factional fight to take over from Mugabe. The ministers were fired on the pretext of performing below expectation. The sacking of Mujuru followed by more ministers betrays the factional hand. Policies that were being pursued by these 16 ministers were greatly affected as new ministers came with their own agendas and new policy direction. Clearly, factionalism affected policy implementations.

The research subtly exposed how Mugabe remnants continue to perpetuate factionalism which continues to retard the development process since his resignation from office. The alleged clashes between President Mnangagwa and his vice Chiwenga as well as the fight between Finance Minister Ncube and Reserve Bank Governor Mangudya best, demonstrates the Mugabe remnants (News Briefs 17 November 2017). Clearly, these residual effects of Mugabe factionalism are blocking the sound implementation of policies. The firing of the nurse by the Vice President and the rehiring of the very fired nurses by the President highlights serious clashes and policy inconsistencies that curtail development as was in the old dispensation. Clearly, there has been no fundamental break between the Mugabe era and the purported 'New Dispensation'. Power structures remain essentially the same politically, socially and economically and problems of tribalism, regionalism, racism, corruption, and succession persisting. The opposition Leaders Nelson Chamisa makes similar claims of tribal politics indicting that it's a continuation of 'Mugabeism' Those who were in the government (Robert Mugabe) has Zezurunised our government and the current one (Mnangagwa) have

Karangasised our government (New Zimbabwe, 2018) The “ED2023” mantra speaks to the same effect of the Mugabe legacy were political post were Godly ordained and were democracy had no space in choosing a leader “VaMugabe chete”. We see the same in the era of President Mnangagwa were the Zimbabwe Amalgamated Churches Council patron Jimayi Muduvuri told the media that “...the country’s president was ordained by God” (My Zimbabwe News, 2018) This clearly blocks and competition to the throne.

5.2 RECOMMENDATIONS: DEMOCRATISING, EMBRACING, AND MANAGING FACTIONALISM S IN ZANU-PF FOR THE ACHIEVEMENT OF NATIONAL DEVELOPMENT.

The advanced argument by this dissertation is that national development can only be achieved through the democratisation of factionalism, embracement and its management by the incumbent party ZANU-PF to avoid lack of cohesion and to propel national development. For ZANU-PF to refocus on policy and development factionalism should, therefore, be used as a platform for policy ideas and a platform for the voiceless as a panacea to degenerative and competitive factionalism as well to promote political maturity in a factional ridden party. Democracy necessitates a political milieu pigeon-holed by political parity among the people precisely the rule by the people. Democratisation encourages constitutionalism a fact lacking in ZANU-PF, also democratisation encourages transparency and accountability to fight corruption which is a tumour in ZANU-PF and government by association. Lack of democracy has also promoted nepotism the biggest enemy of political development as unqualified people end up being employed only to become hurdles to sound policy formulation and implementation

The research further proposes that the ruling party embrace factionalism as stated by Madison (2013) that factionalism is inevitable and cannot be removed. It's, therefore, better for the Party

to put more effort into managing it as this will enable ZANU-PF to give more time to national development. Choosing a faction is one's democratic right thus democratisation a fundamental principle that compels the need to manage factionalism as opposed to muzzling it, muzzling factionalism breeds tyrants and mortgage leader for their graceless fall. To sway Zimbabwe in the development trajectory there is need to explore alternative non-autocratic tendencies as well as doing away with the idea of regarding leaders as Godly ordained. To achieve this there is a need to take a leaf from Julius Caesar's stance where he realised and gave power back to the people through the Senate. Caesar realised that only the Senate was capable of managing the state affairs better than a soldier as he was just focused on conquering new lands as a means to quench his selfish desire for domination. This prompts Hobbes and Plato to call for political parties to stop perusing selfish interests as this has two ripple effects, firstly it undermines political equality which is vital for a functioning democracy and secondly it makes it difficult for political parties to formulate broad and coherent manifestos which in turn are supposed to be foundation of policy direction. Thus, ZANU-PF can only come up with good development strategies if it embraces factionalism as a source for varying policies and in turn synchronising the varying ideas to form sound and workable development policies.

Importantly the research highlights ZANU-PF factionalism from the entitlement perspective, a quality harboured by war-vets. The thesis recommends that this new twist to the discourse of factionalism and development be employed by factional managers to rethink on the causes of factionalism in revolutionary parties and remould factionalism theories to encourage development.

5.2.1 Introduction of a clear Succession Policy

ZANU-PF factional squabbles for the past 37 years were premised on the succession issue, taking varying forms firstly from Heroism, entitlement, the regional/tribal matrix, and the generational renewal respectively indicating that any attempt to muzzle factionalism only influences it to mutate and take a different form to disguise itself hence the need for a clear successive plan. The need to position oneself on a vintage position resulted in a lot of backbiting during the Mugabe era as contenders fought to win Mugabe's heart. Thus, the choice of a successor should not be a sole responsibility but should be a party collective decision based on merit and not on entitlement, war credentials, and regionalism. Constitutionalism on the succession issue ensures that leaders do not cling on to power at the end of their term limits as constitutions stipulate term limits. So, there is a need for the party constitution to clarify on term limits rather than depend on the dictates of the national constitution of two-term limits. On top, the ZANU-PF elective congress should be left to do its mandate without favor and injustices.

ZANU-PF can take a leaf from the Botswana Democratic Party's controlled succession mechanism. BDP employed the constitutionally agreed controlled succession mechanism where only a few people picked a president after President Seretse Khama in 1980 died while still the incumbent president. Through the formal mechanism, he was succeeded by Vice President Ketumile Masire who was handpicked by few members (Nsereko 2004:51) This formal mechanism helped to eliminate the succession struggle. This was also positive in that the vice president succeeded the president thereby eliminating policy reversals or policy changes a situation that was likely to spark factions in defence of the old order. This smooth transition eliminated room for destructive factionalism which tends to split political parties. Moreover, no development progress was affected, and civil unrest was allayed. In 2018 through the same

system, Ian Khama stepped down leaving the helm to Mokgweetsi Masisi marking the end of a dynastic rule in Botswana with the BDP respectively naming Masisi as their presidential candidate (Reuters, 2018). ZANU-PF can thus copy such an arrangement which seem bad for democracy but is very good for governance which is what Zimbabwe badly needs and what President Munangagwa has promised indicated by raft policies he has put in place.

5.2.2 Eliminating Direct Military involvement in Party issues.

ZANU-PF has stayed for too long stuck in the modernization ideology where they denote that “the development of the country is the highest goal of a government” this illumed a serious threat to political democracy. This is so because it raises expectations, frustrations among elites especially the military who are then compelled to intervene in civilian politics in the process weakening already fragile and limited experience of democracy as well as set precedence for cycles of military interference in the name of justice. Statement by former Commander Defense Forces General Chiwenga at the height of the factional fights in ZANU-PF save as a case in point “. *We must remind those behind the current treacherous shenanigans that when it comes to matters of protecting our revolution, the military will not hesitate to step in.*” (The Indian Express, 2019). This is dangerous as it undermines the institutionalisation of democracy and national development as well as naturally entitle war-vets. Military involvement can also be traced when Mugabe took over from Ndabaningi Sithole, he needed the Army’s blessing, that is from the likes of Tongogara and Chitepo Operation restore legacy highlight their involvement in party issues as highlighted by Major general Moyo’s statement when he addressed the nation he stated “We are only targeting criminals around him...causing social and economic suffering in the country in order to bring them to justice.” (Major general Sibusiso Moyo,2017). Ironically up to date, no criminal has been convicted, all those arrested

have since been released for example Kasukuwere and Chombo known land barons were arrested to be released. It, therefore, becomes apparent that the army moved in to bring sanity within the party, the same sanity expected to translate to the nation. Such self-acclaimed righteousness is dangerous to democracy as they tend to close out the electoral process in choosing a successor, in turn, breeding competitive factionalism. There was no Justice, yet justice should always be seen to be saved. Hence the army should not be directly involved in deciding leadership for the party since the internal party constitution clearly stipulates how leaders are chosen. Nowhere in the constitution of Zimbabwe and ZANU-PF is the Army mandated to choose a leader for the people of Zimbabwe and the party. So, this serious disregard of the constitutions should come to an end if any meaningful development is to be achieved. For example, the issue of appointing VPs was not even in the constitution but just a formal ZANU-PF practice in choosing second and third secretary but was smuggled into the national set-up. The mooted of amending the clause of the running mate which is yet to be active in 2023 highlights how internal fights translate to government.

5.3 MANAGING FACTIONALISM

Party management is the behaviour approaches employed by leadership in the administration of party activities to minimizing intra-party opposition. They make up innumerable strategies to pacify and pressure intra-party cliques to tow party lines. Management of political parties is an organizational requirement traced throughout the history of political party formation since factions are bad news to political party managers as highlighted by Waller et al, (1995). Factionalism has a tendency of affecting party stability and institutionalization, by impacting on party efficiency and legitimacy and internal systems, leaders must, therefore, settle intra-party disputes to make sure harmony prevails. Indeed, mismanagement can exacerbate

factionalism or even annihilate a party (Boucek 2009: 477) making it imperative for party leaders to effectively manage factions.

5.3.1 Carrots and Sticks: Managing Intra-Party Conflict

Carrots are used to effect balance amongst factions, for example, a party that has the majority seats in Parliament through an able party manager must ensure a balanced allocation of cabinets post among the factions (Wongwan, 2008). For ZANU-PF and its multi-ethnicity, the first Secretary by necessity must ensure equitable payoff for all regional factions (Karanga, Zezuru, Ndebele) meaning no one regional faction must obtain more comparative to other factional groupings or at the disadvantage of others. The First Secretary can employ the “carrot” approach, by warming into regional demands such as funding, policy, posting, and delegating greater autonomy to a regional faction to increasing space for factional flexibility. But Boucek, (2009) warns against too much “carrot” as this also has the potential to intensify the factional fights to “degenerative factionalism”. The current national devolution process is a good platform considering that Matabeleland has been blaming the government for neglecting them despite the Unit Accord. This is evident within the party; Ndebele supporters feel they are treated as second class supporters who only get remains. ZANU-PF first secretary President Mnangagwa can also employ the use of “stick” to rein in on unruly party groupings. This calls for the careful withholding of spoils to uncooperative factions. This can be done democratically through party-controlled funds and constitutional clauses to pressurise factions to obey democratically elected party leadership decisions. This call for the centralisation of finance as a means to control and create cooperative and suppressible factions. ZANU-PF can easily achieve this by commanding consent from its original ideological position. Method of origin can influence the ability to control parties.

5.3.2 Eradicating Leadership Centralisation

leadership centralisation denotes the degree to which party leadership is centred upon one person within the party. An alternative to centralisation is a party taxonomy developed by Susan Scarrow (2005). ZANU-PF is a leader dominated party loosely structured to be dominated by a single prominent individual under the concept of “one centre of power”, with the decision-making power tightly held by the same individual. This form of leadership results in members getting fed up of tyrannical rule like what we witnessed during the reign of Robert Mugabe where only what he said mattered. This made people like Zvobgo object resulting in factions and the sabotaging of his presidential bid in 2008. ZANU-PF needs to change this 37-year-old form of leadership which no longer commands cohesion but rather breeds competitive factionalism and in turn divert attention from the national development agenda to dousing internal party conflicts. Riddell (1992) through “Tory tribalism” advocates for the need to promote a sense of loyalty to the party and not to the leader. So, ZANU-PF needs to move away from the centralisation of leadership and employ the democratic way of doing things, that is leading by consensus.

5.4 TOWARDS COLLEGIAL MANAGEMENT

Collegial management style relates to a corporatist ideological style found in policy-oriented political parties. In collegial management the Executive Committee, in this case, ZANU-PF Politburo members make decisions by voting contrary to decisions by a single individual or party “father.” This is a more inclusionary form of management aimed at crafting party policies based upon the professed needs of party grassroots. Collegial management does not employ the carrot and stick approach but instead carries views of all warring factions on board. All factions are compelled to accept and follow policies of the winner when the processes are done

in a democratic and transparent way. Through this form of management, subordinates have an opportunity to really get to acquaint themselves with their leader and get to know him/her much better than those with authoritative leader hence when people vote they know what they will be voting for.

This is a democratic leadership style that best brings out an experienced and professional cabinet or Politburo because it capitalizes on skills and talent of every member since each person can freely air and share views as opposed from being expected to conform. The case of firing the nurses for airing out that hospitals have become death traps highlights how undemocratic leadership styles muzzle members and results in sit-ins.

5.5 Conclusion

This chapter marks the conclusion of this dissertation and focused on giving recommendations and summary of findings that were drawn from the research respondents. It answered the objectives and the research questions of this study basing on the respondents' point of view. The impacts of factionalism on development were highlighted as being more negative than positive. Factionalism from the respondents' view was regarded as the major cause for Zimbabwe's fractured social, political and economic situation. Corruption, policy paralysis, vulnerability, and fragmentation, as well as civil unrest, was seen as by-products of factionalism. Despite the negatives, the research also highlighted that it was factionalism that led to the fall of a tyrant who had overstayed in power and refusing to relinquish power in the process creating an environment for the contestation of power. The fall of Mugabe gave Zimbabweans new hope as they look forward to a developed nation as promised by the new dispensation. Months into the fall of Mugabe the situation seem to be getting worse.

The dissertation has also shown that factionalism within ZANU-PF is caused by varying factors including human nature lack of clear succession, social class and ideological polarisation amongst many. In times of infights or personal threat, political leaders used ethnic ties to elicit support in order to obtain or retain personal political power. Subsequently, the dominant factional leader distributed promotions along ethnic lines. In every serious factional fight, the less victorious factional leader and his/her supporters received disproportionate downgrades and serious purging. At times of stability ethnicity, tribalism patronage was not politically relevant hence the changing nature of factionalism in ZANU-PF. Nature of ZANU-PF factionalism is therefore situational rather than ascriptive

The dissertation through realist theory and the game theory was able to highlight that factionalism is inevitable and that it promotes politics of patronage which in turn promote corruption and nepotism factors that have made the nation lose billions of dollars as a small clique fought to return power and protect their loots at the expense of policy and the development agenda.

Thus, the dissertation concludes by advocating for the embracement, management and the democratization of ZANU-PF as a broad recommendation if factionalism is to be used positively towards economic development. Muzzling factionalism has naturally paved way for varying factional dynamics and birth of new factional leaders after dominant ones are decimated, hence there is need to accept it and there is need to manage it for the greater good.

APPENDICES

APPENDIX I- Table: highlighting the place of data collection, target population, sample size and method used

Place	Target population	Sampling procedure	sample	Technique	Date
Harare	Politicians	Purposive	7	Unstructured interviews	05/03/2019
Harare	G40 members	Purposive	5	Unstructured interviews	07/032019
Gweru	Lacoste members	Purposive	5	Unstructured interviews	30/03/2019
Gweru	Former Government minister	Purposive	3	Unstructured interviews	11/04219
Bulawayo	NGO	Purposive	5	Unstructured interviews	22/04/2019
Harare	Political commentator	Purposive	3	Unstructured interviews	26/04/2019
Harare	Sacked ZANU-PF Member	Purposive	5	Unstructured interviews	27/042019

APPENDIX II – Sample of guiding questions during the unstructured interview sessions.

My name is Tapiwa Patson Sisimayi a student with Midlands State University in the department of development studies. I am carrying out research on THE DYNAMICS AND DIMENSIONS OF FACTIONALISM IN ZANU PF: 1980 – 2017.it would be my pleasure if you could aid in my research by way of responding to questions below. Your responses are only sought for academic purposes, they will not be used for any other purpose. I unreservedly guarantee your anonymity and confidentiality of your responses.

- I. In your view why has, Zimbabwe failed to develop economically under the rule of ZANU-PF, instead, it keeps sinking even after coming up with sound economic policies?
- II. To what extent have the dynamics and dimensions of factionalism in ZANU-PF impacted on the party's quest for economic development?
- III. What exactly is the problem bedeviling ZANU-PF such that it fails to fulfil its economic agenda?

APPENDIX III: Zimbabwe's political map



Source: (www.ezilon.com)

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